History of the Confederate States navy from its organization to the surrender of its last vessel

Front matter

xV 'r-

J. THOMAS SCHARF.

HISTORY

Preface

IT is no exaggeration of the services rendered in the late war by the navy of the United States, to say that without its aid the armies of the Union would not have been successful; that if the United States had been as destitute of a navy and of naval resources as the Southern Confederacy was, that the Union would have been dissolved; that without Farragut and Foote, Grant and Sherman would occupy in history the same plane with McDowell and Banks, Burnside and Hooker; that when the navy was not co-operating McDowell was hurled back on Washington: McClellan was driven from Richmond to seek protection under the guns of the navy on James River; that Pope was bounced from Cedar Mountain and, ricochetting at Manassas, rested like a spent ball under the defences of the capital; that in the West the "tin-clad" navy conveyed the army to Fort Henry, and was its effective left wing at Donelson; that the Mississippi River from Cairo to its mouth was firmly held by the Confederates until Foote from the North and Farragut from the South broke its barriers and opened its navigation: that Vicksburg and Port Hudson successfully defied and defeated the land forces, and surrendered as much to the navy as to the army; that Sherman would never have undertaken the '• march to the sea " if the navy had not provided protection on the seaboard; that Grant, in the Wilderness, diverted by Lee from his direct march on Richmond, sought the friendly help of the navy in his campaign to capture the Confederate capital; that the blockade from the Chesapeake Bay to the mouth of the Rio Grande shut the Confederacy out from the world, deprived it of supplies, weakened its military and naval strength, and compelled exhaustion, by requiring the

W

VI PREFACE.

consumption of everything grown or raised in the country; that there was not an act in either army that surpassed in magnificent courage the bold defiance by Lieut. Morris, of the U. S. Navy, of death alike from shot and drowning, on the deck of the sinking Cuinberlaiid. rather than surrender the ship.

And it was in the school of that navy that Buchanan, Tatnall, Ingraham, Mitchell, Semmes. Wood, Rollins, Tucker, Jones, Maffitt, Maury, Wilkinson, Davidson, Pegram, Brown, Bulloch. Brooke, and their associates, learned examples of heroic seamanship which enabled them to write the story of the Confederate Navy in high relief across the page of history.

That story it is the province of this book to tell, but the difficulties and embarrassments which have surrounded the subject can be known only to the author. Of official records there are very few of any kind in existence, and not a complete set for any department, or of the operations at any port, or of any vessel, except that preserved b}" Admiral Semmes of the Alabama. To meet that difficulty the author was compelled to rely mainly on the aid and assistance of Confederate naval officers. But while willing and anxious to aid in every way, these officers possessed but very few records and M-ere unwilling to rely merely on their memory. However, in reply to letters sent out by the autlior, much reliable information was obtained and valuable suggestions made, which when followed up led to the solving of many difficulties and the clearing away of much doubt and uncertainty. The "Official Records," now being published by the United States Government, have in the published volumes but very little that refers to naval affairs. Thus, the author has been compelled to rely upon his own unequaled collection of naval material, which he has been fifteen years in collecting, on contemporary accounts of operations, collected and preserved in newspapers, private letters, and individual papers, which compared with Federal authorities and such official Confederate records as escaped destruction, were again in many chapters referred to those officers now living who participated in the scenes and actions described for their supervision and correction.

The author's object was the truth, the whole truth as far as practicable, and nothing but the truth, in all he wrote. Many worthy and deserving officers, who fully and faithfully performed their arduous duties, have not received mention in the book, solely because the author had not the record which would enable him to relate the service rendered; while there is abundant authority to establish the truth of all that is told in the book, much valuable service has been lost to history by the destruction of records

It is to be hoped that the book will serve to excite surviving officers, and the representatives of those deceased, to search for and recover lost manuscripts, so that future edi-

PREFACE. vii

tions may add to this labor of love, the record of services omitted in this.

