A treatise on pedagogy for young teachers

Preface

This little book is a growth. Into that growth, several elements have entered: among them are the author's experience as a pupil, first in the country district schools of New England ; and his experience, for more than thirty years, as a teacher ; together with the digested results of his reading and thinking on educational themes. He has here embodied the substance of his instruction to many successive classes in Normal Schools, and the substance of numerous addresses before Teachers' Institutes and other educational meetings. No attempt has been made to amplify any of the topics treated ; on the contrary, a constant and persistent effort has been made to condense to the utmost limit consistent with clearness.

This is not a book of methods, although a few methods will be found in it. Its aim is, rather, to present, in a brief and compact form, such principles as underlie and give form to all methods worthy of attention.

As the title implies, the book has been written with special regard to the needs of young teachers, or of candidates for the teacher's office. But the author does not expect that such young persons will be able to master the book by a cursory reading ; he does, however, flatter himself that young persons of good ability will be able to master the book thoroughly by careful and patient study.

Psychology is made the basis of the treatise ; the author believes that in no other way can the subject be treated in a rational or scientific manner. Nothing in the present trend

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iv Preface.

of educational thought is more marked than the growing desire to found all systems and methods of educational training on the principles revealed by a thorough inductive study of human nature.

Complete "Schemes" have been introduced, because the author has found that they were very helpful to his own students in their efforts to grasp and retain these subjects in an orderly and methodical way. If they are faithfully used, he believes that they may do the same good service for the reader that they have done for his students in the classroom.

The author does not flatter himself that every reader will yield a ready assent to all his statements ; but he has given his opinions freely, as they have been formed in the light of his own thinking and experience. He bespeaks for them a candid consideration, and an acceptance, if, after careful thought, they shall seem reasonable.

Originality is by no means claimed for all that is here pre rented. The author has freely availed himself of any thing that his judgment commended, wherever it might be found. Yet, he has rarely expressed himself in the words of another.

This little book is sent forth with the hope that it may be found of some value in Normal Schools, Teachers' Classes, and Teachers' Institutes, as well as in the private reading of teachers, and, it may be added, of parents, also. If it shall contribute something to improve the training of the youth of our country, and to bring upon the stage of active life a generation better fitted to enjoy its privileges and to discharge its duties worthily, the author will be fully repaid for his labor.

Edwin C. Hewett.

Illinois State Normal University, Normal, January 18, 1884.

Contents

I. — General

I. — General Statement, .

II,

Chapter I. General Statement

Pedagogy. — This new word, Pedagogy* means the science and art of teaching ; but it means more than that. It means the taking of young children, and, by means of both skillful teaching and wise training, leading them up to worthy manhood and womanhood.

* Among families of rank, in ancient Greece, the boys, at the age o_ six or seven, were committed to the care of a Pcedagogus. The word means a "boy-leader" or "child-leader." Professor Anthon says: " They remained with the tutor (pedagogue) until they attained the age of puberty. His duty was rather to guard them from evil, both physical and moral, than to communicate instruction, to cultivate their minds, or to impart of accomplishments. He went with them to and from the school or Gymnasium ; he accompanied them out of doors on all occasions ; he was responsible for their personal safety, and for their avoidance of bad company." From this significance of the word pedagogue, it seems proper to call the science and art of leading youth up

to a worthy manhood, PEDAGOGY.

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i o Pedagogy.

It has been said that the ability to do this work well requires knowledge of three distinct kinds, or in three distinct fields ; namely, a knowledge of the being who is to be taught and trained, a knowledge of those branches, by the study of which his mental growth is to be promoted, and a knowledge of the proper methods by which the matter to be taught, and the being to be taught, shall be brought into the most healthful and fruitful relations to each other.

Man: his Nature and Powers. — It is, therefore, proper that we should begin our work by a consideration of the nature and powers of the being that we propose to teach and train. Man is curiously made up of mind and matter, so wonderfully blended that no one can tell exactly how they live and work together. Of the real nature of both mind and matter, we are profoundly ignorant. No one can tell what either is: we can study their phenomena only.

Man has a body, and he has a mind ; he has, also, powers that belong to the body, and others that belong to the mind. Pedagogy must study the laws of development and action, relating to both classes of power.

