The theory of physical dispositions ...

Preface

The progress which psychological research has made in ' modern times, far from dispensing with the need of theories, has rather accentuated It. New facts have been discovered or more thoroughly investigated, and where the explanation was not at hand, and could not be found empirically, recourse to theories was rendered necessary.

Of these theories some are entirely new, and therefore suggest new philosophical views of the mind; others are principally modifications of earlier theories, and adaptations to meet the needs of present science; others finally are distinct, yet not always conscious, survivals of theories of the past.

In this revival of past theories, it sometimes occurs that the essential, the fundamental basis of the theory is discarded, while that which is secondary or less essential is preserved; and thus the attempt is made to Incorporate certain elements of an older theory in the new. Whenever this happens, it Is interesting to examine how far this dismemberment of a theory of the past and the exclusive preservation of certain portions of It Is justified.

Generally speaking, the modern philosophy of the mind has v/

abandoned the Aristotelian and scholastic view of a substantial soul ; it has retained nevertheless the concept of psychical dispositions. This concept, whatever name may have been given to It, was an actual and logical product of the older theory, so that In using it the scholastics were perfectly consistent.

Can we say the same of modern philosophers? Does this fragment of an ancient edifice find a suitable place in the modern structure? Or is it out of proportion and harmony with the new system into which it has been incorporated? Such is the question which we shall attempt to answer In the following pages. This has necessitated a historical survey, as well as an analysis of the theory under discussion. It is not intended, however, to test directly the value of the scholastic doctrine concern'

IV PREFACE.

ing the soul and its faculties ; nor on the other hand to criticize in any thorough-going way modern theories concerning the nature of the mind. The primary aim of the investigation is to compare the medieval and the various modern systems from the point of view of logical consistency.

Consequently, after ( i ) a brief review of the facts which have to be explained, we shall (2) consider how they have been accounted for in the past, and (3) how they are accounted for at the present time. This will lead us (4) to inquire into the concept of psychical dispositions; finally (5) we shall examine the logical aspect of the theory.

It is a pleasing duty for the writer to acknowledge his indebtedness to Professor E. A. Pace for the help which he has given in the preparation of this study, the numerous suggestions which he has made, and for the constant care with which he has directed the philosophical studies of the author.

BIOGRAPHY.

The author of this dissertation was born November 2, 1875, at Villaines-sous-Luce, a small town of the department of Sarthe (France) . After attending the primary schools, he entered the 'Petit Seminaire' at Sees (Orne) where he pursued the study of the classics. In 1893 he entered the Society of Mary, and after spending one year in England, came to America. He studied philosophy two years in the scholasticate of the Society"^ in Maryland, and then came to the Marist College, near the Catholic University, Washington, D. C, for his theological studies. He followed at the University the courses of Holy Scripture under Professor C. P. Grannan; of Church History under Professor T. J. Shahan, and of Hebrew under Professor H. Hyvernat. In 1899 he received the degree of Bachelor in Theology and was ordained to the priesthood. Having been appointed professor of philosophy at the Marist College, he matriculated in the department of philosophy at the Catholic University in 1900, and studied philosophy and psychology under Professor E. A. Pace, and Greek under Professor G. M. Boiling.

Contents

I. Summary of the Facts.

a) Diversity of conscious states i

h) Mental development 3

CHAPTER I. Summary of the Facts. Diversity of Conscious States

Nothing in nature is more varied, more changing than human consciousness. Mental states are constantly succeeding one another, constantly forcing one another out of the field of consciousness. Hardly has one appeared before it is hurried into the past by another. Of the inner world of consciousness especially can we say what Heraclitus said of the universe r everything changes and flows : " irdvTa pel." This flowing, this succession is so essential to the living human consciousness that a persistent idea, one which refuses to retire and interrupts the stream, is characteristic of an abnormal mind.

There is not one stream of consciousness, but there are as many streams as there are individuals; and if we compare men with one another, we also find the greatest variety of conscious states. It seems certain that, of all the individuals who now exist or have existed in the past, two could not be found whose contents of consciousness at any given time were exactly similar, or even two who ever experienced conscious states exactly alike. At any given moment, if it were possible to obtain an insight into all human consciousness, to make as it were a cross section of it, we would perceive an infinite variety of cognitive, affective and conative states, each differing in many respects from all the others.