Notwithstanding the difficulties which beset the author, many facts have been brought to light, doubtful statements settled, errors corrected, and character rescued from misrepresentation and falsehood. Histories of the U. S. Navy written during the war, or immediately after its close, have undertaken to give accounts and details of Confederate action and motive, without the facts, and without knowledge of the circumstances of the Confederate side of the question, or of the particular action described. Errors, not necessarily intentional, but unavoidable, have thus been introduced into history, which the author of this M^ork has endeavored to correct and explain. While vindicating the political views of Confederate officers, no criticism has been found necessary of those whose convictions of dutv impelled them to take tlie ''other side."

If, therefore, in this effort to relate the deeds of daring, the instances and examples where ingenuity, enterprise and device rose above the embarrassments of restricted and limited resources, we have exhibited a partiality or seemed to detract from the glory of the parent navy, it must be attributed to sympathy with a common suffering, ratlier than a purpose to lesson that renown in which every American must now participate. Time has deprived prejudice of its rancor, politics of its bitterness, and, without changing convictions of duty, has united both sections of the Union under the government instituted by our fathers, and under its influence each party to the war can now read with profit the deeds of those who

" Gashed with honorable scars, Low in glory's lap thev lie, Though they fell they fell like stars, Streaming sj^lendor through the sky."

That navy at all times carries in pride, and we hope will always bear in triumph, that flag which now belongs alike to North and South. If we tell how the stars and bars wrested victor}- from the stars and stripes, we shall only exhibit the heroism of Americans, and make plain a glory that belongs to all the citizens of the Great Republic.

The author heartily acknowledges the intelligent aid and generous encouragement which he has received from his publishers ; and he also acknowledges his indebtedness to the publishers of Admiral Porter's '• Naval History of the Civil War," for the loan of maps and illustrations.

Baltimore, May 1st, 1887.

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.

PAGE

Alabama, Cbuiser 800

Albemable, Ram, Diagbam 403

Atlanta, Cedisee 641

- Be all. Lloyd J 769

' Attack on Foets Jackson and St. Philip. . 290

Bbooke, John M 49

Browne, Isaac N 312

B0CHANAN, FrANKUN 152

-Bulloch, J. D 56

Cairo, U.S. Ieon-Clad 752

' ' Chatakd, Fredeeick 104

Cooke, James W 408

^ Davis, Jefferson 11

Florida, Cruiser 792

- Forrest, French 40

Fort Hindm an. Plan of 318

Fort Morgan 685

Fey, James 344

Governor Moore, Steamer 285

Harriet Lane, Steamer 608

Harbikt Lane, Capture of 605

HoLLiNS, George N , 243

Howell, Jefferson Davis 780

HuGER, Thomas B 288

Indianola, Iron-Clad 362

IjiGRAHAM, D.N 680

Jones, Cap R 184

Lee, B. E., Blockade Bunneb 468

Lee, Sidney Smith 712

Louisl\na, Ram 266

Maffitt, John T 392

Malloey, Stephen R 27

Manassas, K.\M 264

Manassas, in flames 296

Maurt, Matthew F 96

MclNTOSH.C.F 280

Merrimac (See Virginia)

