Generals J.E. Johnston and G.T. Beauregard at the battle of Manassas, July 1861.

Contents

Preliminary

Part I. \ The Official Records

Johnston's Army of the Shenandoah and Beauregard's

Army of the Potomac. 7

Correspondence between the two army commanders, June

and July, 1861 8

General Johnston arrives at Manassas Junction 9

Order for battle 10

President Davis defines " relative positions " of Generals

Johnston and Beauregard 11

Extracts from General Johnston's official report 11

Extracts from General Beauregard's official report 15

Comments on the tenor of these two official reports in regard to the active command of General Beauregard. 21 Extracts from the official report of General D. E. Jones. . 22 Effect of the miscarriage of Beauregard's order to Ewell

to attack 23

President Davis promotes Beauregard to the rank of full

General 23

General H. E. Lee and the Secretary of War congratulate

Beauregard 24

Generals Johnston and Beauregard jointly is^ue a congratulatory address to their combined forces 24

Each of these two ranking Confederate officers acquired

great distinction , . 25

General Johnston, in his "Narrative," 1874, and in the Century 3Iagazine, May, 1885, claimed more credit than was justly his due, and attacked the correctness of General Beauregard's official report 26

IV CONTENTS.

Part II. General Johnstons Claims Considered

PASE

1. He would now liave it believed he " played with Pat-

terson, reinforced Beauregard, and won a victory " . . 27

2. He now claims that he sketched a simple order of march

on the 20th, which he begged General Beauregard to have prepared and submitted to him for inspection so that the order could be distributed to the troops before night 28

3. He now claims that Beauregard's second plan was

"frustrated," "perhapsfortunately," by the appearance of strong bodies of United States troops on the wooded heights in front of Mitchell's, Blackburn's and McLean's Fords 30

4. General Johnston says: "I had been waiting with

General Beauregard on Lookout Hill for evidence of General McDowell's design 34

5. In his "After-thoughts," General Johnston would have

it believed that it "was a great fault," on his part, that a large portion of Beauregard's troops were " not engaged in the battle " 39

6. He now says : " While we were riding forward General

Beauregard suggested to me to assign him to the immediate command of the troops engaged " 40

Y. General Johnston claims : " As fought, the battle was made by me," and adds : " Beauregard commanded those troops [on the Confederate left] under me ; as elsewhere, Lieutenant- Generals commanded corps, and Major-Generals divisions, under me " 42

8. General Johnston claims tliat : " There could have been no greater mistake on General Ewell's part than making the movement to Centreville " 44

Conclusion ^ -

Appendix. Copy of the order for battle 4G

Map of the battlefield and vicinity End

FIELD OF OPERATIONS IN VIRGINIA. JULY 18TH-216T, 1861.

PRELIMINARY.

In the latter part of September, 1861, at the joint request of Generals Johnston and Beauregard, I was appointed Major- General by President Davis, and ordered to report to General Johnston for duty as commander of the Second Corps of his army, then at and in the vicinity of Fairfax Court-house, Ya. The First Corps was commanded by General Beauregard. Intimate personal and official relations existed between the three of us.*

After it was decided by President Davis, in the first days of October, that General Johnston's army could not be reinforced to an extent sufficient to justify an immediate campaign of invasion, the forces were withdrawn to the neighborhood of Centreville. During the next few months we had abundant leisure, and, in that time, I became thorouglily acquainted with the principal events connected with the battle of Manassas and familiar with the ground upon which the fighting occurred. The impressions I then received were deep and lasting. They were derived from all available sources, principally from Generals Johnston and Beauregard.

* After the battle of Manassas, the combined forces of Generals Johnston and Beauregard were called the " Arnay of the Potomac"; which had been the designation of Beauregard's forces before the two bodies of troops were united. Those of the latter were now designated the First Corps, and Johnston's troops, from the Shenandoah, the Second Corps. Up to the time of my arrival General John,ston had commanded this corps, which consisted of eight brigades, not organized into divisions, and he, at the same time, commanded the army. I relieved General Johnston from duty as a Corps Commander, and he was thus enabled to give his undivided attention to the control of the army as a whole.

