War government, federal and state, in Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania and Indiana, 1861-1865

Preface

The Civil War will afford ample ground for historical research and study for generations to come. Massachusetts is far ahead of other States in the preservation and arrangement of all records, especially those in manuscript. Her " shoestring files " contain the original story of the stalwart doings in those days, comprising several hundred volumes of manuscript, well arranged and kept under lock and key. Careful search was made here ; and I was indebted to Governor Crane, Mr. Hamlin, and the other officials, for constant courtesy. The archives at Albany and at Harrisburg were examined. The excellent biography by Foulke sufficiently lighted up and colored the extensive correspondence of Morton as it was set forth in the " Official Records of the Rebellion." This enormous collection of printed matter is a mine of crude ore, and from it will be drawn the maturing history of our pregnant Civil War.

James Ford Rhodes's account is exhaustive, absolutely impartial, and very graphic. I have used freely his widespread authorities. I differ in construing the facts at some important points, as will appear in the following pages. Very likely the difference was in that I could not rise to the heights of his sedate charitableness.

W. B. W.

Providence, R. I., March 1, 1906.

Contents

Introduction ix

I. The Genesis of the Union 1

II. The Executive Crisis 34

Introduction

It was my lot to lap two generations of historians. George Bancroft, Francis Parkman, and others gave me advice and encouragement ; Justin Winsor constant direction and suggestion ; Herbert B. Adams much sympathy. Perhaps I should not have written had not Winsor warmly encouraged it. Sometimes I thought there was enough matter already printed ; but he showed that sincere and serious effort to " enlarge the bounds of knowledge " would never be unwelcome or useless. Latterly, I often urged on the students of this generation that there was a great field for the study of government in the interplay of the National Union and the State commonwealths, which were principalities in the Civil War, especially in its early stages. Likewise the personality of the governors was romantic and interesting. All said " Good " — but no one wrote. When I first suggested my own undertaking to a Nestor in our circles, and told him of these results, or lack of a resultant, he said, " Ah ! those who write about it must have lived it." And the number who lived it is narrowing fast. I realized the force of his saying when I came to lay out subject-matter and narrative in the beginning. Facts which were simple enough alone became complex questions when their relation to other doings entangled the incidents and enforced a new form or frame of suggestion. As Mr. Rhodes well says in his fourth volume, a continuous narrative of the Civil War x INTRODUCTION

does not admit consideration of some important issues, which often end in grave constitutional problems.

When President Lincoln assumed control, Union, " the bond of all things," existed ; though despoiled and damaged, it was not broken or dissolved. Even James Buchanan had been able to comprehend that; weak and undetermined as he was, he could not betray a trust. On the other hand, he could not maintain government in its natural prerogatives ; could not perceive that secession involved immediate coercion, else there could be no Union. This entity, represented by the administration at Washington, was a necessary whole, but not absolute in all its functions.

On the other hand, the States were not mere aggregations of people, though their several populations constituted the people whom Lincoln led and constantly had in mind. In this consciousness he was their working servant as well as director and leader by right. Ultimately he reached the powers of a dictator, but he was no Sulla or Caesar ; he used only the abounding prerogatives of the greatest servant of the people.

Meanwhile, the States — what were they? Minor principalities, not complete in sovereignty, any more than the people are completely sovereign ; but powers with many attributes of sovereignty. They could not coin money or levy war for themselves ; but they could levy war for the Union, on the largest scale conceived at that time by any people, whether governed imperially or democratically. The true functions of these partial powers and petty kingdoms were hardly perceived in 1861. Good people were so busy in putting down rebellious States seeking a new confederacy that

INTRODUCTION xi

they forgot the importance of these mediatory principalities, powerful in their local representation, and instantly ready to support the loyal North. Because it was convenient for a bureau at Washington to stretch forth the national power and levy on the whole people, the bureaucrats were constantly forgetting that this process was in a state of necessary gestation. The central power of the Union, destined ultimately to reach its imperial hand over every citizen, was being slowly developed. As long as all citizens were in substantial agreement, it made little practical difference how these powers were exercised technically. But when Republicans and Democrats resumed their old party lines, the materials for difference of opinion rapidly became national issues of vital importance. The misunderstanding of citizens might become half treasonable opposition in conducting local parties, and might make state legislatures practically hostile to the national government.