page Mississippi, below New Orleans 290

- Mitchell, John K 297

Mobile Bat, Diagram 552

Monitor. Profile 172

-Morris, C.M 88

Mound Battery 424

Nashville, sinking U. S. Vessel 633

Page, Richard L 553

Parker, William H 176

Patrick Henry, School Ship 776

Pensacola Navy- Yard, Destruction of. . . . 615 Queen of the West, Bam 352

" Roanoke Island, Plan 388

RocHELLE, John H 704

Savannah, Defences of 635

^ ScHARF, J. Thomas Frontispiece

Semmes, Raphael 744

Shenandoah, Cruiser 809

Smith's Island, Diagram 423

Stonewall, Ram 784

Sumter, Cruiser 787

' Tathall, Josiah 216

Tennessee, Profile 653

Tennessee, Diagram 555

Tennessee, after captuee 574

Torpedoes 751-764

Torpedo Boats 759

Tucker, John R 200

Turret Ship.. 788

Virginia, IN dock 154

Virginia, Profile 172

Virginia, Sinking Cumberland 160

Virginia and Monitor in Battle — 168

Waddell.I.T... 816

Whittle, William C 300

Wilkinson, John 464

-Wood, John Taylok 121

Names of Commissioned and Warrant Officers, C. S. Navy, . 819

Chapter I Introduction

WHILE it does not enter within the scope of this work to discuss the political subjects which, after long years of debate, culminated in the late war between the States, yet we are confronted at the very threshold of our undertaking with the moral question : Whether there was either violation of oath, or ingratitude to the United States, in resigning commissions in that service, and accepting commissions under their States, b}- those officers who had been educated in the military and naval schools at West Point and Annapolis? That question involves in its solution the theories upon which the Constitution of the United States was framed. For, if it was ordained and established by one people, then the relation of citizenship to the United States was wholly outside of all relation to the States, and the allegiance of those officers was due directly and entirely to the United States. If. on the contrary, the Constitution was ordained and established by the States, in their sovereign and independent character, then allegiance was due primarily to the States, and became due to the United States only through the action of the States. If, therefore, the States, by their sovereign act, transferred the allegiance of their citizens to the United States, that allegiance could only be by the act of the State, and remain due only so long as the State continued a party to the Constitution of the United States.

Whether the theory of a national, or of a compact, government be the true theory of the Constitution, now and hereafter, it is not necessary to discuss. The compact theory of the United States Constitution, announced in 1800 to all the States, and denied bv none, continued to be held by the people of the Southern States down to the year 1861. From that theory was derived the axiom of political faith, that the State, and not the citizen, was the contracting party to the Constitution, and that the power, right and duty of continuing with or withdrawing' from the Union remained with the State. Hence all Southern men held that the sovereign act of the State was obligatory on her citizens, and of such efficacy that disobedience by her citizen to the ordinance of secession would have been treason to the State, In the political relations of States there are questions which the State only can determine ; of these that of allegiance is the first and of most importance. At the formation of the Constitution of 1789. the States transmitted the allegiance of their citizens to the United States. The act of the State, by which the citizen was bound to obey the authority of the United States, did not divest the citizen of his duty to obey the State, but made allegiance to the United States to be the citizen's duty because the State was one of the United States. That act of the State did not create a double allegiance — one to the State, and another to the United States — but transferred, while the State was a party to the United States Constitution, the single allegiance of her citizen to the United States through and by virtue of the act of the State.

Under any theory of double allegiance it would have been impossible for the citizen to have escaped committing the crime of treason. For, if the State should be driven by oppression to withdraw from the Constitution of the United Slates, her citizen, under this double allegiance, would have been bound to the United States. Hence, if the citizens should obey their own State, the}^ would be pursued and hunted down as traitors to the Federal government; and, if forsaking the State to which their allegiance was originally exclusively due, they should adhere to the Federal government, they would be traitors to their own State and enemies to their firesides. Such a scheme of government would be a monstrous engine of cruelty and oppression, which no man can believe the fathers of the Constitution erected to. crush and grind their posterity between the upper and the nether inillstones of the two governments, and then pronounce it to be a scheme "to secure the blessings of liberty to themselves and their posterit}'.-'

With the officers of the army and navy there was no party politics — but they held a faith or conviction upon the relation of their States to the Federal Union, disconnected from all party association, which did not permit them to discuss whether their States were acting wisely or prudently — but only that their States had acted, and that they were bound by the sovereign act of their States. It was their sense of duty — their view of citizenship, their conviction of allegiance to the State — tliat impelled them to resign their commissions in the service of the United States and cast their fortunes with their States.

By ordinance of the Virginia Convention, it Avas "ordained that all officers, civil and military, and the people generally of this State, be and they are hereby released from any and all oaths which they may have taken to support the Constitution of the late confederacy, known as The United States of America, and that the said oaths and the said Constitution are inoperative and void, and of no effect."

Thus a political oath, taken by virtue of a command from the State, was absolved and released by a like sovereign act of the State.

