The French revolution

Preface

For the student of society, the few years that elapsed between the assembling of the States General and the appearance of Napoleon Bonaparte afford material altogether unequaled for a study in social psychology. Few indeed were the political theories and proposals for social amelioration that were not then tried. Nor dares one say that these attempts of philosophers so desperately in earnest to bring in liberty and equality were altogether futile. Because of the constructive genius of Napoleon, they had lasting and, in the main, beneficial results. But there were few of the reform movements then inaugurated that were given anything like normal conditions for trial. Revolutions are not the best means by which to bring about permanent reforms, any more than fevers are the best means of bringing about improvement in one's health; but they are not pathological. No decaying people has vitality enough to carry through a revolt to such constitutional changes as make it worthy the name of revolution. In France, just as in America a few years before, and in England in the preceding century, revolution was the outcome of national convalescence, of a socialized conviction of injustice, and of a universal determination to install justice. It was vi Preface

the expression of popular hatred with abuses — political, social, ecclesiastical, economic — which, if properly met and controlled, might have been turned into the more quiet ways of reform. Nor was it a product of Paris alone. It was the work of a great nation, provinces as well as capital, and to appreciate its significance, the student must never confuse temporary mob rule with a national awakening.

It is this need of studying the spirit of the French people quite as much as their deeds, that has led to what may appear, in a book of this size, a somewhat disproportionately extended treatment of the pre-revolutionary condition of France. But the change of temper which made the Old Regime unendurable and compelled Louis to summon the States General, was by far the most important element of the Revolution. One might properly call it the Revolution itself, so completely were the years of violence under the Convention the outcome of the attempt to preserve advantages the Constituent Assembly had gained. To understand the conditions which were outgrown and the origin and growth of the revolutionary spirit, seems, therefore, quite as necessary as to trace the history of the destruction of abuse and the struggle for liberty and rights.

While novelties in historical matter are always to be suspected, it cannot be denied that the light thrown upon the French Revolution by recent investigators compels a revision of some of the judgments of the past. Especially is this true of leading revo-

Preface vii

lutionists like Danton and Robespierre, and quite as much so of the nature of the Terror. As the present volume is intended for the general reader, I have not judged it necessary to give specific authorities for some of the restatements which have appeared necessary, but have contented myself with giving references to the chief authorities and sources at important points. In addition, general references to English historical literature have been given for the benefit of those who, though not special students, may care to read somewhat widely.

The inadequacy of any brief history of the Revolution can be felt by no one more than by its author, and it is almost unfriendly to involve others in one's own shortcomings, but I cannot refrain from expressing my thanks to Dr. J. W. Fertig, of the Lewis Institute, Chicago, and Dr. VV. K. Clement, who have read the proofs of the book, and to Professor A. W. Small, of the University of Chicago, for many helpful suggestions. But for them this attempt at reworking college lectures would have been even more marked by errors than, I fear, it is now. Thanks are also due to Professor G. T. Little, of Bowdoin College, for the reproduction of the portrait of Mirabeau, the original of which was discovered in Paris by James Bowdoin, and is now in the art collection of Bowdoin College. My indebtedness to the works of Von Sybel, Aulard, Sorel, and H. Morse Stephens will appear on every page. Shailer Mathews.

The University of Chicago, July i6, 1900.

Table Of Contents

Portrait of Mirabeau . . . Frontispiece

ORIGINAL IN THE ART COLLECTION OF BOWDOIN COLLEGE

Part I France At The Outbreak Of The Revolution

CHAPTER

PAGE

I The Absolute Monarchy . . . . i

II The Privileged and Unprivileged , . 12

III Social Contrasts and Morality . . . 3»

IV The Clergy and Religion ... 42 V Intellectual Emancipation through Philosophy ....... 52

