The Shenandoah Valley and Virginia, 1861 to 1865

Contents

PAGE

I The Seizure of Harper's Ferry and the Patterson Campaign 9

II McClellan's West Virginia Campaign, including the Battle of Rich Mountain, July 11, 1861 27

Preface

No section of the United States furnishes a fuller picture of the extraordinary operations of two American armies, pitted against each other for four long years, than does the beautiful "Valley of Virginia," from Harper's Ferry south to Staunton. Its most important city, Winchester, in the lower valley, was occupied or abandoned sixty-eight times by the troops of both armies, as has been said by men of the period of 1861 to 1865, still living there. Indeed, that city changed commanders so frequently and so suddenly that it became customary for the inhabitants to ascertain each morning, before leaving their dwellings, which flag was flying — the Stars and Stripes or the Stars and Bars.

Aside from its superb location, framed in by the Blue Ridge on the east and the Alleghenies on the west, the bottom lands watered by the two branches of the Shenandoah on either side of the main valley, it produced wonderful crops of grain and droves of horses, cattle and swine, proving a bountiful granary to either army that occupied it.

With such attributes and its peculiarly advantageous strategical location, it became a military thoroughfare of the greatest importance to control, being subjected in consequence to all the ravages that war, even in its mildest mood, is capable of inflicting.

Much as it suffered then, that same valley is to-day once more the garden spot of Virginia ; its wounds of forty years ago were rapidly healed as soon as peace was allowed to stand vigil over the thousands of dead, in gray and blue, that dotted the banks of its rivers, and the honest population that now live there train their sons to honor the flag against which the fathers fought, maintaining all the sturdy fortitude that has made the American soldier a world-wide wonder.

The operations of the war in the Valley were naturally connected with the movements east of the Blue Ridge and west of the Alleghenies, as access to the Shenandoah was readily had by numerous mountain passes from either direction, causing collateral or co-operative expeditions beyond the limits of the Valley proper. The writer has made a very exhaustive study of the War of the Rebellion records and maps ; he relies on them mainly for the accuracy of this compilation, together with such other books as Sheridan's '"Memoirs," Allan's "History of the Army of Northern Virginia," Henderson's "Stonewall Jackson," Spark's "Washington," etc.

Sanford C. Kellogg,

U. S. Army.

Washington, D. C, 1903.

Chapter I The Seizure Of Harper^ Ferry And The Patterson Campaign

Virginia (which then included what is now West Virginia) seceded from the Union on the 17th of April, 1 86 1. The State authorities proceeded to seize all United States property within Virginia, particularly the Arsenal at Harper's Ferry, which with its contents — 15,000 arms and machinery for their manufacture — was partially destroyed by Lieutenant Roger Jones, U. S. Army, on the night of April 1 8th, Lieutenant Jones then withdrawing his small party to Carlisle Barracks, Pa.

The Virginia State troops occupied the Arsenal during the night of the 18th, extinguishing the fires. By the 21st of April Maj.-Gen. Kenton Harper, of the Virginia State forces, reported his strength at Harper's Ferry to be "about two thousand." General Harper arranged with the Maryland State authorities for the occupation of Maryland Heights and started to Winchester all the machinery and arms "he could recover from the ruins of the Arsenal. He mentioned "the absence of all written in-

IO SEIZURE OF HARPER S FERRY

structions" and that he had "had to assume heavy responsibility."

This little town of Harper's Ferry, picturesquely located at the point where the Shenandoah River enters the Potomac and where Thomas Jefferson loved to come and gaze upon the superb mountain scenery, had already, only a year and a half before, been the theater of the celebrated John Brown raid, when the Arsenal had also been seized by an irresponsible zealot as part of a wild project "to free the slaves." For this Brown and his small party paid the penalty of their lives, but the intense commotion caused by their attempt had not been allayed when this second seizure of the United States Armory by the Virginia State authorities fanned into blaze again the dormant excitement of a thoroughly aroused country.

To suppress the John Brown raid in October, 1859, Virginia and Maryland had recourse to their military forces, of whom many thousand were sent to the scene. Of the Virginia troops, one company of artillery, composed of cadets from the Virginia Military Institute, went from Lexington under command of the afterwards celebrated Thomas J. Jackson, who was then Professor of Applied Mathematics, Artillery Tactics, etc., at Lexington, he having resigned from the United States Army only a short while before.

