Instinct and intelligence in the animal kingdom

Front matter

NSHNCTand intelligence

IN THE

#MMM KINGDOM

Preface To The First Edition

THE following essay is offered as a contribution to comparative psychology. Its special purpose is to submit the manner in which modern animal psychology applies the notions of instinct and intelligence to a careful examination. In a former publication we endeavored to elucidate the doctrine of animal intelligence according to St. Thomas Aquinas. For this purpose we selected an example from insect life. 1 Besides numerous smaller essays on the life of ants and their guests, which appeared mostly in German scientific periodicals, we have published a biologic-psychological work on Mixed Ant-Societies. 2 It was principally in discussing the latter publication that representatives of modern animal psychology raised sundry objections to our distinction between instinct and intelligence. As, however, the exact meaning and use of these terms is the essential point of difference between the old and recent animal psychology, we deemed it appropriate to treat this question in a special paper in which the difficulties of our critics could be more closely investigated. We shall try, as far as possible, to avoid all abstract philosophical discussions; the more so, as the present essay must be adapted to the views of modern naturalists.

1 ) "The leaf-roller" (Rhynchites betulae). A scientific essay on Animal Instinct. Muenster, 1884.

2 ) "The Compound Nests and Mixed Colonies of Ants" (German). Muenster, 1891.

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Preface to the First Edition

Consequently we have first to explain what we, and what our antagonists mean by instinct and intelligence. This will lead to a correct use of the terms. Secondly, we must examine the true relation of instinct to intelligence in animal life. This investigation will show, whether intelligence in its genuine meaning may be attributed to animals, or whether man is the only intelligent being in the created world. For the same purpose we shall soon publish a further essay on the comparative mental faculties of ants, of higher animals and of man, which will be in close connection with and rest upon the present work.

Preface To The Second Edition

THE interest with which this essay was received, has made a second edition necessary. In order to do justice to recent objections of our scientific opponents, we had to enlarge it in various places. Still we confine ourselves to real and positive objections. Moreover, we have inserted a chapter on the different Forms of Learning.

The present work is closely connected with our Comparative Studies on the Mental Faculties of Ants and Higher Animals (German, second, enlarged edition, Freiburg i. Br., 1900). Besides, we desire to call attention to an essay written for Zoologists, and entitled "The Mental Faculties of Ants" (German). Zoologica, Heft 26, Stuttgart, 1899. It may w r ell serve as a supplement to the views we advanced in the above mentioned writings, as it supplies new material for argument,

REMARKS OF THE TRANSLATOR.

MANY books on animal psychology, and in particular, on the instinct of animals, have been written within the last quarter of the nineteenth century. However, the value of these publications is very different. Several authors have deceived themselves and their readers by dropping the chain of argument at the critical point, by evading the difficulty, and using logically unwarrantable, or otherwise obscure phrases. Very few, indeed, are plain and consistent. E. Wasmann, well known in Germany as the famous ant biologist, is one of the few. With admirable surety of aim, and well skilled in controversial philosophy, he presses his subject home, sentence by sentence, he is never afraid to face the point at issue, and occasionally adduces an appropriate example, mostly taken from his own observation.

The object of this translation is to make Englishspeaking scientists acquainted with Wasmann's publications, which are considered in Germany as standard biological literature. The technical terms we have adopted are pretty nearly the same as those of Lubbock, Romanes, etc., in their scientific writings. We took this precaution in order to be better understood by modern scientists. The terms "understanding," "reason" and "intelligence," however, are used for one and the same physical entity.

In the "American Naturalist" (1901, p. 808), Prof,

Remarks of the Translator.

\V. M. Wheeler, of Texas University, suggests, that a translation of Wasmann's psychological essays might prove useful for American readers. Prof. Wheeler's psychological views are, in general, very similar to those of Wasmann; but as he does not accept Wasmann's definition of instinct and intelligence, some critical remarks on his objections have been added by the author to the fourth chapter of this English translation of his book. Moreover, the reader will find some additional notes on the psychological views of Loeb and Garner.

We shall consider it an ample reward for our trouble, if even a few thorough scientists become acquainted through this translation with Wasmann's valuable publications.

