Phases of royal government in New York, 1691-1719 ...

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Book _,^ Syr

Phases of Royal Government in New York 1691-1719

A DISSERTATION

Chapter I. Introduction

As a royal province in the British empire in the eighteenth century, New York well illustrates the duality of political existence characteristic of such a community. It was, on the one hand, a province with its own local interests to be respected and developed, its peculiar history, and its own local consciousness of these as features of identity. It was, equally, on the other hand, a part of the British empire, with its share of the benefits and burdens attaching to that relation. The ideal of empire, probably only vaguely before the mind of the British government at that time, provided for co-operation and interaction between these two aspects of provincial existence, which, while always emphasizing imperial welfare, yet sought to achieve that welfare by development of the peculiar situation of the province. For example, provincial policy in the matter of Indian relations illustrates with peculiar felicity this duality of existence. Upon maintenance of the friendly relations with the Iroquois, inherited from the Dutch, depended, not alone the fur-trade, but the very existence of the province. Experience developed the fact that, owing to the peculiar position of the Five Nations among the native races of the continent, this Iroquois alliance was the key to the Indian policy of all the continental English communities taken together. Successful administration of this problem required recognition of both local and general aspects and the elaboration of a line of conduct vvhich should make the two aspects serve each other.

It was the unic[ue task of the governor of such a province to blend, in his actual conduct of public affairs, these two aspects of provincial existence. In theory, he was the governmental head of the community, and, at the same time, the crown's agent in this particular unit of the administrative system of a general imperial policy. In theory, also, the organization of the legislature provided simply for assistance to the governor in the execution of his dual function by representatives of the community at large. Actually, however, as described in Chapter II., the organization and relations of the executive official system made it far iiiorc easily and characteristically llic exponent of the policy of the imperial government than of the local interests of the province. Similarly, the legislature became, in practice, the exponent of local-provincial feeling and policy, rather than of any attempt to embody this with general imperial interest in the conduct of public aflfairs.

It is obvious that the realization of the ideal of co-operation and supplementation of these two aspects of provincial existence would be difficult. As in the case of the Holy Roman Empire successful working required mutual confidence on the part of the two elements, which was seldom realized ; so, in this case, the relation between executive and legislature was seldom for any long period one of mutual understanding and intelligent co-operation. There were certain circumstances in particular, acting as obstructions in the path of the realization of the ideal, which may be mentioned. The imperial administration, on the one hand, awkward and lumbering under the best of circumstances, failed to exercise the requisite care in the delicate matter of appointment to the governorship. Court influences resulted in the a]:)pointment of adventurers like Fletcher and Cornbury. Even when pains were taken to select a man on the basis of the particular needs of the situation from the government point of view, the result might not be the choice of a man with the right sort of skill. This was true in the case of the Bellomont appointment. Even in the case of what was, in its results, the nearest to an ideal appointment — that of Hunter — efficient svipport from home could not be relied upon by th.e appointee. Circumstances of local character in the province, on the other hand, v/ere equally an obstruction to the attainment of the ideal. In the first place, the heat of factious passion, coming over from the Leisler affair, caused popular attention and interest to center more on measures bringing triumph to one or other of the local factions than on issues of truly public policy. Then, too, outside the realm of Leislerian or .Anti-Leislerian politics, the men of leading calibre were, as a class, characterized more by selfish ambition for the interests of a group of local magnates and their dependents, than bv intelligent appreciation of the true relations of local-provincial and general-imperial interests.

The actual interworking of all these features, during the first twenty years after 1691, was such that we may say that durir.g all this time there was no effective opportunity for the realization of the possibilities contained in the theory of the Royal Provin':e. Not until experience had brought the province through a period of developing education, and fortune had brought to the governorship a man having both an intelligent conception of the ideal, and — what was equally important — the personal temperament and political skill capable of making an impression on the actual conduct of affairs, was a sound basis of political development reached.