The United States authorities, to repossess the Arsenal which Brown had seized and which

AND THE PATTERSON CAMPAIGN II

had never been guarded, sent a party of sixty marines and other troops from Washington, all under command of Lieut.-Col. Robert E. Lee, 2d U. S. Cavalry, who had with him, as his adjutant, Lieut. J. E. B. Stuart, of the ist Dragoons. A most interesting account of their operations is to be found in the annual report of Secretary of War J. B. Floyd, dated December i, 1859, and in Horace Greeley's "The American Conflict," Vol. I.

With the renewed fame of Harper's Ferry as a locality in 1861, soon followed the marvelous notoriety of the principal actors in the suppression of the insane attempt of 1859, for Lieut.- Col. R. E. Lee, as well as Lieut. J. E. B. Stuart, resigned from the United States Army when Virginia seceded. Lee was immediately (April 23d) appointed a major-general by Governor Letcher and assigned to command all the military and naval forces of the State; Stuart in June appears as a lieutenant-colonel of cavalry at Bunker Hill, near Winchester, while T. J. Jackson commanded a brigade nearby. All three were destined to become famous Confederate leaders.

Col. Thomas J. Jackson ("Stonewall"), on being appointed by Governor Letcher, had been ordered by General Lee, on the 27th of April, to proceed to Harper's Ferry to organize into regiments the volunteer forces collected in that vicinity, and to expedite the transfer of the machinery from the Arsenal to the Richmond Armory. He was to take command of all the forces at and near Harper's Ferry, relieving Major-General Harper.

On the 7th of May Jackson reported to Lee he had occupied and fortified Bolivar and Loudoun Heights and would do the same with Maryland Heights; that his command was badly supplied every way and that his strength should be increased fe 10,000 disciplined men. He reported the Union troops as being at the Relay House, near Baltimore, on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. A large force was also said to be forming at Chambersburg, Pa.

On the nth of May Jackson reported his strength at about 4,500, but not all armed. He had outposts at Point of Rocks, Berlin, Shepherdstown and Martinsburg. He mentioned an armed Union force of Marylanders opposite Shepherdstown, threatening that place with artillery.

An order of S. Cooper, Adjutant and Inspector-General, dated Montgomery, Ala., May 15, 1 86 1, notified Joseph E. Johnston of his ap^ pointment as brigadier-general, C. S. A., and directed him to proceed to Harper's Ferry, he having been assigned by President Davis to the command of the troops there.

At this period there was great confusion and conflict of authority arising from orders issued at Montgomery and those emanating from Richmond, in relation to military affairs in Virginia. This was partially cured by an order from Secretary of War Walker at Montgomery, dated May 10, in which General Lee, to prevent confusion, was directed to assume control of the Confederate forces in Virginia until further orders.

Later on, by the removal of the administrative machinery of the Confederate Government from Montgomery to Richmond and the absorption of the Virginia State troops into the Confederate Army, all friction was terminated.

An inspection made of the troops at Harper's Ferry and outposts on the 21st of May by Col. George Deas, mentioned the First, Second, Third, Fourth and Fifth Virginia, the Fourth Alabama, two Mississippi regiments, five companies of Virginia artillery, eight companies of Virginia cavalry, four companies of Kentucky infantry, and some small detachments, numbering in all 7,700 men, nearly all well armed and available for active service. This force was soon afterwards increased to 20,000.

Deas reports having visited Ashby's position at Point of Rocks, twelve miles below Harper's Ferry, where he found two companies of Virginia cavalry, six pieces of light artillery, and a company of riflemen, together with some Marylanders. Ashby had control of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad at that point with his artillery and had mined the piers of the wagon bridge over the Potomac.

Deas speaks of all the troops as raw and inexperienced; they could not well have been otherwise.

The correspondence of the Confederate authorities of this early period shows a desire to avoid as long as possible any aggressive movements, every effort being made to organize, arm and equip an effective army.

The region to the westward and northwestward of Harper's Ferry, at Berkeley (Bath), and beyond toward the Ohio River, was filled with Union men who resisted or fled from the Confederate recruiting officers. This was a great disappointment to the Richmond authorities, who counted upon getting control of the western branches of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, especially at Grafton and Parkersburg. It was this section that afterwards became the State of West Virginia, by refusing to accept the ordinance of secession of the mother State and by organizing a separate Statehood.