6 PRELIMINARY.

In 187i I read General Johnston's " Narrative," and was surprised and shocked to find that, in reference to Manassas, his accoftnt differed so greatly from the opinions I had formed in 1861, which were derived in great part from himself, and from reading liis official report.

In his " JSTarrative," he not only claimed more credit for his services in that battle than I had been led to believe he was justly entitled to receive, but, in my opinion, he now imfairly called in question the accuracy of General Beauregard's official report, and endeavored to detract from the well-earned distinction of that army commander.

In the Century Magazine^ May, 1885, General Johnston emphasized his attack on the correctness of General Beauregard's official report, and enlarged his own claims.

Since that time the official records have become accessible. I have made a synopsis of those records, and propose to contrast some of General Johnston's more recent statements with his own official report, and with facts which were well established in 1861.

BATTLE OF MANASSAS.

Part I.

The OJicial Records.

Early in tlie summer of 1861, General J. E. Jolmston commanded the Confederate Army of the Shenandoah, which protected that valley against the Federal forces under General Patterson ; whilst General G. T. Beaureguard commanded the Confederate Army of the Potomac, near Manassas, confronting the main Federal Army, which was in the vicinity of "Washington City.

These two Confederate leaders controlled separate armies ; and, each independently of the other, reported to, and received orders direct from the "War Department at Pichmond.

On the 11th of June, 1861, General Beaureguard, from Manassas, wrote to President Davis : "I wish it distinctly understood, however, that if the enemy should ofiFer battle on the line of Bull Pun, I shall accept it for my command, against whatever odds he may array in my front." Again, on the next day, he wrote : " The enemy seem to be taking the o^ensive towards Harper's Ferry, and a few days hence may find General J. E. Johnston in such a critical condition as to render it impossible to relieve him. If he were ordered to abandon forthwith his present position and concentrate suddenly his forces with mine, guarding with small detachments all the passes through which the enem}' might follow him, we could, by a bold and rapid movement forward, retake Arlington Heights and Alexandria, if not too strongly fortified and garrisoned, which would have the effect of recalling all the enemy's forces from Northern Virginia for the protection of Washington. I beg and entreat that a concerted plan of operations be adopted at once by the Government for its different columns. Otherwise we will be assailed in detail by superior forces and will be cut off or destroyed entirely."

From Winchester, on the 21st of that month, Major W. H. C. Whiting, General Johnston's Chief of Staff, wrote to General Beaureguard : "In the event of a move upon you, having now cleared the enemy from this part of the valley, the General xnight be able to throw from 5,000 to 6,000 men on his flank." Later, on the same day. General Johnston wrote to General Beauregard : " In the absence of a common superior, I am anxious to correspond with you — to be informed of your needs — that I may help you when the state of things in my front will permit me to do so."

On the next day General Beaureguard wrote to General -^Johnston : " I consider the chain of Bull Kun Mountain, Little Hiver, and Goose Creek a strong secondary line of defense for my left flank, but should they penetrate into Virginia, this side of it, by moving rapidly a strong force of your command to Aldie or Leesburg to take them in flank or rear, they would have to fall back on the Potomac, or run the risk of being cut off from their base of operations, particularly if I could attack them from here at the same time." Two days later : "I do not believe in the hostile advance of General Patterson, for I am informed, on what I consider good authority, that they have quite a stampede in Washington, thinking that we are going to unite our forces for its attack, or that you are going to cross the Potomac at or -about Edward's Ferry to attack it in rear, whilst I attack it in iront."

On the 9th of July, General Johnston wrote to General Beauregard : " I wrote you yesterday that intelligence I have just received indicated that the enemy's intention is to advance upon us here. Colonel Stuart, who is at the head of our scouting service, has just written to me, that he suspects, for certain cirfiumstances, that he will move forward to-night. We are just beorinnine: some little field works, , . . but have done too little to make them available. . . . Militia, about 2,000, were called out, but they have to prepare their own ammunition, which they have not done. So the chances are against us. Less so, however, than a retreat would make them."

The official records show that in the meantime General Beauregard more than once warned the Confederate Government, and General Johnston, that a forward movement of the main Federal Army from the vicinity of Washington was imminent. He urged the importance of transferring General Johnston's army from Winchester to the vicinity of Manassas, and again informed the Government that whether he received aid from General Johnston's forces or not, he had determined to hold the defensive line of Bull Kun ; and, when the Federals closely approached that position he would assume the offensive, cross that stream, and attack them.