That such differences in the mental states of several individuals depend in a large measure upon differences in the environment is obvious. Sensations of sight, of hearing, of touch, of pressure, of heat and cold, etc., which affect the mind more frequently than does any other state, and which are for the most part occasions and determinations of other conscious processes, depend essentially on surrounding objects which stimulate the sense organs. In fact all our states of consciousness.

representative, emotional or conative, have their origin in our sensations and are determined by them.

We can therefore to a large extent account for the diversity of mental states in several men by external factors. But this is far from being an adequate explanation. If two persons be placed amid surroundings identical as far as possible, we still find a great difference in their states of consciousness. They will not see, hear, feel in the same manner. Their sensations will be the starting point of mental processes differing in a still greater degree. Attention, interest, associations and consequently the whole experience of the past together with the habits of life, must be taken into consideration.

We find in all persons differences of temperament, of bodily and mental condition, of age, sex, etc. There are native endowments which we receive with existence itself, and which are from the very beginning of our life ingrained in our nature, and all these influence our conscious states. ' Qiiidqitid recipittir, per modiim recipientis i-ecipitiir' is an old scholastic axiom which we may apply here. When we receive an impression in consciousness, it is modified by our own condition.

But the actual condition of the mind is not determined only by its nativ-e endowments; past experiences have imprinted their mark on the mind. It is impossible to give a complete explanation of any mental state in the concrete, as it is de facto given, without taking past experience into consideration. The present conscious process is very complex in the causes which have determined its production and its character.

In some cases the relation of the present to the past is obvious; it is perceived spontaneously. In memory, for instance, we refer the present idea to another one which has been in consciousness before. The very nature of recognition is to perceive that the present idea is a reproduction of a past one. In other cases it is only by careful study, by long and patient research, by attentive and continuous introspection that we can discern the influence of one process on another. Even then our efforts are frequently unsuccessful, because that influence is too complex, and the result of too many factors. In no case can it be determined in all its details.

Thus we see that under the perpetual flux of conscious processes something must remain permanently, since the past continues to influence the present, and remains a powerful factor in the actual appearance and nature of our thoughts. This is more clearly perceived if we consider the development of the mind.

Mental Development.

Man cannot cast off his own nature, character, acquired tendencies and habits of life, all of which tend to modify his views of things. As we incessantly accumulate new experiences, our mind is constantly being modified. In many cases this is apparent; we are aware that we do not view the same objects now in the same manner as we did formerly. Our opinions, inclinations, tendencies are changed. In a word, our mind develops.

Mental development depends essentially upon this possibility of reviving past experience. And even when this past experience is not itself revived, it enters nevertheless as a factor more or less important, more or less distinct, in all our mental life. If we compare the mental operations of a man with those of a child, we can, with J. Sully,'- reduce the differences to the three following points : Number, perfection, complexity. The adult goes through a number of processes far greater than the child, and these processes are more varied. He not only experiences sensations, but observes, compares, reasons. He attentively notices the points of likeness and of difference. He considers, discusses, deliberates and performs many other operations which in the child are either entirely wanting, or are found only in an imperfect, rudimentary condition. His operations reach also a higher degree of perfection, his sensations are more distinct, his discriminations more accurate, his judgments more certain and more general. All these are effected with less effort and more rapidly. They are, however, more complex than in the child. The mind has a greater capacity and a greater power. It can receive at the same time more impressions, and hence the processes of differentiation and of

' Outlines of Psychology, pp. 41 ff.

integration have a much higher complexity. The same impression can suggest in the mind by association a multitude of ideas. The mind can do more; each one of its actions depends on, and is determined by, a large number of circumstances and of past experiences, at least in an implicit and unconscious manner. The same would also prove true if we compared not the intellectual, but the emotional and volitional life of the adult with that of the child. An increase in the number, the perfection and the complexity of the processes would manifestly reveal itself.

Professor Baldwin describes these differences in the following terms: "The phenomena of the infant consciousness are simple, as opposed to reflective; that is, they are the child's presentations or memories simply, not his own observations of them. In the adult consciousness the disturbing influence of inner observation is a matter of notorious moment. It is impossible for me to know exactly what I feel, for the apprehending of it through the attention alters its character. . . . There is around every one of us a web of convention and prejudice of our own making. Not only do we reflect the social formalities of our environment, and thus lose the distinguishing spontaneities of childhood, but each one of us builds up his own little world of seclusion and formality with himself. . . . The child, on the contrary, has not learnt his own importance, his pedigree, his beauty, his social place, his religion, his paternal disgrace; and he has not observed himself through all these and countless other lenses of time, place, and circumstance. He has not yet turned himself into an idol nor the world into a temple."^