The country being mountainous, the inhabitants, like the highlanders of Kentucky, Tennessee and North Carolina, were in the main very loyal to the United States, and furnished it a valuable body of troops and scouts.

Gen. Joseph E. Johnston assumed command of the troops at Harper's Ferry on the 24th of May, pursuant to the orders of the Confederate Adjutant-General already mentioned. Colonel Jackson had not been notified of the coming of Johnston and at first demurred to yielding up the command, but when he received a communication having the endorsement "referred to

Gen. J. E. Johnston, commanding officer at Harper's Ferry. By order of Major-General Lee," etc., Colonel Jackson contended no longer.

Immediately on taking command, General Johnston reported the position at Harper's Ferry untenable except by a very large force, or against an enemy strong enough to turn it above or below. His outposts extended from Williamsport through Shepherdstown to Point of Rocks, a distance of about 40 miles. General Johnston advised General Lee, that in case of a serious flank attack, the forces at Harper's Ferry and outposts be retired and employed as a screening army to oppose an enemy's advance into the lower valley, and that the troops at Harper's Ferry should never allow themselves to become invested.

General Lee, on the 31st of May, authorized General Johnston, in case he should be attacked or threatened at Harper's Ferry, to take the field and oppose the advance of an enemy into the Shenandoah Valley. However, General Lee deprecated the abandonment of Harper's Ferry on account of the depressing effect it would have upon "the cause of the South."

A column of Union troops from Ohio under General McClellan was expected by General Lee to push through eastward by the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, to effect a junction, east of Cumberland, with the Union army forming at Chambersburg, Pa. To prevent this expected junction of the two columns, General Lee sent Gen. R. S. Garnett, early in June, 1861, to Beverly, west of the Allegheny Mountains, via Staunton, the Greenbrier country, and Huttonsville, with some organized troops and local levies, to gain possession of, or at least to obstruct, the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad between Grafton and Parkersburg. General Lee also sent a Colonel Angus MacDonald, with a light party of partisan cavalry, to break the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad at Cheat River, including roadbed, tunnels and bridges. Both of these movements were effectually prevented ; General Garnett reached Huttonsville on the 14th of June, and was defeated soon after by McClellan near Beverly, while MacDonald's party never got farther than Romney.

General Lee placed so much hope in the success of the two above-mentioned raids upon the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad that he reassured General Johnston at Harper's Ferry, on the 7th of June, as to the improbability of any immediate attack upon that position by the Federal Ohio column, and expressed the belief that General Johnston would have "merely to resist an attack in front from Pennsylvania."

Mr. Jefferson Davis was particularly averse to the evacuation of Harper's Ferry, and so expressed himself in a letter to General Beauregard at Manassas, dated June 13th, 1861, in reply to a suggestion of Beauregard that Johnston's troops might be joined to his, so that a forward aggressive movement might be made with a view to the capture of Alexandria and Arlington Heights. Mr. Davis discouraged that project with the argument that by withdrawing Johnston from the Valley of the Shenandoah, the enemy would be left free to pass to Beauregard's rear, cut his communications with Richmond and attack him in reverse, while he (Beauregard) was occupied with the enemy in his front.

On the same date, June 1 3th, authority to retire from Harper's Ferry, should he find it imperative to do so, was given General Johnston by Adj. -Gen. Cooper, Johnston to destroy the bridge across the Potomac and everything he could not bring off, and then to fall back on Winchester. If necessary, Johnston was to still further retire toward Manassas along the railroad from Front Royal and endeavor to check the enemy at the passes of the Blue Ridge.

On the 14th of June Johnston commenced to withdraw from Harper's Ferry, reaching Bunker Hill, 12 miles north of Winchester, on the 1 6th, to meet General Patterson's command of Union troops then moving from Hagerstown toward the Shenandoah Valley through Williamsport and Falling Waters.

Johnston's main force at Bunker Hill was about 7,000 strong. He had an additional force of about 5,000 under T. J. Jackson at

Shepherdstown, in front of Martinsburg and along the Potomac. He also had with him a small force of cavalry under Lieut.-Col. J. E. B. Stuart, and over twenty pieces of field artillery. Winchester was then held by about 5.000 militia and some newly arrived volunteers, all covered by field works, in which twelve batteries were placed; these troops were commanded by Gen. J. H. Carson, of the Virginia State Militia.

A force of Union troops having appeared at Romney, 43 miles west of Winchester, on the 14th of June, Johnston detached three regiments under Col. A. P. Hill to meet it.