Part II The Beginnings Of The Revolution

VI The Development of the Revolutionary Spirit

under Louis XV .... 73

VII The Reform Movement under Turgot and

VIII Bankruptcy and the Convocation of the

States General ..... 102

PART III THE attempt at CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY

IX The States General and the Evolution of the

National Assembly . . . . m

X The Uprising of the Masses . . . 125

ix

X Table of Contents

XI The End of the Old Regime . . . 138

XII The Reorganization of France . . 150

XIII The Progress of the Revolutionary Spirit . 166

XIV Foreign War and the End of the Monarchy 182

PART IV THE REPUBLIC XV The Jacobin Conquest ..... 207

XVI The Reign of Terror as a Political Experiment ....... 224

XVII The Republic under the Terror . . . 234

XVIII The Dictatorship of Robespierre . . 252

XIX The Return to Constitutional Government 266

Chronological Summary ,.,,,. 287

Chapter I The Absolute Monarchy

I. The Absolute Monarchy in France: i. Its Rise through the Centralization of Feudal France; 2. The Councils, Parlements, and the King; 3. The Provincial Administration, (a) the Provinces, {d) the Intendances, [c) the Intendants. II. The Extent of Centralization. III. The Capital and the Nation. IV. The Decay of Governmental Efficiency.

When Louis XVI. came to the throne of France, May 10, 1774, it was universally believed that the clumsy, conscientious, stupid young man and his beautiful wife were to introduce a period of national prosperity such as France had not known since the earlier days of Louis XIV. In part these hopes were realized, for the nation was more prosperous under Louis XVI. than under Louis XV., or, indeed, than it had been during the last third of the long reign of Louis XIV. That they were not more fully realized, and that within fifteen years radical reform of every sort was demanded for the very existence of France, was due to the structure of French society and the organization of the French state; perhaps as much as anything, to the irresponsible monarchy which the young king inherited. [: /,ir.A. v.( t,

To understand the French tnonarchy, one needs to begin one's study at the time that Louis XI. broke the military power of the nobles by his defeat of Charles the Bold, From that time the royal power grew rapidly. The Reformation, it is true, increased the political influence of the nobles, and for a time it looked as if there might be two states in France, one Protestant and the other Catholic. But Henry IV., and after him Richelieu and Mazarin, annihilated the power of the nobility, and built upon its ruins an absolute monarchy. Although France remained broken up into great feudal estates, their lords had grown so subservient as to have become what Carlyle contemptuously calls them, "gilt pasteboard caryatids of the throne." By the seventeenth century France had become the one strongly centralized — it would almost be possible to say, the one modern — state in Europe. It was, in fact, the political marvel of the day. It alone of all the European powers had emerged more resplendent from the awful century and a half succeeding the Protestant movement in Germany. It was not only leader in thought, -in art, in manners; it was practically dictator in European politics. The Peace "of Westphalia, which in 1648 brought to a close the Thirty Years' War, was- to all intents and purposes a French document, announcing that Louis XIV. proposed to control the policy of every continental

The Absolute Monarchy 3

state. It is true such pretensions could not and did not long endure, and after the victories of William of Orange, the Duke of Marlborough, and Prince Eugene, and even after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes (1685), the Grand Monarch's influence had waned in international affairs. But so thoroughly had the work of Richelieu and Mazarin been done that the monarchy itself was no loser by national misfortune. It even grew the more absolute, and France the more unified. And this in the very century in which Germany had barely missed committing suicide in the Thirty Years' War, and England had been rent in twain by Roundhead and Cavalier! The records of the time show clearly enough that the French monarchy was the envy of European kings. And well it might have been in the eyes of a ruler like Charles I. of England. "ZV/^/, c' est mot — The state? 'Tis I!" — is the definition legend makes Louis XIV.' give of France, and there is no more symbolical picture than that of the young "Sun King" as with the equivalent of these words on his lips he walked into the meeting of the Parlement of Paris, and, with ridingboots on his feet and riding-whip in his hand, addressed the kneeling commoners. The regency of Orleans and the reign of Louis XV., though fatal to the morals of the court, none the less increased the absolutism of the king. As all power belonged to the monarch, so all property. Montesquieu saw in monarchy a despotism limited only by the sale of public offices. Blackstone, writing in the eighteenth century, classes France

'Louis did not use these words, but made a short speech to the same effect. See Fournier, V Esprit dans VHistoire.

with Turkey. The Sorbonne, the great theological court of the nation, said that all the property of his subjects belonged to the king, and that in taking it he took simply what was his own. The one remaining check upon his action, the High Court of Paris (Parle77ient de Paris) ^ was suppressed during the last years of Louis XV., and replaced by a most unpopular new court, named after the minister who brought it into existence, the Court {Parlejnent) of Maupeou. Of anything resembling a representative legislative body for the entire nation there was no trace for the one hundred and seventy-five years preceding 1789.' The legislative, like the administrative power, was centered in the king. The legal phrase summed up the whole matter, "As the king ^^ wills, so the law wills."

