Conspiracy of the Spaniards, against the republic of Venice, in 1618.

Preface

The translator need offer no apologies to the public for presenting them this little volume, upon v/hich is founded one of the most thrilling tragedies of our language, and the plot of which, man}^ no doubt, have believed to exist only in the imagination of the poet. The present age will hardly agree with the author in his eulogiums on the government of Venice. But, although detestable in its tyranny, which exceeded that of the most despotic monarchies of Europe, and for the secrecy with which it was conducted, yet we cannot justify the attempt made to overthrow it by means which would alike have attacked the innocent and the guilty, and have also placed it under the power of a government scarcely less arbitrary. The translator has endeavoured to

4 PREFACE.

render the literal meaning of the author as nearly as the different idioms of the two languages would allow, and with many hopes of its favourable reception by those who will not feel less interest in the reality of the existence of Pierre and Jaffier, than could have been experienced in witnessing their personation on the stage, it is sent forth ** to strut its little hour," and then to be forgotten.

Introduction

Of all the histories of human events there are none more interesting than those of conspiracies ; courage, prudence and fidelity, which are equally requisite in all who participate in them, are qualities rare in their nature, and still more rarely found united in the same person. Men often flatter themselves with possessing more of the affection of their associates than in reality belongs to them, especially if they are conscious of meriting it, and have exerted themselves to please. Some leaders of conspiracies have placed entire dependance upon the regard of their colleagues ; but there are few friendships stronger than the fear of death, and this fear often overcomes the judgment in unforseen events; the discretion which is necessary on such occasions, never accompanies it, and most persons who are extremely anxious are apt to betray themselves.

If a conspirator is so intelligent that there is no danger of his committing an imprudence, he seldom interests so powerfully the feelings, as those who are less discerning. His knowledge

6 INTRODUCTION.

of the extent of the peril to which he is exposed, the various parts he must perform to escape from it, the uncertainty of the advantages he may derive from the enterprise, the recompense he would receive for discovering it, render him rather feared than beloved.

Experience is the foundation of knowledge, and men seldom reason justly on the first transaction with which they are connected. The wisest are those who profit by the faults they have committed, and by their consequences receive instruction for the better regulation of their conduct in future. Whatever experience may be obtained in other affairs,, there can be no certainty of conducting a conspiracy with success, as there is no com.parison between the peril and difficulty attending such an undertaking and that of any other transaction. To avoid committing any considerable error, it is necessary to have been already concerned in an affair of the kind; but the same person is seldom twice a conspirator. If the first attempt succeeds, the advantages derived from it prevents the necessity of again incurring the same risk ; and no one, after a failure, if so fortunate as to escape, would willingly hazard his life a second time.

It is also to be considered, that however we may abhor tyrants, self-love is generally more

INTRODUCTION. /

powerful than any hatred we can feel towards them. It is not sufficient for a conspirator to be faithful, if he is not convinced of the fidelity of his colleagues. A chief ought to respect all the ridiculous forms which terror may take as well as the more solid difficulties that are to be encountered, as both are equally capable of ruining the enterprise. A word or movement, although made without any reference to the subject, are sometimes sufficient to induce a belief of treachery, and hasten the event. A change of time or place, which, in itself, is of no importance, frequently intimidates, merely because it has not been anticipated; and men are so constituted, that, feeling culpable, they imagine others know them to be so, and apply to themselves all that is said or done in their presence.

If these difficulties are great in conspiracies which have for their object the death of but one person, how much more formidable are they in those which attack a number, and tend to the usurpation of a city or a state, and wdiich, of course, require more time to regulate, and more persons to execute them.

These considerations have always made me regard such enterprises as the parts of history most moral and instructive, and have induced me to give an account of the conspiracy in b INTRODUCTION,

Venice, conducted by a Spanish -Ambassador in the year 1618.

