An introductory study of ethics

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Preface

The study of conduct which is here offered to students and teachers of philosophy was begun with the intention of furnishing simply a plain statement of the existing ethical situation, — by which I mean an analysis of the moral problem and a definition of the several types of ethical theory. But it was found impossible to make a plain statement without adopting a point of view for the definition of the problem and the theories in question. And in the search for a satisfactory point of view I have been led to a more or less independent reconstruction of the situation as a whole. In a study like ethics, where nothing can be uttered which has not been in a measure foreshadowed, it is difficult to know how far one has succeeded in really contributing to the discussion ; yet I hope that the following pages may be found not only useful to students beginning the study but of interest to those already familiar with its problems.

I hope also that they may appeal to some who are not, in the stricter sense, students of philosophy. Without ignoring the necessities of scientific treatment I have endeavoured to avoid some of its narrower limitations and to meet the point of view of the educated man. There is a large public of thoughtful persons whose attitude toward philosophical study is one of serious interest yet at the same time somewhat

VI PREFACE

sceptical, and to whom probably every student of philosophy has felt the need of justifying the claims of his subject. I believe that an introductory study for college purposes ought to be such as to meet this need, and that, on the other hand, a philosophical study addressed to college students would do well to presuppose in them the same breadth of interest and maturity of thought as is to be found in the educated man as such. This presupposition may frequently run counter to the facts, but even then it will offer probably the best method of securing a thoughtful interest in the subject.

Contents

INTRODUCTION CHAPTER I

PAGE

The Scope and Method of Ethics 3

Chapter II

1. Problems of Profession and Occupation . . . .21

2. The Social Problem 25

3. Personal Problems 26

4. General Features of the Moral Problem .... 29

5. The Forms of Ethical Theory . . , . . • " 31

CHAPTER III Empirical Hedonism: the Ethics of Happiness ... 37

1. General Statement 37

2. The Hedonistic Method 39

3. The Resulting Conception of Pleasure . . . . . 44

4. Pleasure and Duty 46

5. Mill's Distinction of Quantity and Quality .... 52

vii

Vlll CONTENTS

CHAPTER VIII Hedonistic Social Theory and Common Sense . . .138

1. Self-interest and Duty 138

2. The Pleasures of Conscience 144

3. The Advantages of the Average Man 146

4. The Outlook for a Social Equilibrium 148

5. The Positive Value of the Hedonistic Social Theory . . 150

CONTENTS

IX

Part II Idealism Chapter IX

PAGE

Intuitionism : the Ethics of Conscience 161

1. Definition of Intuitionism 161

2. Perceptional Intuitionism 162

3. ^Esthetic Intuitionism 165

4. Dogmatic Intuitionism 167

5. Mar tineau's Table of Springs of Action . . . .169

CHAPTER X Rationalism: the Ethics of Principle

1. Kant's Ethical Theory

2. Kant's Practical Maxim : the Categorical Imperative

3. The Insufficiency of the Categorical Imperative .

4. The Positive Significance of Kant's View

173 173 177 180 183

CHAPTER XI Self-realisation : the Ethics of Purpose

1. The Problem of Self .

2. The Self of Hedonism .

3. The Self of Idealism .

4. Self and Self-realisation

5. Self-realisation and Pleasure

6. Self-realisation and Rationalism

189 189 190

193 197 198 206

Chapter XII

1. The Hedonistic Individual and the Hedonistic Society . 209

2. The Idealistic Individual 212

3. The Idealistic Conception of Individuality . . . .219

4. The Idealistic Society 220

5. The Idealistic Conception of Social Duty .... 224

CONTENTS

CHAPTER XIII Idealism as a System of Philosophy

1. The Idealistic Standpoint and Method

2. The Idealistic Psychology

3. The Idealistic Biology .

4. The Idealistic Cosmology

PAGE

228 228 230

235 239

CHAPTER XIV Idealism and Common Sense

1. Idealism and the Common-sense Scale

2. The Idealistic Significance of the Higher Virtues

3. Idealistic Elements in the Social Problem

4. The Limitations of Idealism ....

5. Idealism and Hedonism ....

245 245 247

25 !