As far as the machinery of this absolutism was concerned, the king might in person care for the affairs of state, or, if like Louis XV. he was disinclined to such exertion, the state was managed by ministers and councils, while the master of them all enjoyed himself as he saw fit.^ These councils had legally the right neither of initiation nor of decision, but were advisory. The king, if he chose, could decide all matters without reference to them, or dismiss them outright if he preferred. Yet in actual practice this seldom happened, and practically all laws were made

*But it should be noted that provincial assemblies continued to meet and preserve, however irapertectly, the thought ot representation.

'There were five of these councils: of State, Dispatches, Finance, Commerce, and, less important, the Privy Council. Each of the first four had never more than nine members, while the Privy Council numbered 100-150. The king was supposedly a member of them all, but usually attended only the first three named.

The Absolute Monarchy J

by them, although no law was supposed to be finally binding until it had been registered by the Parlement of Paris — that is, had been formally approved and entered on the records of the state.

The administrative division of France was cumbersome. There were, in fact, three general strata of administrative units. There was first, the ecclesiastic, which concerned the Roman Church alone. Second, there were the provinces. These were the remains of originally independent kingdoms or duchies which had been gradually united into the nation, and by the time of Louis XVI. had become merely military districts under governors, whose office, except in actual revolt, had become practically sinecures. The provinces numbered thirty-two (or thirty-three if Corsica be included), and were of two classes, those of the Pays d' Election and those of the Pays d' Etat. The difference between these two classes of provinces was this: the provinces known as the Pays d' Etat had been more recently conquered or acquired than those of the Pays d' Election^ and had preserved the privilege of holding provincial assemblies. The assemblies were composed of members of the three estates, clergy, nobles, commons, and enjoyed the right of consenting to taxation, and in other ways preserved something of self-government.' ^\\^JPays d' Election^ on the other hand, comprised the central provinces of France, and possessed no trace of that self-government which, as their name indicates, had been theirs

^There were seventeen such provinces in 1789, the most important of which were Brittany, Flanders, Burgundy, Artois, Languedoc, Provence, Dauphine.

until 1614. It was these provinces that especially felt the effects of maladministration.

A third division of France may be said to have dated from the time of Richelieu, and was wholly for purposes of civil administration, especially for the purpose of taxation. It consisted of thirty-five^ generalites or intendances, at the head of each of which was an intendant. They coincided approximately with the provinces, and were subdivided into subordinate districts bearing a variety of names.^

It was this fiscal division of France that furnished the points of contact between the monarch and his people. The intendant was a member of the Privy Council, and was thus, like the Council itself, an extension of the royal will. As John Law said, these intendants constituted the ''thirty tyrants" of France. Thanks to the power delegated them by the Council, they were supreme in their districts, levying taxes, making laws, and in case appeal was taken from any of their decisions, actually judging these appeals. Was rejoicing in order? The intendant ordered bonfires; mourning? crepe. Did a town guard fail to attend the Te Deum? They were forthwith fined twenty francs a man. If the peasant brought an ox to market, the inspector of cattle presented himself; the inspector of calves looked after the calves; the inspector of swine took care of the pigs, and if it happened to be a sow with young, he was joined by

*Thirty-one according to the report of Necker in 1784, but for various reasons he omits four.

*In the Pays (V Election these were generally known as elections or gouvernements ; in the Pays d^Eiat, as dioceses, bailliages, elections^ etc. On this entire matter, see Boiteau, Etat de la France en 178Q, chs. 3, 4.