CHAPTER II. Instinct and Intelligence according to Modern Zoology... 12

Its definitions of Instinct and Intelligence examined and illustrated by examples. Darwin's views on animal intelligence. Modern zoology mistakes complex sensitive representations for intelligence. Examples prove that this notion of intelligence is untenable.

CHAPTER III. What is Intelligence and what is Instinct? 23

Intelligence and reason. Intelligence is the power of formal conclusion. Instinct is a sensitive impulse to actions that are unconsciously adaptive. Essential and unessential criteria of instinct. The power of sensitive perception and its faculties. Instinct is the adaptive disposition of the powers of sensitive perception and appetite, and constitutes as such the principle of the spontaneous actions of the animal. Senses and spirit.

CHAPTER IV. Examination of some obj ections 45

Popular psychology strongly opposed to a critical analysis of notions. Is Reimarus the originator of Modern Animarl » Psychology? Reimarus and the Animal Psychology of Scholastic Philosophy. Forel's Automatisms" and ''Plastic Neurozymic Activities." Other objections of Forel. A charming criminal romance of ants by an anonymous critic. H. E. Ziegler and Modern Science.

Contents.

CHAPTER V. General Sense Images and the Power of Abstraction 75

Emery's objections against an essential difference between instinct and intelligence. Relation of the sensitive life of perception to the spiritual life of man. The "material conclusions" of animals. General sense images and their difference from general concepts.

CHAPTER VI. Intelligence and Speech 96

Emery's opinions on the relation of intelligence to speech. Their examination. Human speech is not the cause of intelligence, but intelligence is the cause of speech. The pretended "abstractions of the first order" in animals. Human speech and the so-called language of animals. Conclusions. Emery's last reply.

CHAPTER VII. A Uniform Standard for Comparative Animal Psychology 124

Smalian's objections. The pretended "gradual difference" between animal and human intelligence. Can the psychic life of insects be compared with that of the higher animals? Sense organs and the nervous system of insects. The cortex of vertebrates and the by-brain of insects. Sensitive consciousness and spiritual self-consciousness. There is a uniform critical standard for Comparative Psychology. Bethe's new reflex-theory of ant life.

CHAPTER VIII. The Different Forms of Learning 149

In view of biological facts, six different forms of learning have to be distinguished, three forms of self-dependent learning, and three forms of learning through outside influence. All six forms of learning are found united only in man. In animals, both in ants and in the higher mammals, the third and sixth forms are missing. And as these two forms alone offer a real argument for intelligence, it is untenable to assume animal intelligence.

Conclusion 169

Chapter I. Popular Or Scientific Animal Psychology

Clearness is the only way to truth.

IT is nowadays fashionable to admit animal intelligence, and it has become a mania to humanize the brute. It is considered unscientific to use the word, "instinct," and even more so to explain all psychic manifestations of the animal from its instinctive sensitive life. On closer investigation, however, we soon notice whence this fashion originates. We become convinced that its proper home is to be found not in the truly scientific, but in the so-called popular scientific circles, especially those societies which have been instituted for the protection and love of animals, and gather their psychological knowledge of animal life from the works of such men as Buechner and Brehm. Having been led astray by these and similar writers, many try to solve the enigma of animal life by shifting their own range of thought into the brain of the brute. Then they innocently draw out their own ideas, and believe them to be the n.ental activities of the animal, But genuine scientists, even adherents of the Darwinian theory of evolution, judge otherwise. With these men the point of discussion is a very different one. The question is not, whether the adaptive actions of animals have in general to be explained by instinct or intelligence, for these scientific opponents willingly acknowledge, that the psychic phenomena of animal life are mostly of an instinctive nature, whilst those which they ascribe to "intelligence" are understood to proceed from a faculty

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very different from the faculty of human beings. These opponents, as Romanes, Ziegler, etc., agree with us in deeming it unscientific and ridiculous to explain, as Brehm does, the adaptive activity that proceeds from the sensitive knowledge of animals by the "animals' own understanding." With true scientists, therefore, the gist of the argument will turn on the following two questions : First, is human "intelligence" essentially different from that of the animal, or only different in degree? Secondly, is it possible or not, that the human mind could have developed from the animal faculty of sensation ?

