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The new American Navy

John Davis Long · 1903 · Scanned text · Free in the US

63,853 words · about 4 h 28 min to read

Period artwork: Interior of the Bodleian Library, 1845
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Free in the US: this text is in the public domain in the United States; it may still be in copyright elsewhere.

Licence: PD · Library of Congress states the book is in the public domain and free to use and reuse (https://data.labs.loc.gov/digitized-books/README.html); published 1903, public domain asserted for the US only · Library of Congress, Selected Digitized Books (https://www.loc.gov/item/03031878); text via the Common Pile (CC BY 4.0 compilation, per-document rights preserved)

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About this book

Author
John Davis Long
Language
English
Published
1903
Length
63,853 words · about 4 h 28 min
Sections
6 reader sections
Text
Scanned text, read from page scans by OCR; may contain errors
Rights
Public domain in the United States

 

Contents (6)

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Preface

Since the war with Spain our navy has steadily strengthened the hold which it already had on popular sentiment. Its brilhant record at that time, its substantial consummation of the war by the unprecedented thorougliness of its victories at Manila and Santiago, the clean and creditable conduct of its commissioned and civilian officials in charge of its business affairs, and the necessity of its expanded equipment and service by reason of om* added insular possessions, have stimulated the feelmg of national mterest m it and dependence on it. These have also led to most generous appropriations by successive congresses for its continued increase in officers and men, m ships, and in all the facilities of naval construction. The object of this volume is to give mformation as to the start and progress of this increase, the development into what is now called the New IS^avy, as well as to tell of its recent exploits.

With this purpose there has been an attempt not so much to make a picturesque story as to vi PREFACE

give an idea of the work done in the last halfdozen presidential terms by earnest members of Congress, by successive secretaries of the navy, by naval oflScers and seamen ; also of the many arts that enter into the construction, armament, and equipment of our men-of-war; of the organization and administration of the various bureaus of the Navy Department, the great busy navy-yards, and the steadily bettering Hfe of all on shipboard; and of the achievements by which officers and enhsted men have added so much luster to the already shining record of the American navy. My regret is that in referring to some of these achievements in connection with recent naval operations, I have omitted so many. But where merit has been the rule, it is impossible to mention every desert unless almost every name on the roll and action on the record be specified. Yery likely a sailorman would better treat all these topics than a civilian. The latter, however, is so far disinterested that his praise cannot be charged to bias in favor of his own caUing. As Secretary of the Navy from the fifth of March, 1897, to the first of May, 1902, I had an opportunity to be impressed by the fine spirit, the loyal, patriotic impulse, the scientific and mechanical attainments, the courage, devotion, and service of the men of the navy. These qualities,

PREFACE vii

and not the frictions, foibles, and faults which are a part of all human nature, have given them their notably high character. Associated with them I felt their tremendous power as a mighty arm upholding the honor of the country; retired from that association I regard them with midimmished admiration and confidence.

JOHN D. LONG.

HiNGHAM, Mass., July 15th, 1903.

Contents

Nucleus of the New American Navy — Inefficiency of Spain's navy in the war with the United States — Lesson of the need of preparedness taught by our naval history — The navy at the beginning of the Civil "War — Damage to our merchant marine inflicted during the Civil AVar — Reduction of naval force at the end of the Rebellion — Virginius affair exhibits our naval weakness — Geographical situation of the United States as affecting our naval policy — Value of steam for war purposes first recognized by the United States — Ericsson — Iron ships — Armored ships — Contest between guns and armor — Merrimac and Monitor — Their combat an epochmaking one — Steel ships — Rapid changes in naval construction an excuse for Congressional inaction in providing for new men-of-war — Secretary Robeson's policy — The navy in 1879 — Law of 1883 limiting repairs — Birth of the New Navy — Secretary Hunt's recommendations — Naval Advisory Board and its recommendations — Effect of naval construction on steel industry — Naval Committee's report, and Congressional action thereon resulting in building of first ships of the New Navy ■ 1-25

II

Uncertainty in the early 80's as to motive power and mar terial to be used in the new ships — Navy-yards ill