On the 17th of July he telegraphed to the Government, and to General Johnston, that McDowell was advancing with his whole army, and had driven the Confederate outposts from Fairfax Court-house. The War Department at Richmond ordered General Johnston to move his army from Winchester to Manassas. That order was received about 1 A. m. on the 18th, and General Johnston telegraphed to the Government : "I have had the honor to receive your telegram of yesterday. General Patterson seems to have moved yesterday to Charlestown, twenty-three miles to the east of Winchester. Unless he prevents it, we shall move towards General Beauregard to-day."

On that day (the 18th) the Federals attacked Beauregard's line at Blackburn's Ford. That attack was repulsed, but Beauregard then refrained from making a counter-attack, by crossing Bull Run, because he preferred to await the arrival of Johnston's forces, which he knew had been, on the previous day, ordered to move to Manassas.

On the 19th, a small portion of Johnston's army reached Beauregard. About noon on the 20th, General Johnston himself arrived with another detachment, and he was then confident the w'hole of his forces would unite with those of Beauregard before daylight next morning.

10 GENEBAL8 JOHNSTON AND BEAUREGAED

During the night, by authority of General Johnston, General Beauregard drew np and signed an order for battle, directing the movements of all of Johnston's forces as well as his own.

That order -was formally approved, in writing, by General Johnston at 4.C0 a. m. on the 21st. It required that :

I. — Ewell's brigade, supported by Holmes' brigade, should commence the offensive movement by crossing Bull Run at Union Mills, and move on the Centreville road to attack the enemy.

II. — Jones' brigade, supported by Early's brigade, was to cross at McLean's Ford, and attack on Ewell's left.

III. — Longstreet's brigade, supported by Jackson's brigade, was to cross at McLean's Ford and go into action on Jones' left.

lY. — Bonhara's Brigade, supported by Bartow's brigade, was to cross at Mitchell's Ford, and go into action on Longstreet's left.

Y. — Cocke's brigade, supported by Elzey's brigade, was to cross at the Stone Bridge, and the fords on the right thereof, to the left of Bonham's brigade, and move to the attack in the direction of Centreville.

YI. — Bee's brigade, Wilcox's brigade, Stuart's cavalry, and Walton's battery, would constitute the reserve and was to cross at Mitchell's Ford, to be used as circumstances might require.*

At 5.30 A. M. on the 21st, it was reported that the Federals, in large force, were threatening close in front of Stone Bridge. Beauregard's plan, as given above, was at once modified, with the approval of General Johnston, so that the Confederate left would stand on the defensive, and only the right and centre would cross the stream — assume the active offensive — and immediately attack the left flank and rear of the Federals between Bull Bun and Ceutreville. This was Beauregard's second plan.

En route from Winchester to Manassas, General Johnston made an inquiry in regard to the " relative positions " of himself and General Beauregard. In reply President Davis telegraphed him :

* For the full text of this order see Appendix A.

" You are a General in the Confederate Army, possessed of tlie power attaching to that rank. You will know how to make the exact knowledge of Brigadier-General Beauregard, as well of the ground as of the troops and preparation, avail for tlie success of the object in which you co-operate. The zeal of both assures me of harmonious action."

Extracts from Gp:neral J. E. Johnston's Official Report.*

"... I reached Manassas about noon on the 20tli. I found General Beauregard's position too extensive, and the ground too densely wooded and intricate, to be learned in the brief time at my disposal, and therefore determined to rely upon his knowledge of it and of the enemy's positions. This I did readily from full confidence in his capacity. . . . I regarded the arrival of the remainder of the Army of the Shenandoah during the night as certain, and Patterson's junction witli the Grand [Union] x\rmy on the 22d as probable. During the evening it was determined, instead of remaining in the defensive positions then occupied, to assume the offensive and attack the enemy before such a junction. General Beauregard proposed a plan of battle, which I approved without hesitation. He drew up the necessary order during the night, which was approved formally by me at 4.30 o'clock on the morning of the 21st. The early movements of the enemy on that morning and the non-arrival of the expected troops prevented its execution. General Beauregard afterwards proposed a modification of the abandoned plan, to attack with our right while the left stood on the defensive. This, too, became impracticable, and a battle ensued different in place and circumstances from any previous plan on our side. . . . About 8 o'clock General Beauregard and I placed ourselves on a commanding hill in rear of General Bonliam's left. Near 9 o'clock the signal officer, Captain Alexander, reported that a large body of troops was crossing the valley of Bull Run some two miles above the [stone] bridge. General Bee, who had been placed near Colonel Cocke's position, Colonel

* " Official Records," Series I., Vol. II.. p. 470.

