An introduction to systematic philosophy

Front matter

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Class 3 4 ^ 3 /

Book . N a

Preface

There are two things that this book is not. First, it is not an historical introduction to philosophy. I have dealt only in a few cases with the history of the problems under consideration, but have generally given only brief notes and a few references to guide the student should he desire to devote some time to looking up historical matters. Secondly, it is not a handbook of philosophy. It does not give pro and con all the various doctrines held by the great philosophical writers of the past and the leading writers of the present. It does not give an exhaustive bibliography under the different headings, but mentions as a rule only those books with whose titles the beginner should get acquainted and in which he will find the best introduction to a further and profounder treatment of the problem in hand.

But what is the book ? It is an attempt to state and explain the chief problems of philosophy as problems actually existing to-day, and to give such solution of these as the author is able to give. In fact, its chief value seems to me to lie in the selection and in the order of the problems with which it deals. The instructor who uses the book for his classes may easily select those chapters which he wishes to omit and those which he desires to emphasize. I strongly urge the beginner and the general reader to omit for the first reading the following chapters: V, VII, X, XII, XIII, XX, XXX, XXXI, XXXIII, XLV, XLVI, XLVII, LVII, and LVIII. By so doing the book will gain in interest and the main argument will not be seriously disturbed.

Viii PREFACE

I am quite aware that the book has many faults, but my excuse for publishing it now is, first, the belief that it is an approach toward what an introduction to philosophy should be, and, secondly, the desire to learn through it how to write a better introduction some time in the future, especially in case a second edition is called for. Doubtless, the reader will find inconsistencies; but inconsistency between the solutions of different problems does not seem to me a fatal fault, for I believe that we philosophers should profit by following the example of natural science and devoting ourselves chiefly to separate problems and their solution, even if we have to set aside for the time being the making of a system. Hence I have tried to present a series of problems and their solutions rather than a completed philosophical system. In this presentation there is, of course, a system, or general doctrine, in the background, and a word should be said about it.

If I have understood Professor Miinsterberg aright in the first chapter of his " Psychology and Life," I agree with every statement that he there makes. My terminology is different, but my general views are the same. I should call the main doctrine of my book a rationalistic idealism. By idealism I mean the doctrine that denies the existence of a transcendent world, and that, therefore, limits all problems to the world of experience. By rationalism I mean that our attempt to interpret the world must presuppose premises or a ijriori truths about the world. Against naturalism I maintain that man's ideals can rightly lay claim to the same validity as does his science ; and in behalf of naturalism I attempt to justify the atomic mechanical interpretation of nature and indirectly of mind.

The book presupposes on the part of the reader a general knowledge of natural science, psychology, and formal logic.

PEEFACE ix

Next a word about its use for classes. It is not intended to be exactly a text-book. Rather it is to furnisb the student with a problem and with enough information about the problem for him to take an active part in a discussion in class. The instructor will doubtless disagree with much that I have said, and will wish to impart to his students his own views and his objections to mine. My expectation is that he will do so, and that the book will be merely a help to prepare the student for this. In short, the ideal introductory course in systematic philosophy seems to me to be not a lecture course nor a series of recitations, but a critical and systematized discussion, — a Socratic discussion if you will.

I hope that all these remarks about college matters will not discourage the general reader by making him think that the book is not intended for him as well.

Finally, I wish to express my heartfelt thanks to my colleagues, = Professor H. A. Aikins and Dr. W. D. Briggs, for numerous and most helpful suggestions and corrections in the course of final revision.

WALTER T. MARVIN.

Cleveland, Ohio, April 21, 1903.