Perhaps my judgment may be misled by my attachment to the subject of which I have undertaken to treat ; but it appears to me that it is peculiarly calculated to show what prudence or chance may effect in the affairs of the world, the whole extent of the human mind, its various limits, its greatest elevations, and its most secret weaknesses ; the infinite number of resources it must possess to govern men, and to discover the proper use of subtilty, and the difference between skill and finesse. As malice is more detestable when it abuses that which is excellent, great horror will be excited by this history, in which the most admirable qualities are used for a vile purpose. A Greek sage seeing a criminal persist in a falsehood with wonderful constancy amidst the most horrible tortures, could not forbear ex" claiming, *^ Oh ! vrretch, why employ for so bad a purpose that which is in itself so estimable,"

This conspiracy is mentioned in the history of Nani, hook 3d p. 156, and in the 5th vol. of the " Mercure Francais," of the year 1618 p. 38, there is a letter from Venice dated the 2 1st of May of the same 3-ear. The principal works from which this recital is taken, such as the narrative of the Marquis of Bedemar, the despatch of the Capt. Jacques Pierre to the Duke of Ossuno, the deposition of Jaflier, the criminal process against the conspirators and many others, are to be found among the manuscripts of the national library, and the " Sqnittinio della liberta Veneta " is amongst the printed books. The rest is drawn from various other manuscnpts,

CONSPIRACY

OF THE SPANIARDS,

AGAINST THE REPUBLIC OF VENICE,

The controversy between Paul 5th and the Republic of Venice having been adjusted by France v^ith the honor and glory which were merited by the holy See and the Venetians, the Spaniards alone felt there was any cause for dissatisfaction. As they had declared for the Pope, and had offered to subjugate the Venetians by their arms, they were irritated that they had no participation in the treaty ; but having penetrated the secret of the arrangement, they knew they had no cause of complaint against the holy Father, and that the contempt which had been shown them originated in the Republic. It was the Senate who had wished to exclude them entirely from the mediation, under the pretext that they could not be arbiters after having evinced so much partiality.

Whatever resentment they felt for this outrage they kept concealed during the life of Henry 4th. The obligations of this prince to the Venetians were too well known, and the care he had taken of their interests in their disputes with the court of Rome were not less public. But his death having placed the Spaniards at liberty, a pretext alone was needed.

A troop of privates called the Uscoques resided in the Austrian possessions on the Adriatic sea, and adjoining the Venetian territory. These robbers, who had committed an infinite number of outrages on the subjects of the Republic, were protected by the Archduke Ferdinand de Grez, sovereign of this country, and afterward Emperor. He was a very religious prince, but his ministers divided the plunder with the Uscoques, and as they were devoted to the court of Spain, they took this opportunity of being revenged on the Venetians.

The emperor Matthias, touched with the just complaints of the Republic, reconciled this disturbance at Vienna, in the month of February, 1612 ; but this reconciliation was so badly observed on the part of the Archduke, that they were obliged to come to an open war, from which the Spaniards did not realise all the advantages they had anticipated.

The Venetians easily repaired by their management, the losses which they sustained in trifling combats. As they had nothing to fear from the Turks, they could better prosecute this war than the Archduke. This prince was pressed by the Emperor to make peace, for the Grand Seigneur menaced Hungary, and he was also obliged to reserve considerable sums to favor his election to the kingdom of Bohemia, which took place soon afterward. The Spaniards would willingly have contributed the means of continuing the war, but the controversy in which they were engaged with Charles Emannuel, Duke of Savoy, would not permit of their dividing their forces ; and as the duke received from the Republic large sums of money, they could not detach him from his ally.

The Spanish council were indignant at finding the Venetians every where successful. The mild and peaceable genius of Philip 3d, and of the Duke of Lerma, his favourite, suggested to them no way of extricating themselves from this dilemma ; but, one of their ministers in Italy, who was not so moderate as themselves, came forward to their assistance.

