1815, Waterloo

BOOK ONE. Entrance into Campaign

'Chapter I. — The Last Army of the Empire. PAGE

I. — The transition from a peace to a war footing. — Recall of the men on leave of absence. — Mobilization of the National Guard. — The conscription of 1 8i 5 9

II. — The armament and clothinj^. — Supplies.^The fortresses.

— The war budgf t 17

III. — First and second distributions of the troops into army corps. — Strength of the first army and the auxiliary

army on June 15, 1815 24

IV. — Removals and promotions 26

V. — The command: The Marshals of France 30

VI.— The command : The Chief of Staff 35

VIT. — The command- The Generals 38

VIII. — The spirit of the Army 43

Chapter II. — The Plans of Campaign

r. — Idea of an invasion of Belgium in the first days of April. . 51

II.— The Allies' plan of campaign 53

III. — Napoleon's plan of campaign 55

IV. — Concentration of the French Army (June 8-14). — Arrival of the Emperor at Beaumont. — Strength and positions

of the armies on June 14th 38

Chapter III. — First Combats

I — Passage of the Belgian frontier (June 15th). — The desertion of General Bourmont 61

II. — Capture of Charleroi 64

III. — Interview between Napoleon and Ney. — Combat of Gilly

on the right wing 66

IV. — The operations of Ney. — Combat of Gosselies. — Combat of I Frasnes. — Quatre-Bras 70

4 Table of Contents.

Chapter I. — The Morning of June i6th. page I. — The plans and orders of Napoleon (from five to eight

o'clock) 73

II. — The departure of Napoleon for Fleurus (half-past nine). . . 75

III. — Concentration of the Prussian Army to the north of the Ligny. — Inactivity of the English Arm}' during the day of June 15th. — The ball of the Duchess of Richmond (night of June I5th-i6th).. . 77

IV. — Arrival of Wellington at Quatre-Bras (June i6th, ten o'clock). — Interview betwpen Wellington and Blticher at the mill of Bussy, near Ligny (one o'clock in the afternoon) 81

Chapter II. — The Battle 0/ Ligny

I. — -The field of battle. — Dispositions of Blxicher and Napoleon 85

II. — From three o'clock until four: Attacks of Saint- Amand by

Vandamme and of Ligny by Gerard 89

III. — From four o'clock until half-past seven: Counter-attack of Bliicher. — Appearance of a supposed column of the enemy upon the flank of the French Army. — Demonstration of Grouchy against the Prussian left. — Stubborn fight in Saint-Amand and Ligny 92

IV. — From half-past seven o'clock until half-past nine: Final assault. — Capture of Ligny. — Combats o 1 the hills. — Retreat of the Prussians 98

Chapter III. — The Battle of Quatre-Bras

I. — Inaction of Marshal Ney during the morning of June i6th.

Reiterated orders of the Emperor 10,3

II. — Attack of Quatre-Bras bv the corp-; of Reille (two o'clock in the afternoon). — ^Return of WeUington to Quatre- Brai and arrival of the first English reinforcements (three o'clock). — Death of the Duke of Brunswick (half-past four o'clock) 106

III. — False movement of Count d'Erlon 1 10

IV. — The charge of Kellermann's cuirassiers (six o'c1ock).^Offensive movement c^f Wellington (seven o'clock). — The French driven back into their first positions (from eight to nine o'clock) 113

Chapter IV. — The Retreat of the Prussian Army

I. — The first plans of Napoleon for the day of June 17th. . . . 118 II. — The orders of the Emperor to Grouchy (between eleven

and half-past eleven o'clock) 121

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PAGE

III. — Retreat of the Prussian Army on Wavre 124

IV.— Movements of Pajol and Exelmans towards Namnr and

Gembloux in pursuit of the Prussian columns 126

V. — March of the army ot Grouchy — Bivouac at Gembloux.— Letter of Grouchy to the Emperor (ten o'clock in the evening) 128

Chapter V. — The Retreat of the English Army

I. — Exchange of despatches between Bliicher and Wellington (morning of June 17th). — Retreat of the English Army

(ten o'clock) . 134.