Contents

CHAPTER

I. Philosophy and the Philosopher

PAGE 1

Part I Metaphysics

I. THE PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE

II. The Infinite Diversity of Things, Qualities, and Relations in Nature 15

in. The Gradation of Things, Qualities, and Relations in

Respect to their Universality and Permanence . . 27

IV. The Primary and Secondary Qualities .... 38

V. Things and their Qualities : Substance ... 57

VI. The Atomic Theory 64

Vn. Motion 79

VIII. The Conservation of Mass and Motion .... 85

IX. The Mechanical Theory 94

X. Space and Time 99

XI. The World's Infinity 104

XII. Mathematics and Abstract Mechanics as A Priori

Sciences 107

Appendix : Note on the Nature of Probability . .116

Xin. A Critique of Natural Science 120

II. THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND

XIV. The Distinction between Mental States and Material

Things 125

XV. The Existence of Other Minds than Ours . . .134

XVI. Immortality 139

XVII. Mental Causation and Conservation .... 151

Xll

CONTENTS

CHAPTER PAGE

XVIII. The Freedom of the Will 162

XIX. The Soul and Personal Identity .... 164

XX. A Critique of Psychology 174

III. ONTOLOGY

XXI. Introductory 178

XXII. Materialism 184

XXIII. Spiritualism 195

XXIV. Dualism 208

XXV. The Problem of Substance 210

IV. COSMOLOGY

XXVI. Introductory 217

XXVII. Pluralism 235

XXVIII. Singularism 255

XXIX. The Principle of Causation 264

XXX. The Causal Relation between Mind and Body . 274

XXXI. Panpsychism 280

V. COSMOGONY

XXXII. Creation 291

XXXIII. The Doctrine and Principles of Evolution . . 303

XXXIV. Teleology 320

XXXV. Conclusion 329

Part II

THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE I. THE NATURE OF KNOWLEDGE

XXXVI. Introductory

XXXVII. The Elements of Knowledge .

XXXVIII. The Given, or The Object of Knowledge

XXXIX. The Given, or The World of Facts

XL. Knowledge and the Principles of Knowledge

337 344

349 364 374

CONTENTS xiii

II. THE VALIDITY OF KNOWLEDGE

CUAPTBR PAGE

XLI. The Relativity and Infinitude of Knowledge and its

Validity 382

XLII. The Transcendent Element in Knowledge and its

Validity 390

IIL THE WORLD AS PRESUPPOSED BY KNOWLEDGE

XLIII. The Premises of Knowledge, or Rationalism vs.

Empiricism . 395

XLIV. The Transcendent World, or Realism vs. Idealism . 403 XLV. The Determination of the Given . . . .412

XLVI. The Principles of Reality 420

XLVn. The Principles of Reality (conc/MC?ec?) . . . 429

IV. THE MANIFOLD INTERPRETATION OF THE WORLD

XLVm. The Real and the Ideal 439

ESTHETICS LIV. The Nature of the Beautiful 511 xiv CONTENTS

Part VI Philosophy As A Science

OHAPTEB

LV. The Definition and Scope of Philosophy

LVI. The Division of Philosophy

LVII. The Historical Development of Philosophy

LVIII. The Method of Philosophy ....

LIX. The Meaning and Value of Philosophy

521 534 538

548 551

APPENDIX I A Scheme of the History of Philosophy 565

APPENDIX n

A Bibliography of Books especially referred to for Parallel Reading 568

Index 569

AN INTEODUCTION

TO

SYSTEMATIC PHILOSOPHY is a love for the truth.

mTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY

Chapter I

What is Philosophy, and who is the Philosopher ? Philosophy is an enthusiasm, a love for the truth ; and the Philosophy Philosopher is he whose life and thought are controlled b}^ this mightiest of loves. Truth is his mistress ; and to be faithful to her in thought, in word, and in deed, is the devotion that alone seems to him meet and right. He is a lover of the Truth ; but what is Truth ? It is the old, old question, and its answer might well be called also the old, old answer. For more than a score of centuries, from the days when Greek civilization had reached manhood, on through the ten centuries of its prime, old age, and dotage, through the centuries, when under the influence of Greek thought the dogmas of the Catholic Church were formulating, on through the Middle Ages and the Renascence, down to and through the days of modern thought and civilization to our own time, this question has been ever before the mind of Europe's spiritual leaders ; yes, to answer it her greatest minds have lived, and proved themselves willing to suffer, and even to die.