As the contest advanced and thickened, the functions of the leaders of these local communities were extended and amplified. The term "War Governor" grew naturally out of the occasion, and such men were Paladins of more than chivalrous devotion to the cause of one common country. The name indicates that something had been added to the office as it had been known in the ordinary civic routine of the States. They were indeed detached but assimilated War Ministers, wielding the resources of their governments, not only in execution of the law, but by mustering all the powers of the States according to the need, and under the requisitions, of the national government. Their enerxii INTRODUCTION

gies in most instances were unbounded, while their executive resource and tact were unfailing. Their intercourse with the President and departments, varying according to the traits and characteristics of each individual, affords most interesting ground for investigation. A vast amount of humanness — of the nature and condition of man — shows itself in the interplay of these powerful, practical men of affairs with the authorities at Washington. The officials of the bureaus were more constrained, limited by politics and routine, oppressed by a conserving sense of responsibility, than were these captains who worked in the midst of the people. They had a certain sovereign quality as direct representatives of the people ; but their dominions and principalities were portions of the Union, — parts of its whole, — combined in its structure, and constantly affected by the national movement of all the parts.

There were great personalities developed then; and none greater than the three men treated herein, — Morton, Andrew, Curtin, — whose service was continuous throughout the war. The personages differed as much, essentially, as the circumstances and conditions of their respective communities. Moreover, the prescribed conditions of the occasion in some degree forecast the resultant action of those personages, which action in turn varied its color as personal characteristics came into play.

The main motive of my thesis lies just here. War government, federal and state, did the work most potent and far-reaching in its results, in the business we are now indicating. The rebellion made itself and created its necessary issues; the immensity of the war, the

INTRODUCTION xiii

hecatombs of slaughter, the wasting of myriad homes, were due to occasional incapacities of the administration.

The administration — president and cabinet — could not grasp the whole national issue resting in its hands. It was so fearful of doing too much that it tried to even the national balance by striking from the recruiting measures the heaped-up resources which the governors and loyal legislators were constantly offering from the very heart of the people. This puttering economy of the national rulers turned awry the magnificent stream of early recruits — not raw clodhoppers, but soldiers amply supplied and equipped by state energy out of state treasuries. This mustering force, which ought to have marched out in regular tread toward Washington, was either checked and hindered like an uncertain desert stream, or it was driven like a fitful torrent when the recurring panics called hastily for more and more troops. The mismanagement of these proffered thousands and abounding resources finally exhausted the voluntary spirit which prevailed so vigorously in the early days. The exhaustion of the volunteers naturally compelled the administration to put forth its central authority and to bring every citizen of the United States — exemptions excepted — under its military control: in short, it made a draft.

But this process, clear in statement, was by no means easy and simple as the facts occurred. If the loyal communities had been kept at work mustering and equipping out of the abundant local resources of the States, there could not have arisen those differing issues which did arise concerning the powers of the States jriv INTRODUCTION

and the main functions of the national government. These disturbing matters became burning questions. They were adopted by the old Democratic party, now cast adrift and needing as a party a respectable shibboleth. The Republican partisans, on the other hand, were by no means self-effacing or modest in their assertions. The most intense partisan is a narrow and over-virtuous one. But deeper in political consequence than these personal or partisan predilections was the larger ground of legitimate constitutional evolution. There were no actual constitutional means for placing States in loyal opposition to the fair course of the national government. The well-practiced American methods of installing opposition through discussion and party debate, failed in times of revolution, when the matter touched vital national issues. The practical outcome of agitating a Northern State and throwing it across the line of action taken by the national government was a veiled support of the seceded and rebellious States. There was no essential difference between the position advocated by Horatio Seymour in 1863 * and that of Robert E. Lee when he resigned his commission in the army of the Union. 2 These innate constitutional limitations were not fully recognized and comprehended at the time ; but the people felt them, endured immense