Don Alphonso de la Gueva, Marquis of Bedemar, and Ambassador to Venice, was one of the most powerful geniuses and dangerous minds that Spain had ever produced. It is seen by the writings which he has left, that he understood all that can be found in ancient and modern historians which could form an extraordinary man. He compared the events which they related with those that passed in his own time. He observed wherein they differed or possessed resemblances, and the different results these distinctions produced on the similitudes. He could generally judge of the success of an enterprise as soon as he knew its plans and foundation. If he found by the consequences that he had not foretold justly, he returned to the source of his error, and endeavoured to discover what had deceived him. By this study he comprehended the sure ways, the true means, and the principal circumstances which presaged success to great designs, and which almost always effected it. This continual practice of reading, meditating, and observing on the events of the world, had raised his sagacity to such a point, that his conjectures upon the future almost passed in the Spanish council for prophecies.

To this profound knowledge of the nature of great affairs were joined the most singular talents for conducting them ; a facility of speaking and writing in a manner inexpressibly agreeable ; a wonderful instinct for understanding men ; an air always gay and open, in which appeared more animation than gravity ; so far removed from dissimulation as to approach ingenuousness ; a temper free and complaisant, but more imj>enetrable because every one believed he conld penetrate it ; manners tender, insinuating and flattering, which secretly attracted hearts the most difficult to conciliate ; and every appearance of perfect calmness of mind in the midst of the most terrible agitations.

The Spanish Ambassadors generally possessed full control over the courts to which they were sent, and the Marquis of Bedemar had been chosen for that of Venice in 1607, as the most difficult of all foreign employments, and in which no assistance could be received from women, monks or favorites. The Spanish council were so well satisfied with his management, that however his assistance was needed elsewhere, they could not resolve to recall him, even after six years residence in Venice.

Such a length of time enabled him to study the principles of that government, to discover its most secret resources, to distinguish wherein consisted its strength and weakness, and to see all its advantages and faults. As he saw that the Archduke would be compelled to conclude a peace which could not fail of being disgraceful to the house of Austria, because the wrong had proceeded from it, he resolved to undertake something which might prevent the success of any treaty with the Republic.

He considered that, in the actual situation of Venice, there was nothing to render it impossible for him to become master of it, especially with the knowledge he possessed, and the force which he might command. The armies of the Republic had exhausted not only its arms, but the men capable of bearing them. As the fleet had never been so fine, the Senate had never believed itself so formidable, or to have had less cause for fear. However, this invincible fleet could not remove from the coast of Istria, Vv hich was the seat of war. The army v/as no nearer, and there was nothing which could oppose a descent of the Spanish navy. , To render this invasion more sure, the Marquis of Bedemar intended to seize the principal ports, such as the place of St. Mark, and the Arsenal ; and as it would be diflicult to effect this whilst the city remained in perfect tranquillity, he proposed putting fire to it in the most susceptible places, and where it would, with the most difficulty, be extinguished.

He did not make known his intentions in Spain, for he well understood that princes do not willingly explain their wishes until the success of such enterprises is so certain that nothing but their approbation is wanting to secure a happy result. He was contented with proving to the Duke d' Usuda, principal Secretary of State, that seeing the disgrace that befel the house of Austria in the war of the Friuli, by the insolent conduct of the Venetians, and that all the means of accommodation which had been adopted at Vienna, and elsewhere, were ignominious, he believed himself so situated, that both nature and political considerations obliged a faithful subject to have resource to the most extraordinary means of preserving his prince and his country from an infamy otherwise inevitable ; and that this ought to be his particular care, for as the employment which he held placed continually before his eyes the sources of the evil to be remedied, no one could better judge what that remedy should be, and that he would endeavour to acquit himself of this duty in a manner worthy the zeal which he felt for the greatness of his master.

The Duke d' Usuda, who understood his character, comprehended immediately that this language conveyed a project equally important and perilous ; but as those who are prudent never betray a knowledge which might prove dangerous, unless forced to it, he did not communicate his thoughts to the first minister, but replied to the Marquis of Bedemar in general terms, praising his zeal, and that he confided the management entirely to his accustomed prudence. The Marquis, who expected no other answer, was not surprised at receiving one so cold, he was occupied in accomplishing his design in a manner to assure approbation.