The Absolute Monarchy 7

the inspector of sucking pigs.' The intendants themselves mostly remained in Paris or Versailles, and the actual oversight of their districts was in the hands of his sub-delegates. These latter officials are described in the great protest presented by the Cour des Aides to Louis XVI. in 1775/ as men without rank and without legal authority, against whose petty tyranny the inhabitants of a village dared not defend themselves. It is indeed easy to see how an absentee official, even if he had the best intentions, might lend himself unwittingly to all the abuses attending too great reliance upon a practically independent subordinate. Yet, on the other hand, the possibility for reform that lay in the hands of a conscientious resident intendant is to be seen in the enormous improvements accomplished by Turgot during the twelve years of his administration of Limoges.

So complete was this centralization of power and administration that the government at Versailles, through the councils and intendants, cared for matters that, according to modern political ideas, might much better have been left to local magistrates and boards. Indeed, nothing within the entire range of life was too great or too small to be overlooked by the ubiquitous representative of royalty. We should expect that the taxes would be levied by the Royal Council, and in the light of other facts it is not suprising to discover that there was no national as distinct from the king's personal treasury.^ But even a mod-

Von Hoist, French Revolution^ 1, 14.

'This highly important document for

published, with a translation, in 1

versity ot Pennsylvania, Dept. of His

^The proposal in 1788 to make such a distinction was revolutionary.

'This highly important document for the study of the Old Regime has been published, with a translation, in Translations and Reprints. V, 2. (University ot Pennsylvania, Dept. of Hist.)

ern Frenchman, accustomed to a republic that is more bureaucratic than some monarchies, could not imagine his government assuming such paternal functions as the Bourbon king. By means of lettres de cachet^ or royal orders for arrest, obtained easily by the nobility, and which sometimes were even signed when blank, he could imprison any person without trial. By them he even could interfere in family life, helping a despairing father discipline his unmanageable son. In agriculture, the Royal Council advised what crops should be planted, seasoning the energetic enforcement of their advice with much good counsel. In towns and parishes the central government was supreme. "There was no city, town, borough, village, or hamlet in the kingdom; there was neither hospital, church fabric, or religious house which could have an independent will in the management of its private affairs, or which could administer its own property after its own plans." ^

Wits saw no limit to this absolutism. When in 1732 the government found it advisable to close up the St. Medard Cemetery in Paris because of the disorders arising from the miracles alleged to have been wrought at a Jansenist's grave, the following notice was found one morning on the closed gates: '*By order of the king. God is hereby forbidden to work miracles in this place." Just how the ignorant masses thought of this power we can well imagine. It would be impossible to convince them that this all-powerful ruler was not answerable for their misfortunes and miseries.

*De Tocqueville, The Old RSginie, 64.

The Absolute Monarchy 9

The centralization of France in Paris was at once the explanation and the result of this condition of affairs.* In the eighteenth century Paris was rapidly becoming France. The old nobility, who formerly had lived scattered throughout the provinces, after one desperate attempt to regain the power Richelieu had wrested from them, had flocked to the royal court at Versailles, there to make their fortunes. But not only the nobility sought the capital; trade more and more turned thither. In the sixteenth century, for instance, the provinces had many important book publishers; in the eighteenth century they had practically none; all were in Paris. Arthur Young, a thoroughly intelligent Englishman, traveling through some of the smaller cities at the outbreak of the Revolution, asked some of the leading men what they would do. "Oh,*' said they, "we don't know; we are only small provincial towns; we will wait till we see what Paris will do." It is true that the Revolution was an affair of the provincials quite as much as of the Parisians — perhaps in some ways even more so, for few of its leaders were from the capital; but without this centralization of authority and national life the problem of reform would have been far easier, and one is inclined to believe, the desperation of theorists like Robespierre and the brutality of men like Hebert would have been short-lived, if indeed possible. As it was, although the Revolution was quite as much the

'Such a statement is intended to be only general. The political relation of Paris to France was really threefold: (i) ft was the capital; (2) it was one of the "royal cities" {botines villes)\ (3) it was a self-governing municipality. It was characteristic of the political condition of France that Paris had institutions appropriate to each of these characters. See Monin, L'Etat de Paris en ijSq, 29.

lO The French Revolution

work of the provinces as of the capital, the control of Paris proved to be the control of the state.