2 Lee resigned April 20, 1861, and wrote his sister on the same day : " The whole South is in a state of revolution, into which Virginia, after a long struggle, has been drawn ; and though I recognize no necessity for this state of things, and would have forborne and pleaded to the end for redress of grievances, real or supposed, yet in my own person I had to meet the question whether I should take part against my native State." — Recollections of General Lee, p. 26.

INTRODUCTION xv

anxiety accordingly, and cherished bitter hatred of the Copperhead.

v The practical outcome and effect of all this agitation was not the repression of the States politically, but their disuse as the greatest volunteering agencies ever known. The national government, absorbing the strength of the Union, reaching forth its natural prerogatives, seized every citizen — not exempt from military service — through the draft. This did not change the nature of the contest, though forms changed. Methods of organization were altered greatly ; and to half-developed statesmen like Horatio Seymour these methods seemed unrepublican and despotic. The people knew better, and acted accordingly.

v There was an immense loss of immediate vigor in a people bred to local government, when the large state organisms were curtailed of their largest and most far-reaching local functions. Morton, Curtin, and Andrew were no less loyal patriots when they were striving to administer the draft. The contrast between them and Seymour's half-way counselors was like Milton's vision of Gabriel and Michael arrayed against Satan and Moloch, though the amiable Copperhead lacked the force of these rebellious angels. But the governors could not be the mighty agents they had been, injecting the national ascendency into every hamlet, and stimulating every citizen, through his local functions and civic pride, to offer himself on the altar of his country. It is pathetic to read the anxious expressions of these governors, and to enter into their struggles, when trying to ward off the draft. They became mere implements and utensils — very serviceable, it is xvi INTRODUCTION

true, in carrying through the national power and in distributing its action, but occupying, nevertheless, a difficult and unpleasant office.

Perhaps nothing in the early days of the Rebellion impressed observers and critics, at home or abroad, more forcibly than the immediate use of the kingly power which survived in the office of President. The Southern Confederacy differed in character from the United States, though its form was much the same. The seceding States formed their government in the strictest method of representative institutions, such as had been followed in the old republic, but adapting the new form to the maintenance of slavery. Their orderly conduct in these respects justly commended itself. But the office of President, though it finally assumed dictatorial powers under the inevitable pressure of war, was new and untried in the beginning. On the other hand, President Lincoln, instead of surrendering to anarchy at Washington, as the rebels hoped and even expected, found plenty of prerogatives awaiting his hand. These were inevitable powers, emanating directly from the people and concentrating in a crisis only in one hand, if there is to be any effective government enforced by such people or nation. These kingly, though not organized, powers, carefully exercised by Lincoln, gradually widened into the effective control of a dictator. The form was republican and limited, but the substance was of the old attributes of sovereignty.

Nothing more bewildered the average congressman, in his Philistine consciousness, than this potent and elusive force in the President. The people trusted Lincoln, and, knowing their nature as he did, he never

INTRODUCTION xvii

abused their confidence and never doubted their support. This serene authority maddened the half intelligent congressman, who fancied himself the essence of a town-meeting, backed at any moment by overwhelming popular vote. Seward, with characteristic sagacity, noted that Congress frequently represented the Press, which they then mistook for the People. 1 Certainly, important issues were generally initiated by the legislative branch of government, and must be always confirmed, as soon as circumstance would admit. But in an extraordinary crisis, legislation was so carved out by circumstance and enforced by patriotic necessity that the congressional representative felt himself under duress, as it were. However, if he could not wholly initiate the necessary bill, he could scold ; and there was much talk against acting in accord with the " royal pleasure," in the words of Ben Wade. 2

This disappointed energy of congressmen and of party leaders generally culminated in the serious revolt against Lincoln in the early canvass for his reelection in 1864. Though the people had nominated him, these petty politicians fancied he could not be elected without their own instant help. They wanted something else, they did not know what, until the great ground swell of the people lifted the politicians on the wave, and swept away the McClellans and Seymours.