Power is the ability to do something.

For the sake of distinction, we may call the powers that pertain to the body, as those shown by the muscles, material powers; and we may call

General Statement. 1 1

those powers that pertain especially to the mind, as the power to remember, the power to love, etc., immaterial powers. To be sure, the mind's powers do not show themselevs wholly independent of the body. When we remember or love, we use the brain ; but we do not believe that the changes in the brain make memory or love, although the exercise of these powers is without doubt accompanied by changes in the brain. We do not believe that ' ' the brain secretes thought as the liver secretes bile. " The truth seems to be that, in some way not fully understood, the mind uses the brain as its instrument.

Our best philosophers teach us that the mind itself is one indivisible thing: it does not possess organs, as the body does, nor is it a bundle of powers ; but it has many powers which it can exercise in various ways. When we love, it is the entire mind that loves, and not part of it, although it may work with more or less force in the act. The same is true when we remember, when we will, etc.

Grand Divisions of Mental Power. — The powers of the mind, or the immaterial powers of man, are very numerous ; but they may all be arranged in three classes. This is the teaching of almost all of the modern philosophers; but, formerly, philosophers divided these powers into two groups instead of three.

The three groups of immaterial powers, or the powers of mind, are :

1st, Those powers by which we know, or the Intellect.

2d, Those by which we feel, or the Sensibility.

3d, The power by which we choose and execute, or the Will.

In speaking of the immaterial powers of man and their phenomena, we are obliged to borrow most of our terms from the body and its phenomena. This is somewhat unfortunate, as the terms thus borrowed are likely to be misunderstood. The word feel, which we have just used, is an example of such a term. When one speaks of feeling sorrow, he means something very different from that which he means when he speaks of feeling the table with his finger. In the latter case, he means an affection of the mind through the nerves of the body. This is perception, or an exercise of one of the knowing powers. In the former case, he means an affection of the mind independent of the nerves, as when he feels sorrow for the loss of a friend. This is an exercise of sensibility.

The action of the three grand classes of mental powers may be illustrated in the following way : You take up a newspaper, and read of the floods in the lower Mississippi valley. You are able to understand what the writer says — to think his thoughts after him — and his thoughts awaken new thoughts of your own. Thus, you see that you have the power to know, to think, — or, you have Intellect. As you read of the sufferings the floods cause the people, you begin to pity them and to desire to relieve their suffering. You thus see that you have the power to feel, — or, you possess Sensibilityo You learn that others are sending money

General Statement. 13

to aid these poor people ; moved by your feelings, you determine to join in the contribution. Thus, you see that you have the power to choose, to determine, — or, you have" Will.

Thus, we have represented the three grand classes of mental powers ; nor is there any mental faculty that can not be properly grouped under one of these three classes. Moreover, these classes of mental powers always act in the order here given. It is inconceivable that we should have feeling in regard to any matter till we know something about it, or think we do. Nor do we ever put forth any activity of the will till we are prompted to it by some feeling.

This is illustrated in the case of the "prodigal son." He "came to himself," and thought; he felt, in respect to his wretched condition and the plenty at his father's house; he then resolved to arise and go to his father.

A wise writer, or orator, or teacher, who wants to lead men up to a resolution, always observes this order. He strives first to awaken thought, — to make people know something about the matter in hand. He then seeks to arouse their feelings in view of what they know and think. It is only after both these results are reached that he hopes to bring them to any resolution, or choice, or action, respecting the matter.

i. Consciousness.

2. Attention, \ See page 33

3. Conception.

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Chapter II. The Intellect

The group of knowing powers, or the Intellect, is subdivided into four groups, viz.: the Presentative Powers, the Representative Powers, the Reflective Powers, and the Intuitive Power.

The presentative powers give us knowledge of the outside world through the senses.

The representative powers give us concepts of absent objects.

The reflective powers show us the relations and connections of objects, or of their concepts.

The intuitive power is the power by which zve know certain fundamental things without being taught.

The word "object" must not be confined to material things.

The Presentative Powers. — The Presentative Powers, often called the Perceptives, seem to get their name in this way : The ancients used to divide the universe, for every man, into the Ego and the Non-ego ; the Ego is the man himself, and the Non-ego includes everything except himself. The presentative powers, or the senses, present, as it were, the things of the Non-ego to the Ego, shut up, as he seems . to be, somewhere in this bodily tenement, — they are a kind of " introduction committee."