Now what has been this answer of the ages ? It is contained in one word. Truth is Consistency. He that makes And Truth it a chief aim of his life in thought^ in word., and in deed, to he consistent, he is a philosopher ; and the endeavor to bring consistency into the life and thought of the civilization of the day, this endeavor is philosophy.

means Cousistency.

This explains why Philosophy is misunderstood and seems to lack progress.

Here we have at once the explanation why the philosopher has been so widely misunderstood in our own day. You and I live in a time when the discovery of new facts and of new laws of nature and of mind is praised and honored, in a time that has little patience with a study not giving man directly new means of overcoming life's obstacles and of winning life's allies. This is the work of science. Science to-day is hailed as chief and conqueror ; but philosophy is looked upon as a feeble, dotard tribesman, living over from generations now passed away. Our charity and reverence for old age may permit it to remain still among us ; but who looks to it for aught that is useful or aught that will help, truly help, the march of progress ?

Progress means the gaining of new information about the facts of the world in which we live. Progress means the application of this information to subduing nature to our service. We have not time to sit down to ask ourselves whether all that we are doing, all that we are learning, is consistent, the new with the old, or the one part with the other. We must be up and doing. The world will not stand still for us. What if here and there we are inconsistent? Results are what we seek, and results are what we can show. Behold how we have increased the security of life against disease, against starvation, against hostile peoples. See the luxury and comfort now possible to the day laborer, and the raised standard of living everywhere among us. Mark the means of easy transit from one end of our earth to the other, and the wide and rapid intercommunication between man and man now established the Avhole world over. Behold the teeming population in countries but recently unable to support a tenth of the men they now comfortably clothe and feed. Look at our great cities, where but recently was wilderness. And last but not least, if you desire spiritual progress, see the truths that our empirical sciences have won for us.

where a century ago all was ignorance, superstition, or the mere blind following of worthless tradition.

Such has been and often is still the talk in vogue. It is the talk of the hysterical enthusiast. It is such, because no sane man even dreams of disputing the truth of a word that is there said. It is such, because no .sane man can help but be in general as well informed as the one that makes the outcry. It is such, because the very progress to which so much praise is given results from an application of the philosopher's principle, ,consistency ; without which science could never have existed. Who but the man that cannot see, fails to .apprehend one of the chief causes, over and above the mere information science has given us, of the material progress of our day ? Can we point to a mightier power for wealth and progress than social and industrial organization?

Were the nations not mighty peoples but petty and hostile tribes, were industrial and commercial corporations no longer here, but in their stead only the little shop, the merchant .single-handed, and the lonely pack-carrier, where then were our boasted wealth and luxury, what then would it serve us though we knew twixje the laws of nature, and twice the means of subduing them that we now know? But what is organization? Is it mother than a means to be consistent? Is it aught but an instrument to bring each individual and his life into, harmony with all the rest of his fellow-men and with their lives ?

Ah, if that be so, then there is a twofold work to be done in this world of ours. It is not he alone that discovers new truths and shows us how we may .bridle the forces of nature, important, most important though his work is, it is not he alone that -achieves the results we call progress. There is another who works hand in hand with him, and without whom the world would fare ilL There is the great social and industrial organizer. There is the man that sees where two forces that should be friendly,

Reply to this Misunderstanding.

Progress has two Factors, and one of these is Organization.