There has never existed so absolute a monarchy as the supreme dominion which the Senate of Venice exercised over this republic. It placed an immeasurable distance between the patricians and plebeians. Nobles alone could command in the countries dependant on it. The first lords and magistrates of the land regarded its members rather as sovereigns than governors. If the Republic sometimes gave the first places in the army to foreigners, it was always on condition that they should follow implicitly the directions of the Venetian general in chief, and which left them, in reality, nothing but the power of executing his wishes.

As there is no pretext so plausible as war for taxing the people, that of the Uscoques presented a good occasion of enriching the nobles by whom it had been conducted. This war had been an excessive expense ; besides the money which was requisite in Piedmont, it was necessary to support a third army in Lombardy, against the governor of Milan, who was continually menacing to make some movement in favour of the Archduke. The justice of the cause rendered the commanders of the Republic more hardy in inventing new vexations, but it did not tend to make the people more patient of suiTering. They expressed their feelings so openly that the Marquis of Bedemar thought, with reason, that the revolution v»^hich he meditated would be as agreeable to the people as it would be pernicious to the nobility.

There were even amongst this nobility many persons who disliked the government, and who were partisans of the court of Rome. Ambitious and vindictive, many were irritated that the Republic had been governed by other council than their own during its quarrel with the holy See. They were disposed to do and to suffer every thing, could they Vv^rest the authority from the hands in which it was now held ; and they would have regarded with joy the misfortunes of the state, as the consequences of management of which they had not approved. Others, simple and stupid, wished to be more catholic than the Pope. As he had withdrawn many of his pretensions in the reconciliation, they imagined that having been reduced to it by policy, he had still

mentally reserved the power of excommunication, and that this intention still existed in the will of his Holiness. Of this number were several Senators, equally poor in the gifts of fortune and of mind, but who assisted the designs of the Marquis W Bedemar. He persuaded them under the pretence of kindness, that their consciences ought no longer to permit them to wish for the prosperity of Venice.

Although the prohibitions were rigorous which forbid the nobles holding any intercourse w^ith foreigners, he had found the means of contracting intimacies with the most needy and discontented. The acquaintance of their connexions in convents, of their mistresses or their confessors, was purchased at any price, and presents made them, which, although of no intrinsic value, were prized as curiosities from foreign countries. This liberality, apparently without a motive, caused those to reflect who were the objects of it, in what manner they could procure more considerable advantages. With this view they satisfied his curiosity as far as was in their power, and diligently sought information to reply to his demands ; his gratitude surpassing their expectations, they allowed themselves no rest until they had engaged their patrons in this intercourse. These nobles could not behold, without envy, persons entirely dependant upon them become richer than themselves, by presents that were made on their account. Perhaps necessity actuated them, but whatever was the cause, from that time there was no deliberation in the Senate that was secret from the Spanish Ambassador ; he was warned of all the resolutions that were taken, and the generals of the Archduke were acquainted with those which regarded the war before the commanders of the Republic received orders to execute them.

With this information the Ambassador needed but a body of military to succeed in the enterprise, and as there was a powerful Spanish army in Lombardy, this v/ant could easily be supplied if ^ the Governor of Milan would enter into his designs. The Marquis of Inojosa, who held this employment, was too closely connected with the Duke of Savoy to consent to it ; he had just signed the treaty of Ast, in which France and Venice had acted as mediators between that prince and himself The Ambassador, who knew that this negotiation would not be approved by Spain, wrote to have him recalled, and at the same time solicited the government of Milan for his friend, Don Pedro de Toledo, Marquis of Villa-Franca. Don Pedro was ordered to depart immediately and take the place of Inojosa about the end of the year 1C15. He had no sooner

20 CONSPIRACY or

arrired at Milan than he sent notice of it to Venice by the Marquis of Lara.

