America, Asia and the Pacific

Preface

Why add still another to the numerous books bearing more or less directly upon the present conflict? The answer is that the author does not merely aim to lay bare the causes which have led to the war between Russia and Japan, the elements in either power making for success or failure, and the probable results of the war, particularly in so far as they are likely to affect our own interests, but that the book has also a wider scope.

The war represents but the initial stage in an international struggle throwing deep shadows before, a great struggle, but one which, there is every reason to hope, may be fought solely with the weapons of peace. But it will be, in any event, a long contest, and will involve, not two nations, but all the leading nations of the globe. Its ultimate outcome will settle, probably for centuries to come, the question of predominance, commercial and political, among the civilised powers. This coming conflict will be, in a word, for the mastery of the Pacific.

That the Pacific during this century is bound to become what the Atlantic was during the eighteenth and nineteenth, and the Mediterranean during the twenty-five centuries preceding, is one of the author's chief contentions. The argument upon which it rests he deems irrefutable. ^

Of almost equal interest is the question how well or ill prepared for this impending conflict is each of

iii iv Preface

the competitors. Investigation in this line forms another part of the book, and perhaps one of more than transitory value.

It is the writer's firm belief that the United States is the nation best equipped for the coming race in the Pacific, and the chief reasons for it, which suggested themselves, are cited more or less fully. But the fact is also dwelt upon at some length that American expansion in the Pacific, immensely favoured as it will be by the opening of the Panama Canal, is not a mere whim, not a thing merely desirable, but something absolutely necessary to safeguard our further national development, and to preserve us from the curse of illbalanced production — generally called overproduction — and all its attendant evils.

With the exhaustion of our free arable lands, and with American re-emigration across the Canadian border, this nation has entered on a new phase of existence, has lost the distinguishing trait of youth and risen to full maturity. That condition entails new burdens and responsibilities. Hereafter this nation will furnish emigrants in increasing number.

On the other hand, the equipment of our chief rivals in the Pacific — Great Britain and her colonies, Germany, France, Japan, and Russia — is also carefully examined, and points of strength or weakness are set down.

Another topic discussed in the book is the prospective ownership of that rich inheritance — the Dutch East Indies. It is one to which, so far, little attention has been paid in this country.

China and South America, prospectively our greatest markets in the very near future, are considered at considerable length; and the folly of neglecting the

Preface v

magnificent opportunities they offer American enterprise is pointed out.

From all the data thus marshalled the deduction has been drawn, that if the people of the United States use but wisely and promptly the surpassing natural advantages kind fate has thrown into their lap, victory cannot fail them in the end. This nation will play in the Pacific the dominant note in the concert of the great powers.

It may not be superfluous to mention that much of the general argument of the book is based on both geographic and historical foundations. In every instance, the greatest care has been taken to derive the statistics from the latest and most authoritative sources.

W. v. S.

New York, May, 1904.

Contents

I. Elements in the Present War

II. Military Notes ....

III. Opinions of Experts

Conclusion

Appendix ....

Index ....

LIST OF MAPS

PAGE

Pacific Ocean (Front Cover) 2

corea and the neighbouring parts of japan . . .21

Formosa Island 79

China and Asiatic Russia 95

Panama and Vicinity 154

South America (Northern Half) -170

South America (Southern Half) 173

Dutch East Indies 215

Alaskan Coal Fields 234

Hawaii 237

Philippines 239

Rainfall Map of Australia 261

Plan of Tsing Tao 276

IX

AMERICA, ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

Chapter I Elements In The Present War

The great drama which is now being played in the Far East is the prologue to a far longer and more important one, involving the mastery of the Pacific. As such, no nation on earth is interested in it in the same degree as the United States. It is necessary to keep this all-important fact constantly in mind.