But before commencing our comparative psychic investigation, it is of the utmost importance to establish some short and clear notions, according to which we shall have to decide, whether certain animal actions are instinctive or intelligent. True, nowadays, writers are not fond of exact definitions in this very line of science. "Why, everybody knows what is meant by instinct and intelligence; therefore, we need not tire our readers with philosophical definitions." In these, or in similar terms, they are wont to introduce their essays. However, this is fishing in troubled waters. No wonder, then, that after the perusal of such a "scientific examination," the reader is at a loss to see what the author has proven ; for the author was at a loss himself.

Any reasoning man, much more any naturalist, who earnestly desires to investigate, and not to humanize the psychic faculties of the animal, will therefore agree with us in demanding a clear psychological analysis. Only those who assert with Alfred Brehm, that the notion of "instinct" is missing in their vocabulary, and bar out any other motive of animal psychology beyond "the animal's own understanding" 1 are frightened by a critical analysis of psychological notions, and style it a "reactionary endeavor," through which modern animal psychology is again to be "shackled by the dogmatical fetters of mediaeval scholasticism." Let the correct answer to this objection be given by William Wundt, professor at the University of Leipzig, a prominent authority among German psychologists. It is all the more impartial, as Wundt does not seem to be acquainted with any of our former publications, and cannot reasonably be suspected of being influenced by the "scholastic reactionary party." Wundt thinks that modern animal psychologists deserve the reproach of too rashly making use of unfinished and inadequate concepts, 2 and he thus continues :

"Bacon's comparison of the insufficient observation of nature by the Aristotelians of his day to the report of an ambassador, who based his knowledge of the measures of a government upon town gossip and not upon accurate examination, applies fairly enough to the animal psychology of our time. It is permeated through and through by the concepts of the every-day psy-

1 ) See "Brehm's Thierleben," 2d edition, Vol.* I; Ein Blick auf das Leben der Gesamtheit, p. 20 ff. In the recent (third) edition the whole tendential babble of Brehm on animal intelligence, unpolished in contents and form, has happily been omitted in the introduction to the first volume. Yet the psychological explanation of animal life, founded upon that collection of empty phrases, has, I am sorry to say, remained unchanged in the course of the work, even in the most recent edition. See also our review of the third edition in "Natur und Ofienbarung," 37 (1891), p. 570 ff. and 40 (1894), p. 61 ff.

2 ) "Lectures on Human and Animal Psychology" (translated from the Second German Edition by J. E, Creighton and E. B. Titchener, 1896), Lect. 23, p. 341.

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chology, 1 which is thought to suffice for the requirements of ordinary life, and too often also for the sciences which cannot do without psychological reference. The one great defect of this popular psychology is, that it does not take mental processes for what they show themselves to be to a direct and unprejudiced view, but imports into them the reflections of the observer about them. The necessary consequence for animal psychology is, that the mental actions of the animals, from the lowest to the highest, are interpreted as acts of the understanding. If any vital manifestation of the organism is capable of possible derivation from a series of reflections and inferences, that is taken as sufficient proof, that these reflections and inferences actually led up to it. And, indeed, in the absence of a careful anyalsis of our subjective perceptions we can hardly avoid this conclusion. Logical reflection is the logical process most familiar to us, because we discover its presence when we think about any object whatsoever. So that for popular psychology mental life in general is dissolved in the medium of logical reflection. The question whether there are not perhaps other mental processes of a simpler nature is not asked at all, for the one reason that whenever self-observation is required, it discovers this reflective process in the human consciousness. The same idea is applied to feelings, impulses and voluntary actions which are regarded, if not as acts of intelligence, still as affective states which belong to the intellectual sphere.

"This mistake, then, springs from ignorance of exl ) "Jener vulgaeren Psychologie" (German text.)

act psychological methods. It is, unfortunately, often rendered worse by the inclination of animal psychologists to see the intellectual achievements of animals in the most brilliant light. . . . Unbridled by scientific criticism, the imagination of the observer ascribes the phenomena in perfectly good faith to motives which are entirely of its own invention. The facts reported may be wholly true; the interpretation of the psychologist, innocently woven in with his account of them, puts them from first to last in a totally wrong light. You will find a proof of this on nearly every page of the works on animal psychology."