The senses are commonly said to be five in number, — Feeling, or the sense of touch; Seeing, Hearing, Tasting, and Smelling. To these, some philosophers add a sixth sense, which they call the Sense of Resistance to muscular effort.

Feeling is the most general of all the senses, as it extends over the whole body, wherever the nerves are found. There is some propriety in saying that the other senses are modifications of feeling, because they all require special nerves for their action. All these special nerves are located in the head. Two of the senses, seeing and hearing, in addition to the special nerves, also require curiously constructed organs.

Most of the words used to designate the powers of the mind may also signify the acts which the powers perform ; thus, Feeling may mean the power to feel, or the act of feeling. The same is true of Memory, Judgment, etc. Whenever we use one of these words, we do well to think carefully whether we mean by it the power, or the act which that power is able to perform.

The sense of feeling makes us acquainted with such objects only as are close to us. It also acts slowly, from the parts to the whole ; this is illustrated by the actions of a blind man as he studies objects that he handles. We all act in a similar way when we grope in the dark.

The Intellect. i y

Seeing is very different ; it shows us objects that are near, or very distant, and it acts very rapidly ; it gives us notions of things as wholes at first, and afterward studies their parts. The special nerves of sight are called the optic nerves. But sight can not act when light is absent, nor when the rays are obstructed by opaque objects.

Hearing. — The medium through which we hear must always be present where life is possible, for it is the air we breathe ; nor do intervening objects wholly prevent our hearing. No other sense affects the emotions so quickly or so deeply as hearing ; this is seen in the effects of music, or of the tones of the voice. The auditory nerve is the special nerve of hearing.

The senses we have considered make us acquainted with the size, shape, position, resonance, etc., of bodies ; in other words, with such qualities of bodies as have relation to space.

Tasting and Smelling. — But tasting and smelling, by means of the gustatory and olfactory nerves, enable us to learn much of the composition and condition of bodies. We judge by these senses whether substances are fit to be taken into our organism or not. Hence, the special nerves for these senses are found in the mouth and nose, the gateways to the stomach and lungs.

Sense of Resistance. — When you allow an object merely to touch your hand, you simply feel it; but when you let it rest upon your hand, and

Pedagogy.

put forth muscular effort to sustain it, your sense seems to give you something besides simple feeling ; you have a sense of something resisting your muscular effort. This is why philosphers say that there is a sixth sense; and they say that no other sense makes us know so soon and so certainly that there are objects outside of our own organism.

Teachers can teach young children a great many truths about the "five senses," but they would better say nothing to them about the sixth sense. Children should understand that it is the mind that acts through these nerves and organs of the senses. The eye does not see ; but the mind sees by means of the eye.

Because the sense of resistance to muscular effort is not regarded by all as a separate sense, distinct from mere feeling, we have placed an interrogation mark after it in the scheme.

The Representative Powers. — The representative powers give us concepts of absent objects in two ways; viz., either as they are or were, or as they might be. When the concept is as the object was or is, the mental act is reproduction. If you know that the thing reproduced is a concept of some former mental possession, you recognize it, or know it again. These two mental acts — reproduction and recognition — make up the act of memory ; hence,

Memory is that 7'epresentative power which brings before the mind concepts of absent objects as they are or were, and recognizes them.

Concepts of anything the mind has ever possessed, — sights, sounds, tastes, thoughts, feelings, former concepts, etc., may thus come before the mind and be recognized, for memory can bring before us all these things.

It is probable that a very large share of the concepts that are really reproductions are not recognized ; they may seem to us to be original; often we question when a thing "comes into the mind," whether it is something that we remember, or is really a new thing. Not long since, a certain eminent preacher was accused of plagiarism. It seemed to be clear that he had used in his sermon whole sentences just as they were to be found in a book, which he admitted he had read. His defense was that his mind had great tenacity in retaining words, and that these words were not recognized when they were reproduced. Whatever the fact may have been, his defense was psychologically a plausible one.

Imagination is that representative power which gives us concepts of absent objects, not as they are or were, but as they might be.