CHAPTER XV Idealistic Social Theory and Common Sense

1. Self-realisation and Duty

(a) Self-respect and Duty

(b) Duty and Respect for Others

(c) Self-respect and Respect for Others

(d) Respect for Private Interests

2. The Conditions of an Idealistic Society

3. The Limitations of the Idealistic Social Theory

Part III Hedonism And Idealism: Situation

THE MORAL

CHAPTER XVI The Situation from a Metaphysical Standpoint . . . 287

1. The Necessity for a Coordination of Theory . . . . 287

2. The Ultimately Complementary Character of the Opposing

Conceptions 289

(a) Mechanism and Consciousness 290

CONTENTS xi

PAGE

Metaphysical Standpoint — continued :

(£) Happiness and Self-realisation 296

(c~) Social Equilibrium and Social Organism . . . 299

3. The Immediate Contradictions of Concrete Thought . .301

4. Hedonism and Idealism as Regulative Hypotheses . . 304

CHAPTER XVII The Situation from an Evolutionary Standpoint

1. The Standpoint for a Conception of Evolution

2. The Evolutionary Process .

(a) The Evolution of Knowledge (6) The Evolution of Will

3. Hedonism and Idealism as Evolutionary Attitudes

4. The Permanence of the Problematic Situation

306 306 307 309 310 312

5. The Evolutionary Significance of the Regulative Hypothesis 321

Chapter XVIII

1. A Review of the Moral Situation 323

2. Progress and Happiness 326

3. The Conception of a Maximum Sustained Progress . . 332

4. Moral Health 337

CHAPTER XIX Concrete Illustrations of the Moral Attitude . . . 342

1. The Duties of Citizenship 342

2. My Duty to Society 348

(#) The Acceptance of Unearned Rewards . . . 349

(b) The Administration of Wealth 352

(c) The Payment of Services 354

(d) The Social Problem and the Moral Attitude . . 356

(e) The Use of Personal Capacities 358

3. My Duty to my Neighbour 360

4. Personal Duties 363

(a) The Obligations of Honour 363

(&) Self-control 371

Index 375

Introduction

AN INTRODUCTORY STUDY OF ETHICS

Chapter I The Scope And Method Of Ethics

1. DEFINITION OF ETHICS

Ethics is commonly described as the study of moral conduct. By moral conduct we mean of course to include immoral conduct, since ethics in dealing with the one necessarily includes the other. The term ' moral ' as here used covers all conduct which is subject to the judgment of right and wrong. The distinction implied is not between moral and immoral, right and wrong, but between moral and z/^moral, i.e. between conduct which has a moral aspect and that which has none. For example, whether I shall in a given case speak truly or falsely is a distinctly moral question, but whether I shall write this page with a pen, a pencil, or a typewriter appears to have no moral significance whatever.

The question arises, then, What is it that gives conduct a moral significance ? Theoretically this question may lead. in various directions. It may require us to distinguish the moral from the economic, the psychological, the physiological, the physical, or from any other aspect of human conduct. But the practically important question in the definition of ethics is the distinction of the moral from the useful. This question has been, in the history of ethics, a subject of long-continued discussion. At first sight it seems that between the moral and the merely useful there is a wide and impassable gulf. It seems one thing to say that an act is advisable, or profitable, or useful, or expedient, and quite another to declare it to be a positive duty. There appears to be a wide distinction between " It is best for me to do it " and " I ought to do it," and it would seem that, in the case of the merely useful act, I might refuse to perform it provided I were willing to accept the consequences, whereas the moral act is one that I am bound to perform whether I accept them or not. Accordingly, it has been widely held that the sentiment of duty — the feeling of ' ought,' as it is sometimes described — is wholly unique and irreducible to a consideration of utilities ; and by some moralists it has been maintained that the feeling is ultimately unanalysable. 1