The dangers hinted at by Wundt to which pseudo-psychology may give rise in a scientific examination of the psychic faculties of animals are not at all new. More than a hundred years ago the elder Reimarus emphatically objected in his "General Considerations on the Instincts of Animals" to the undiscriminating humanization of animals, of which certain modern psychologists are so very fond. 1 Many representatives of Christian views of nature have recently, and without regard to Reimarus, energetically protested against this extremely unscientific method of pseudo-psychology. 2 Although Wundt's suggestions merely express an old truth, they are not, on that account, less instructive and less worthy of consideration; the more so, as Wundt knows their

*) "Allgemeine Betrachtungen ueber die Triebe der Thiere," 3d edition, Hamburg, 1773. See especially §23.

2 ) "Seelenleben der Thiere" (3d edition, 1897), by Otto Fluegel, an adherent of Herbart's Philosophy. "Der Thierische Wille," by G.' H. Schneider, a Darwinian zoologist who dedicated his work to Prof. Dr. E. Haeckel, as if he wished to prove, that "mediaeval" philosophers and theologians were not the only ones inclined to oppose the views of modern animal psychology.

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importance from personal experience. On comparing the first edition of his "Lectures on Human and Animal Psychology," with the second edition, which we have just quoted, it will not escape notice, that Wundt was formerly influenced in his views on animal psychology by the very "pseudo-psychology" which he now so justly condemns. Nevertheless, it can only redound to his honor, that he had the courage to free himself from the sway of that unscientific method; and we believe that other naturalists, who reason scientifically, might follow his example, without the least injury to their good name.

Let us, then, begin our investigation with a critical analysis of concepts.

The key to a scientific inquiry into the nature of the animal soul is evidently the soul of man. For we have no immediate insight into the psychic acts of the animal ; /we can only infer their existence and nature from the exterior actions which our senses perceive. We must compare these manifestations of the activity of the animal soul with the manifestations of our own psychic life, the interior causes of which are known to us from our inner consciousness. Consequently scientific psychology applies the same key as pseudo-psychology, but it follows critical methods. It does not forget, as the other does, the fundamental law of a rational explanation of nature whicli runs thus: We must explain phenomena in the simplest way possible, and we are not \J allowed to attribute to animals higher psychic faculties than are requisite for the explanation of definite and well-observed facts.

This is the only correct standard. It is applied in the following manner by scientific psychology in comparing the activity of the human soul with that of the animal. We perceive in ourselves two main groups of psychic processes : unconsciously adaptive and consciously adaptive, or instinctive and intelligent processes. When an infant feels the pangs of hunger and manifests this feeling by cries and signs, the connection between the bodily want of food and the psychic sensation thereof, between the soul's affection of uneasiness and the exterior act of its manifestation by the muscles in crying, is instinctive, it is unconsciously adaptive. On closer attention we find, even in every-day life, a great number and variety of psychic processes, in which the connection of interior feelings, or of exterior perceptions, with certain ideas, affections and exterior actions, is also unconsciously adaptive, independent of any act of deliberation or free volition. These psychic processes are the lowest and simplest forms of the activity of the human soul. Consequently we must not go beyond them in judging the manifestations of the psychic life of animals. We are not allowed to introduce deliberation and free volition for the sake of explanation, unless these simpler, unconsciously adaptive associations, prove to be inadequate. This is scientific psychology. Pseudo-psychology, however, proceeds very differently. In order to explain the activity of the animal soul it has recourse at once to the highest psychic functions in man, to the logical processes of the intellect and to the free volitions of the will. The poet who idealizes may justly do so, but not the philosopher, nor the naturalist who reasons philosophically.

Which actions, then, are to be called instinctive f As

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the very name suggests, instinctive actions are those which spring from impulses of the sensitive appetite and are accompanied by sense perceptions and sensile feelings. These two qualities distinguish them from reflex motions. Lastly, they are unconsciously adaptive, and thereby totally different from acts of the intellect.

