Company "A," corps of engineers, U. S. A., 1846-48, in the Mexican war

Preface

Executive Document, No 1, United States Senate, December 7, 1847. contains a Communication from the Secretary of War. transmitting to Congress the official reports of commanding generals and their subordinates in the Mexican War.

The Secretary says: ""The company of engineer soldiers, authorized by the act of May 15, 1846, 1ms been more than a year on active duty in Mexico, and has rendered efficient service. I again submit, with approval, the proposition of the Chief Engineer for an increase of this description of force." ( Senate-Ex. Due. No. 1. 1847, p. 67.)

Table Of Contents

Page

Chap. I. — Enlistment — Instruction — -Detention on the Rio Grande — March to Victoria and Tampico — Landing at Vera Cruz — Death of Captain Swift. - 7 ' II. — Engaged in Operations against Vera Cruz. - 21 III. — After tlic Surrender of Vera Cruz to the Occupation of Puebla. - 28 '■ IV. — From Puehla to Churubusco. - 34 V. — Capture of the City of Mexico. - 48 VI. — In the City of Mexico; Return to West Point. - ~>7 Appendix A.— Brief Extracts, from Wilcox's History of the

B. — Promotions of Enlisted Men of the Company. 69

Chapter I. Enlistment— Instruction— Detention On The Rio Grande— March

TO VICTORIA AND TAMPICO— LANDING AT VERA CRUZ— DEATH

OF CAPTAIN SWIFT.

Previous to the war with Mexico there existed among the people of the United States a strong prejudice against maintaining even a small regular army in time of peace. Active opposition to a permanent, regular military establishment extended to the West Point Academy, in which cadets were trained and qualified to become commissioned oilicers of the army. That Academy was then a component part of the Military Engineer Corps. For years the chief of the Corps had, in vain, urged upon Congress, the necessity for having, at least one company of enlisted engineer soldiers as a part of the regular army.

In the meantime lie had, however, succeeded in persuading the Government at Washington to send — by permission of the Government of France— a selected Captain of the U. S. Engineer Corps to the French School of engineer officers at Met/.; for the purpose of having in the U. S. Army, an officer qualified to instruct and command a company of engineer soldiers in case Congress could be induced to authorize the enlistment of such a company.

Captain Alexander J. Swift was the officer selected to be sent to Mctz. On his return to the United States, he was assigned to temporary duty at West Point awaiting the long delayed passage of an act authorizing the enlistment of a company of U. S. Engineer soldiers.

That act was passed soon after the commencement of hostilities with Mexico. It provided for the enlistment of an engineer company of 100 men. in the regular army. The company to be composed of 1<» sergeants, 10 corporals, 30 artificers, 39 second class privates, and 2 musicians; all with higher pay than that of enlisted men in the line of the army.

Captain Swift was assigned to the command ; and, at his request, I was ordered to report to him as next officer in rank to himself. At my suggestion, Brevet Second Lieutenant George B. McClellan, who had just been graduated from the Military Academy, was issigiied as junior officer of the company.

At that time I had been an officer of engineers for four 3-cars ; my rank was that of second lieutenant. All the first lieutenants, and some of the second lieutenants, of that corps, were then in sole charge of the construction of separate fortifications, or were engaged in other important duties. Captain Swift was not disposed to apply for the assignment of any of those officers to be subalterns under him in a company of soldiers.

I had taught McClellan during his last year in the Academy, and felt assured that lie would be in full harmony with me in the duties we would bo called npo:i to perform under Captain Swift. It is safe to say that no throe officers of a company of soldiers ever worked together with less friction. The understanding between them was complete. There were no jars — no doubts or cross purposes — and no conflict of opinion or of action.

In the beginning I was charged with the instruction of the company as an infantry command, whilst the Captain took control of \]\e recruiting, the collection of engineer implements — including an India Rubber Ponton Bridge— and ho privately instructed McClellan and myself, at his own house, in the rudiments of practical military engineering which ho had acquired at Metz. In the meantime we taught him, at the same place, the manual of arms and Infantry tactics which had been introduced into the army after he was graduated at the Military Academy. In practical engineer drills the Captain was always in control.

After the men were passably well drilled in the "Infantry School of the Company"; the time had come for him to take executive command on the infantry drill ground. lie did this on the first occasion, like a veteran Captain of Infantry until "a rest" was ordered.