The Ambassador communicated his project to this Marquis in the manner he thought best calculated to obtain his acquiescence, and to discover if the new governor would allow him 15{)0 of his best troops whenever he applied for them. Don Pedro, charmed by the greatness of the enterprise, resolved to second it, so far as it could be done without risking his ruin in case of its failure. He sent the Marquis of Lara a second time to Venice to assure the Ambassador of his assent. But at the same time he beo^ofed him to consider that he could not send such men as would answer his purpose v;ithout a careful selection — that if they perished he would be inexcusable in having exposed the bravest soldiers of his army to such great danger : that he vrould, however, do all in his power, and that the men he would choose he would ansvvcr for as for himself

Nothing was more important to the design of the Ambassador than to prevent any kind of reconciliation. With this viev/ he obliged the Marquis of Lara to make the most unreasonable propositions of peace to the Senate on the part of the Governor of Milan. The Senate replied, as was anticipated, with indignation, and would enter into no negotiation. Don Pedro on his side did all in his power to aggravate them still more. The Duke of Mantua was not much disposed to pardon his rebel subjects, which he had promised in the treaty of Ast ; he was encouraged to persevere in his resistance, and to continue the executions he had commenced. Propositions were made to the Duke of Savoy to obtain the fulfilment of this treaty, which they knew he would not accept, and excuses were made for not disbanding the army under pretence of the war of the Friuli, in which Spain could not, with honour, avoid taking a part. The Venetian army had passed the Lizonzo, and besieged Gradiska, the capital of the estates of the Archduke. The Spanish council, who had appeared neutral until then, seeing this prince in danger of being entirely despoiled, menaced a declaration of war. At this time the misunderstanding which had existed in the house of Austria, between the Spanish and German branches, on account of the rivalry of the son and the brother of Charles 5th, for the succession to the empire, was accommodated. The interest which the Spaniards took in this war was the first mark of reconciliation. Don Pedro ordered the colonel of horse, Gambalotta, to advance near Cremona with troops, and mounted twenty-four batteries of cannon at Pavia, which he made known would soon be reinforced by a body of eight thousand men, commanded by Don Sancho de Luna. On the other side the Viceroy of Naples, who crossed the Mediterranean with the Spanish fleet, menaced an attack on the Duke of Savoy, by Villa-Franca. He closed the avenue to all succours arriving by sea from the Republic, and every day threatened to enter the gulf, and blockade the Venetian fleet.

The Venetian Ambassadors at the respective courts at which they resided inveighed against the violence of this proceeding, the Marquis of Bedemar justified it. He believed it important for his design to destroy the veneration v/ith which Europe, for so many ages, had regarded this Republic as the most ancient of existing states, and where Liberty was most enjoyed. This liberty had been recently proved, and raised more high during the controversy with the Pope, by several works which were yet thought incontrovertable, although the opposite party were not wanting in men of talents capable of answering them.

The Ambassador again examined them, refuted in a few chapters the numerous volumes of the Venetian authors without honouring any one in particular by naming him ; and as there are no questions in subjects of this nature which a skilful man may not render problematical, under pretence of establishing the right of the Emperors over Venice, he proved that the independence of this Republic was as much a chimera as its empire oyer the sea. As it was not necessary for his design that he should be known as the author of this libel, he had it published so secretly that it was not discovered during his life that he had any concern in it. It appears strange that he was not suspected ; but it must be believed that the Venetians did not yet understand him ; his manners lively and passionate, did not allow them to suppose a man of so impetuous a character could be the author of a satire of so much refinement and delicacy. Equity and good faith appeared to predominate throughout, and the declamation acrainst the outrages of the Venetians were expressed in terms of such apparent moderation as was fully sufficient to render them, plausible. This work, which was entitled, *' Squittinio della liber fa veneta,''^ excited a great sensation.

Their ignorance respecting the author naturally inclined them to suspect the court of Rome on account of the preceding writings. The learned men of the Senate believed that the force of it would be felt by every one as much as by themselves, and it occasioned them more terror than even the loss of a battle, and Fra-Paolo was ordered to examine it. This man who had ridiculed the other writers of the opposite party declared it would be better not to reply to this, as it would be bringing things to light that had better remain buried in the shades of antiquity ; but if the Senate judged it proper for the dignity of the Republic to notice this work, he would undertake to give the court of Rome so much trouble in defending itself, that it would no longer think of attacking. In the first heat of resentment this offer was accepted, and Fra-Paolo saw with joy an occasion to publish his history of the council of thirty, which otherwise would not have appeared during his life.