To express the matter in another way, Russia and Japan, though their struggle be a titanic one, form a vanguard of the greater armies made up by the civilised nations of the globe. The coming strife for commercial and political supremacy on that vast highway, which the irony of fate has dubbed the " Pacific " Ocean, though it may not be waged with powder and shot, will be the most gigantic the world has ever seen. And — let us emphasise this again — it is the American people who have most at stake in it. In a sense it is quite true that Japan is fighting the American's battle. The " Jap," our pupil, in this war stands for most of the things this nation is striving for.

But, very naturally, Japan has interests exclusively her own. A time may come when her interests will clash with those of America. She is ambitious, very ambitious, and though quite recently a leading Japanese, Jihei Hashiguchi, in speaking of his country's relations with the United States, compared them to the " filial affection of a child " — and in this probably was perfectly in the right — that is not saying that this feeling is not subject to change.

Certainly Japan owes her awakening from many centuries of slumber to Commodore Perry, President Pierce, and the United States. This country first unbound the cerements which had held Japan in her living tomb, isolated and estranged from the entire world. It helped the Land of the Rising Sun to enter the family of nations as a full-fledged member. It guided the halting steps of the new sister nation in its path onward and upward. It opened wide the portals of American educational institutions, and it inaugurated a policy of mutual friendship and mutually profitable commercial intercourse.

But, after all, a nation's duty is first to herself. This applies both to the United States and Japan, and it is quite conceivable that the future holds in store situations differing so much from the present one as to make of Japan one of this country's most assiduous rivals, possibly a foe.

As to Russia, the case stands very differently. Once Americans ventured forth on the Pacific, Russia inevitably became their enemy. It was Captain Mahan who first pointed this out clearly in one of his most thoughtful books. But it requires no laboured argument to show this. Russia's coast on the Pacific is to-day longer than that of the United States at the other extreme. Russia's aim is to be and remain the leading Pacific power. She is the archenemy of the " open door " in China as well as in her own possessions. Economically she is monopolistic and given

Elements in the Present War 5

over to fiscalism. The spread of her suzerainty, the enlargement of her " spheres of interest," mean the narrowing of every kind of opportunity for the United States. Conversely, the growing power of the United States along the Asiatic coast of the Pacific is tantamount to a diminution of Russia's power. All this without considering at all the deep racial antipathy between the Slav and the Anglo-Saxon, the irreconcilable differences in the conception of life and its ideals, in government and policy.

It is useless to mince matters. Let us look the facts squarely in the face. Russia is this country's foe and will remain so, all sentimental pleadings to the contrary. She could afford to be the friend of the United States so long as the latter was no world-power, and was, furthermore, on more or less strained terms with England, Russia's most dangerous rival during the whole course of the nineteenth century. This fact is so self-evident that it is strange indeed Americans as a body have not yet grasped it. Russia's friendly policy during the great Civil War, her sale of Alaska, her assurances of friendship on many occasions in the past, all explain themselves in that way. To keep the two great English-speaking races apart was the task of deep wisdom for Russian statesmanship.

Since John Bull and Uncle Sam have buried the hatchet and forgotten old grievances in a sincere reconciliation, and more particularly since the younger one of these two blood relations has started out on a vigorous career of his own in the line of conquest and colonisation within easy reach of Russia's own Far East possessions, with all that this implies, the lion and the lamb can no more lie down in peace together than can Russia and the United States. For to do so would mean the relinquishment of what each of these two nations considers its " manifest destiny/'

We see, then, that the war between Russia and Japan is fraught for this country with much deeper meaning than many seem to suspect.

When first the news flashed over the cable that hostilities had actually been begun by Japan in her dashing naval attack on the fleet lying within the shelter of the harbour and the forts and coast batteries of Port Arthur, early in the morning of February 8th, just three days after the rupture of diplomatic relations between the two countries, the world stood agape. Little Japan, holding a territory so infinitesimally small in comparison with mammoth Russia, with a navy of yesterday's creation, and an army still in process of formation, to beard the bear and his cubs in his very lair! Why, to nine out of ten the thing seemed absurd, even more absurd than Japan's easy victory over China in 1894.