Illustrations. — You turn your face towards a church and notice carefully how it looks ; you are now perceivi7ig it by sight. You turn away, and before your "mind's eye" stands the same form as clearly as before : the representative power has reproduced a concept of what was perceived. You know that you are conceiving of the building as it was, so you recognize the concept, — you remember the building.

You now begin to play with this concept ; you replace the brick with stone; you give it extra towers ; you elevate the spire to twice its present height, etc. You are now conceiving of the absent object as it might be. Imagination is at work.

Chapter III

the intellect. — Concluded.

The Reflective Power acts in several ways ; authors do not agree fully in respect to their number. We may safely indicate five of these ways of acting, and perhaps the list will not be exhausted. The five of which we shall speak are : Comparing, Abstracting, Judging, Generalizing, and Reasoning.

By some authors, the Reflective Power is called the Understanding ; by others, it is called the Elaborative Faculty.

Because writers on Psychology do not agree as to the exact number of forms in which the Reflective Power acts, we have placed the abbreviation Etc. after our list, in the Scheme.

Comparing. — As the Reflective Power deals with the relations of things, or of the concepts of things, rather than with the things themselves, it will be obvious that much of its action must be in the form of comparison. It notes the relations of size, length, position, density, value, purpose, cause and effect, agreement, and a multitude of others.

Comparison is clearly involved in abstracting, judging, generalizing, reasoning,- etc.; hence, some writers regard comparison as including all the various forms of the Reflective Power.

Abstracting. — It is seen that the process of abstraction is a very common one, when we observe the large number of abstract terms which are used even by children and uncultivated people. The process of abstraction has sometimes been illustratated in this way: you look at several objects having a common color, as a red ribbon, a red book, a red necktie, etc. You note their color in connection with the other qualities of those objects. You now perceive the color in the concrete. You turn away, or shut your eyes, and think of what you have just seen ; you now conceive the color in the concrete. Again, you drop out of thought all the other qualities of the several objects, but still think of the color in connection with each object ; you are now conceiving of the color in the discrete. Once more, all thought of the objects disappears, and you think of the color only, apart from every object and from all other qualities. You are now conceiving of redness in the abstract, — that is, drawn away from every thing else. It is probable that some such process as this is often gone through with by those who have no thought of the peculiar form of mental activity they are exercising.

Judging. — In judging, the mind holds before itself two concepts, and decides that they agree or disagree ; these concepts may be simple or very complex. You bring before your mind a concept of the thing we call snow, and a concept of the quality whiteness ; you decide that these agree, and you say, "Snow is white." You bring before your mind a concept of the act called murder, and a concept of the quality tightness; you decide that they do not agree, and you say, "Murder is not right." Every judgment, then, involves two concepts, and the decision respecting them.

Proposition. — The expression of a judgment is a proposition.

This definition is often expressed in a false form by saying, "A proposition is a judgment expressed." In objection to this, we say a proposition is not a judgment expressed or unexpressed ; the judgment is the thing, the proposition is the expression or symbol of the thing. Here, as everywhere, the teacher can not afford to confound a thing and its symbol.

As a judgment involves three things, so a proposition must have three parts ; these we call subject, attribute, and copula. The subject is the word or words denoting the principal concept ; the attribute is the word or words denoting the related concept ; and the copula is the word or words expressing the decision. Both copula and attribute may be expressed by a single word, as in the proposition, Water flows. In this relation of judgment and proposition is the foundation of grammar.

Generalizing. — In generalizing, the mind acts in a direction the reverse of that in abstracting; instead of taking several objects and drawing from them a common quality, we take a quality and group together the objects that possess it. A large part of the work of the student of natural science is of this kind. If we take the quality of possessing a backbone, we may group together all the animals that have this quality, and call them vertebrates. Of course, an act of judgment must precede the putting of every object into its class, or the rejection of it from a class.

The common quality according to which we generalize may be obvious, but not important, as in the formation of the group of animals called quadrupeds ; in such a case, we have merely a loose classification. In true generalization, or scientific classification, we arrange the objects with reference to some important or fundamental quality. Should a servant girl classify a library, probably she would do it very loosely, putting together books of the same color, or size, or condition ; the owner would classify by arranging the books according to their contents, — putting together those which treat of a common subject.