II. — Arrival of Napoleon at Quatre-Bras, still occupied by the

English cavalry (two o'clock) 136

III. — Vigorous pursuit of the English rear guard by Napoleon in person — Combat of Genappe. — Cannonade of Mont

Saint-Jean (seven o'clock) 1 39

IV. — The night bivouac 141

V. — Uncertainties of Napoleon. — Letter from Bliicher to Wellington. — Orders of Napoleon (night of June lyth-iSth) 143

Chapter I. — Bliicher and Grbuchy

I. — Dispositions and movements of the Prussian Army on the morning of June i8th — Departure from Wavre of

Field Marshal Bliicher (eleven o'clock) 149

II.— Dispositions of Grouchy _. . ^5^

III. — Discussion between Gerard and Grouchy at Walhain

(noon) i.'^S

Chapter II. — The Battle of Waterloo. — Morning. I. — Topography of the field of battle , . 158

II. — Positions of the Anglo-Dutch Army 160

III. —Luncheon of Napoleon at Caillou.— Letter to Grouchy. . . 163 IV —The last review (ten o'clock).— Order of battle of the French Army. — Disposition of Napoleon for the attack

(eleven o 'clock) 167

Chapter III. — The Battle of Waterloo. — From half-past eleven to three o'clock. I. — Attack of Hougoumont by Jerome Bonaparte's division of

Reille's corps • • '73

II. Appearance of Bulow's corps upon the heights of Chapelle

Saint-Lambert. — New despatch of Napoleon to Grouchy 175 IIT__Attack 01 La Have Sainte and of the plateau of Mont

Saint-Jean bv the corps of Count d'Erlon 178

6 Table of Contents.

PAGE IV. — Counter-attack of the English of Picton. — Charge of the Horse Guards of Somerset. — Mishap of the cuirassiers

in the hollow road t8o

V. — Charge of the dragoons of Ponsonhy. — Rout of d'Erlon's infantry. — Counter-charge of the lancers of Jacquinot and the cuirassiers of Farine. — Burning of Hougoumout. i8i

Chapter IV. — The Battle of Waterloo. — From three o'clock until seven

I. — Second attack of La Haye Sainte — The order from Ney

to Milhaud i86

II. — First and second charges of the cuirassiers of Milhaud and of the light cavalry of the Guard. — Order from the Emperor to the cuirassiers of Kellermann and to the cavalry of Guyot 189

III. — Entrance into line of Bulow's corps. — Lobau's defense. —

Capture and recapture of Plancenoit 192

IV. — Third and fourth charges of the cuirassiers of Milhaud, supported by those of Kellermann, the dragoons, and horse

grenadiers of the Guard 195

V. — General attack of the plateau by the infantry of Reille and d'Erlon and by the debris of the cavalry. — Capture of La Haye Sainte. — The English line shaken. — New combats at Plancenoit 198

Chapter V. — The Battle of Waterloo. — From seven to mne o'clock. I. ^Dispositions for the final attack. — Strengthening of the

English line. — Approach of Ziethen's corps 202

II. — Assault of the plateau of Mont Saint-Jean by the Middle

Guard 205

III. — "The Guard recoils!'' — General advance of the English Army — Irruption of the Prussians of Ziethen. — The

panic 209

IV. — The squares of Christiani, Roguet, and Cambronne 211

V. — Arrival of Pirch's corps to the support of Bulow. — Butchery in Plancenoit. — The melee on the plateau of La Belle Alliance. — Ihe last squares of the Old Guard. ... 213

Chapter VI.— The Rout. 1. — Meeting of Wellington and Bliicher in front of La Belle