Everyone will allow, that instinctive actions are neither mere reflex phenomena nor intellectual functions. They are not mere reflex phenomena, for they contain, as experience teaches, a psychic element which cannot be eliminated without destroying their very essence. Reflex actions are those adaptive processes of a livingorganism, which solely, but essentially depend on the irritation of certain motory nerves. They are specified by it alone, whether this activity of the motory nerves be connected with an irritation of the sensory nerves or not. Indeed, this latter connection is quite unessential to reflex activity. Consequently sensation is not an essential element of reflex acts. Thus the regular pumping motions of the heart, which we call palpitations, and the peristaltic motions of the bowels during digestion are reflex actions; but they are not necessarily perceptible. Similarly reflex is the act of sneezing, which is caused by the irritation of certain sensory nerves of the organs of breathing, or the twitchings of certain motory muscles, which are produced by irritations of the spinal ganglia. Therefore reflex actions are due solely to an influence of the nerve mechanism, and the psychic element of sensation is not essential to them. But this is not the case in any process that is truly instinctive. For in all such actions sensation participates as a cause in producing the corresponding activity. Therefore we cannot exclude a psychic element from the definition of "instinct" without ignoring its very nature and taking it for a reflex motion, as was done by Herbert Spencer, 1 who states that instinct is a "complex reflexactivity/'

As some psychic element is essential to all instinctive actions, it can only be that element which distinguishes instinctive from intellectual functions. This is, however, the unconsciously adaptive connection of certain sensile affections with their corresponding activities. For the sake of illustration let us recur to our example of the babe whose cries are an instinctive manifestation of its feeling of hunger and its impulse for nourishment. Now, we do not call this manifestation intelligent, because the tiny screamer does not cry with conscious intention. It is quite unaware of the suitableness of its very suitable clamor. Therefore the consciousness of the end is the chief element which distinguishes intelligent from instinctive actions.

Hence, the following principle established by Prof. H. E. Ziegler in an essay on the "Notion of Instinct" 2 is by no means tenable: "We must omit the element of consciousness in trying to determine the notion of instinct in a useful manner." Ziegler gives his reason for this principle. "Who can ever know when a dog, a lizard, a fish, a beetle, a snail, or an earth-worm

J ) "Principles of Psychology," Vol. I, Chapt. 5, p. 451. Romanes attacks this definition in his "Mental Evolution in the Animal Kingdom" (1885), p. 283.

2 ) "Verhandlungen der Deutschen Zoologischen Gesellschaft," 1892, pp. 121-136. The same lecture has been published as an appendix to his book: "Die Naturwissenschaft und die socialdemokratische Theorie." Stuttgart, 1893.

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performs an action with or without consciousness? It is always precarious in natural sciences to introduce an element which cannot be examined or identified empirically, as a constituent part of any notion/' However, Ziegler overlooked the fact, that in critical discussions on the psychic activities of animals we are forced to start from the analogy of the same activities in man ; otherwise our knowledge of animal psychology would be very limited. In our own psychic life, however, we know from experience the difference between intentional and unintentional actions, a difference which is equally characteristic of their exterior manifestations. But as this is so clearly the case in the psychic life of man, comparative psychology is forced to extend the distinction between intentional and unintentional actions to the psychic life of animals. Nor is this the only reason for doing so. For without this distinction animal psychology would merely become a department of nerve physiology. According to Ziegler the difference between instinctive and intelligent action consists in the fact that the former depends on hereditary nerve mechanisms, and the latter on the individual experience of single beings. Yet, reflex activities depend equally well on hereditary nerve dispositions ; hence, according to Ziegler's definition, the difference between instinct and reflex activity would altogether disappear. Therefore it cannot be adopted. It is true, the possibility of hereditary transmission of the instinctive associations of perceptions — as was long ago the doctrine of Aristotelian Philosophy — is one of the distinctive features of instinct in contradistinction to intelligence; but it does not constitute the only, and much less the essential criterion of instinct. For reflex mechanisms are also hereditary; and even intelligence itself, taken as a faculty, is hereditary in the sense that all normal human beings enter into life gifted with this precious faculty. Hence the essence of instinct, in contradistinction to intelligence, should not be based so much on the possibility of hereditary transmission as on the want of intentionality.

Chapter II. Instinct And Intelligence According To Modern

ZOOLOGY.

IN his above-mentioned essay Ziegler tries to explain the difference between instinct and intelligence in the following manner: "Those associations in the life of animals are due to intelligence which spring from impressions gained by individual sense perceptions; those, however, which do not depend on individual experience, are instinctive." This explanation, according to which only those psychic actions of the animal are said to be instinctive, which immediately arise from hereditary dispositions, whilst all those which presuppose individual experience are due to intelligence, is, by the way, not at all new. It might simply be styled the animal psychology of modern zoology, especially since the days of Charles Darwin. Let us therefore carefully examine, whether this view of the question corresponds to the demands of scientific psychology.