Organization, and therefore Progress, means Consistency, or Harmony ; and the Harmonizer is, as such, the Philosopher.

are conflicting, and the one destroying the results of the other. He marks the contradiction that exists, and endeavors to learn and to appl}^ the deeper principle that will harmonize them. His motto is, " For we are members one of another." He knows that two elements enter into every movement, — the propelling force and the repelling one. No matter how great the former may be, the latter may easily make it of no avail. True progress must, then, be a twofold one ; and they that work for man's advancement must engage in this double labor. There are those who give their lives to accumulate the forces of propulsion, but those lives are no less useful which are given to removing the repelling forces. Now where there are many workers it may easily be that men themselves, in their aims and in their labor, may so act that one destroys what the other would accomplish ; that one is to the other as a repelling force. What, then, is to happen ? No one man is so powerful that he can subdue all that are in his way; no one man can have the world to himself. Life is, and must be, a movement against resisting forces. There is, then, but one thing to be done. Harmful, needless, profitless resistance must be done away; and this is the work of the philosopher, to harmonize, to make consistent the lives of fellow-men whether it be in their thoughts or in their words or in their deeds. No matter where, conflict must give place to peace. We maj^, then, call the philosopher the world's peacemaker: and we may judge him that brings peace out of discord a philosopher, no matter where his work may be ; no matter whether it be in the organization of industry or commerce, in the settlement of strife between capital and labor, in the making of treaties between nations ; or, whether it be in removing the conflict between scientific theories and between religion and science, or in overcoming the struggle between the body and the spirit, — the warfare between things material and things spiritual for the mastery over man; or, finally, whether it be in the revealing to our minds the unity of the individual and the world to which he belongs, — the unity of the finite and the infinite. No matter where we meet it, the work of harmonizing discord and contradiction will belong to the man that is at bottom philosophically minded.

But, as has been implied all along, the organizer is only supplementing the work of another. The mind that finds new facts and the mind that reconciles the old and the new are complementary. Often in the history of civilization we have had men that united in the one mind a mighty power for both forms of labor; and, doubtless, no--man is so one-sided that he is wholly devoted to the one or the other. Such great men were in days gone by an Aristotle, a St. Paul, a Descartes, a Leibniz, a Newton, a Franklin, and, in our own days, a Helmholtz, a Darwin, a Mill, a Lotze, a Huxley, and tens of others that might just as rightly be named.

Let us look somewhat more at the details of the philosopher's calling. Clearly he must be judicially minded. His work as reconciler demands that he understand both The Pecusides of the controversy, and that he do justice to both; j^f^Q'^i?-**^ otherwise he would establish a peace that were no true He is a peace. His work, as compared with the explorer's, the r^tbe/than inventor's, the discoverer's, is at home, whereas theirs is an Obout in the field. They must be trained to observation, he ^^^^^' must be trained to reflection. They are great observers, he is a great thinker. In fact, it has often been his stayat-home life that has caused him to be so misjudged and ill spoken of. He seems to be weaving all out of his "inner consciousness." He does not seem to be a lover of facts and of deeds. He is rather a lover of solitude and of quiet, of repose and of meditation. No wonder the nineteenth century misunderstands him!

But to turn from the man to his work. Of course, from our discussion, it follows that his work is everywhere, —

INTEODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY

The Narrower Field ol Philosophy. It seeks to harmouize the universal, or most general conflicts.

Philosophy in the narrower sense.

Meaning of the term, "the Truth," in tlie original definition.

in the struggles with self, in the farail}-, the state, the church, in commerce and industry, in science and religion, and in morality and art. We would have the reader not forget that to be a peacemaker, or harmonizer, no matter where, is to have the spirit of the philosopher, and to be one indeed. But the work of philosophy, in the more general and historic use of the term, is in a narrower field than everywhere. In the traditional and narroiver sense of the ivord philosoijhy is the study of the fiaidamental problems before the human mind and the endeavor to bring an ultimate harmony into all human thought and action. The conflicts it would harmonize are the universal ones ; and the students in our schools and colleges who would study philosophy are not to expect in their courses in that subject to deal with all manner of human discords. Philosophy in the broader sense may be studied in almost every course, or even lecture, throughout a college or university career, as it may also be studied in every department of life's work. But philosophy in the narrower sense is the subject of the present book, and it is to this we must introduce the reader.