We must separate the dictatorial powers in the presidential hand — and so sparingly used by him — from the great act of emancipation, which produced the most far-reaching changes. The President herein acted from a line of prerogatives differing totally from those of a

1 Seward at Washington, 1861-72, p. 23. 2 Infra, p. 253.

xviii INTRODUCTION

dictator. If they had not differed, the influence of learned critics like Benjamin R. Curtis, 1 shouting " Usurpation!" would have created something more than a bubble on the surface of the foaming agitation of the time. The President, burdened with unsought responsibility in supervising incompetent generals, had come to be literally Commander-in-Chief as the war moved on. As soon as possible, the same conscientious ruler gladly yielded his baton to General Grant. His greatest military act was when his bloodless sword bent into a pen and struck the shackles from four million human beings. Tremendous powers were given by the American people to their Dictator and to their Commander-in-Chief ; but there was no mingling and confusion of the two entities. The capacity to recognize and discriminate these great governmental agencies, latent in the people, always put forth at the right moment, is a wonder.

A salient point of my study consists in the contention that, if the powers of the people, voluntarily thrust upon the administration in the year following the autumn of 1861, had been energized and fully employed, the tremendous changes in the Constitution and government of the United States would not have occurred. These events and their issues are matter of history. But if slavery had not been destroyed as it was, speculation can hardly conceive of its abolition. Plainly, legislative power could not have been moved to so great a change in the Constitution as matters stood. The border States were sluggish and indifferent to every kind of compensation offered ; the Northern Copperheads opposed every

INTRODUCTION xix

and any interference with the wonted enthrallment of the blacks. How can we conceive of the successful passage of constitutional amendments capable of solving the difficulty ? These speculations, however, go beyond our province. Our business is to inquire into the relations of the Union and the States, and we would ascertain why such vast popular intelligence, backed by enormous resources, did not instantly smash the Rebellion before arbitrary power could muster every man and some children, by desperate conscription, into open revolt.

Pursuing one particular theme, I am forced into some unwelcome criticism of Abraham Lincoln. But it is particular and not general criticism, intended only for the cases cited, and for the question of the moment. The record for the first eighteen months compels strict examination and considerable criticism. Lincoln's greatness grew with the occasion ; though his magnanimous spirit was innate and not installed by any election or inauguration. In managing affairs the President showed at times great facility ; but there were certain limitations inborn which affected his conduct of office, especially in the early period. Great in every contact with the whole people, he was often little toward his fellow-men. The sense of beauty, the quality of taste in truth and nobleness, had no place in his rugged nature. 1 Consequently the jester or the shrewd politician generally was manifest in his presidential intercourse. Neither the man nor the statesman predominated at the White House or in the intercourse of bureaus. The great man was a poor executive. Sagacious and sincere within, he xx INTRODUCTION

•

often affected those around him, as if he were a trifling clown. Average citizens, good patriots, could not comprehend how pearls could irradiate so rough a shell. Nor was this action mere modest merit languishing within the man. As John Hay shows, 1 he was ambitious to the core ; conscious of large ability, and seeking its exercise within such limits as his own lack of taste and breeding prescribed. Meanwhile, such self-seeking competitors as Chase — strong in conscious power and culture — were disgruntled and affronted by enforced contact with the Rail-splitter. Seward got his lesson early and learned the power of his master. Stanton, a disparaging critic at first, had no presidential ambition, 2 and was educated into loyal confidence by Lincoln's magnanimous treatment. These mighty men cooperated sincerely, though the restless ambition of Chase never could submit to Lincoln's dominating personality, while his intriguing spirit finally went to the verge of personal treachery. 3

All history loses when cast into topical form, but that form was inevitable here. Narrative proper would have included all events of the struggle, and in its mass must have obscured the main principles of this treatise. While the topics cannot follow a strict chronology, and more or less entangle necessary narrative, I trust that the main purposes of the work will become apparent.