Reasoning. — We can not enter very fully into the subject of Reasoning, — Logic is a science in itself. In a process of systematic reasoning, we compare two related propositions, and deduce a third which necessarily follows from the comparison. The two given propositions are called premises ; the one derived is the conclusion. To illustrate: 1st, Four pencils cost four times as much as one pencil ; 2d, One pencil costs three cents; hence, 3d, Four pencils cost four times three cents, or twelve cents. Here the first premise states a general truth ; the second premise states a contingent truth, and the conclusion inevitably follows from the premises. The two premises and the conclusion together make up a syllogism. A process of reasoning may make clear what is involved in the premises, but it can never lead to the discovery of any thing not contained in the premises.

The Intuitive Power. — It is said that the Intuitive Power acts in only one way, but its products are of two kinds. By this power, we know certain necessary, self-evident truths, and also certain fundamental notions or ideas.

Some assert that we get all our knowledge, of every sort, through experience and reflection ; they claim that this is as true in regard to what we have called the truths and ideas of intuition as it is of our knowledge of the qualities of objects. We hold, however, that observation and experience merely furnish an occasion for this kind of knowledge ; they do not cause us to have it.

Truths. — Thus, we know that a part can not equal the whole ; we know that the same thing can not be in two places at the same time ; we know that a statement can not be both true and not true at the same time and in the same sense. All such truths every sane and sound mind knows at once, as soon as it is capable of comprehending clearly what is said. We can not disbelieve them, if we try. No attempt at proof can make us believe them any more firmly. In fact, no proof of them is possible ; we may illustrate such truths, but we can not demonstrate them. Many of these truths are included in the axioms of mathematics; but there are axioms which do not belong to mathematics.

All necessary, self-evident truths, have these three characteristics: 1st, They are true everywhere, and at all times ; 2d, They can not be demonstrated ; 3d, The contradictory of any one of them is manifestly absurd. To illustrate, take the axiom that a whole is equal to the sum of all its parts. This must be true everywhere, and it must be true at all times. We may illustrate it, — that is, we may show it to be true in any given case ; but we can not prove that it will always be true in every case. The contradictory, viz., that the whole is not equal to the sum of all its parts, is seen to be absurd at once by . any one capable of understanding the statement.

Ideas. — Philosophers do not agee as to the number of fundamental ideas given us by Intuition. We may safely say that there are seven of them, at least ; viz. , Being, Time, Space, Beauty, Cause, Right, and Personal Identity.

Being. — By the intuitive idea of Being, we mean that all men naturally and always believe in the existence of themselves and of other things. None but crazy men and some philosophers ever think or talk as if there could be any doubt about this.

Time. — The intuitive idea of Time means the necessary notion of time as passing whenever we think of the occurrence of events. We can not rid ourselves of this idea; in thought we may empty time of every event, but we can not think the time away. In respect to definite amounts of time, we exercise our judgment and experience; but the idea that there must be some amount of time is intuitive.

Space. — The intuitive idea of Space is very similar. We judge of the amount of space in any particular instance, but we can not get rid of the idea that space is, and must be ; we can empty it in thought, but we can not think it away, nor think of it as finite.

Beauty. — The intuitive idea of Beauty is that there is, and must be, such a thing as beauty ; or, in other words, that some things are beautiful and some are not. The child shows that he has this idea very early; ''pretty" is one of his first words. The judgment decides as to the beauty of any particular thing, and the decisions differ very widely.

Cause. — We believe intuitively that every effect must have a cause ; the child shows that this idea is inherent by his questions "Why?" "What makes it?" etc. A cause that is not itself caused is inconceivable to him ; is it not beyond the conception of any one? Judgment pronounces as to what the cause is, in a particular case.

It is highly important that we do not confound the occasion of a thing with its cause. The occasion of a thing allows it to be or to be done ; the cause makes it to be or to be done. To illustrate : The expansive force of steam is the cause of motion in the locomotive ; the opening of the valve, or throttle, is the occasion of the motion.

Right. — The idea that there is such a thing as Right, — that some things are right, and others are wrong, — seems to be intuitive. "Is it right?" is a question that has a meaning to a very young child ; parents and teachers would do better to ask it more frequently. Judgment decides whether a specific thing is right or not.