CONTENTS

equipped for shipbuilding — Europe then in advance of the United States in naval science — Comparative expenditures by Europe and the United States — Contempt of foreign nations for our navy — Second Naval Advisory Board and its work — Twin screws opposed and then adopted — Sail vejsus steam power — Lack of cooperation between bui'eaus and board — Secretary Chandler's report — Contract awarded to John Roach — Criticisms on the new vessels — The White Squadron — Additional ships — Career of the Charleston — New types of men-of-war — Modern ordnance and torpedoes — Our pioneer torpedo-boat, the Cushing — The Vesuvius — Armored ships necessary — Armor and its manufacture in the United States — Congress endeavors to secure lower prices — Guns and armor — Battle-ships authorized — Vessels comprised in the New Navy — Their cost — Navy-yards — Private shipyards — Improved standards of manufacture a result of the construction of the New Navy 26-59 m

THE ORGANIZATION AND EDUCATION OF THE NAVY

Importance of personnel to an efficient navy — The lesson of the SjDanish Armada — Examjiles from our own naval history — The old-time man-of-war's man

— The new mechanic-sailor — A modern naval officer's duties — Personnel of the New Navy — Of the old — The midshipman's trials — Early schools for naval training — Professor Chauvenet and Secretary Bancroft — The Naval Academy — Its reconstruction — The naval war college — The engineer service — The line and staff controversy — The reorganization law

— Foreigners in the sei'vice — Apprentices and the Americanization of the navy — Training-schools for

new duties — The marine corps 60-95

CONTENTS xi

IV The Administration Of The Navt

The man at the desk — The forgotten men who make our victories sure — Early officials and their faithful siibordinates — Our debt to bureau chiefs in the Civil and Spanish wars — Functions of the Navy Department — Its early history — Xaval commissioners

— Maury's criticisms — Reorganization — The bureau system — Scandals and abuses in the old navy

— Secretary Whitney's reforms — Continued by Secretary Tracy and his successors — Navy-yard reorganization — Lack of docking facilities — New docks

— The bureau system's disadvantages — Recommendations for its improvement — The Naval Observatory — The Board of Construction — A general

Cuba's struggle for freedom — Our sympathy — President Cleveland's action — President McKinley's policy toward Spain — Action by the Senate — Spain's reconcentration policy causes protest by the President — American help for starving Cubans — General Woodford's offer to Spain and its result — The Maine sent to Havana — The De Lome incident — The destruction of the Maine — The Court of Inquiry and its verdict — The crisis precipitated — Preparations for war — The squadrons mobilized — Congress appropriates fifty millions " For the National Defense " — Purchase of foreign men-of-war — Improvised war-ships — Their equipment — The enlistment of crews xii CONTENTS

— The naval militia — The Naval War Board — The

New Navy ready for war 125-164

VI The Battle Of Manila Bat

Spain's colonies a source of weakness — The Navy Department plans to strike the vulnerable point — The Philippine Islands and the attack by the New Navy — Preparations in advance of the war — The Spanish defenses — Our Asiatic Squadron — Dewey and his captains — Dewey's instructions and preparations — He is told to strike — The Philippine captaingeneral's proclamation — Dewey's problem — Montojo's fleet — Dewey sails for Manila — Forcing the channel — The first shot — " You may fire when you 're ready, Gridley ! " — The destruction of the Spanish squadron — Attack on the shore defenses — • The good news comes to Washington — Results of

the battle 165-200

vn

THE BLOCKADE OF CUBA AND ITS EFFECT

Cuba's independence recognized — Diplomatic relations severed — The plan of campaign — Admiral Cervera on Spain's most effective defense — Cuba the first scene of naval endeavor — Plans for American defense against possible attack by the Spanish fleet — Our squadrons — Sampson and Schley in command — The captains of the fleet — List of vessels that served during the war — Spain's fleet — The President's proclamation of blockade — Objects of the blockade — Havana not to be attacked — The blockade from a foreign point of view — Captain Jacobsen's description of Havana in war time — Portugal's attitude in the conflict 201-238

CONTENTS

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