What is meant by ''hereditary instinct"? Complex representations or combinations of certain affections with certain impulses that are inherited complete as such, do not exist. 1 Only the psychic faculty, or the dis-

*) We have previously proved that the assumption of innate, cognitive images (species objective innatae), in order to explain instinct, is highly improbable, even from a mere psychological standpoint ("Der Trichterwickler," p. 154 ff.). It is still less probable from a zoological (somatological) point of view, as every possible instinctive representation would have to pre-exist in the embryonic disposition of the animal in a definite, material part or element (whether it be an Id or a Determinant of Weismann).

Instinct and Intelligence According to Modern Zoology. 13

position of the nervous system, from which those combinations originate, is inherited. From the possibility of hereditary transmission of this two-fold disposition springs what we call "hereditary instinct." Hence also innate instincts are due merely to a hereditary power of association. This argument, however, renders the difference between instinct and intelligence, w T hich is urged by modern psychology, untenable; for the latter calls "instinct" the hereditary sensitive power of association, and "intelligence" the exercise of the same power thrown into activity by the sense perceptions of the animal. Let us substantiate this truth by an example. A young chicken is frightened at the very first sight of a wasp and is afraid to peck at it. Quite in keeping with modern zoological theories, this abstention is doubtless due to instinct; for, even without any painful experience, the mere sight of the w T asp excites the feeling of fright by dint of a hereditary law of association. Now, let us suppose that in its youthful impetuosity in search of food, the chicken did not carefully examine the inviting titbit and pounced on the wasp and had been stung before it had time to form that instinctive association. According to the psychology of modern zoologists, this identical chicken is said to act from intelligence, whenever it carefully abstains in future from pecking at wasps. But is not this an evident abuse of the word "intelligence" ? The mere psychological analysis of the process furnishes a definite answer to this question. The very sight of a wasp immediately arouses, according to the innate laws of association of representations not only the image of the first wasp, but also the imagination of the pain which the chicken felt in consequence of its former impetuous, but disastrous attack; this complex representation excites the affection of fright, according to the same innate laws of association, and the wasp escapes unscathed and the chicken unstung. Essentially the same psychic laws underlie the actions in each case, in that of the chicken which was cautious at the first sight of the wasp, and in that of the same chicken which controlled its impetuosity after the painful experience of the wasp's sting. What right then have psychologists to ascribe intelligence in the latter case? From the standpoint of critical psychology both processes must be reduced to the sa:me causes. It is merely an act of the sensile memory, which distinguishes the doings in the second case from those of the first. The sensile memory, it is true, is not instinct in the stricter acceptance of the term; but it clearly belongs to the range of instinctive sensation, and not to intelligence.

How then does it come to pass, that modern psychology speaks of "intelligence," when the chicken is induced by the wasp's sting to beware of all wasps in future? Simply because this pseudo-science takes sensile imagination for intelligence and arbitrarily puts the following logical syllogisms into the chicken's brain : That" object has a striking resemblance to the thing which stung me yesterday; now, I don't want to be stung again : therefore I'll leave that thing alone today. True, the reasoning power of man is able to resolve the simple process of the sensile association of animals into a logical deduction; but this fact merely warrants the conclusion, that man is endowed with intelligence, and not that the animal possesses it. Hence we must

Instinct and Intelligence According to Modern Zoology. 15

acknowledge either that the animal psychology of modern zoologists arbitrarily substitutes "syllogisms similar to those of man" for the simple sense functions of the animal, or that it plays not less arbitrarily with the term "intelligence." Both alternatives can only be explained by the fact that, as Wundt correctly observes, modern zoology is not free from the influence of the pseudo-psychology.

In this connection it may be to the purpose to quote a passage from Charles Darwin's "Descent of Man," which illustrates the methods of certain psychologists in the Darwinian theory of evolution. "Of all the faculties of the human mind it will, I presume, be admitted that Reason stands at the summit. Few persons any longer dispute that animals possess some power of reasoning. Animals may constantly be seen (?) to pause, deliberate, and resolve. It is a significant fact that the more the habits of any particular animal are studied by a naturalist, the more he attributes to reason and the less to unlearnt instincts. In future chapters we shall see, that some animals extremely low in the scale apparently display a certain amount of reason." 1