Whilst the men were "at rest", McClellan and myself quietly, but earnestly, congratulated him upon his successful debut as drill officer of an Infantry Company. lie kindly attributed to our instruction in his house, whatever proficiency he had acquired in the now tactics which had then been recently introduced.

But, after the company was again called to "Attention" and the drill was progressing, whilst marching with full company front across the plain, the men all well in line, to my surprise the Captain ordered " faster'', and added "the step is much too slow ". Of course we went " faster ". In a short time the Captain ordered "faster still, the step is very much too slow". This order was several times repeated, and before the drill ended we were virtually " at a run ".

After the drill was over and the Company dismissed from the parade ground, I asked the Captain why he had not given the commands " quick time " and " double quick ", instead of saying " faster *' and "still faster". He said he did not intend the step should be " quick time" — much less "double quick". He only wanted the rate to be in "common time — 90 steps a minute"; and added: "you had not reached thai rate when the drill ended ''.

I insisted that lie must be mistaken, and told him we were marching in "common time" or verv near it, when he first gave Hhc order, "faster". He persisted that he was right in regard to the rate of the stop— said " that he had carefully counted it, watch in hand"; and added: "You were, at the last, not making more than 85 steps to the minute". I was satisfied that he was mistaken; but he relied implicitly upon the correctness of his count and the accuracy of his watch.

McClellan and 1 proceeded to the company quarters, of which I still had charge. On the way we referred to the matter of the step, and both of us were at a loss to account for the misapprc- , hension we were sure the Captain labored under in regard to it.

I asked McClellan to take out his watch and count whilst I marched in ''common time". I made t'O steps per minute-- and repeated it more than once. It presently dawned upon us that our Captain, whilst consulting his watch, had counted only one foot ill getting at the number of steps: and that we were really making 170 steps to the minute when he counted 85. The mystery was solved, the Captain had counted "the left foot" only.

When we next went to his house for instruction in details of the school of the engineer soldier, I asked him how many steps we were making a minute when he first ordered "faster", lie said "about 45". I replied: "That's it. We have found out what was the matter. You counted only the left foot. We were marching in 'common time' when you ordered us to move ' faster '; and you pushed us to nearly twice' that rate ".

"The cat was out of the bag." The Captain saw it at once and laughed heartily over the error he had fallen into in the latter part of his "first appearance" as captain, in drilling the company as infantry- He made no such mistake thereafter; and the men never knew of his "count", watch in hand.

On the 26th of September, 1846, we sailed from New York, 71 rank and file, for Brazos Santiago, under orders to report to General Taylor, commanding the U. S. army in Mexico. We landed at Brazos on the l-th of October, remained at that point for several days, proceeded thence to the mouth of the Uio Grande and arrived at Camargo on the 2nd of November. There the company was delayed for several weeks because transportation for the en-! gineer train to the headquarters of the Army at Monterey, was not then available.

The Company left Carmargo for Brazos, on the 29th of November, under orders to proceed to Tampico by sea, but was ordered to return to Matamoros with a portion of its tools, and march, via Victoria, to Tampico — the bulk of its train to be transported to the latter place by water.

Whilst detained at Camargo instruction in the school of the engineer soldier was kept up, and infantry drills were constantly practiced. During that time several thousand troops were in camp near Camargo, and the men of the engineer company learned that they were, by the line of the army, styled: "the pick and shovel brigade". Their officers advised them not to care for this epithet but, "take it easy, continue to endeavor to become model infantry, and engraft on that a fair knowledge of the duties of the engineer soldier'. They were assured that "for heavy work", details would have to be made from the line of the army; and these details would, for the time, constitute the real " pick and shovel brigade " under the control of engineer officers, assisted by trained engineer soldiers. When the time came for close lighting the engineer company would be at the front.

The troops stationed on the Rio Grande during the fall of 1846, suffered greatly from Mexican diarrhoea, fevers and other diseases. Several men of the engineer company died, and Captain Swift and twenty of the men were left in hospital at Matamoros, when the company finally left the latter place.

Before giving an account of our first march in the enemy's country, it may be well to state here, that with two exceptions, the enlisted men of the engineer company were native born, and all but four of them were raw recruits. Each of these four had served, with credit, during one or more terms of enlistment in the regular army. Three of them were promptly made sergeants, and the fourth was a musician (bugler).