The four months of Sloughter's administration served merely to commit the newly established government to the policy of persecuting the leaders of the Leislerian regime. Whatever may be the degree of truth in Smith's violently hostile characterization of Sloughter, he certainly was not a person of the strength of character required to settle the government in a community torn with faction as was- New York. Ingoldsby's administration of fourteen months was, in main outline, a continuation of the regime inaugurated under Sloughter's auspices by those who had played the part of victims during Leisler's rule. Ingoldsby's administration illustrated the characteristics of periods happening with unfortunate frequency during New York's early existence as a royal province, viz., the intervals between the death, removal or long absence of a governor, and his return or the arrival of the next incumbent. Under such circumstances, there was likely to be either a suspension of the more active and aggressive features of provincial development, with surreptitious exploitation of opportunities for private gain, such as corrupt dealings in land grants, or a violent use of governmental machinery, made unscrupulous by a consciousness of desperation such as is illustrated in the last weeks of Nanfan's power. Ingoldsby's term, in 1691-1692, illustrates the former group of activ ities, which served almost as well as the other type of proceedings to hinder the normal development of the possibilities of interaction between the two aspects of provincial existence.

The administration of Fletcher, from 1692 to 1698, did little to improve the situation. Important elements of the imperial system were perverted for corrupt purposes. The system of connivance at violations of the imperial trade system enriched a few New Yorkers at the expense of the ideal of the empire. Extravagant grants of land to a few favorites endangered Indian

O rilASKS OF ROYAL GOVERNMEiNT

relations and retarded the development and peopling of the province for many years to come. The circumstances of war on the frontiers necessitated activity in those departments of the imperial and provincial systems which bore on military matters, but the actual conduct of these affairs did little to promote tlie spirit of co-operation. Fletcher's conduct of hostilities was energetic, but unskilful and wasteful. The heavy burdens of taxation and detaciiments of militia for frontier service were not rendered lighter by the conviction on the part of many that the governor's arrogance and lack of tact were responsible for the disobedience of the neighboring provinces to the direction from England that they should be aiding and assisting to New York. The home government itself was hard pressed and could render bttle effective aid. Then, Fletcher's attitude in matters of local partisanship was practically a continuation of the Anti-Leislerian course pursued by the government since Sloughter's arrival. This complicated the relations between governor and assembly in the matter of raising supplies for military purposes. Altogether, these were not favorable circumstances for the development of the ideal of co-operation between the local and imperial aspects of provincial life.

Bellomont's arrival inaugurated a veritable revolution in the course of affairs. He threw himself vigorously into the task of the suppression of piracy, in so far as New York was concerned therewith. He put into practice, as it was intended to be used, the system of penalties for violations of the acts of trade and navigation. In other words, the imperial trade system, with ill the machinery that that involved, began to have effective operation in New York for the first time. Bellomont was very active in attempts at development of the positive aspect of the imperial trade system, and expended much energy in devising ways and means for inaugurating the naval stores policy in New York. It was impossible for him to develop the crown's landed estate on account of Fletcher's misconduct, but all his efforts went towards correcting and undoing as far as jijossible that official's mischief. Rut in all this, as in other matters, the complication of local jjartisan politics exercised a baleful influence. Fletcher and Cornbury went through the motions of a zeal for the empire, which, practically, as events worked out, meant a zeal for the personal welfare of themselves and a favored group of magnates whose provincial interests made political influence with the government necessary to them. In the case of Bellomont we have a genuine zeal for imperial interests, intelligently conceived and impartially administered, as far as "graft" is concerned. But the circumstances of his accession and the circumstances of the province combined to make the spirit of partisanship in the assembly and in the subordinate executive service too much for him to control.

Long before he came to the province it was known that he was enthusiastically of the opinion that the Leislerian cause and party had been shamefully treated. So much of his activity on arriving in the province was of the negative kind — undoing mischief and punishing wrong-doers — and he made it such a personal affair with Fletcher that, with a people of provincial character, he could hardly avoid presenting the appearance of being chief of the Leislerian faction. This, of course, awakened into well-nigh ungovernable activity the revengeful zeal of the friends of Leisler. Bellomont had his hands full, even when he was in the province, in keeping a decent peace. When, then, death removed the only member of the government whose authority and personality was sufficient to hold passions in leash, the violence of the long-repressed Leislerians knew no bounds. The debauch of vindictive passion under the administration of Nanfan, of which the Bayard and Hutchins trial and the confiscation of Robert Livingston's estate are the most conspicuous manifestations, is a measure for us of Bellomont's real service. From some points of view it seems as if Bellomont's administration was too short to am.ount to anything as an object-lesson of what royal provincial government might be. But the odds against success in this attempt were heavy. The division of his attention between three governments, lack of the most efficient support from home, the excessive rage of passions, for a part of which lie was, for personal rea.sons, unwittingly and inevitably responsible, militated strongly against the success of his administration. Hard-won progress was made towards giving the theory of the empire a chance. But the province needed more experience to make this beginning fruitful.