Alliance (quarter-past nine). — The rout of the French 217

II. — Attempt at resistance in Genappe (eleven o'clock) 219

III. — Pursuit of the Prussian cavalry (night of June i8th-i9th) 221 IV. — Halt of the Emperor at Quatre-Bras. — The Army passes

the Sambre at Charleroi (morning of June 19th; 223

V. — Retreat on Laon. — Departure of the Emperor for Paris

Chapter VII. — The Combats of Wavre and the Retreat of Grouchy

I. — March of Grouchy on Wavre. — Combat of La Baraque, —

Attack of Wavre (afternoon of June 18th); 231

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PAGE

II. — The second despatch of Soult. — New assaults against Wavre and Bierges. — Passage of the Dyle at Limale and night combat 235

III. — Renewal of the combat and defeat of Thielmann (morning of June 19th). — News of the disaster (half-past ten in the morning). — Retreat of Grouchy (afternoon and evening of June 19th) 238

IV. — Combats of La Falise and Boquet (morning of June 20th). — Defense of Namur (from three to nine in the evening). — Rallying atOivet of the army of Grouchy (June 2ist) 242

Chapter VIII. — The Campaign of 181 5

I. — The operations of June 15th. — The battles of Ligny and

Quatre-Bras 246

II. — The error of Napoleon 252

III. — Marshal Grouchy 256

IV.— Waterloo 263

WATERLOO.

CHAPTER I. The IvAst Army of the Empire

J. — The transition from a peace to a war footing. — Recall of the men on leave of absence. — Mobilization of the National Guard. — The conscription of 1815.

II. — The armament and clothing. — Supplies.— The fortresses. — The war budget.

III. — First and second distributions of the troops into army corps. — Strength of the first army and the auxiliary army on June 15, 1815.

IV. — Removals and promotions.

V. — The command: The Marshals of France. VI.— The command : The Chief of Staff.

VII. — The command: The Generals.

VIII.^The spirit of the .\rmy.

I

On his return from the isle of Elba the Emperor found no more than 200,000 men under the flags. If he had felt himself to be all-powerful as formerly, he would have had recourse for doubling the Army, to an extraordinary levy of the classes of 1806 to 1 8 14, to the recall of the class of 1815, and to the anticipated call of the class of 18 16. But, having hardly resumed the throne, he hesitated before so unpopular a measure as the reestablishment of the conscription, which had been abollo Watekloo.

ished by lyouis XVIII. He had then for sole resources the return into the ranks of the soldiers on limited and unlimited leave and the recall of numerous deserters carried on the muster-rolls as "absent without permission." The men on six months' furlough amounted to 32,800, the deserters to 85,000. Almost all of the men on six months' furlough could be counted on to rejoin their colors ; already three or four thousand had arrived at the depots, in conformity with the royal ordinance of March 9th. But among the 85,000 men "absent without permission" it was necessary to admit that there would be a great number who would not rejoin their regiments and also a great many who would be entitled to receive definite discharges, either on account of infirmities, or as supports of their families. Marshal Davout, Minister of War, estimated that the recall of soldiers of every category would give scarcely 59,000 men.

The decree calling out the reserves, which had been prepared on March 2 8tli, was not made public until April 9th. This delay was attributable to reasons of a political nature. The Emperor, who at that time was attempting by all possible means to enter in negotiations with the powers for the maintenance of peace, feared that the putting of the Army on a war footing would belie his pacific protestations. Towards the French population, who so ardently desired peace, he felt constrained to show the same consideration. The West was in agitation, the Midi was in arms; in the rest of France the Royalists were laboring to destroy the popularity of the Emperor by predicting war. This was not the moment to alarm, to dissatisfy all the country by calling out the reserves. Moreover, Napoleon still preserved a ray of hope that there would not be a rupture with Europe. This illusory hope diminishing from hour to hour, he decided to publish the decree in the Monite.ur of April 9th. As he foresaw, this decree struck a blow at piiblic opinion. In a few days the rente fell eight francs. Sadness and discouragement prevailed throughout the land. The peasants, generally very happy at no longer having to endure the vexations of the country nobility or to fear the reestabli'^hment of privileges and the replevin of the property of the emiare'^\ felt their sentiments for the Emperor growing weaker at the thought that his return was about to bring, if not a second invasion, at least an interminable war. By reason of the time necessary for the transmission and the posting of orders and legal delays, the mustering-in of the