But closer reflection modified this first view considerably. It is true that after a month of hostilities the majority of military experts still clung in the main to their first views. On this side of the water, such good judges as Generals Francis V. Greene and Joseph Wheeler pronounced in favour of ultimate victory for Russia. But General Nelson A. Miles was non-committal, and General Daniel E. Sickles expressed the emphatic opinion that Russia would soon " lie down."

Yet reliable figures show us the following relative strength for Russia and Japan :

Naval. — Russia, with a battle fleet of 22 vessels against a Japanese battle fleet of 12, an enormous disparity. The comparative list is the following:

Elements in the Present War

RUSSIA

Names

Tons

Launched

Nominal Speed— Knots

Borodino . . . . ) Alexander III . . . )

13,400

13,100

Tavrichesky . . . )

Retwisan . . . . >-

12,700

Tsarevitch. . . . )

CO

O

Petropavlovsk .

Poltava ....

Sevastopol ....

10,000

M

Gheorgi Pobiedononostseff y to c

G

Navarin ....

1 1 ,000 a>

<D

Tchesme ....

Ekaterina II

PQ

Sinope . . . .J

PQ

Emporor Alexander II . 1

Emporor Nicholas I .

Dvenadsat

8,000

Apostolov .

to

Sissoi Veliky

9,000

Rostislav .

JAPAN

Names

Tons

Launched

Nominal Speed— Knots

Shikishima Asahi .

Mikasa Hatsuse

\ I

15,200

CO

O

T a a

Yashima Fuji .

Chin-Yen Tokiwa

1 i

7,325

CO

C O Qi

Asama Idzumo Iwate .

Yakumo

PQ

PQ

Officers and men in the Russian navy, 60,000. Japanese, 28,000.

The total naval strength of the two opponents showed this disparity still more glaringly. The Russian vessels outnumbered the Japanese almost three to one. In the matter of torpedo boats and destroyers, Russia, on paper, was particularly favoured.

In reality, however, Russia at the start was in far worse condition than her doughty little opponent, for her navy necessarily was scattered. Part of it was in the Baltic ; another part guarded the Black Sea, and only the third part, though rather the largest of the three, was in Far Asian waters.

True, Russia had prepared herself in a measure for serious complications in Far Asia. She had sent, for eight months preceding the outbreak of the war, troops, ships, and provisions to Vladivostok, Dalny, and Port Arthur, and she had purposely magnified her forces there and in the whole of Manchuria and neighbouring Siberia. Russia, in other words, had been playing a big game of bluff with little Japan, and had never for a moment taken into consideration the possibility that her hand might be called. Thus it was that she was taken by surprise, unprepared, and wofully behind in all the essentials of ready and efficient warfare.

As to the respective land forces, Japan was overmatched far more prodigiously than in the matter of sea strength.

General Miles computes the Japanese army at a round 600,000, and the Russian at 1,700,000. With the reserves of every kind, he calculates that Japan could probably mobilise 1,000,000 men and Russia 4,000,000. In point of efficiency, the balance is somewhat in favour of Japan. Her army is more active, enterprising, better trained, and better disciplined than

Elements in the Present War 9

is the Russian. Her general staff is, man for man, brainier and more resourceful than Russia's. " Jap " and Russian have demonstrated their prowess on many well-fought fields. Either of the two possesses great endurance and sterling fortitude; either, too, is inured to hardship and scant fare, though the Russian is the heavier feeder, and is much more prone to physical ailments and serious disease on Chinese soil than is the Japanese. This latter fact was abundantly proved during the Boxer uprising, when the rate of mortality and illness among the Japanese troops was the lowest of all, the American soldiers coming next, the English and Continental troops following, — the rate for them being about the same, — and the Russians showing the highest figures, their rate — about twelve per cent. — being just eight times higher than that of the "Japs."