The Confederate authorities had relinquished Harper's Ferry with the greatest reluctance, principally because they still had hopes that there was sufficient disaffection in Maryland to carry that State over to the Confederacy and thus isolate Washington. These hopes had been greatly encouraged by the attack on the Sixth Massachusetts, while passing through Baltimore to Washington on the 19th of April, and the vacillating actions of the Maryland State authorities, particularly Governor Hicks, but especially by the action of both State and municipal authorities in resisting, or actually preventing, the approach of Northern troops to the relief of Washington through Baltimore or Maryland. Washington was thus isolated for three weeks.

While holding Harper's Ferry the Confederate authorities at Richmond were in actual contact with their disaffected Maryland brethren, from whom they received supplies of all kinds, besides recruits for their armies, which were openly enlisted at Baltimore by Lieut.- Col. Geo. H. Steuart and others. Moreover, Harper's Ferry constituted the principal gateway for an invasion of Pennsylvania from Virginia when the time should be ripe to attempt it. It also throttled and prevented the use of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad by the Federal authorities as a means of communication east and west.

It was as important a point on their northern frontier for the Confederates to hold as Chattanooga afterwards became on their central line. Consequently, the troops guarding that important gateway were strengthened as rapidly as circumstances would permit, Johnston's army being justly regarded as second only in importance to that of Beauregard at Manassas, then threatening Washington.

The Capital's position during May and June, 1 86 1 was critical, the enemy's lines and outposts being advanced almost to the fortifications; the enemy's left flank extended to Leesburg, with pickets along the Potomac from the Chain Bridge to Point of Rocks, threatening to cross at the many fords and ferries. General McDowell was placed in command of the troops in front of Washington on the 27th of May, the aged General Winfield Scott retaining the direction of all the armies in the field.

Communication with the North through Baltimore had then been effectually restored by Gen. B. F. Butler, who seized that city by a coup de main on May 14th, 1861, the citizens finding him in possession of Federal Hill when they opened their windows that morning. Their surprise was equaled only by that of General Scott and the Washington authorities, who had given no orders for the movement; on the contrary, General Scott so much disapproved of General Butler's action that he relieved him from the command the following day and sent him to Fortress Monroe. Reinforcements for Washington were then rushed through Baltimore even to the extent of weakening Patterson's column, then assembling at Chambersburg to operate toward Harper's Ferry and Cumberland.

A column of about 2,500 men under General Stone was organized at Washington on the 8th of June to proceed through Rockville, Maryland, toward Edward's Ferry on the Potomac and Leesburg in Virginia, as a diversion in favor of Patterson's expected advance on Harper's Ferry from Chambersburg. Stone made his headquarters at Poolesville and eventually extended his pickets to the Monocacy River and Noland's Ferry. He did not connect with Patterson's troops and had nothing on his right.

AND THE PATTERSON CAMPAIGN 2i

Another diversion in Patterson's favor was made from the center of McDowell's army as far as Vienna, Va., on the 17th of June, toward Leesburg, but which threatened to become so serious an affair and caused General Scott such uneasiness that he stopped General Patterson's movement south of the Potomac at Williamsport, ordered him to recross the river, and detached from him all his most experienced troops and all his artillery, for service at Washington. This left Patterson with a force composed almost entirely of three-months' men and no artillery capable of being moved for lack of horses.

McClellan's operations in West Virginia, from which so much assistance to Patterson's movement on Harper's Ferry had been expected, failed of realization, although McClellan did succeed in reopening and firmly holding the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad as far eastward as Cumberland, to which point he pushed Col. Lew Wallace's Eleventh Indiana Regiment, but could not afterwards spare any other troops to support the position, as all of McClellan's then available force was being used in keeping open and securing the railroad west of Cumberland, besides operating against the troops of Garnett south of the railroad at Philippi, Buckhannon, Beverly, and Rich Mountain, where McClellan finally defeated Garnett and dispersed his command on the nth of July and occupied Beverly on the 1 2th.

This was a beautiful strategic movement of two converging columns — one from Buckhannon and the other from Philippi — on the enemy's two strong positions at Rich Mountain and Laurel Hill, covering Beverly, and resulted in the loss to the enemy of all his stores and artillery, a great part of his wagons, with 135 killed, and over 800 prisoners, of whom a large number were wounded.