As to the resignation of those officers. Admiral Semmes very justly remarks :

" It must be admitted, indeed, tliat there was some little nerve required on the part of an officer of the ref;u]ar army or navy to elect to go with his State. His profession was his only fortune ; he depended upon it for the means of subsisting himself and family. If he remained where he was, a competency for life, and promotions, and honors, probably, awaited him ; if he went with the South, a dark, uncertain future was before him ; he could not possibly better his condition, and, if the South failed, he would have thrown away the labor of a life-time. The struggle was hard in other respects. All professions are clannish. Men nmtually cling together who have been bred in a common pursuit, and this i-emark is peculiarly applicable to the army and the navy. West Point and Annapolis were powerful bonds to knit together the hearts of young men. Friendships were there formed which it was difficult to sever, especially when strengthened by years of after-associatit>n in common toils, counnon pleasures, and common dangers. Naval officers, in particular, who had been rocked together in the same storm, and had escaped perhaps from the same shipwreck, found it very difficult to draw their swords against each other. The flag, too, had a charm which it was difficult to resist. It had long been the emblem of the principle that all just governments are founded on the consent of the governed, vindicated against our British ancestors in the War of the Revolution; and it was difficult to realize the fact that it no longer represented that principle, but had become the emblem of its opposite : that of coercing unwilling States to remain under a government which they deemed unjust and oppressive."

Of the same tenor is the testimony borne by Capt. Bulloch and Parker, and by the sentiments of affection in every Southern officer who resigned from the United States Navy. It required no sacrifice and entailed no inconvenience to remain loyal to the Union : but to resign from that service involved every consideration which might deter a man not actuated by exalted principles.

There could not, therefore, be any violation of an oath which had been taken by command of the State, after the State absolved and released her citizen from its obligation and commanded his services in her own defence.

As to ingratitude, in resigning after education in the military and naval schools — the same reasons apply with equal force. Those schools had been established and maintained by the States, in their associated capacity as " The United States of America," for the defence only of the States, for outside of the States there was nothing to defend. The citizens of the States were appointed cadets from the States, maintained by the taxes of citizens of the States, and were appointed to the army and navy which was designed only to protect and defend the States. It is hardly necessary to say that it nevei was within the contemplation of the States, when the schools at West Point and Annapolis were established, to conjecture or suppose that the graduates would ever be called upon to fight against the States — even for the union of the States. But in 1861 events had presented to the States that most unexpected result — the soldiers and sailors, educated by the Federal government in its character of agent of the Sia'. . were called upon by that agent to fight against its princi] i ! by the servant to make war on the master; by the crejilur.- to destroy the creator. In that anomalous condition of the relations of the States to the Federal Union, the eleves of West Point and Annapolis returned to their States without the least ingratitude to the United Ptates, which had lost sight of its origin and assumed a mastery where only a service or agency was designed.^

Such was the firm and honest sense of duty entertaiiipd not only by these officers, but taught and inculcated in the political literature of the Southern States, and incorporate'! in the great principles of government and parties from the election of Mr. Jefferson in 1800 to the close of Mr. Buchanan's in iMiO, The resolutions of Virginia and Kentucky, in 179S, was tlie magna cliarta of political principles not only for the South* rn States, but New England, in 1815, drew from them her justil ■ ution of opposition to the war with Great Britain. That tb ■••(^ resolutions had been assailed and the inference of the righ' of secession controverted by eminent statesmen and jurists o t the North is not denied, but they retained throughout tiu- South their great cardinal features of political faith. In ob > - ing convictions directly resulting from the teachings of ?[r. Jefferson and Mr. Madison, ratified and confirmed by the n. - peated elections of both of the authors of those resolutions, the officers discharged a duty as binding upon their conscienies as was their faith in the Supreme Being.

1 At the beginning of the war a great deal was ARMY. South. N<.f,h.

said about the way the bodj' of the officers Generals 2

who commanded the army and navy was con- Colonels It

stituted with reference to the North and the jj'^"*^g'"'"*'*^*'^°°*''^ g[ ,:,'

Soiith. and much speculation was rife as to the Cantains" 151 IH")

course these gentlemen would pursue in case Lieutenants'. [.'...!.'... !..'.!!'.".*.! 238 2'.':?

of conflict between the two sections. Mr.