12 GENERALS JOHNSTON AND BEAUKEGARD

Hampton, witli Lis legion, and Colonel Jackson, from a, point near Genei-al Bonham's left, were ordered to hasten to tlie left iianlv. . . . The enemy, nnder cover of a strong demonstration on our right, made a long detour through the woods on his right, crossed Bull Run two miles above our left, and threw himself upon the flank and rear of our position. This movement was fortunately discovered by us in time to check its progress, and ultimately to form a new line of battle nearly at right angles with the defensive line of Bull Run,"

General Johnston then describes, in some detail, the movement of Colonel Evans, supported by General Bee, and later by Colonel Hampton, to cheek the enemy, advancing on the Sudley road ; and the withdrawal of these forces — after a bloody contest — to the plateau where the main fighting occurred later ; and on which Colonel Jackson's brigade had just formed in line of battle.

General Johnston adds : " In the meantime I waited with General Beauregard near the centre the full development of the enemy's designs. About 11 o'clock the violence of the firing on the left indicated a battle, and the march of a large body of troops from the enemy's centre towards the conflict was shown by clouds of dust. I was thus convinced that his great efiiort was to be made with his right. I stated that conviction to General Beauregard, and the absolute necessity of immediately strengthening our left as much as possible. Orders were accordingly sent to General Holmes and Colonel Early to move with all speed to the sound of the firing, and to General Bonham to send up two of his regiments and a battery. General Beauregard and I then hurried at a rapid gallop to the scene of action, about four miles off. On the way I directed my chief of artillery, Colonel Pendleton, to follow with his own and Alburtis' batteries. We came not a moment too soon. The long contest against five-fold odds and heavy losses, especially of field officers, had greatly discouraged the troops of General Bee and Colonel Evans. Our presence with them under fire, and some example, had the happiest effect on the spirit of the troops. Order was soon restored and the battle re-established, to which the firmness of Jackson's brigade greatly contributed. Then, in a brief and rapid conference, General Beauregard was assigned to the command of the left, which, as the younger officer, he claimed, while I returned to that of the whole field. . . .

" My headquarters were now established near the Lewis house. From this commanding elevation my view embraced the position of the enemy beyond the stream and the approaches to the Stone Bridge, a point of special importance. I could also see the advance of our troops far down the valley in the direction of Manassas and observe the progress of the action and the manoeuvres of the enemy."

Speaking of the main fighting on the plateau, General John, ston says : "• For nearly three hours they [the Confederate forces] maintained their position, repelling five successive assaults by the heavy masses of the enemy, whose numbers enabled him continually to bring up fresh troops as their preceding columns were driven back. Colonel Stuart contributed to one of these repulses by a well-timed and vigorous charge on the enemy's right flank with two companies of his cavalry. . . . The expected reinforcements appeared soon after. Colonel Cocke was then desired to lead his brigade into action to support the right of the troops engaged, which he did with alacrity and effect. Within a half hour the two regiments of General Bonham's brigade (Cash's and Kershaw's) came up, and were directed against the enemy's right, which he seemed to be strenghtening. Fisher's JSTorth Carolina regiment was soon after sent in the same direction. About 3 o'clock, while the enemy seemed to be striving to outflank and drive back our left, and thus separate us from Manassas, General E. K. Smith arrived with three regiments of Elzey's brigade. He was instructed to attack the right flank of the enemy, now exposed to us. Before the movement was completed he fell, severely wounded. Colonel Elzey, at once taking command, executed it with great promptitude and vigor. General Beauregard rapidly seized the opportunity thus afforded him, and threw forward his whole line. The enemy was driven back from the long-contested hill, and victory was no longer doubtful. lie made yet another attempt to retrieve the day. He again extended his right with a still