Up to the time of Bellomont's death, it may be said that the exponents of the general-imperial aspect of provincial life had been more conspicuous, had been more bold in grasp and initia-

10 PHASES OF KOYAL GOVERNMENT

tivc. This was natural. The assembly was new to its work. The circumstances of war complicated development. Nanfan's administration from 1701 to 1702, taken as the outspoken and unrestrained expression of what was present but suppressed under Bellomont, is the time when local provincial forces get the upper hand. This period, discouraging in its revelation of possibilities, is not to be taken as fairly representing what was truly characteristic of provincial life, any more than Fletcher's administration is to be taken as an exemplification of the imperial theory. In fact, the" features of excessive violence may be regarded as the consequences of the exasperation resulting from the Sloughter and Fletcher regimes, and the escape from utter wrecking of the imperial machinery, wdiich even the most violent Leislerians recognized as out of the question as a matter of expediency, may be regarded as due to Bellomont.

The promise of better things, vaguely felt as expressed in tlie appointment of Cornbury, came to nothing. His relationship to the queen and his "interest" at court flattered the New Yorkers' sense of importance. But experience soon developed to the eyes of the knot of maG:nates, v/ho were the real springs of power in the province, that for their purposes he was worse than Fletcher and Bellomont. We may indeed suppose that this group of leading individuals, standing, really, midway between popular feeling in general and the particular designs of the empire for the province, had themselves grown into slightly largerminded conceptions of tlie interest of the province. Still they looked upon public policy with a view in which their personal interests bulked most conspicuously. For their purpose, a governor must manage to keep just enough in favor with the home

-^overnment to keep his place, and must equally escape ahenating popular provincial favor so as to avoid frittering away his energy in fruitless quarrels with the popular element — fruitless, that is, to their schemes. The great service rendered by Cornbury 's administration to the development of New York as a royal province was the fact that he lost estimation both with the people of the province and with the local magnates, and thus compelled a measure of union among all elements for a common public end. This union against Cornbury's aim to make both imperial and ])rovincial interests serve his personal ends was finally successful.

But another short term of office — that of Lovelace for six

IN NEW YORK, 169I-I719. II

months — and another interval of government by a figure-head — Ingoldsby, again, for thirteen months — intervened before the arrival of a governor adequate to the task before him.

In Hunter we have the first governor whose administration displayed not only intelligent zeal for the empire and sympathetic appreciation of the situation of the provincials, but also the ability to relate these two features in the actual conduct of affairs.

Full description of these successive administrations and of Hunter's career in New York would be an extensive task, requiring for its satisfactory 'achievement materials not at present accessible. It would practically constitute a political history of the province during its first 'stage of royal provincial existence. It is one of the purposes of this sketch rather to describe as carefully as may be the two elements of the governmental system, representing respectively the general-imperial and the local-provincial aspects of New York, as they actually developed during the period from 1691 to the close of Hunter's administration. Chapters II. and III. are concerned with this description. These chronological limits are chosen because this was the period during v/hich were elaborated the main outlines of the system and the more or less permanent methods of control, of that which has always been fundamental in English political development, viz., the power of the purse. Throughout all the manifestations of social and public life in the province, there was, to an extent, a general contest between provincial and imperial ideals. The essentially fundamental relation of financial, to all other questions, gives particular importance to the development of the contest between these ideals in the matter of control over raising and spending public money. In chapters IV. and V. an endeavor is m.ade to trace the story of this development. The elaboration of this financial system and the application of the results of the controversy over the matter to the general conduct of provincial aflfairs, in a way, make up the first stage of the existence of New York as a royal province.