The Last Army of the Empire. h

men began only on April 25th. Public opinion was so opposed to the idea of war that among the men recalled, though all of them ,vere old soldiers of Napoleon, a great many presented themselves only in order to show cause why they should be ■exempted or discharged from further service. It is true that, though a great number of these men had deserted in 18 14 in order to avoid wearing the white cockade, a great number had left their corps because they were weary of war. During the last year they had resumed vvork in the fields and workshops, and a great many of them had married; hence they were still less disposed to take up arms again. In the departments in which the Royalist spirit predominated, and in which those who had been recalled to arms felt themselves supported by the population, the meetings of the Board of Examiners were tumultuous. The men cried: "We will not set out. Long live the King!" Fearing an insurrection in the West, the Emperor authorized many prefects of that region to apply the decree with great circumspection, and even to suspend its execution. In spite of everything, the levy gave 17,000 men more than Davout, Avho was little inclined to illusions, had presumed. In the first days of June 52,446 men had been incorporated and 23,448 were en route to rejoin their regiments.

The voluntary enlistments, which had been so rare during the Campaign of France, amounted to nearly 15,000 men. A royal ordinance of December 31, 18 14, granted to each enrolled volunteer a bounty of fifty francs. The Emperor suppressed this bounty. "This method," said he, "is not in accord with the sentiments manifested by the French in the defense of their independence." In order to increase the enlistments, the Emperor thought of causing to be read by officers of the Guard calls to arms, accompanied by the beating of drums, upon the public places, around the workshops, and in the villages. But, Davout having represented to him that "this would cause useless disorder," he abandoned this expedient of the recruiting sergeants of the eighteenth century

Reduced to a few vessels in condition to take the sea, without crews (two-thirds of the sailors had been sent home on furlough), and without supplies, the fleets could only be employed in some cruises in the Mediterranean. With the available men in the ports and the naval reserves the Emperor hoped to constitute fifty or sixty battalions of sailors. It was onlv with great difficulty that twenty were formed, and by the middle of June only one had been put en roide; it formed the garrison of Calais. The three regiments of the artillery of the Marine, of a real effective of 5,284 men under the Restoration, were raised to nearly 6,000 by the organization of a new battalion. Six battalions remained in the ports, whose defense they assured; two were detached to Paris, one went to Lyons, and another fought in Brittany in the mobile column of General Bigarre.

Of the three foreign regiments which existed under Louis XVIIL, the Emperor preserved the second (Isenberg) and the third (Irish), presenting together 875 bayonets; the first {La Tour d' 4 uvergne) , which had remained faithful to the Duke of Angouleme during the short campaign in the Midi, was disbanded. The Emperor would have liked to have kept the four Swiss regiments, but the opposition manifested by the officers to taking the tricolor cockade necessitated the disbanding of these troops. Napoleon busied himself with organizing five new foreign regiments: one of Poles, quickly raised to 800 men, thanks to the soldiers of the ex-legion of the Vistula, who, although disbanded in 18 14, had not yet returned to Poland; one of Swiss, into which entered 502 men of the four regiments suppressed on April 2nd; one of Italians, one of Germans, and one of Dutch-Belgians. These three last were to be formed with deserters from the armiies of Frimont, Bliicher, and the Prince of Orange. At the beginning of June the Dutch-Belgian regiment counted 378 bayonets. Finally there were raised in the Gironde a battalion of negroes and a few companies of Spanish refugees.