Students of military history need scarcely be told that disease works generally more havoc in armies in the field than does the bullet. To confine our illustration only to the more recent wars, in the Crimea the French lost 236 men from sickness to 64 from wounds in each 1000. The death-rate of the English was 179 from sickness and 47 from wounds. In Mexico the French lost in every 1000 of their troops 140 from disease and only 49 from wounds. In the Russo-Turkish war the Russians lost, per 1000, 113 from sickness and 49 from wounds. The losses in our own Civil War during two years — June, 1861, to June, 1863 — were 53.2 per 1000, of which 8.6 were from wounds and 44.6 from sickness. In the Boer war, while the figures are not at hand in complete form, it is well known that sickness was vastly more fatal than Boer marksmanship, deadly as that was admitted to be.

io The War and Its Outcome

The Russian troops in Manchuria are peculiarly susceptible to sickness. They have been enfeebled by the rigours of a hard winter, with incomplete housing, insufficient food, and probably a total disregard of the hygiene of the person. Most of them are ignorant peasants who have never learned to take care of themselves at home, and still less afield. The medical staff is not as efficient as might be. It is a safe prediction that ten will die or be incapacitated by sickness for every one who is killed or incapacitated by Japanese bullets.

Indeed, the precursor of the ravages to be expected from disease among the Russians has already made its appearance. News recently came from Harbin, the military centre of Russia in Manchuria, that that place has already become a hotbed of typhus and other zymotic diseases, a class of physical ills easily preventable under rigid official sanitation, but not under prevailing war conditions.

The men from Japan are spare eaters and sparer drinkers, their regular diet both in peace and war being fish and rice, and their commissariat is correspondingly easy to handle. This fact gives them an enormous advantage in a war with any western nation, Russia included.

Nevertheless, the chances of Japan in a land war with Russia seemed slim indeed. It looked as if the overwhelming numbers of Russia's armies would crush her.

But here again circumstances must be taken into account. Though Japan in this war avowedly fought for her very existence, she would not have gone into it if the disparity were as great in actual numbers as at first sight it seemed.

Elements in the Present War 1 1

There were several very important compensating features for Japan. The most important is the fact that while in either Corea or Manchuria she is still very near to her basis of supply, and, in any case, is fighting in a congenial climate, Russia is from 5000 to 6000 miles away from her sources of sustenance. Again, the sea route being closed to her by the vigilance of the Japanese navy, everything Russia needs for her army in the way of supplies, ammunition, provisions, tents, and other field equipments, as well as reinforcements, must come overland, and by the one line at her disposal — the Transsiberian Railroad and its two Manchurian branches. This ramshackle affair of a railroad, though built at an expense of $750,000,000, — a single-track road, resting at many places on badly graded and imperfectly secured beds, — is the one hope of Russia in this war. Whenever and wherever it fails, she is temporarily hampered and outdone. As an American writer of distinction graphically put it, this thin line of steel means Russia's victory or defeat.

As a striking illustration of the insufficiency of the Transsiberian Railroad at this present juncture, the leading French military journal, La France Militaire, on information furnished it from the Russian general staff, makes the following statement:

" The Russian army assembled by April 6 on the Mukden-Harbin road amounted to 260,000 men, and at that date was to be shortly brought to 300,000.

" Now, such an army involved, according to the accepted military computation, and on territory such as this sparsely settled one of Manchuria, 100,000 horses. Merely to feed these men and animals required a supply of 1600 tons of food and forage a day. To transport this amount there were needed six trains of from 30 to 35 each of the kind of freight-cars in use on the Transsiberian Railroad."

And this, it appeared, was very nearly the capacity of the road, and to transport and deliver this amount every day it was necessary that there should be no movement of troops or other passenger traffic in the same direction to interfere with the process" of supply.

That is to say: it was, theoretically, all the road could do to supply such an army as Russia was then preparing, and it was pretty clear that her preparations were not excessive, compared with the number of the Japanese troops the Russians were reckoning to encounter. There was absolutely no " factor of safety " allowed for accidents and partial disablements on the railroad.

True, the Transsiberian Railroad, it was given out by Russian authorities, was not their only source of supply. For, according to these authorities, there were at that time considerable accumulations of provisions at Port Arthur, Vladivostok, Mukden, and Harbin. But these statements were clearly exaggerated. As a matter of fact, the supplies at those points were insignificant, when such vast masses of men and beasts were concerned.