Mental development is not simply growth. It means, it is true, an increase, an accumulation, a storing up of ideas in the mind; but it means more than that. At the present time, when child-study and pedagogy have been the object of such patient and fruitful research, the principle has been made clearer and clearer that to furnish a mind with ideas is not the true method of education, nor the true means of developing the mental faculties. Plato himself brings out the same

' Menial Development in the Child and the Race, I., p. 4.

principle when he makes Socrates compare the art of education to the art of midwifery. The teacher does not infuse science into the pupil's mind, he simply directs and encourages his efforts. "My disciples," says Socrates, "make wonderful progress, as they themselves and everybody can see; and this is clear that they make this progress without ever learning anything from me, but from themselves finding and coming to the possession of many beautiful things."^

Mental development consists In an increase of power to acquire knowledge, both theoretical and practical, to discern, judge, coordinate, rather than in the acquisition of ideas. "We may say that the mind grows when It increases its stock of materials. It develops In so far as its materials are elaborated Into higher and more complex forms. Mere growth of mind would thus be illustrated by an Increase in the bulk of mental retentions, that Is, in the contents of memory: development, by the ordering of these contents in their relations of difference and likeness, and so on."^

The mind is developed not only in its perceptive faculties, but also In Its conative and affective faculties. The will and even the feelings, as well as the intellect, can and must be educated. They also are capable of modification, growth and perfection.

The facts of mental development and of mental differentiation necessarily imply that past perceptions, past operations, continue to have an influence on subsequent perception and operation. If the tendencies and aptitudes of the individual mind change, if the conscious states become more perfect and more complex, It Is In consequence of increased exercise, of multiplied experiences; these therefore must leave in the mind some after-effect. This, as we have said above, is a partial and very important reason of the differences In the conscious states of several Individuals, even when they are placed in similar circumstances. It Is also the reason for the differences in the views of the same person at different times of his life.

' Tliecetetus, cc. VI., VIL, pp. 149 ff. ^ Sully, Outlines of Psychology, 40.

Mental development supposes that the mind not only receives, but also retains. It must acquire a certain facility for doing again what it has done before ; it must have the power of recalling to consciousness that which has been given there in the past. In mental habit and memory the relations of two conscious phenomena that take place at different times are most apparent. We must now briefly consider those two factors, with which especially we have to deal in the present dissertation.

Habit.

In general, the term habit signifies all aptitude, all tendency to act in a special manner easily and rapidly; but in a stricter sense, it applies only to personal habit, acquired by one's own repeated operations. There are innate dispositions to experience a conscious state rather than another, to perform certain actions, to behave in such or such a manner. They depend on our native endowment, constitution, character, and are in many cases transmitted by heredity. With these we are not concerned for the present, but only with habits acquired by the individual himself, and which are the results of his own activity.

Habits are very important in our whole life, organic, mental, social and moral. They form in us what has rightly been called a second nature. We know that all action which has been repeated requires less and less effort. By exercise, the various organs of the body acquire strength, skill, dexterity. By frequent repetition every movement tends to grow easy, to be reproduced automatically without reflection and effort as soon as it is suggested. Complex series of coordinated movements also are facilitated; as soon as the series is started each one of its elements follows in turn without distinct consciousness and attention; it has become 'natural.'

For mental life also habit is of the greatest importance. By practice the senses acquire greater and greater perfection. Sight becomes more accurate; we can discriminate tints which at first appeared exactly similar; we can form a more precise estimate of distances, perspective, figures, etc. The ear distinguishes more readily the pitch, intensity, timbre, harmony of various sounds. In the same way, the other senses are 'educated,' adapted, trained, to perform their functions, or at least some of them, with increasing perfection and facility.

Memory and association themselves can become habitual; frequently repeated associations become stronger; the ties which connect several ideas become more steadfast and enduring. The more frequently ideas have appeared together in consciousness, the more apt will they be to recall one another if one of them is revived in consciousness.

We can also acquire habits, both general and special, of attention, reflection, introspection. These powers may be developed, applied to certain actions rather than to others. The higher faculties of the mind can be directed and improved. By sustained attention and application it is possible to acquire facility in studying sciences for which one felt neither taste nor aptitude. A man can always, at least in some degree, change his taste and tendencies, and acquire a relative facility where before he experienced nothing but dislike and difficulty.

Repeated effort strengthens the will and increases the power of determination; it develops self-control, self-restraint, mastery over oneself; it gives to the will the power to resist natural impulses and inclinations, and to carry out what has been resolved.