Chapter II. The Executive Official System

In the original constitution of government in the province of New York, after its organization by the government of William and Mary, the executive held a position of especial advantage and, at first, at any rate, of power. The newly established assembly took some time in learning its position and possible power, and a struggle for vantage ground preceded its engagement in the struggle for the dominating position in the provincial government which it afterward attained. And in the executive department tlie governor was easily the dominating figure. There were other executive officials, holding office by patent from the crown and having functions important in provincial and imperial life. The executive aspect of the functions of the council was also of great importance. Nevertheless the relations between the governor and these officials and the council were such that, in the last analysis, it was the character and aims of the individual who held the office of governor that determined the complexion of the adminir^tration of public affairs in the province.

With this view of the importance of the governor, the circumstances surrounding appointment to an office of so great possibilities come to be of interest. The appointment was made by the King in Council, the name of the appointee was then signified by the Principal Secretary of State, wlto was at the time in charge of colonial affairs, to the Board of Trade, and at the same time the latter were desired to prepare a commission and a set of instructions. The influences actually having weight in the selection of individuals for this im.portant office are not easy to determine. Authoritative information on the subject is scanty and fragmentary and yields only negative results to the search for light on the workings of the imperial system at this period.

It would appear that, whether solicited or not, the crown did not lack for intimations from interested parties, at any rate as to the qualities desired in an appointee. Thus, in 1689 we find a petition to the king from twenty-one merchants trading to and in New York, expressing to the king satisfaction in the appointment of Sloughter, calling attention to the strategic position of

New York and desiring- that some military force and equipment be sent out with the,new irovernor.^ In 1701, after the death of Bellomont, we find Robert Livingston in a long communication to the Board of Trade mentioning as among the things necessary at that time for the preservation of the province, "that a governor be appointed who is a soldier, a man fearing God and hating covetousness and who will administer impartially without siding with any faction."- Again, in 1708, we find Lewis Morris writing to the Secretary of State in terms of the greatest freedom as to the "impudent conduct of the Governors, to call it no worse, that has been the great prejudice of her Majesty's service in America ;" adding, "We are told Sir Gilbert Heathcote has made some interest for his brother. Coll. Caleb Heathcote; he will be a man to the general satisfaction of ye people, and at this juncture to obteine a resetlement of her Ma j -ties revenue no man fitter. I know no man understands the Province or People better, or is more capable of doing her Majestic reall service. He is an honest man and the reverse of my Lord Cornbury."^ Whether either of these latter communications, or their substance, ever came to the knowledge of the sovereign is of course impossible to determine. Certainly Cornbury was as far as it is possible to conceive from the ideal figure sketched by Livingston and the appointment of Lovelace would at best indicate that military qualities at that juncture were considered more important than thoroug'h understanding of the province and people.

The appointment of Bellomont. an appointment as to which we have more than the usual amount of evidence concerning the crown's specific purpose, and upon which, apparently, unusual care was expended in consideration of the qualities of the appointee, reflected the disposition to consider more the interests of the trading empire at large than the exceedingly peculiar local situation in New York. At that time the quality of impartiality mentioned in Livingston's requirements was quite as necessary as in 1 70 1, and in this particular Bellomont was deficient, at any rate in any effective degree, and his predilection for the cause of one

14 PHASKS OF ROYAL GOVERNMENT

of tb.e factions in the province had hcen matter of pubHc knowlcdge before his appointment..^

In the case of Fletcher, (1692-1698), we have his own assertion in liis defence against charges of corruption, that "in the Irish Warr" and in his thirty years of service precechng he was "so far from making gaine by the misfortunes of our friends that I never did it from the ruine of our enemies and it was I presume the report of this behaviour that sent me into New York for I had never thought of the place till the moment it was proposed to me and my answer required."- We have no more than his own assertion for these points, however, and in the reply made to this defence of Fletcher's, we have a hint as to forces that were reputed to have great weight in the making of all these appointments. It was asserted that, so far as misfortunes in Ireland were concerned, Bellomont had suffered more in this particular "from that power that preferred and advanced Col. Fletcher," and that, too, at a time when Fletcher was not disturbed in his patrimony." As to Fletcher's need for the exercise of favor from some quarter, we have the testimony of William Penn to the fact of his being "a necessitous man," of whom it was to be feared that he would "more consider the advancement of his own private fortunes than the public benefit of the Province."*