All of the recruits but one, were very carefully selected material, out of which to form, as soon as practicable, skilled engineer soldiers. The one exception was a short, fat, dumpy, Long Island Dutchman — a good cook, specially enlisted by Captain Swift to cook for the men. lie was given the pay and rank of artificer of engineers. The men looked upon him more as a servant of theirs than as a fellow soldier. lie was well satisfied with his position, prided himself on his special duties, rather looked down upon ''soldiers" — and was impudent by nature.

All went well enough with the "cook " until he was required t«» take his place in the ranks, at regular bi-montly "muster, and inspection " for pay. His performance on that occasion was so grotesquely awkward that I directed he should he put through the "squad-drill " by one of the sergeants, who was a thoroughly competent, hut rather severe, drill-master.

The "cook' 5 felt that his rights were invaded, in requiring him to submit to be drilled. The sergeant made no progress in teaching him. After three days' trial, he reported to me that he was mortified, and ashamed, to have to admit he could do nothing with "that cook''; and he asked to be relieved from the duty of drilling him. In reply to my question : "Can't you make him obey you?'' He replied: "No — the only thing I can do is to kill him "; and added: "When that kind of tiling has to be done, in this company, my understanding is, the lieutenant in command is the only one who has the right to kill ".

I relieved the sergeant, and told him I would take the "cook " in hand at the next drill. On the following day, I marched him offinto the dense chapparel,on the bottom lands near Matamoros. After following obscure paths, about three miles in their windings through the jungle, I halted him in a small open space a few hundred yards from the company camp. lie thought no doubt, we were live miles from camp — in a boundless wilderness — whilst, in fact, we were at no time five hundred yards away.

I told him of the report that had been made to me of his disobedience, informed him that I had brought him into the chapparel for the purpose of compelling him to obey me; called his attention to the fact that we were in the enemy's country in time of war; all of our lives were in peril, and that persistent disobedience on the part of any officer or soldier to the legal authority of those over him. was punishable with death ; that I did not propose to place him before a Court Martial ; but, would kill him, if he did not implicitly obey an order I proposed then and there to give him.

I measured 15 paces in front of him and placed a small white chip on the ground, called him to " attention ", ordered him to place his eyes on that chip, and told him if he removed them from it before I gave the command "rest",] would run him through with my rapier.

I then drilled him at the manual of arms for about 20 minutes. Large beads of perspiration rolled down his face — he began to totter on his feet — and I gave tin 1 command "rest ". He had not taken his eyes from the chip.

At the command "rest", he drew a long sigh of relief and uttered a subdued but prolonged " Oh ". I asked him if he now thought be could obey the sergeant, He replied: "Yes, I will obey anybody ".

I told him I would temporarily withdraw what I had said about killing him, and would put him on his good behavior. I drilled him about two hours longer; and then took him, by a circuitous route, through the jungle, back to camp. lie was obedient enough thereafter.

When the war had ended and I was relieved from duty with the company, one of the men told me that " the cook", on his return from the drill I had given him said : " The Lieutenant took me wav off, ever so far, in the chapparal, and told me he took me there to kill me if I didn't mind him. The little devil meant it, and would have done it too, if I had fooled with him like I had done with the sergeant,''

Except this case, of "the cook ", there had been no difficulty in bringing the men of the company to a high standard of drill and discipline as an infantry company, and a reasonable degree of proficiency in the school of the engineer soldier. But, on their first march into the enemy's country, they were called upon to do an immense amount of hard work not specially refeirred to in their preliminary instruction.

THE MARCH FROM MATAMOROS TO VICTORIA AND TAMPICO.

By special orders from General Taylor, brought by Major George A. McCall to Captain Swift, the latter was charged with the duty of repairing the road from Matamoros to Victoria, and making it practicable for artillery and the baggage train; and to do this, if possible, so that the whole command might make its prescribed daily marches and arrive at Victoria on a named day. Captain Swift was authorized to call upon the commander of the forces, on this march, for such assistance as might be needed to perform the work; and was directed to do no more to the road than was barely sufficient to enable the trains to pass over it. It was not expected that we would ever have occasion to pass through that region again; and it was not proposed to make a permanent road for the benefit of Mexicans.

Captain Swift being sick in hospital, the foregoing instructions were given to me, as Commander of the company, by Major McCall, who, in the capacity of Adjutant-General of the forces under General Patterson, accompanied him on this march.

Under orders from General Taylor, the company of engineers, reduced to two officers and forty-live enlisted men for service, marched from Matamoros on the 21st of December, 184G, with a column of volunteers under General Patterson, to join General Taylor's army at Victoria. We arrived at the latter place on the 4th of January, 18-17. A great deal of work had been done by details of volunteers and the engineer company in making the road practicable for artillery and b igg ige wagon 5. Without dwelling upon daily operations, the folio wirg statement of the manner in which we made our way across a difficult stream may be of interest.