As to Manchuria and the maritime province of Russian Siberia, neither produces agricultural supplies for export. In other words, they raise only sufficient for their own populations.

But putting the best face upon the matter, certain things are beyond dispute. First, the Russian forces in the Far East at the outbreak of the war were much smaller than had all along been stated; instead of 200,000 or 250,000, as claimed, they were barely

Elements in the Present War i 3

50,000, and of this number only about one-half was really available against the enemy. Second, from three to four months had to elapse before Russia, by her sole available means of communication, — that is, the Transsiberian Railroad, — could concentrate on the theatre of war an army large enough to face in the field such an army as Japan herself could assemble within one-half of that time, either on the Liao Tung Peninsula or in Corea. So that for quite a length of time Japan enjoyed the immeasurable advantage, provided she bestirred herself, of having double or treble the number of fighting men in the field that Russia could muster, and this despite the enormous superiority in numbers that Russia could boast of in theory. Now, as to this point of speed on Japan's part, all the attendant circumstances are not plain at this writing. It is certain that her navy, compact though small, splendidly officered and manned, was ready at the hour when the scale had tipped in favour of war. The facts in this respect are known to the world. In the roadstead of Chemulpo, Corea, two fine Russian battleships were sunk by Japanese broadsides. At Port Arthur Admiral Togo inflicted even worse damage upon the Russian fleet by means of his swift little torpedo boats. Again and again this same undaunted naval hero went to the charge at Port Arthur, daringly yet cautiously sacrificing men and treasure in the attempt to " bottle up " that chief Russian stronghold in the disputed territory. Not for a moment has Japan's navy failed in its duty; the same dash, valour, and shrewdness have characterised every move of Japan's fleet since the war clouds burst. In her navy, at any rate, Japan has demonstrated superior mettle and skill.

Chapter II Military Notes

As to the Japanese army, it did not suffer in its operations from an insufficient Transsiberian Railroad, but the obstacles it had to contend with in making its way to the mainland were, nevertheless, of a similar character, and in some respects they were even harder to overcome.

Weather was one of them. Lack of sufficient communications was another. Beyond the middle of March the harbour points on the Corean and Manchurian coasts, where landings could be effected, were ice-bound. The winter was of unusual severity and length, even in the more southern latitudes of Japan and Corea; and when thawing set in, the poor roads of the country became morasses, scarcely passable. Add to this that Japan has only 5015 miles of railroad all told within her island empire, composed as it is of over 4000 separate islands, with few lines piercing the mountainous interior. Thus, the amassing and concentrating of large armed forces, particularly in the dead of winter, was a matter of extreme difficulty for Japan. And then to send these troops from their native islands over various arms of the Japan Sea to the mainland presented another series of extreme difficulties.

This is a statement of the chief obstacles Japan had to surmount in making her army available for fight-

Military Notes 15

ing purposes at the theatre of war. Whether they alone account for the failure of Japan to display the same swiftness and skill in utilising her land forces that she had shown in handling her navy, is at this hour matter of conjecture.

Whatever the reasons, in any event the fact remains that Japan missed the golden opportunity fate had thrown in her way at the opening of the war. It was Baron Hayashi, Japan's minister in London, who made the broad statement shortly after the beginning of the war, that his country meant to win by delivering swift, powerful blows at the enemy. If so, that chance has gone. If Japan had concentrated an army of, say, 150,000 men, in Lower Manchuria and Northern Corea, between February 5 and April 5, she could have driven out the Russians from all the points of vantage in dispute; could have seized Port Arthur from the land side, and could have fortified her land position in such a manner as to render it almost impossible at a later date for Russia to oust her, always providing that Japan still maintained her naval superiority. Whatever the cause, she did not make the land operations, and by this omission rendered her task doubly and trebly difficult.