Thus in all human faculties, from the lowest to the highest, the influence of habit is felt and in all, its effects are essentially the same. That which was painful and disagreeable, becomes easy, automatic, connatural. That which required many conscious efforts, a constant attention, and unceasing watchfulness, is now performed without difficulty, and with scarcely any notice. Sometimes attention will even prevent us from doing habitual things correctly. Thus, for example, when we have some hesitation about the spelling of a word, reflection may rather increase the uncertainty. Let the hand write according to its own impulse, and frequently the spelling will prove correct, because there is an association which has been established between the motion of the hand and the word mentally conceived. Or one hesitating between two spellings may write the word according to both, and frequently the eye will, for the same reason, tell which of the two is correct. It is difficult o CHARLES A. DUBRAY.

in those cases to determine how far the mind and the organism respectively contribute to the final result, but it is certain that both have a share in it. In some cases the habit is chiefly an adaptation of the organs, and in others it seems to be mostly mental. In this dissertation we consider mental habits; as to organic habits, we consider them only in so far as they refer to conscious processes.

Memory.

Memory sometimes means a general faculty or a certain class of operations; it refers to the power which the mind possesses of preserving and reproducing its past experiences. We say of a man that he has a good memory, a faithful memory, when he readily remembers what he has learned or perceived. We also speak of visual or of auditory memory, implying a special aptitude to remember colors or sounds ; hence we have the visual or auditory types of memory.

Memory is also taken for the acts themselves of recall or reproduction, for the actual exercise of the faculty, and this implies three conditions : the presence of an idea in consciousness, its disappearance, and its recall. In some cases we have recognition, and It is an essential element of the complete act of memory. Yet we may see the same person, hear the same tune several times without recognizing them. The same idea may come back to consciousness without our being aware of the repetition and without our being able to perceive the similarit}' and Identity.

We can reproduce and recognize mental impressions. After days, weeks, or years of absence, they may be recalled again to consciousness. Sometimes they present themselves unexpectedly; they flash again into our mind without effort on our part when we least expect them and even when we endeavor to keep them away. In other cases we try to recall to consciousness ideas which were there at some previous time, or we strive to make clear and distinct that which has left but a faint and obscure idea in the mind. While we do not and cannot revive all our past experiences, yet we cannot assign any limits to this possibility of reappearance. We can recall impressions recelved formerly by the senses; colors, sounds, odors, etc., can be represented when the stimulus is no longer .present. Pains and pleasures, desires and regrets, emotions and passions, the most abstract ideas, can also be remembered. Of no state that has once been present in consciousness can we say that it has disappeared never to return. How this is possible; what conditions are required; what laws govern memory; what is the nature of the state which is revived; and how it is related to the preceding state, we do not for the present have to determine. But the fact itself of reproduction is most evident; we experience it daily, and at every moment of the day; we recognize in the present state an echo or a consequence of a former state; we refer it back to a determined event in our past mental life. Memory is thus a fundamental factor of our mental life. Without memory, this life would be a disconnected series of successive states bearing no relation to one another, and in which nothing permanent, nothing constant would be found. Intellectual and moral development would be an Impossibility; reading, speaking, reasoning could find no place. Since these actions essentially imply a connection of the present with the past, something of the past must remain In consciousness if we are to have the understanding of the present.

We not only revive past impressions as they have once occurred In the mind, but we associate them, we form new combinations and arrangements In consciousness; we modify our past. With Ideas which have been given separately in consciousness, we construct new mental representations; we unite parts of mental images with parts of other images. Fancy has no limits; it not only can produce fantastic and grotesque representations, but when it Is guided by reason, it becom.es the principle of works of art and Invention.

Summary.

We have briefly mentioned the facts which we have to consider in this work, namely, facts of memory and of mental habituation. We have confined ourselves to the most general statements, because the present study is not so much a study of the facts as of the theories proposed as explanations of these facts.

lO CHARLES A. DUBRAY.

Additions from memory and habit group themselves unceasingly around the central nucleus with which we began our mental life; they modify it in such a manner that they make it even unknowable in itself. What a pure sensation, or any other mental state would be, apart from all the revived ideas, from associations, from habits, we certainly do not know.

A multitude of factors contribute to frame and mould our conscious life, our mental behavior, our character. And for this reason is our character essentially personal, similar to no other. To the primitive nucleus of native endowments and tendencies, our successive actions have added a much greater part; they have modified it and left on it their own imprint.