The opposite view, which is the view to be presented here, and probably the more common view of to-day, treats the distinction between the moral and the useful as ultimately a distinction of degree only. An act is moral, as distinct from merely useful, to the extent that its consequences are conceived to be far-reaching and important. Any act may become a subject for moral judgment. An apparently most insignificant act, such as tying my shoe, may at times be a decisive factor in the attainment of moral purposes ; if the knot is not tied fast, it may come loose and impede my efforts at a moment when all my energies are engaged in a struggle of life and death. And though acts of this kind have rarely such tragic importance, yet it is clear that every minute detail of my action contributes, through the manner of its performance, its share toward the furtherance or hindrance of my life-purpose, and hence toward success or failure in the attainment of moral ends. When, therefore, we distinguish certain acts as being useful rather than right, it means only that we abstract from their ultimate consequences and attend to those that are more immediate. And this, again, means only that we fail to consider their moral character, — not that they are intrinsically unmoral.

1 See Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, Book I, ch. iii ; Martineau, Types of Ethical Theory, Part II, Introduction.

When, on the other hand, we speak of certain acts as distinctly moral, it means that we have their ultimate consequences clearly in mind. With regard to most of our particular acts these ultimate consequences are rarely considered, for a large part of our life is already securely organised upon moral grounds. From a moral standpoint it is highly important to obtain sufficient food and sleep, to avoid the dangers of fire and water and of poison, but there is little temptation to do otherwise. Consequently, we rarely think of asking, Why should I eat? or, Why should I be on my guard against fire and other dangers? If we do ask the question, it is, as a rule, readily answered by reference to some proximate end whose value is relatively unquestioned. For example, if a man asks me, Why should I eat ? or, as the question is more likely to be, Why should I eat this and abstain from that? it is sufficient to point out the effect of his action upon his health. The value of health is commonly accepted as unquestionable. Hence, the question of what to eat is commonly regarded as a question of mere utility. It is only when the proximate end of such acts is itself under discussion that the question becomes a moral one. For example, if a man goes to the length of asking why he should care for his health, it will be necessary, in giving him an answer, to explain the connection between physical health and all the more important objects of his life. When this connection is made out, it becomes clear that the choice between two articles of food, so far as this choice is related to health, is one involving far-reaching and important consequences. The choice is then taken out of the region of the merely useful into that of the distinctly moral.

The difficulty which men have in connecting the moral and the useful is due largely to the narrow range of consequences commonly implied in the latter. To call an act profitable means usually that it will put money in one's pockets. To say that it is advisable, or that it is best, is merely a more delicate expression of the same idea. The expediency, e.g., of holding certain views or of making certain acquaintances, commonly suggests meanness and insincerity. And even the term ' useful,' though more abstract and morally colourless, is very commonly limited to a usefulness for purely material ends. Limiting these terms to such narrow ends, one is justified in making a sharp distinction between the useful and the moral. Certainly the duty of filling my own pocket, though imperative enough at times, is on the whole less generally imperative than that of telling the truth ; and I may very easily think of the one as less binding than the other. But when we take into consideration the broader ends of specifically moral action, the case is different. When we remember that we have not only to supply our own needs but those of others, and not our material needs only but all the needs, intellectual, artistic, spiritual, as well as material, which arise out of our human nature taken as a whole, we feel that the usefulness of our acts toward these larger ends acquires a certain dignity and imperativeness which is not evident when we think of them as useful in a purely selfish and material sense. It then becomes clear that, through a more comprehensive interpretation of the ends aimed at, our conception of the useful has gradually developed into that of the truly moral.