Wallace, who reached Cumberland on the nth of June and communicated with Patterson, made a reconnaissance southeastward toward Winchester, which reached Romney on the 14th, where he attacked and dispersed Mac- Donald's forces strengthened by two pieces of artillery, after which Wallace returned to Cumberland. This was the Federal force mentioned by Johnston and against which he detached Hill with three regiments. Wallace's movement proved serviceable to Patterson, as it alarmed the militia and other troops at Winchester and attracted the attention of Johnston and Jackson at Bunker Hill and Martinsburg, who believed Wallace's forces to be the advance of McClellan's West Virginia column.-

Wallace at Cumberland then became uneasy because of rumors (which afterwards proved unfounded) that he was to be attacked by a heavy force from the west and south. He called on General Patterson, who had not then crossed the Potomac, for assistance. Patterson instructed Wallace to move toward Hancock, eastward, or, if that was not feasible, to retire northward into Bedford, Pa., unless he could hold his own at Cumberland. Patterson detached Burnside's newly-arrived Rhode Island regiment and battery, on the 1 6th, to move to meet Wallace at Hancock; but Burnside was almost immediately recalled by orders from Washington and sent to the latter point, together with all the regular troops and all the artillery forming a part of Patterson's column, to meet a threatened attack on the Capital.

With the bulk of the remainder of his army, then reduced to barely 12,000 men, Patterson crossed the Potomac at Williamsport on the 1 6th of June and advanced to find the enemy; but the same orders which called away the Rhode Island Regiment and all the regular troops, directed Patterson to recross the Potomac, which he did on the 17th and 18th, but not before he had driven the enemy southward through Martinsburg and also beyond Falling Waters. Johnston, with 12,000 men, then reoccupied Martinsburg and threatened to cross at Williamsport, which had the effect of delaying the sending off of the troops ordered to Washington, so that they did not all go until the 2 1 st of June.

The aggressive movement into the Shenandoah Valley was thus abandoned for the time being. Patterson established himself in front of Harper's Ferry, at Williamsport, Falling

24 SEIZURE OE HARPER S FERRY

Waters and Sharpsburg, his own headquarters being at Hagerstown. He was called upon by General Scott to project a new campaign, but to remain in front of Johnston's army. After persistent solicitation, Patterson succeeded in obtaining the Rhode Island battery once more, and Stone's Brigade of three regiments and a half from Poolesville ; he also got the harness he needed to move his only battery (Perkins's), so that on the 2d of July, with about 10,000 men, he recrossed the Potomac into Virginia near Falling Waters and forced back T. J. Jackson's force of about 4,000 infantry, artillery and cavalry to beyond Martinsburg, which Patterson occupied again on the 3d of July and halted for supplies. Part of Stone's command joined Patterson there on the 8th of July, when preparations were at once made to move on Winchester, in which direction all of Johnston's army had retired, but finding several of his officers unfavorable to that movement, Patterson called a council of war on the 9th, at which it was decided to remain in observation of Johnston, but not to pursue him, as it was known he had been heavily reinforced, some extravagant estimates of Johnston's strength at Winchester being 40,000 men of all arms.

On the 15th of July Patterson moved his army to Bunker Hill, and on the 17th to Charlestown; his base was then established at Harper's Ferry, ten miles away. The terms of service of his three-months' men commenced to expire and but very few would consent to remain longer.

McDowell commenced his advance from Washington toward Manassas on the 18th of July via Fairfax Court House. Naturally, great anxiety was felt as to the effect this movement would have upon Johnston's army in the Shenandoah. Patterson's instructions were to endeavor to detain Johnston, but if he went towards Manassas, Patterson was to cross the Shenandoah River near its mouth at Keyes's Ferry and march to McDowell's assistance via Hillsboro and Leesburg. Johnston did get away from Winchester without the knowledge of Patterson on the 18th (the same day that Mc- Dowell passed through Fairfax Court-House), and marched via Millwood and Ashby's Gap to Piedmont on the Manassas Gap Railway during the 19th and 20th, the last of his entire force arriving upon the Bull Run Battlefield during the 21st, his advance guard under Jackson reaching Manassas as early as 4 p. m. of the 19th.

Had McDowell's attack been hastened by but two days, Johnston could not have reached Beauregard in time to assist him. As it was he brought with him a reinforcement of over 10,- 000 men. Patterson was too weak to have prevented him from going, even if he had known of Johnston's departure ; and he was too deficient in wagon transportation to have reached McDowell before Johnston could get to Beauregard, particularly as he (Patterson) would be on an exterior line.