What is philosophy? We defined it as an enthusiasm for the Truth, and at once asked. What is truth? Two possible meanings of the word have been implied in what has already been said; and we may now denote this twofold meaning by adopting the distinction between "a truth," or "truths," and "the truth." There were, as we saw, two great works for our minds to do : first, to discover the new, and, secondly, to organize or assimilate the new with the old, or to systematize each part with every other part. To do the former work we must collect new facts, and interpret these new facts either through our knowledge of the old or through some new thought of a creative as opposed to a merely traditional thinker. Such new knowledge we call a discovery. It is "a new truth." But "the truth" has quite a different meaning. The truth refers to that complete body of knowledge that includes in it The Truth

all truths., — all truths oraayiized into one great system. It '^*^'*^

'^ 1/ t/ comijlete

is the difference between the scattered parts of a dead system of body on the dissecting table and those parts united in the [ruth^'^"^^ living organism, each part where it belongs, each part ministering to every other part, and all together forming a unity whose life and meaning can be thought of as one. Thus, the truth means all individual truths united into one all-including system.

But if this be the truth, how can we ever attain to it? To construct such an all-including system would require that we have all truths in our possession; but this we shall never have, for as long as rational beings exist new facts will be revealing themselves and demanding to be interpreted and to have this interpretation, or new truth, brought into harmony with old truths and the old with it. The truth then is not something we now possess, or ever will possess; nay, rather, we never shall possess it; but it is an ideal toward which the reason of man is ever striving, — an ideal we can realize only in part, yet realize more and more as our knowledge progresses. The truth is only an ideal. But mark what The Truth this implies. It does tell us that we have not attained ^® therefore

^ . only an

the truth, but it also tells us that we have a partial ideal. idea, a notion, a mental picture of that which we are striving to realize. We may not know the truth; for did we, we should have already fulfilled our ideal. Yet we do know enough about it and its nature to search for it intelligently; for did we not know this, how could "we seek it? When you or I hunt for this or that object, it may well be that we know little about the object; still, we must know something, otherwise we should not know where to search nor should we know the object when we had found it.

Now, ultimately, every rational mind is a seeker after the truth: and if this be so, we must all have some faint

8'

INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOrilY

The twofold implication of this Ideal and hence the twofold work of Philosophy, (a) Gaining a more perfect view of our Ideal, the Truth. {b) Realizing our Ideal, by the Organization of Truths.

Philosophy needs for its work the truths gaiaed by Science :

picture of that which we seek so that we may recognize it when we find it; otherwise, our task were hopeless.

Notice now what we have been saying. The seeker after the trutli has a twofold work to do. He must have an idea, or mental picture, of that for which he searches. He must be able to recognize truth when he finds it. He must have before him, air castle though it be, an image of the ideal called the truth. On the other hand, merely to have the ideal, and yet in no way to realize it, were little indeed, and quite profitless. Therefore he must strive to realize it, and in part succeed, ere he be worthy of the name, a seeker after the truth. But to realize it we have found to mean the organizing of truths into an organic whole, or system. The seeker after the truth must do this also. Hence, if we define philosophy as the search for the truth, we see at once that philosophy's work must be twofold: first, there is the ivorking out of that ideal, or mental jncture, those marks or C7'iteria, those characteristics or descriptions of the truth which will enable us to guide our search intelligently and to recognize the truth and to hasten the dag of its com2:>lete realization ; secondlg, there is the organization of truths into a sgstem, or the complete unification of our knowledge. In its broader sense philosophy includes both. Many have restricted its meaning solely to this latter work ; but a moment's thought must show that no man can find an object, or realize an ideal, unless he has some notion of that for which he searches or some picture of that ideal unto which he would attain.

The second task, or work of systematizing, is clearly but complementary to the work of those who discover new truths. Clearly, the philosopher could never systematize truths he does not possess, and, therefore, without the discoverer of new truths his very task must be hopeless.