14 GENEEALS JOHNSTON AND BEAUREGARD

wider sweep to turn our left. Just as be reformed to renew the battle Colonel Early's three regiments came upon the field. The enemy's new formation exposed his right flank more even than the previous one. Colonel Early was therefore ordered to throw himself directly upon it, supported by Colonel Stuart's cavalry and Beckham's battery. He executed this attack bravely and well, while a simultaneous charge was made by General Beauregard in front. The enemy was broken by this combined attack. He lost all the artillery which he had advanced to the scene of the conflict. He had no more fresh troops to rally on, and a general rout ensued. Instructions were instantly sent to General Bonham to march by the quickest route to the turnpike to intercept the fugitives, and to General Longstreet to follow as closely as possible upon the right. Their progress was checked by the enemy's reserve and by night at Centreville. . . . Colonel Stuart pressed the pursuit on the principal line of retreat, the Sudley road. Eour companies of cavalry, under Colonel Radford and Lieutenant-Colonel Munford, which I had held in reserve, were ordered to cross the stream at Ball's Ford to reach the turnpike, the line of retreat of the enemy's left. ... A report came to me from the right that a strong body of U. S. troops was advancing upon Manassas. General Holmes, who had just reached the field, and General Ewell, on his way to it, were ordered to meet this unexpected attack. They found no foe, however. . . .

" Our victory was as complete as one gained by infantry and ai'tillery can be. An adequate force of calvary would have made it decisive. . . . The loss of the Army of the Potomac [Beauregard's] was 108 killed, 510 wounded, and 12 missing. That of the Army of the Shenandoah [Johnston's] was 270 killed, 979 wounded, and 18 missing. Total killed, 378 ; wounded, 1,489 ; missing, 30. ... It will be remarked that the three brigadier-generals of the Army of the Shenandoah were all wounded [General Bee, mortally]. . . .

" The apparent firmness of the U. S. troops at Centreville, who had not been engaged, which checked our pursuit ; the strong forces occupying the works near Georgetown, Arlington, and Alexandria ; the certainty, too, that General Patterson, if needed, would reach "Washington with his army of thirty thousand men sooner than we could, and the condition and inadequate means of the army in ammunition, provisions, and transportation prevented any serious thoughts of advancing against the capitaL It is certain that the fresh troops within the works were in number quite sufficient for their defense. If not. General Patterson's Army would certainly reinforce them soon enough." From General Johnson's report it might be inferred that General Beauregard ivaited until 11 a. m., " the full development of the enemy's designs " ; and that, at the end of that time, General Johnston gave specific instructions, telling General Beauregard what to do ; and when, and how, to do it. But General Johnston does not exactly say this. What he does say will be better understood in view of the specific statements contained in the following :

EXTBACTS FROM GeNEEAL BeAUREGARd's OFFICIAL RePORT.

" . . . . The "War Department having been informed by me, by telegraph, on the 17th of July, of the movement of General McDowell, General Johnston was immediately ordered to form a junction of his army corps with mine. . . . General Holmes was also directed to push forward. . . . General Johnston arrived here about noon on the 20th of July, and being my senior in rank, he necessarily assumed command of all the forces of the Confederate States then concentrating at this point. Made acquainted with my plan of operation and dispositions to meet the enemy, he gave them his entire approval, and generously directed their execution under my command. . . .

" It became necessary, on the morning of the 21st, before daylight, to modify the plan accepted, to suit the contingency of an immediate attack on our lines by the main force of the enemy, then plainly at hand. ... By half-past four a. m., on the 21st of July, I had prepared and dispatched orders* directing the whole of the Confederate forces within the lines of Bull Run, including the brigades and regiments of General Johnston which had arrived at that time, to be held in readiness to march at a

* See Appendix A.