The disposition to explain the influences determining appointments in terms of other things than personal fitness is reflected all through William Smith's "History of New York." Thus in the case of Sloughter's appointment he remarks that a governor never was more necessary for reconciling a divided people as well as for defending them ; "But cither through the hurry of the King's affairs or the powerful interest of a favorite a man was sent over utterly destitute of every qualification for government."^ In like manner. Smith describes Cornburv's earlv

' "The King did him the honor to say that he thought him a man of resolution and integrity, and with these qualities more likely than any other he could think of, to put a stop to the growth of piracy." Smith. History of New York, p. 150.

Mbid. IV. 458.

'' Smith, p. 122. Colden's estimate of the reliability of Smith's characterizations of governors was very low, Smith's defects in this regard being ascribed to "force of early prejudice — a narrow education, a weak desertion of James II. for William, and adds, "King William in gratitude for his services gave him a commission for this government."^

The appointment of Hunter is the most interesting of all, for, though he proved to be the best governor New York ever had, there seems to be no evidence that there was anything more in this case than the bestowal of a place on a favorite, this time happening to be a man well qualified for his post. Smith mentions his acquaintance with Addison and others and hazards the suggestion that it was "by their interest that he was advanced to this profitable place."- Colden in his Letters on Smith's "History" mentions Hunter's membership in the guard of honor of the Princess Anne when she retired from her father's court, his service in William's and Anne's army till after Ramillies, his commission as governor of Virginia, obtained through "friends in Queen Anne's Court," and, further, names Dr. Arbuthnot, the queen's favorite physician, as the court influence behind Hunter. "The Duke of Marlborough's influence over the Queen began about this time to lessen, and Dr. Arbuthnot prevailed with the Queen to name Mr. Hunter for the government of Jamaica which happened to be vacant without consulting her Ministry who had designed that government for another, but Mr. Hunter being apprehensive that if he went to Jamaica against the inclinations of the ministry he would be made uneasy in his government and the government of New York becoming vacant at this time by the death of Lord Lovelace, the Ministers were willing that he should have the Government of New York, therefor Mr. Hunter desired his friends to inform the Queen that he would rather have the government of New York than Jamaica, and it was accordingly granted him."^ An undoubted instance in eighteenth century English politics of "something equally as good" !

judgement and a stubborn temper of mind" (N. Y. Hist. Soc. Colls., 1869, p. 207). It is not necessary to agree with Colden in this opinion of Smith, but, apart from the general question, it is to be observed that upon the point of reasons leading to the appointment Smith would probably be simply recording what was matter of general impression m N. Y. at the time and, so far as this goes, his serviceability is hardly to be impeached.

!0 1 iiASiiS OF ROYAL GOVERN M1£NT

Huring the period under consideration, three of the governors were members of the nobihty — Richard, Earl of Bellomont, Edward, Viscount Cornbury, and John, Lord Lovelace, Baron of Hurley; three were soldiers — Colonels Sloughter and Fletcher, and Brigadier Hunter. None were natives of New York or persons with previous experience in any practical way with the affairs of the dependencies. All but one, Sloughter, were governors of other provinces at the same time with their incumbency in New York ; Fletcher, of Pennsylvania, from 26 October, 1692, to 20 August, 1694; Bellomont, throughout his incumbency, of Massachusetts and New Hampshire; Cornbury, Lovelace and Hunter, of New Jersey. It does not appear that this circumstance of a double government was regarded in New York as of very serious importance except in the case of Bellomont, who was absent from New York for nearly a year out of his three years of residence in America. At this time a petition of thirtythree New York merchants was preferred to the king, alleging that the strictness of Bellomont's instructions to the lieutenant governor during his (Bellomont's) absence acted as a great hindrance to justice, trade and industry without any advantage to other sui'jccts or to the king, and praying that the province be restored to "its former manner of administration unconcerned with the Governor of any other place. "^ This should probably be interpreted, however, as a part of the general mercantile hostilitv to Bellomont rather than as a serious complaint on this point as a specific grievance. As to the connection with New Jersey, no complaint appears from any quarter in New York, and tliere would seem to be little reason for any, for the governor's absences in that province were only for the purpose of meeting the assembly there and the sessions rarely consumed more than seven or eight weeks out of the year. In 1709 the point was raised, whether orders concerning New York given by the governor when he himself was in New Jersey were not void. The Board of Trade gave opinion that this was "groundless and unreasonable the contrary being practised every Day here by the Lords Lieutenants of Counties and particularly by the Lords Lieutenants of Ireland who frequently send orders into Ireland whilst they are Resident in the Kingdom."^