The country being threatened, the laws and decrees of 1791, 1792, 1805, and 1813, which had not been abrogated, gave the Emperor the right to increase the Army by means of mobilized National Guards. Some days after his return to the Tuileries he occupied himself, with Davout and Carnot, in reorganizing the National Guard. There were at that time in all France nearly 200,000 National Guards, aged from twenty to sixty years, and Carnot estimated that this number could be raised to 2,500,000. A decree, rendered on April loth, prescribed that all citizens liable to ser^dce in the National Guard should be inscribed upon the muster-rolls in order to be formed into battalions. The Emperor did not think of organizing such a multitude, but he counted on taking therefrom a great number of mobilized battalions, composed solely of

The Last Akmy or the Empike. 13

men from twenty to forty years old. He remembered that at Fere-Champenoise in 18 14 the National Guards had fought like old soldiers. By new decrees the Emperor ordered the mobilization of 326 battalions of 720 men each, which were to be directed immediately upon the frontier places and the entrenched camps. This was putting again in force the decree of the lyCgislative Assembly of July 11, 1792, with this attenuation, that in the war battalions the providing of substitutes was fixed at the small sum of 120 francs.

In a score of departments, notably in Aisne, Ain, Ardeche, Ardennes, Aube, Cote-d'Or, Isere, Jura, Marne, Meurthe, Meuse, Mont-Blanc, Haut-Rhin, Bas-Rhin, Rhone, Haute- Saone, Saone-et-Loire, Seine-et-Marne, Seine-et-Oise, Vosges, and Yonne, the levy was effected very easily, the battalions soon received their full complement of men, and the mobilized National Guards quitted family and fireside with cries of "lyong live the Emperor!" and with the enthusiasm of 1791. Those of the Guards who were able to do so purchased their own arms and uniforms. But the same patriotism and the same good- will did not animate the whole of France. In half of the country, in spite of the Guards and mobile columns, hardly one-fourth of the fixed contingents could be raised. By the end of May Orne had furnished 107 Guards out of 2,160 demanded, Pas-de-Calais 437 out of 7,440, and Gers 98 out of 1,440. At Amiens this proclamation was circulated: "Who has recalled Bonaparte? The Army. Well, let it defend him. His enemies are our friends. We will not arm to defend a man whom hell has vomited forth." In Vendee and Brittany, where an insurrection was feared, the National Guards were not called out; but when civil war began, some thousands of citizens took up arms spontaneously and seconded the troops against the RoyaHst bands without, howeyer, leaving their department.

Out of the 234,720 National Guards called into rervice by the decrees from April loth to May 15th, nearly 150,000 were by June 15th assembled in the fortresses or on the march for them. A third of the officers for the battalions were named from the officers on half-pay and for the other two-thirds from the civil element. The Emperor had not wished to leave the selection of the officers to election. He named them from civil lists, prepared in each department by a committee composed of a prefect, a councillor-general, two generals, and a superior

14 AVateeloo.

officer. Almost all of the National Guards not only appeared! resigned to do their duty, but determined to do it willingly. They drilled their best, yielded docilely to discipline, and entered the cities with branches of lilac in the muzzles of their guns, singing the "Marseillaise," and terminating each couplet with cries of "Long live the Nation! Long live the Emperor !" If there sometimes arose complaints, it was from those who were vet neither armed nor clothed and who demanded guns, overcoats, and shoes. Mortier, Jourdan, Leclerc des Essarts,. Rouver, Lanusse, Berckheim, and all the general officers who commanded mobilized National Guards or passed them in review, praised the good spirit and fine attitude of these improvised soldiers. Gerard wrote Vandamme, June 5th: "The ten battalions of National GuardvS of the reserve of Nancy are superb. In three weeks there will be no difference between them and the troops of the Line."