There would have been advantages, if I could have included all the States in this study. But so much detail would have incumbered the main topic, which consists in the actual relations of a State — as such —

1 Cf. infra, p. 46. 2 Boutwell, Sixty Years, vol. ii, 89.

INTRODUCTION xxi

to the central organ of all the States. In the communities chosen, Morton, Andrew, and Curtin held continuous service throughout the war, Perhaps Morton had the most difficult post among all the Union patriots. His legislature sometimes was absolutely hostile and violent ; to keep the State not only in line, but actually moving forward, participating in all important movements, was a triumph in executive experience.

New York, the Empire State, likewise affords instructive lessons. The city has been always a disturbing factor in national politics. Great commercial centres produce much socially ; but they do not comprehend and cheerfully embrace the largest political issues. Commerce is an immense factor in civilization, but it is not superior or even coequal to civilization. Commerce was made for man. As we may not consider the Church in this connection, the development of the State is the greatest mundane interest of man. The great city, with its benumbing influence, brought the overwhelming numbers to Seymour which effected his election. Its backward tendencies confirmed him in his silly wandering after State-independence, and in his quasi-opposition to the national administration.

Although this study is limited to four States, and those Northern, my purpose is national in making it. The individual unionists and secessionists of 1861 are fast passing away. All of us should try to record and interpret the large and controlling principles of the tremendous struggle, as they worked out in the actual operations of the time. The secessionists of 1861 became after bloody trial and sacrifice renewed American citizens. By thorough patriotism and heroic effort they xxii INTRODUCTION

and their descendants have shown in these latter years that the United States has no better citizens than those dwelling in the Southern States. The dogmas of State- Rights and Secession have passed into the constitutional museum, which preserves all the wondrous structures now developed into the modern organism of liberty and law. However these dogmas were born and bred, — whatever their basis in legal evolution, — they were maintained by brave men and true women. No people ever fought more faithfully, or spent their substance more fully, than the people of the Southern Confederacy.

North and South must preserve the record and study the issues developed. The essential point, as well as the difficulty in historic treatment, is to view and estimate the facts in just proportion for all time. Now, the imperial Union is established in all minds, North and South ; then, when the facts occurred, they were passing through minds not judicially bent, but struggling for life or death.

In summing up my own impressions, I see, first, the personality of Abraham Lincoln, towering high above his time. The man was cast in heroic mould, and the circumstances shaping him to his work were the largest in history since Napoleon : perhaps larger than Napoleon's, for the soldier-emperor worked upon institutions which had been gradually losing their popular birthmark and character ; while Lincoln came with his environment directly from the people. Out of the very bosom and heart of humanity came this man, a daily offering to the caprices and humors of popular government, a final sacrifice to an assassin — the fruit of treason and rebellion.

INTRODUCTION xxiii

Secondly, I recognize that the leaders and generals of the Confederacy played a great part in this failure of disunion and the victorious ascendency of the Union. There has been much criticism of Jefferson Davis ; and doubtless his prejudices and pedantry were liable to censure. Yet it is pretty certain that no one could have accomplished more. The fall of the Southern idea as embodied in the Confederacy was fated ; its descent to the nadir of defeat and dissolution could not have been affected much by any individual living within its borders. Davis's necessary policy was inevitably aggressive as well as creative. He could not wait, as Lincoln could and did, for governmental powers latent in the people to spring forth and reestablish the Union. Davis had to make and break.

Lee was a great moral force at all times. As a soldier he was masterly in defense, provided his opponent did not exceed the scholastic traditions of decorous offense. He created opportunity out of the calculated weakness of his antagonists. Yet this master of defensive strategy fell short whenever attempting a serious offensive to crush his enemy. The gallant sons of the South could assault vigorously and win battles. They could not overcome their opponent intrenched in all the powers of representation, inclosed by all the works of civilization. To attain success, they must not only attack but destroy, demolish not only the men in arms, but the solid institutions which encompassed the Union soldier, protecting him whether in victory or defeat.