But nothwithstanding — or better, perhaps, because of this elaborate organization — the government of France by the middle of the eighteenth century had become thoroughly inefficient. The feudal survivals in the provinces, the utter injustice of allowing the Pays d' Etat elements of self-government not enjoyed by the Pays d' Election^ the impossibility of administering municipal affairs equitably or effectively from Versailles, all combined to cripple the government. The weakness of the administration was increased by the neglect paid by Louis XV. to affairs of state. "The old machine will last through my days," he said, and went about his pleasures. Evidences of the inability of the monarchy to govern are numerous throughout the quarter-century preceding the Revolution. It is not merely that the state possessed a debt of hundreds of millions, that taxes were spent long before they were collected, that a deficit grew annually, that legislation was imbecile in its treatment of the most important economic matters. The country was really drifting to ruin. Cynical old Louis XV. saw it — or if not he, the Pompadour — and all too truly prophesied that after him would be the deluge. Chesterfield and Rousseau saw it. Indeed, the evidence was only too abundant. There being no popular representation, there were no popular leaders. The very "wardheeler," with his "gang," is to-day, by some strange paradox of American politics, a guarantee that government by the people shall not perish from the earth; but even he was lacking in monarchical France. Government could not maintain order. The artisans had

The Absolute Monarchy li

grown so accustomed to thinking of the state as a mere taxing organization that they were suspicious even of the call for representative assemblies in 1787. Smugglers were innumerable, despite fearful penalties; and under desperate leaders like Mandrin in 1754, or Hulin in 1782, sometimes waged miniature civil war. "Brigands" in bands ranged over the country, intimidating, robbing, even murdering, well-to-do peasants. Police protection was insufficient. In 1764 the government made a desperate effort to check the evil, and fifty thousand vagabonds are said to have been arrested in one year; but the evil persisted. An ordinance of 1778 provided that the police should arrest, not only beggars and vagabonds whom they encountered, but also those denounced as such or as suspected persons. This law reads as if it were intended to be the model of that against "suspects" passed by the Terrorists; but it did not accomplish its end. The "brigands" increased, and became an everincreasing source of terror.

In one word, the government of France was^senile.- From without, it could only coerce; and brilliant as was the court at Versailles, long before the Revolution the monarchy had lost its ability to fulfill either old or new functions. For Fr ance, a magnificent ^..^ation of more than twentyriive millions, had outgrown absolutism, and was growing spiritually ambitious, stronger, and restless. The problem grew more fatally simple with every year, until at last it might be said to have become this: Would the government recognize this new France, and if so, had the monarchy sufficient vitality to endure the rejuvenation of reform?

Chapter II

I. The Classes of the Privileged. II. Taxation: i. Exemptions; 2. The Case of the Peasants; 3. The Indirect Taxes. III. Sinecures and Pensions for the Nobles. IV. Feudal Privileges: i. Feudal Dues; 2. Hunting; 3. Absentee Lords; 4. The Increase of the Nobility. V. The Third Estate: I. Classes; 2. The Bourgeoisie as Compared with the Peasants; 3. Rise of Bourgeoisie in importance; 4. Hatred of Bourgeoisie on the Part of the Peasants and Artisans. VI. The Army: i. The Militia; 2. The Regular Army: {a) The Common Soldier, {b) The Officers, {c) The Army as a Type of the Nation.

The Old Regime was essentially characterized bycivil and social inequality. In this it was the outcome of feudalism. The centralization of all political power in the hands of the king had not been accompanied by the abolition of privileges with roots running back into the earliest years of the nation's life. The great houses of the Second Estate, or nobility, perpetuated rights that recalled the times when their founders had been absolute masters of their villeins' life and limb; while the new houses, like all upstarts, saw in their lack of antiquity a reason for insisting the more arrogantly upon privilege and exemption. As one looks back across the Revolution upon these social inequalities and hoary abuses, it is easy to see that they, and not monarchy, were the first objects of popular hatred, and to appreciate the fact often to be emphasized that the Revolution was fundamentally social rather than political. It was not primarily a revolt against "absolutism, for to this day the French have had no government that in some way has not perpetuated Bourbon centralization. It was an uprising against privilege.