If the war lasted any length of time, the men from twenty to fortv years of age, forming the first ban of the National Guard, could be counted on to give at least 150,000 more men, for a great number of refractory men from the departments of the Centre and Midi would end by submitting to the law ; thanks to the pacification of Vendee, which was near and certain, the decrees relating to the mobilization of the National Guards could be applied in the departments of the West ; and, finally,, there would be an opportunity to decree new levies in the patriotic departm.ents of the East. For the second ban of the militia, its organization was not pressed, save at Paris and Lyons. When the lack of time and arms prevented the forming of the mobilized battalions, it was not the hour to increase the sedentary battalions, which, by reason of the pacific services which they were to render, were already sufficiently numerous. In the mass of citizens aged from forty to sixty years there were, however, a great many men who could be used advantageously in the defense of the fortresses. They were the old officers, subalterns, and soldiers retired after a minimum ser\dce of twenty-four vears. Since the month of April man}^ retired officers had requested permission to reenter the Army; but there were so man}^ officers on half-pay that all of them could not be utilized. With the retired officers and soldiers Davout thought of forming battalions of veterans for the fortresses. "They will set an example for the National Guards," wrote he to the Emperor, "and will inspire them with the military

■ Tpie Last Army op the EiLPiiiE. 15

spirit." Napoleon did not fail to adopt this proposition. On May i8th he rendered a decree inviting all retired soldiers I0 resume service temporarily, in order to be organized into battalions and batteries for the fortresses. The retired soldiers, who numbered 94,000, but of whom hardly half appeared eligible for service, hastened, to present themselves at the musteringplaces. With the most robust there were formed fifty-six battalions and twenty-five companies of artillery, of a total strength of nearly 25,000 men.

At Paris the sedentary National Guard was raised to 36,518 men. The workmen of the faubourgs had demanded spontaneously to cooperate in the defense of the city, and from these workmen twenty-four battalions of Federate Sharpshooters were formed. These 18,000 sharpshooters, commanded by officers on half-pay, were destined to occupy the advance posts and the works of the first line. At Lyons there were by June 12th 4,000 sedentary National Guards, and Mouton-Duvernet was busy forming fifteen battalions of Federate Sharpshooters. In Aisne and Ardennes and in all the departments of the East the levies en masse could be counted on in case the country was invaded. Composed of foresters, gendarmes, custom-house officers, sedentary National Guards, and in general of all the able-bodied citizens, the levies en masse were to assemble at the sound of the tocsin upon the order of the military authorities in order to occupy the mountains and defiles.

With the 150,000 mobilized National Guards, the 25,000 retired soldiers, the 26,000 Federates of Paris, Lyons, Toulouse, and Nancv, the urban and rural National Guards, the free corps and the levies en masse, it seemed that the fortresses, the large cities, the defiles, and the bridge-heads would be sufficiently provided with defenders. But in spite of voluntary enlistments and of the return of two-thirds of the men on furlough, the active army was still too weak. After much hesitation, the Emperor decided to call out the class of 18 15. The conscription had been aboHshed by Article XII. of the Royal Charter; and this article ha dug been interpreted as having a retroactive effect for the conscripts of 1S15, though a senaiusconsulte of October 9, 18 13, had called them under the flags, it was to be feared that the recall of these conscripts would be regarded as an abuse of power. Davout himself, ordinarily so resolute, represented to the Emperor that it would not be prudent to pronounce the unpleasant word "conscription. ' "It would be better," said he, "to change the name of the thing, and declare that all young men having entered into their twentieth year since the ist of January last will make a part of the National Guard and vvill be directed upon the depots of the Army, with the promise of being discharged after the end of the war." The Council of State, to which the projected decree relating to the conscription of 1815 was submitted in the meeting of May 23d, refused to give its adherence to the measure, "the le\'ying of men being within the jurisdiction of the legislative power."