After the Battle of Bull Run Major-General Banks was sent from Baltimore to relieve Patterson at Harper's Ferry, reaching there July 25 ; Major-General McClellan was called from West Virginia to command the Division of the Potomac, superseding General McDowell, and assumed that command also on the 25th of

July.

The original order for Patterson's relief was dated July 19, before the Battle of Bull Run, to take effect July 27, "when his tour of duty will expire." The same order designated the Valley of Virginia as the future Department of the Shenandoah (G. O. 46, of 1861). Patterson held the commission of major-general of Pennsylvania militia, which had been ordered out for three months' service in the field under the call of the President the day after the firing on Fort Sumter, April 14, 1861.

Chapter II

M'CLELLAN'S WEST VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN, IN- CLUDING THE BATTLE OF RICH MOUN- TAIN, JULY II, 1 86 1.

With a small advance party General McClellan personally reached Grafton by rail from Ohio on the 23rd of June, his column consisting of seven regiments, three batteries, and one troop of cavalry closely following. Grafton had been occupied from Wheeling as early as May 30 by Col. B. F. Kelley, First Virginia Volunteers, supported by Col. J. Irvine's Sixteenth Ohio. The Fourteenth Ohio, Col. J. B. Steedman, was sent at the same time from Marietta, Ohio, to occupy Parkersburg. Colonel Kelley then moved on Philippi, fifteen miles south of Grafton, where a Confederate force several hundred strong, under Col. George A. Porterfield, had collected. This latter force had been operating on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad north and west of Grafton, burning bridges, etc. Colonel Kelley received his orders from Gen. T. A. Morris, Indiana Volunteers, who had reached Grafton with four Indiana regiments from Indianapolis on the 1st of June, and assumed command.

28 m'clellan's w. va. campaign

On the 2d of June two cooperating columns were sent by General Morris to Philippi; one, under Kelley, went by rail to a point 6 miles east of Grafton, and then, by a delayed night march, to Philippi; the other column, under Colonel Dumont, of the Seventh Indiana, went by rail to Webster, a few miles from Grafton, and then marched in the same direction as Kelley's column, but by a different route, both columns timing the movement so as to reach the vicinity of Philippi very early on the morning of June 3d, Dumont to attract attention from Kelley's movements. The two columns reached Philippi almost simultaneously, surprising and routing. the enemy, who was pursued in the direction of Beverly and Huttonsville, where Colonel Porterfield met reinforcements, and remained in command until superseded, on the 14th of June, by Gen. R. S. Garnett, especially sent from Richmond by General Lee.

Immediately on assuming command of the Confederate troops at Huttonsville, General Garnett moved them northward through Beverly, where he established his depot, to the passes of the mountains westward through Rich Mountain on the Buckhannon road and northward on the Philippi road at Laurel Hill. Both positions were then fortified and some few pieces of artillery placed in the fortifications. He had an outpost at Leadsville, on the St. George road, to protect his rear.

BATTLE OF RICH MOUNTAIN 29

General Garnett's instructions from General Lee were not only to impede McClellan's advance eastward through the passes, but also to endeavor to break the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad effectually by destroying the Cheat River viaduct. The latter part of these orders Garnett was never able to accomplish, but to secure his own position in and about Beverly he blocked all the mountain roads in the direction of the enemy as far north as St. George, the countyseat of Tucker County. He found the Union sentiment strongly in the ascendency among the people of the country, and complained to General Lee that he neither could get assistance from them nor prevent their giving information to the enemy of all his movements. His strength was about 10,000 men, with six pieces of artillery, as shown by his ration returns, when McClellan attacked him on the nth of July at Rich Mountain; but he had made the fatal mistake of dividing his force, although both of his main positions at Rich Mountain and at Laurel Hill were strong.

After securing the position at Philippi with Morris's Brigade, and placing a force of 2,000 men at Cheat River Bridge and Rowlesburg under Brig.-Gen. C. W. Hill, ample forces were kept by McClellan at Grafton, Webster, Clarksburg and Parkersburg to maintain rail communication with Ohio. With the surplus regiments reaching him from Ohio and Indiana, McClellan organized at Buckhannon a column

3° m'clellan's w. va. campaign

of about 6,000 men to attack Garnett, with the expectation of driving him out toward Staunton.