16 GENEEALS JOHNSTON AND BEAUREGARD

moment's notice. . . . Informed at 5.30 a. m., by Colonel Evans, that the enemy had deployed some twelve hundred men with several pieces of artillery in his immediate front [at and above the Stone Bridge, the left of the Confederate line], I at once ordered him, as also General Cocke, if attacked, to maintain tlieir position to the last extremity. In my opinion, the most effective method of relieving that Hank was by a rapid, determined attack, with my right wing and centre, on the enemy's flank and rear at Centerville. ... By such a movement I confidently expected to achieve a complete victory for my country by 12 meridian. These new dispositions were submitted to General Johnston, who fully approved them, and the orders for their immediate execution were at once issued. Brigadier-General Ewell was directed to begin the movement, to be followed and supported successively by Generals D. R. Jones, Longstreet, and Bonham, respectively supported by their several appointed reserves. . . About 8.30 A. M. General Johnston and myself transferred our headquarters to a central position, about half a mile in rear of Mitchell's Ford, whence we might watch the course of events. ... In the meantime, about 7 o'clock a. m., Jackson's brigade, with Imboden's and five pieces of Walton's battery, had been sent to take up a position along Bull Hun, to guard the interval between Cocke's right and Bouham's left, with orders tO' support either in case of need. ... So much of Bee's and Bartow's brigades, now united, as had arrived, some twenty-eight hundred muskets, had also been sent forward to support the position of the Stone Bridge."

In his report, General Beauregard proceeds to describe the Federal movement, by Sudley's Ford, against the Confederate left, and the resistance offered by Evans, Bee and Hampton, before these three commands were forced back to the plateau upon which the main fighting occurred ; and he adds :

" From the point previously indicated, where General Johnston and myself had established our headquarters, we heard the continuous roll of musketry and the sustained din of the artillery, which announced the serious outburst of the battle on our left flank ; and we anxiously, but confidently awaited similar sounds of conflict from our front at Centreville, resulting from the prescribed attack in that quarter by our riglit wing. At Iialf-past ten A. M., however, this expectation was dissipated by a dispatch from Brigadier-General Ewell, informing me, to my profound disappointment, that my orders for his advance had miscarried ; but that in consequence of a communication from General D. R. Jones, he had just thrown his brigade across the stream at Union Mills. But, in my judgment, it was now too late for the effective execution of the contemplated movement, which must have required quite three hours for the troops to get into position for the attack. Therefore, it became immediately necessary to depend on new combinations and other dispositions suited to the now pressing exigency. The movement of the right and centre,, already begun by Jones and Longstreet, was at once countermanded, with the sanction of General Johnston, and we arranged to meet the enemy on the field upon which he had chosen to give us battle. . . . These orders having been dul}^ dispatched by staff oflBcers, at 11.30 a. m.. General Johnston and myself set out for the immediate field of action. ... As soon as General Johnston and myself reached the field we were occupied with the organization of the heroic troops whose previous stand, with scarce a parallel, has nothing more valiant in all the pages of history. ... It was now that General Johnston impressively and gallantly charged to the front, with the colors of the 4rth Alabama regiment by his side, all the field officers of the regiment having been previously disabled. ... As soon as we had thus rallied and disposed our forces, I urged General Johnston to leave the immediate conduct of the Held to me, while he, repairing to Portici (the Lewis house), should urge reinforcements forward. At first he was unwilling, but, reminded that one of us must do so, and that properly it was his place, he reluctantly, but fortunately complied ; fortunately, because from thstt position, by his energy and sagacity, his keen perception and anticipations of my needs, he so directed the reserves as to insure the success of the day."

In his report, General Beauregard describes, in detail, several phases of the main fightiijg, and adds :

"Now, full 2 o'clock p. M., I gave the order for the riglit of my line, except my reserves, to advance to recover the plateau.

. . . The Federal lines were broken and swept back at all points from tbe open ground of the plateau. Rallying soon, however, as they were strongly reinforced by fresh regiments, the Federalists returned, and, by weight of numbers, pressed our lines back, recovered their ground and guns, and renewed the offensive. By this time, between half-past 2 and 3 o'clock p. m., our reinforcements pushed forward, and, directed by General Johnston to the required quarter, were at hand just as I had ordered forward, to a second effort for the recovery of the plateau, the whole line, including my reserve, which, at this crisis of the battle, I felt called u])on to lead in person. . . . Tlie whole open ground was again swept clear of the enemy, and the plateau around the Henry and Robinson houses remained fully in our possession. ... While the enemy had thus been driven back on our right, entirely across the turnpike, and beyond Young's Branch on our left, the woods yet swarmed with them, when our reinforcements opportunely arrived in quick succession and took position in that part of the field."