The tenure of office by the governor was during the pleasure of the crown and the powers granted by the commission were to be exercised immediately upon arrival within the province, which arrival, followed immediately by the publication of the commission, worked the determination of the effectiveness of the commission of the preceding incumbent.^ It might, and frequently did, happen that some time elapsed between the appointment of a governor and the exercise by him of the powers conveyed by his commission. Thus :

Sloughter — Commission dated 14 November, 1689 ; arrived in New York 19 March, 1691.

Fletcher — Commission dated 17 March, 1692; arrived in JSjew York 28 August, 1692.

Bellomont- — Appointed 16 March, 1697 ; arrived 2 April, 1698.

Cornbury — Appointed 13 June, 1701 ; arrived 3 May, 1702.

Lovelace — Appointed 28 March, 1708; arrived 18 December, 1708.

Hunter — Appointed 9 September, 1709; arrived 14 June, 1710.

During the period from 1691 to 1720 the frequency with which the office of governor changed hands undoubtedly constituted a feature of weakness in the imperial system of colonial admisintration.^ Eleven different persons administered the powers of the governor's commission during the above-mentioned period, of whom six held commissions as governor and six acted ad interim ; one, Ingoldsby, as commander-in-chief, from 2^ July, 1691, to 30 August, 1692, and as lieutenant governor from 6 May, 1709, to 10 April, 1710; one, Nanfan, as lieutenant governor from 20 May, 1701, to 3 May, 1702; and two, as president of the council, Beekman, from 10 April, 1710, to 16 June, 1710, and Schuyler, from July, 1719, to September, 1720. There was one period of interregnum, as it were. On the death of Bellomont, 5 March, 1701, the lieutenant governor, Nanfan, was

^ Smith (p. 149) says that Bellomont was appointed in 1695 but the appointment was signified to the Board of Trade on the above date. Col. Doc. IV. 261.

^ Egerton : A Short History of British Colonial Policy, pp. 156-8.

15 PHASES OF ROYAL GOVERN MliNT

on leave of absence in Barbadoes. Dispute immediately arose as to whether powers of administration devolved upon the president of the council or upon the council acting by a majority of votes under the presidency of the eldest councilor. The violence of the spirit of faction then raging in the province caused the eldest councilor, William Smith, to proceed with so great caution that no precedent could be said to have been created by the case, the details of which will be related in anotb.er connection. Fortunately no outbreak occurred, and the arrival of Xanfan, 20 May, 1701, {)ut an end to an extremely awkward situation. Making no distinction between governors holding office by commission and persons administering the povv'ers of the commission ad interim, the office changed hands ten times between 1691 and 1720, and the average term was, approximately, two years and a half. J t is to be noted with respect to this average, that it does not by any means tell the story. The terms of two governors, Sloughter and Lovelace, were cut very short by death, in the case of Sloughter, after four months, and in the case of Lovelace, after six months, of office. As we shall see, the powers of a lieutenant governor or a president of the council, particularly the latter, were of a somewhat curtailed character, compared v»ith those of a governor ; so that as material for the study of the working of the imperial system under normal circumstances, we have during this period only the administrations of Fletcher, of five years and a half, Bellomont, nearly three years, Cornbury, five years and a half, and Hunter, a little over nine years.