That there is a close connection between memory and habit is evident. Both are based on the same power of the mind to preserve something of the past. In order to be reproduced and recognized a conscious process must either remain or leave some lasting effect in the mind. The facility of action produced by the repetition of actions supposes also that these actions affect the mind in a permanent manner.

Briefly stated, therefore, the question which the psychologist has to solve is this: There are certain mental processes which certainly depend on past processes. The past in many ways influences the present. How shall we account for such an influence? How does the past, v.hich as far as we can know directly has disappeared, affect the present?

CHAPTER II. History. General Remarks

The facts which we have just mentioned have evidently no claim to being new. There are sciences which have developed only after long periods of time, because the facts on which they are based, or which they seek to explain, were not sufficiently known. In proportion as human experience increases, and as, with the help of more perfect instruments and greater accuracy of observation, facts are discovered or become better known, new problems offer themselves for investigation, new facts ask for explanation. Hence new theories, new hypotheses, which could not even have been thought of before, are brought to light.

But this is not the case with our problem. Ever since men have existed, there have been facts of retention and reproduction of knowledge; in their organisms they have treasured up habits of skill, strength, dexterity; and in their minds, images, learning, science. To these we owe the progress and development of our race. Nor could men fail to notice and observe these facts which occur every day, and at every moment of the day; which can be perceived in others to a certain extent, but especially which each perceives in himself. The obser\'ation of our own actions and states is not, it is true, always easy; introspective attention, especially to the details of our mental life, is found to be sometimes very arduous, and comparatively few men are capable of it. But it is impossible for a man not to notice, at least in a general way, that the idea which now occurs to his mind is the same as, or at least similar to, the idea which had already been there before; or that the repetition of certain actions makes it easier to perform them anew. This appears the more certain, if we consider that these facts are of the greatest importance both for the organic life and the development of the mind.

u

That the ancients had a far less perfect and accurate knowledge of them than we have now is of course beyond doubt. They had no idea of memory experiments and of the accurate observations which are made in modern laboratories. But still, thinkers perceived enough facts to arouse their curiosity, and make them eager to find an explanation of these phenomena. Men are not satisfied with perceiving facts. They are, says Aristotle, desirous of 'knowing' them, that Is, of understanding their conditions and causes.^ Plato means the same thing when he tells us that wonder is the most important characteristic of a philosopher, and that It is the beginning of all philosophy.^ For we wonder when we see that some unexpected event happens, or when we know a fact, but are ignorant of the causes that produce it.

We must find, therefore, in the history of philosophy attempts to solve the problem of the reproduction of our mental states. We shall endeavor to outline briefly some of these attempts, without trying to present the views of all philosophers. A complete summary would be too long, and is not necessary for our purpose. But in order to show how ancient philosophers considered the present problem, and what solutions they offered, we shall analyze the most characteristic, the most complete and most systematic theories, those which have exercised the greatest Influence on subsequent thinkers.

Early Period of Greek Philosophy — Stoics — Epicureans.

We do not find in early Greek philosophy any attempt at a systematic treatment of the question. Thought was engaged In a broader field of Investigation, that of the primordial constituent elements of the world, and probably much attention could not be devoted to particular questions of psychological life. Moreover, the works of those philosophers have not come down to us; frequently we are obliged to rely on imperfect testimonies of later writers, or simply to Infer from their general doctrine what they must have held on a special point.

' Metaphysics, I., i, 980a, 22. * TheiEtetus, 155 D.

Memory was commonly explained by the retention of images, effluxes, which, being detached from external objects, came in contact with the sense organs, and produced sensations. Thus for Empedocles, the 'effluvia' (cnroppoaC) proceed from the object, enter the pores {tvopot) of the organism, and sensation takes place when they meet the element which corresponds to them, for 'the like is known by the like.'^

In the atomistic system of Leucippus and Democritus, external objects constantly produce similitudes of themselves, or 'ei'SwXa'; sensation takes place when this real representation or likeness of the objects comes in contact with the atoms of the soul.

We can also dispose at once of the later theory of the Stoics and of the Epicureans. According to them also, the soul is material.- The Stoics explain sensation by saying that it is the impression produced in the soul, either in a strict material sense (rvircdcri'^ iv yJrvxH), as with Cleanthes ; or as a change of state in the soul (erepoLwcn^ i^^XV'')} as with Chrysippus.^ Memory consists in preserving those characters, or impressions left by sensation. According to the Epicureans also the soul perceives external objects when their ' etScoXa' or 'simulacra' come in contact with it, and remembers when it preserves their imprint (tutto?)*. We see that this theory of sensation and memory is essentially the same as that of Democritus.