One great disadvantage in a military sense under which Japan is labouring is her lack of sufficient cavalry. Russia in this respect is exceptionally well equipped. Her supply of Cossacks, irregular and very hardy cavalry, is practically exhaustless. From the Cossack settlements in Western and Eastern Siberia alone she can draw some twenty-five regiments of this class of troops. And the Cossack with his tireless native horse is an excellent man for campaigning in Manchuria or Corea.

Japan, as her great military organiser, Fieldmarshal Yamagata, has stated, has scarcely any use for cavalry at home. The difficult and mountainous nature of the main islands forbids the employment of cavalry on a large scale. Besides, the native horse of Japan does not make a good cavalry mount, and the greater expense involved in that arm of the service for a poor country like Japan is another factor. So in cavalry Japan is very badly off.

On the other hand, in measuring the respective value of Russia's troops, a clear distinction ought to be made between those coming from her Asiatic provinces, and those coming from the European ones. The latter, for a war like the present one, are greatly inferior. This will show itself more and more plainly as the war progresses. The Russian soldier of the interior cannot compare physically with his comrade of Siberia or Central Asia. Nor is he accustomed to the difficult climate and hardships of every kind.

A word as to the finances of the two countries. It is a common mistake to suppose Russia to be a wealthy country, that is, so far as capital is concerned. There is an immensity of latent natural resources, but these for the overwhelming part are not yet being exploited, and they do not help her in a great war. For the moment she has the sinews of war, but how about six months hence?

The unwary are apt to be misled by the flashy budget reports annually issued by the finance ministry in St. Petersburg. The one for 1904 shows a total government revenue of almost $1,000,000,000, with the ordinary expenditures several millions below that figure. But this total is arrived at by bringing under its head a number of important resources which are

Military Notes 17

in the nature of government monopolies, and which in every other country would not be so classed. Among these are the government liquor monopoly, the receipts from the entire network of Russian railroads (altogether about 42,000 miles in length, that is, less than one-fifth of the length of the American railroads), the earnings of a large number of great industrial establishments owned and operated by the government, and so forth.

Furthermore, these Russian budgets are notoriously unreliable — there is always more or less juggling with figures in them. And then comes the vast item of Russia's national debt. That portion of it for which the government is directly and indirectly responsible amounts to over $4,250,000,000, according to a computation recently made by Frank A. Vanderlip, a well-known financial writer. Foreign creditors hold of this something like $1,900,000,000, France alone about $1,450,000,000, with Germany, Holland, and Belgium next in importance on the list. To meet the interest on this enormous debt — most of it at four per cent. — means every year a fearful strain on Russian finances. This gigantic debt, as will be pointed out elsewhere, is also responsible for the fact that Russia is compelled to maintain a vast excess of exports over imports. And as these exports are nearly all agricultural, not enough foodstuffs are left in Russia to nourish her population adequately.

With all that, Russia has been obliged every year since 1893 to pile a new foreign debt on top of her old one, and since 1900 she has found increasing difficulty in obtaining new loans.

It cannot, therefore, be said that Russia's finances are in a sound condition. The exact opposite is the truth.

However, when comparing her financial resources with those of Japan, Russia is superior, so far as the ability to raise large sums of money abroad is concerned.

True, Japan's debt is but little more than a fraction of Russia's. Its total is now $370,000,000, and $50,- 000,000 of that represents the new domestic issue (oversubscribed enormously by patriotic "Japs") made since the beginning of this war. Again, by far the greater part of the whole debt takes the form of domestic loans.

But despite the marvellous advance of Japan since 1870 in all the factors of civilised life, the island empire is, after all, poor when compared with Western nations. A. R. Colquhoun, in his latest book, makes the statement that the average annual earnings of a Japanese family are but $45.00. Such a figure speaks plainly. It may be well to mention, though, that $45.00 per annum, ridiculously low as it seems to us, is more than the average Russian earns. The highest figure claimed by the Russian government itself for the average yearly income of a Russian peasant family is 63 roubles, about $32.00. And the Russian peasants form 95 per cent, of the total population.