To await the meeting of the Chambers! But would the enemy await until they met before entering France? Now, the conscription of 1815 would furnish 120,000 soldiers, of whom 20,000 had fought during the last campaign. The Emperor removed the scruples of the Council of State by proposing to assimilate the conscription of 18 15 with the soldiers on leave of absence. To recall them a decree would be no longer necessary; a simple administrative measure would suffice. The Council of State enunciated a favorable opinion, and in the first days of June Davout was able to issue instructions for the levy of the class of 18 15. The country had then decided that, since war was inevitable, it was necessary to make the best of it. The departure of the conscripts was effected without the resistance and rebellions which had been occasioned in so many of the departments by the recall of the soldiers on furlough and in a less degree by the mobilization of the National Guards. On June i ith — that is to say, one week after the decree had been made public — 46,419 conscripts had assembled, ready to set out, in the chefslieux of the departments. In Alsace, Lorraine, Champagne, Franche-Comte, Burgundy, and even in many provinces of the Centre, an extreme goodwill was reported. The Prefect of Seine-et-Oise wrote: "The conscripts of 18 15 have assembled in three days with an astoning facility." The Prefect of Mont-Blanc remarked that his department had furnished more combatants than at any time of the Revolution. Aisne, which from April ist to June 12th had given 18,200 volunteers, recalled soldiers, conscripts, mobilized National Guards, irregular sharpshooters, and retired soldiers — among whom were to be seen some old men of seventythree years — merited these words from Napoleon: "In this

The Last Army of .the Empike. 17

•department (Aisne) there will be found as many men as there will be guns with which to arm them."

II

A great many guns, munitions, provisions, horses, uni- *' forms, and shoes were necessary, and there were very few. Almost all of the material had to be improvised. If the artillery possessed 13,947 pieces of ordnance, it was in need of horses, harness, and 600,000 projectiles. In the infantry and cavalry regiments, both with greatly reduced effectives, the armament was complete; but to arm the recalled soldiers, the enlisted volunteers, the naval reserves, the mobilized National Guards, the Federate Sharpshooters, and the conscripts of 18 15, who, according to the expectation of everyone, would amount towards the middle of September to more, than 500,000 men, there were in the arsenals and magazines but 195,000 muskets, of which 74,000 were in need of repairs.

"The safety of the country," wrote Napoleon, "depends upon the quantity of guns with which we shall be able to arm ourselves." The imperial factories, to which all the gunsmiths, exempted from the different conscriptions since the year VIII. (1799), were recalled by decree, received an order for 235,000 muskets and musketoons and 15,000 pairs of pistols. The bayonets were made in the cutleries of Langres and Moulin s. Ten thousand fowling-pieces and 4,000 blunderbusses were distributed among the peasants of Alsace, Lorraine, Champagne, and Burgundy. For repairing the unserviceable guns, one had recourse to private industry. Workshops were established in the principal cities, in which were employed all the gunsmiths, locksmiths, cabinet-makers, and braziers; in Paris there were six of these shops, which employed 2,000 workmen. The Government also attempted to purchase some guns in England, and a few thousand were brought from Belgium and the Rhenish provinces, concealed in coal barges. Others were brought in by the peasants, a reward of 12 francs being offered for each gun restored; and others still were requisitioned from the merchants and ship-owners, who had been notified by means of placards to furnish a list of all the arms in their possession.

In spite of the activity displayed and all the means employed, the men arrived at the depots faster than the arms

1 8 A¥atJ':rloo.

entered into the arsenals. The factories and shops could furnish but 20,000 new and almost the same number of repaired guns per month. In the first days of June hardl}^^ half of the mobilized National Guards had received muskets. As for the short swords for the infantry, the making of which had been suspended, for it was first necessary to make bayonets, it was decided that, even in the Line, only the companies^ of grenadiers should be provided with them. Cuirasses were lacking. "Cause the men to rejoin anyhow," wrote Napoleon ;^ "cuirasses are not indispensable for making war." Everywhere the making of cartridges was pressed in such fashion as to raise the supply to 100 cartridges per man; 50 in the cartridge-box and 50 in the caissons of the park. At Vincennes 12,000,000 were manufactured in two months. On June ist the reserve supply of the Army of the North amounted to 5,500,000 cartridges, and the soldiers of all the regim^ents in the first line had, with a few exceptions, their complement of 50 cartridges.