There is a third division, once citizens then state participants in the turmoil of the Civil War. It is not a class, for the individuals composing it cannot be clasxxiv INTRODUCTION

sified. It is composed of disunionists at the North. It is significant that, while Copperheads sought office persistently, the whole country never accepted a disunionist. It was not until Grover Cleveland brought new issues to the front that the Union gave control to the Democracy. Now we are coming into the third generation, which is disposed to forgive and even to forget. The Union is restored both North and South, and patriots everywhere prevail. No one cares to remember when he meets a patriot that his father struck against the flag. Those differences were adjusted. But what of secret betrayers, traitors at heart, who did not breast the battle openly ?

The great historic facts cannot be traversed or obscured. The outlines of the struggle for the Union must deepen, must become more manifest, as history records salient events and brings into relief the true meaning of men's acts in those days. If we depict Lincoln in massive form and drape him in heroic lines ; if we grant to Davis and Lee the epical grandeur belonging to a great cause sincerely lost — what next? How shall we define those abortive and mischievous creatures, who belonged neither to the Union nor to the Confederacy ?

" Men like these on earth he shall not find In all the miscreant race of human kind."

It is not agreeable to portray these individuals. It matters not that they might have been good fathers or neighbors — worshiping in due form and living properly. The State is over all and in all. Domestic life is important ; but in the great revolutionary crucibles the State must renovate or throw off every kind of matter

INTRODUCTION xxv

hostile to itself. Or, changing our view, the body politic must nourish itself, rejecting all waste-product, which, being rejected, becomes offal, hardly to be distinguished from treason and disloyalty. Verily, the lot of the Northern disunionist was hard. It will become harder, as time reveals more fully the discordant elements of that time in the clear white light of a restored and greater Union.

Chapter I

IN the winter of 1860-61, the United States was vexed by one of the greatest problems in civil government ever set forth in the history of the world. A great commonwealth comprising many differing communities had subdued the earth from ocean to ocean. These communities during some forty years had struggled for or against the system of labor that enslaved the African negro. All the powers of a brilliant branch of the Anglo-Saxon race, apt in political life, had been devoted to the pursuit and the extension of domestic slavery. According with this masterful passion and contingent to it, local self-government had developed vigorously in these slaveholding communities, devoting and attaching their citizens to a solid governing force known as State- Rights. 1 The inevitable principle that the whole must control the parts, 2 — in event of political difference, —

1 W. H. Russell, cited by Rhodes, vol. iii, 433. " State rights meant protection to Slavery, extension of slave territory, and free trade in slave produce with the outer world."

2 Webster held, according to Merriam, American Political Theories, p. 284, that the Union was established by the people of the United States, and not by the people of the several States. It was as all the people that they established the Constitution.

though embodied in the framework of the Constitution, had never worked itself out in our American experience.

The idea of Union — one out of many, not essentially acting against a part, but including the whole 1 even to the suppression of an offending part — worked itself slowly into the convictions of the American people, and through severe agony became the controlling purpose of their lives. Yet, a nebulous consciousness of this hovering force inhered in the political sentiment of the United States ; it strove for expression in the Northern States, and finally overcame the resisting forces, active in the Southern communities, latent in Europe.

To sketch the progress and to trace the interplay of these great governing principles — the overwhelming power of the Union, on the one hand, and the quickening force of home-communities, on the other — will be the purpose of this study.

A prevailing Union was a magnificent creation out of the progress of government. Perhaps the feeblest conception of this transcending idea that ever animated a practical Executive existed in the person and office of James Buchanan ; yet, such as it was, it prevailed. In that dark and trying winter, when the President, halting between many opinions, sustained the government after his fashion, there was only one positive idea that animated his muddled consciousness. It was true that he