Seward, in the political campaign of 1860, de- Total 407 5"; ■

nounced both services as mere slave-catching N.VVY.

and slave-keeping institutions, and declared Captains 34 4'

for the abolition of both when he was speaking Commanders (",2 6 .;

in the West, where the Navy was particularly Lieutenants 135 19 i

unmmnlar Surgeons 25 4t

unpopular. Assistant Surgeons 44 3".

The imi^ression. in 18G0, seemed prevalent Paymasters 30 3'

that the majority of the olficers in both branches Chaplains 7 1<

of the service came from the South, and had Masters 15 2!;

Southern preiudices, but the armv and navy . '.'^^^'S??^'\:.- l^ ,?]

. . • li .; ,, • It,, 'n -L.- t Actmg Midshipmen fiO 17f<

registers give the following tables, from which Boatswains..... 14 27

it will be seen that there was a majority in Gunners .'.'.'.'. '. 20 2€

favor of the Nt)rth in both services — a majority * "

of 112 in the army, and of 253 in the navy ; Total 460 7)3

Chapter II. Want Of Preparation For War

IN the same line of reckless aspersion as that against the resigned officers was the charge r»"'ade against the Southern States of having, while in the Union, prepared resources of arms and collected munitions of war to effect its dissolution.

In support of that assertion, the Potter Committee of the Federal Congress reflected with severity upon the transfer of certain arms to the Southern States during the year 1860, prior to the election of Mr. Lincoln, and when secession was being discussed in the same language which had been used on that subject for thirty years before. But the subsequent secession of the Southern States gave point and application to the charge that Secretary Floyd had prepared the South for war by arming the States with United States arms. The raid of John Brown into Virginia had put into actual war the continued threat of the avowed Abolitionists, who regarded the Constitution as a "compact with the devil and a league with hell" — and who swore to

" Tear down that flaunting lie !

Half-mast the starry flag !

Insult no sunny sky

For defence against those attacks of invasion the peaceful policy of Virginia had rendered her wholly unprepared. Northern cupidity availed itself of that excitement and vociferously cried to Congress for the manufacture of more arms. Pittsburgh manufacturers lobbied a bill through Congress for the manufacture of cannon to arm the unfinished Southern forts.

The appropriation for casting these cannon was passed by Congress, without the knowledge or solicitation of Secretary Floyd, under the industrious lobbying of Pittsburgh iron-founders. The guns were cast in obedience to law, and the early shipment of them in advance of the full completion of the forts, though not in advance of the readiness of the forts to receive their armament, was due more to the fact that the Pittsburgh iron-founders were bound bj^ their contract to deUver them before receiving their pay than to the special eagerness of the Secretary to get them off. The Secretary simply obeyed a mandate of Congress, and the Pittsburgh c<jntractors simply obeyed the influences of cupidity. But those guns never readied the Southern forts, tlieir shipment was stopped in Pittsburgh by Secretary Holt. Much was also said about one hundred thousand muskets having been ordered to be sold to one Belknap at two and one- half dollars each, as being a part of the same scheme to arm the South. But that order was made under a standing law and in pursuance of numerous reports of competent boards of ordnance officers, declaring the Government would do well to get rid of them at two dollars. Those muskets never came to the South ; for, though offered to and urged upon the Southern States, they would not take them. Virginia had previously taken a few thousand, Mississippi as many more, and Alabama -a still greater number. Probably South Carolina and Georgia took also a few thousand; but when a hundred thousand more could have been had for a song they paid no attention to the subject. The offer to the States was at two dollars ; the offer to Belknap was not till afterwards, and at two and one-half dollars, Belknap's scheme was to sell the muskets in Europe, and not to the South, as tJie committee's report insinuated.

For years prior to 1860 it had been the policy of the Federal war department to allow all the rifles and muskets manufactured at the Federal armories to be deposited in Northern arsenals. That at AVatervliet, near Troy, N. Y., contained probably one-half of all the arms of improved patterns owned by the Federal government.