No amount of mere thinking could possibly give these new truths. We must search for the facts. He that would discover gold must go out into the wide world and dig for it. He that stays at home and spends his days in idle dreams of the gold he would discover, will never be more than a poor and worthless idler. No, the philosopher needs the discoverer of truths as much, and even more, than that one needs the philosopher. Our greatest ruler or industrial organizer needs the farmer, the weaver, the coal-miner, and the woodsman. Without them he himself would starve, and his government and organization become a mere powerless dream. As all our civilization is built upon the labor of those who wrest from the soil its potential wealth, so, also, must all philosophy be built upon the truths the discoverers win for us. That philosopher wdio is false to this truth is as blind and as great a fool as that capitalist who forgets his dependence upon the lowliest laborers of field, forest, and mine. Nothing could be so untrue to philosophy herself as that widespread notion that the philosopher cares for none of these things, but weaves the truth out of his inner self, as a spider weaves its web. This view is utterly false, and they that continue to cry it forth from the housetops show a disgraceful ignorance and an unbounded assurance.

But where there is smoke one may justly expect to find fire. It is true that the philosopher's work is reflection. It is true that by thinking he wins that organization of truths we call "the truth." But even more than this. We found his work to be twofold. He was to construct for us the ideal Ave try to realize ; and this work of necessity must be done from within. It is the product of thought.

Look the wide world over, where could we ever find the And necideal of truth? The truth is not something that exists rtifS-s'^from here or there as a fact beside other facts. It is, as we Science by have seen, an ideal, a something that we strive to bring reflective, into existence, but yet something unto which our finite minds can never attain. If this ideal is to be formed,

The Scope of the present book : Philosophy in the narrowest sense.

how and whence is it to come ? Surely only from within us. It is an ideal; an ideal of whom? Of our reason, of our soul as a seeker after the truth. It does not grow on trees, nor is it deep down buried within the earth. No telescope will find it in the heavens, nor will any microscope reveal it to us in the thinnest of sections ever mounted on a glass slide. The ideal comes from within. It is the ideal of our reason, and to our reason we shall have to go if we are ever to behold it. Surely if we are to hunt for anything, why not where there is hope for findinCT it? Is this not scientific? Is this not rather common sense? Away, then, with that dogmatic foolish blindness that bids us hunt the wide world over for that which exists, and can exist, only within us. The philosopher looking within is just as truly a discoverer as is, and just as truly goes back to the sole source of information as does any natural scientist hunting the world over for his facts.

The work of philosophy we have now seen to be twofold, the formation of an ideal and the organization of special truths in accord with this ideal. The first task, the formation of our ideal, requires that we reflect over the work already accomplished by science, and push on, by means of further reflection, to a more perfect and consistent vision of that ideal than the scientist, merely as such, has attained.

In the chapters to which this is introductor}-, we shall try to do, in a general way, this second work of philosophy. We shall try, by reflection, to learn something about those characteristics and marks of the truth presupposed in our very search for it. We are thus, in our book, using the term philosophy in its narrowest signification. Almost all scientists, even professionally, are philosophers in the broader sense that includes both tasks. But philosophy, as part of a college curriculum, is largely, if not entirely, devoted to the narrower problem. It is that narrower problem to which this book would introduce the reader. We shall reflect about all general fields of human knowledge, we shall try to find out their ideals, seek for any inconsistencies in these ideals, and try thus to gain a picture of the truth as a whole, but only in as far as it is a mere ideal, and not a realized fact in the minds of men. If ^ve did the latter, we should have to try to unify all that science has taught the world in the way of truth ; in short, tell the complete story of the world as far as that story has been worked out by man. This we shall not do. Philosophy for us will be that narrow^er problem, the attempt of man to work out a picture of that ideal which the seeker after the truth tries to realize. We shall begin by reflecting upon nature, or the world about us, and the interpretation of it thus far won by man. Then we shall turn to study similarly the mind, or the world within us. Next we shall study the world as a whole, and after that the very attempt, as such, to know the world. Then we shall go on to a short study of other fields of truth besides those of science, — the truths of religion, of morality, and of art.