About noon one day I was informed by Major McCall, who had ridden ahead of the working party, that there was an exceedingly difficult " river-crossing" about one mile in front, and that he feared we would be detained there for, perhaps, two days. I galloped forward to the [dace designated. It look?d ugly. The banks of the stream were something more than 100 feet high and quite steep. Guiding my horse down to the water's edge, I crossed the river which was from two to three feet deep, and about one hundred yards wide. The bottom was fair enough, until within a few yards of the opposite shore, where it was soft mud. (Jetting through this with some difficulty I rode to the top of the bank on the far side.

To make an ordinary practicable road across that stream would require two or three day's work of several hundred men. It seemed a clear case for the free use of drag-ropes to let the wagons down into the stream on the near side, and haul them up the opposite bank.

It was plain to me that with a working party of two hundred men — which was the greatest number we could supply with tools — a straight steep ramp could be cut on both banks in six or eight hours hard work. The greatest difficulty would be encountered in getting out of the stream on the far side.

Returning quickly to where L ha 1 left Major McCall, I asked him to give me a working party of about 800 men, told him I would find use for that number and that in my opinion, with that force, the wagon train could be put acr >ss th i stream before dark. The commanding General thought my requisition for the working tietail was extravagent, as we scarcely had tools enough for a quarter of that number of men. But the detail was ordered, as called for, to report to me. In the meantime the engineer company an 1 its train was taken to the crossing, and the character of the work to be done there was explained to the men.

Leaving Lieutenant McClellan with a portion of the company to take charge of the near hank, directing him to halt there ahout 300 of the working party and send ahout 500 to me on the opposite hank, I crossed the stream with the rest of the company and explained to them the work to he done on that side, particularly the means to he used in getting out of the river. On each side of the stream the working party was divided into three "reliefs'', or relays — with one hundred men or more held in reserve, to meet contingencies.

The working party arrived in good season, tools were promptly distributed to the first "relief" on each side of the river, and the men were told that, if they would work as at a " corn-shuckingmatch ", or as if the " house was on fire", they would he let off in an hour, or less, depending- on the rapidity and effectiveness of their work. It was to be a race against time. I wanted all the work there was in them, and wanted it inside of an hour.

Before the hour was up the '"first relief" on each side of the river, was ordered to stop work, drop their tools, get out of the road and take to the hushes. The "second relief" was immediately inarched into the vacated places, seized the tools, and worked like the first— and on the same conditions. So with the "third relief"; and, inside of three hours frcm the time the work began, the engineer wagons were crossing the river. They soon moved on, leaving the rest of the forces to follow at their leisure.

The volunteer officers afterwards complained to me that the "wild work " on the hanks of that river, had "scattered "their men so badly, it was several days before they could he again got into their proper places.

This case was an exception — a frolic. The usual daily work on the road was more regular and continuous, without disorder.

It may perhaps not he out of place here to mention, that ahout the time I sent the "first relief" into the hushes, and set the "second relief" to work under the directions of men of the engineer company, the commander of the forces, with his staff, arrived on the bank where McClellan was in charge, and asked for me. He was told that I was on the opposite hank. Just at that time the confusion and wild yells of the "first relief" and the loud cheers of the "second relief" when told that they, too, would he let off inside of an hour, provided they would work as if engaged in a " corn -shucking- match ", astounded the general, and had to him the appearance of disorder, perhaps mutiny.

On asking Lieutenant McClellan what it meant, the latter replied : "It is all right; Lieutenant Smith has the larger portion of the engineer company with him on that bank; and I can see him, and men of the company near him in the road, all of whom seem to be quietly giving instructions to the new working party"'.

After starting the ''second relic!" to digging in the road, I had gone to the brow of the bank overlooking the work which was being done, mostly by my own men in the river, where the road was :<» leave it. The engineer sergeant, in charge of that work informed me that he was then in immediate need of about twenty additional men. The reserve working force was not far from me. I called out for a sergeant and twenty men, without arms or accoutrements, to come to me. Pointing to the river, just under the placj ai which I was standing, I directed the sergeant of this reserve party to take his men down at once and report to the engineer sergeant in charge there. The bank was precipitous. The sergeant of the reserve working party said that he would take his men back about one hundred yards, and go down by the road on which the "second relief'' was working. I demurred, and told him again, to take his men straight to where they were needed, lie still hesitated. I pushed him over the brow of the bank, and he went headlong into the river. I then ordered his men to follow him. They did it with a cheer and regular " Comanche-whoop" — sliding down the slope, which was too steep to stand on.