The campaign of 1616 passed without any considerable advantage on either side. The Duke of Savoy and the Venetians, who did not wish to hazard the loss of the glory they had acquired, empowered Gritti, the Venetian Ambassador at Madrid, to renew the negotiation. The Spaniards, indignant at the resistance they had met, made propositions it was impossible should be received. Gradiska remained blockaded. They continued fighting during the winter, and at the commencement of spring they were actuated by such ardour as promised better success than the preceding year. The truce in Holland having rendered useless the greater part of the troops of that state, and reduced the French and German adventurers to seek employment elsewhere, the Counts of Nassau and Lievestein brought eight thousand Dutch and Wallons to the service of the Republic. The Spaniards complained to the Pope that the Venetians were exposing Italy to the dangers of heresy by an intercourse with these military men; but the Venetian Ambassador convinced him it was less the interest of religion which influenced them than sorrow, at beholding two great republics unite their forces against them.

But the Marquis of Bedemar would have been greatly embarrassed had the Pope obliged the Venetians to disband these heretics. As these mercenaries thought only of profit in serving a foreign prince, he hoped to gain the assistance of their chiefs in consideration of a certain sum, and the expectation of the plunder of Venice. To negotiate this affair, he cast his eyes upon an old French gentleman named Nicholas de Renault, a man of talents and knowledge who for reasons not known had sought refuge in Venice. The Marquis of Bedemar had frequently seen him at the house of the French Ambassador, where he lived. In some conversation which chance occasioned, Renault discovered that the capacity of this minister had not been overrated, and the Marquis well pleased to possess a friend of this character at the French Ambassador's, soon became extremely intimate with him.

Although this man was exceedingly poor, he estimated virtue more than riches, but he loved glory beyond virtue, and if it could not be obtained by innocent means, there were none too criminal for him to undertake. From the writings of the ancients he had learned that perfect indifference for life or death which is the foundation of all extraordinary designs; and he always regretted that period when the merit of individuals decided the destiny of states, and when those who possessed it had always the power of making it known.

The Marquis of Bedemar, who had deeply studied him, and who had need of a man to whom he could entirely confide the management of the enterprise, revealed to him his plans, at the same time saying, he had placed dependance on him from the first moment he had conceived the idea of such an undertaking. Renault felt more complimented by this assurance than he would have done with all the praises that could have been oifered him ; his advanced age did not prevent his entering into this engagement, for as in the course of nature his life must be short, he believed he could not better employ the few sad years that yet remained for him, than by risking them in an adventure which might render his name immortal. The Marquis of Bedemar gave him the bills of exchange and letters of credit necessary to negotiate with the commander of the Hollanders ; he charged him not yet to explain the nature of the enterprise, but merely to make him understand that the difficulties had increased to such a degree between the Republic and the house of Austria, that the Spanish Ambassador, then at Venice, foreseeing something might occur which would expose his person to the fury of the people of that city, to guard himself from such peril, he wished to feel assured of the protection of a number of faithful and resolute friends. The pretext was gross, but the slightest veil is a great resource in affairs of this nature, and it was of little consequence to him that they should suspect some mystery, provided they could not penetrate it. By this means he hoped to seduce the chosen band of the Venetian army, and that the rest would remain so feeble it would be easy for Don Pedro to defeat them on the road, if they were ordered to Venice to oppose the conspirators. The navy was much more to be feared ; it was always in its power to conquer, and much more easy to be brought to the aid of the city. It was composed chiefly of the natural subjects of the republic, and there was no doubt at the first noise of a conspiracy it would proceed to Venice. The hope that the Spanish fleet could prevent it was not to be depended on ; it woidd not have been wise to place on the chance of a combat the success of an enterprise already so dangerous, and it was necessary there should be some means to prevent the Venetian fleet from having the power of being useful.