Speaking for the moment very loosely, under the Old Regime Frenchmen were divided into two classes, those with privileges and those without privileges. To the former belonged the First Estate, or the clergy, the Second Estate, or the nobility, and the wealthy commoners. To the class of the unprivileged belonged all the rest of France.

Postponing for the present the consideration of the clergy, we must consider the nobility. By the end of Louis XV. 's reign, nearly every man who was not actually an artisan, a farmer, a shopkeeper, or a small lawyer was a noble. They numbered perhaps one hundred thousand persons, and owned a fifth of the soil. The number of those who actually owned estates, however, was much smaller, but in so far as this fact did not make exceptions necessary, they all enjoyed essentially the same privileges. It has been estimated that there were thirty-five thousand castles or chateaux in France owned by the nobility. The lower nobles, on the whole, contributed an element of strength to the nation. Living on their small estates, they felt the responsibilities of their position, and cared somewhat conscientiously for their peasants. Their sons were likely to be dissipated in early life, but when heads of families of their own, generally reformed. Their daughters were as well educated as conventionality permitted, and either married young or went into convents. One other feature of the life of these small nobles was of great influence upon the national life. As estates were divided among the children, the tendency toward a landless aristocracy was very strong. The result of this was twofold: On the one hand, many of these poor nobles grew all the more strenuous supporters of the privileges of their caste, while on the other hand, some of them, like Mirabeau, cast in their lot with the commoners, and were among the most implacable enemies of the privileges to which their fathers had clung. As a class, however, the noblesse merited the words of Chateaubriand: "Aristocracy has three stages: first, the age of force, from which it degenerates into the age of privilege, and is finally extinguished in the age of vanity."

The chief privilege enjoyed alike by the nobility, the clergy, and the wealthier commoners was that of exemption from taxation. It is true that the clergy, perhaps in return for some legislation hostile to Protestantism, perhaps under stress of war, perhaps from a sense of duty, did occasionally vote a gift to the state, but this was in the place of, not in addition to, taxes. Even thus it steadily lessened. Originally but $600,000 a year, in 1788 it shrank to $360,000, and in 1789 was refused altogether.* Had the church really paid in anything like a proportion to its wealth, the annual levy would have been vastly greater. The

'In this and other estimates the livre is reckoned as a franc. As a matter of fact, from 1774 to 1789 the livre possessed value as silver of fr. 98 cent. But its purchasing power was considerably greater. In 1830 the livre of 1789 had the purchasing power of 1 fr. 40 cent, and to-day it is considerably greater. If all sums are multiplied by three, the probability is that their present purchasing power will be approximately discovered. Cf. Bolteau, U Etat de la France en 178Q, 417.

church raised $36,600,000 itself as tithes, and its taxable property should certainly have yielded the state an equal sum.' Even when the church made its gifts, however, it received a grant from the royal treasury larger than the gift it had made! In 1787 it received $300,000 more than it gave. In one province $360,000 were spent in the public service, but the two upper classes contributed nothing to it. In ten other provinces $2,000,000 was paid by the lower classes as an income tax; the two upper orders paid about $400,000. The princes of the blood paid $36,000, when they should have paid $500,000. In fact, it came to be held that to pay taxes was a disgrace — an evidence of plebeian origin, and corruption of the intendants and their officials was open. Even when the nobility paid taxes, they were clamorous for pensions from the court, and seldom were they absolutely refused.

Over against this scandalous exemption place the condition of the peasant. The direct taxes — chief of which were the land tax (tatlle), poll tax (capitatio7i)^ and, most hated of all, the corvee^ or forced labor on public works — amounted to fifty-three per cent of the net produce of his farm; and this was in addition to the tithes paid the church and the feudal dues paid his seigneur, each of which amounted to fourteen per cent more. Altogether the peasant paid thus eightyone per cent of his supposed income in some form of taxes. So Taine, at least, calculates.^ And even if, as it may very probably be, this is an overstatement,