The attack of John Brown upon Virginia, and the numerous efforts of Northern emissaries to excite Southern slaves to insurrection, suggested the importance of distributing their (juota of these fine guns among the Southern States, Accordingly, orders were issued in 1860, by Secretary Floyd, to transfer the Southern quota of the arms from the Northern arsenals.

On May 30th, 1860, prior to the nomination even of Mr. Lincoln, an order was made for the transfer of the quota of arms to the Southern arsenals. Under which order the transfer was as follows :

Percus'n Muskets. Altered Muskets. Percus'n Rifles.

North Carolina Arsenal, . . . 15,408 9,520 2.000

Baton Roufje, La., . . . 18,82Q 11,420 2,000 The number of arms transferred to these arsenals under this order being 114,868.

That transfer of arms was made prior to the nominations of political parties in 1860, long anterior to the presidential election and entirely without the least expectation of secession or war. The safety of persons and property at the South, the preservation of order and social life in the slave-holding States, had been put in jeopardy by Northern incendiaries, and that transfer of arms was justified by what had already taken place at Harper's Ferry under John Brown, and by the sympathy shown to and martyrdom conferred upon that insurrectionist and incendiary. The portion borne by the Southern States in the expenditures of the Federal government entitled them to the custody of a fair quota of this sort of public property. They were taken under undisputed legal right ; and more than the portion taken belonged to the Southern States by right of property fairly paid for. That transfer of arms was the act of the Federal government, and not the preparation for war by any State.

But the charge of previous preparation for war was believed by many at the North, and has been since the war repeatedly asserted by writers who ought to have known better. If those wiio made the assertion had shown that preparation for war had been even commenced, that materials of war had been collected, that any steps had been taken to make successful an attempt to dissolve the Union, there might be some probability in the assertion. But the fact is now apparent and within the reach of all, that, until the organization of the Confederate States, there was not a ship owned by any State, nor the least effort made to procure one ; that there was not a piece of ordnance of any kind; not a yard in which a yawl-boat could be built; not a machine shop capable, without material alterations, of constructing the simplest piece of naval machinery; not a rope-yard, not a percussion-cap machine ; only one powder mill, no supply of nitre, or sulphur, or lead — not the least preparation of any kind.

Why was it that there were no preparations ? The answer must be found in the conviction of all men, that none could be needed — because secession was a peaceful remedy — and war would not follow separation from a Union which owed its existence to a peaceable secession from an older Union. Hence there was no preparation for war — until President Lincoln's Proclamation, calling on all the States for 75,000 men to recapture the forts, etc., held by the seceded States, made war not only imminent but actual. It was that proclamation which brought the two sections of the Union face to face in war, as independent and hostile Republics, but without the least preparation on the part of either. The United States was in better condition and situation for war than the Confederate States, but not without less preparation. That government had the small army as a nucleus for a larger, and all the ships of the navy — for no Southern officer who resigned brought a ship with him to the

Confederacy. They did not presume to take upon themselves the duty of dividing the navy among the States, notwithstanding it was the common property of all the States. In the excitement of the times, it would have been pardonable conduct to have brought their ships to the defence of the States; but their delicate sense of honor, and a sailor's duty to the government whose commission he bore, required that he should divest himself of every selfish motive before he returned his commission to the Federal government. In the light of such honorable conduct, the petty malice with which Secretary Welles was actuated, when he endeavored to stigmatize these officers with having ''deserted the service," reacts with more effect against the character of the Secretary than against the conduct of these officers.

The forts, arsenals, etc., situated in and attached to the soil •of the States, had all been conveyed to the United States, with the reservation of the State's right of re-entry and occupation, wiien the forts, etc., ceased to be used for the defence of the State. The property was held in trust for all the States, as a means of defending all, through the avenues of commerce in the particular State. Hence, when the State, in which the fort, arsenal and dock-yard was situated, withdrew from the Union, the purposes of the trust ended, and she resumed her right and jurisdiction over the fort. The money expended in improving the fort was, of course, to have been returned to the United States in the settlement of accounts between the seceded States and the United States ;^ and that was one of the objects of the diplomatic mission of Messrs. Forsyth and Crawford to the government at Washington, in March, 1861.