This scene, too, was witnessed from across the river by the General of the forces and his staff. I did not know they were there; but if I had. it would have made no difference; 1 was in charge of the working party, and in haste to finish that special job.

On our arrival at Victoria, the company was relieved from duty under General Patterson, and I was directed to report to the headquarters of General Taylor. On the 12th of January the company was ordered to report to General Twiggs. With two companies of the line to furnish additional details for labor when required I was charged with the duty of making the road between Victoria and Tampico practicable for wagons. These three companies left Victoria on the 13th.

The following extracts from ray official report of the operations of the Engineer Company for the month vi' January, 1847, illustrate, in part, the difficulties met with.

''The first day, (out from Victoria, ) we had three bad boggy brooks to cross; besides a great deal of cutting to do with axes in order to open t!:.' road; and many bad ravines and gullies to render passable. To make a bridge, across a boggy stream, with no other material than the short, knotty, hard and crooked ciiapparal bush, was no easy matter. The first day's march was about ten miles — we encamped about sunset after a very hard day's work."

In order to shorten the route and save the forces one day's march, we were, for several days, working on a mule path "cut-off" from the main road.

"January 14th. The mule path was infamous. No wagon had ever traveled that road — the rancheros have a tradition of a bull cart that, it is said, once passed that way. I believe, however, that the story is not credited. We worked from dawn of day until dark and encamped about six miles from where we started in the morning and about the same distance from the camp we wished to reach that day."

" January 15th. Another day's tremendous hard work."

" January 16th. We had again a very severe day's work."

"January 17th. Road improved very decidedly, but still a good deal to do. We managed, by getting a little ahead with our repairs after the army encamped for the night, to get along without seriously delaying the column."

We arrived at Tampico on the 23rd. The distance from Victoria to Tampico is 120 miles; whole distance from Matamoros to Tampico, by way of Victoria, is 354 miles.

Although the service was arduous, the men came through it in good health, and were all the better sold iers for the practical schooling acquired in that 350 miles of road making. After this experience, ordinary marches and drills were to them, very light matters.

TAMPICO TO VERA CRUZ.

From Tampico we sailed for Lobos Island and Vera Cruz, on a small schooner, the Captain of which was a brave little Frenchman, who was not acquainted with the Mexican Gulf coast, and was not provided with accurate instruments for taking observations. Late one afternoon the clouds rolled away, and we distinctly saw the snow-clad peak of Orizaba. Tins was the first intimation to us that we were " somewhere" , near Vera Cruz. In a very short time we saw opposite to us a large fleet of vessels at anchor.

We were south of Vera Cruz and were passing Anton Lizardo, the place to which we were bound. But a reef was between us and the anchorage where the fleet was quietly lying. The Captain of the schooner said he could cross the reef. Taking his place in the rigging from where he could better observe the breakers and the currents, the schooner tacked here and there, rapidly and repeatedly, under the orders of the little Frenchman ; and we were soon clear of the reef and breakers. It was now nearly dark. In a few moments after reaching the anchorage ground, we glided up a gentle slope, without perceptible shock ; and the how of the vessel was almost entirely out of water.

In less than twenty minutes thereafter a boat from one of our men-of-war pulled alongside; and when the officer in charge learned who we were, he said he would report at once to the naval commander; and had no doubt that the company with its effects would have to be landed on an adjacent island, while the schooner was being lightened and hauled off into deep water.

He said the movements of the little schooner, through the heavy surf, across the dangerous reef, had been watched from the naval vessels with intense anxiety, and expectation that we would be wrecked and all hands lost. This feeling was changed to admiration when it was seen that the schooner was being very skillfully handled in the difficult channel; and all rejoiced when they saw the unknown little craft safely in smooth water; but were surprised, immediately after, to see her put on a course that would inevitably run her aground.

We found that Captain Swift with the convalescents from Matamoros on another vessel, had arrived before us. In the meantime Lieutenant J. G. Foster, of the Engineer Corps, had been assigned to duty with the Company. He was with Captain Swift. I at once reported to the latter, and he resumed command of the Company; but the men remained on separate vessels.