I prefer, then, in defining the scope of ethics, to say simply that it is a study of practical life in its more general aspects. As a study of practical life it is to be distinguished from studies of fact and theory, such as physics, physiology, or psychology, which — immediately at least — aim only at the attainment of truth in itself and have no interest in its practical application. And as a ' more general ' study of practical life it is to be distinguished from the technical sciences such as medicine and applied mechanics, which deal with special departments of practical activity, and with the principles whose application is confined to special departments, rather than with the principle of practical activity in general. Thus the distinction between ethics and the technical studies is a question of degree of generality ; it is another aspect of the distinction between the right and the useful. Both ethics and the technical sciences have to do with right ways of doing things. A method of curing a disease or of building a bridge cannot be technically right if it is morally wrong, and it cannot be morally right if it is technically impossible or wasteful. But no one person can give adequate consideration both to the general principles of conduct and to all its special conditions. Hence, we have a distinction of problem and aspect, ethics emphasising the more general aspects of conduct, the technical sciences emphasising the special aspects of their respective departments.

As a result of its more general character ethics is more interested in the ends of conduct than in the means for attaining these ends, while, owing to their special character, the technical studies are more interested in ways and means. For this reason ethics is often defined as a ' normative ' study — a study of norms or ends — in distinction from the 'practical,' or technical, studies. But it is to be noted that ethics is only predominantly a normative study, not exclusively so ; and the technical studies are only predominantly l practical.' For ends and means cannot be studied in complete isolation from each other. The end to be attained determines the means to be used and is determined in turn by the nature of the available means. It would therefore be misleading to say that the moralist thinks only of ends or ideals ; for the ideal which he recommends presupposes certain technical possibilities, the consideration of which carries him into the fields of the special sciences. Moral conduct must be, in the first place, mechanically and physiologically possible, since nothing can be accounted a duty for which our strength is insufficient. In the second place it must be economically possible ; for moral ideals are at the same time social ideals, and ideals which the economic conditions render impossible can hardly constitute a moral obligation. And further, it must be psychologically possible; it must be the kind of conduct for which there could be a conceivable motive ; for we cannot urge as a duty that in which no one could conceivably be interested. With regard to the physical, physiological, and economic possibilities of conduct, the moralist usually accepts the results attained in the special sciences, though not without reserving the right of criticism and revision. The psychological conditions he investigates himself; and, indeed, it would not be too much to say that the whole task of ethics is to determine what conduct is psychologically possible ; at any rate it is clear that the discussion of ideals or ends is conducted at every step with reference to the actual possibilities of desire and motive. If, moreover, we glance for a moment at the technical sciences, it is evident that they on their side do not overlook the question of ends ; for the physician is not so much interested in the effect of drugs in general as in their curative effects, and the engineer is less interested in mechanical possibilities as such than in their application to human uses. We may say, then, that, as compared with other practical sciences, ethics is more distinctly normative and gives greater attention to the question of ends ; but it does not confine its attention to ends alone, nor are the technical studies interested exclusively in ways and means.

2. THE PRACTICAL VALUE OF ETHICS

As a study of practical life, ethics is the outcome of a practical problem. This statement is sometimes contradicted. Certain moralists, among them Mr. Leslie Stephen, 1 deny that the ethical problem has any practical importance. It is held that we find a substantial unanimity with regard to most of the concrete details of moral conduct, and that the differences relate only to minor occasional points. The problem of ethics is not to tell us what is right but to give us the reason for what we already know to be right. 2 Our interest in the study is con-

1 The Science of Ethics, ch. i, p. I.

2 As a rule men agree on the question as to what is moral ; opinions are divided only as to why it is so. — Wundt.

sequently theoretical rather than practical. It seems, however, that this practical unanimity is largely illusory. Are we really agreed as to what is right ? Granting that we are all agreed upon the duty of being fair and honest, of keeping promises, of helping our neighbour in distress, and the like, can we state what constitutes honesty, justice, benevolence, etc. ? The view under consideration assumes that honesty is already denned and can be incorporated into a simple and clear rule of conduct ; but a slight reflection will convince us that it has nearly as many meanings as there are men who speak of it. For example, I wish to sell a piece of land which I fear will fall in value ; is it honest to offer it for sale without giving my reasons for wishing to be rid of it ? Or have I fulfilled the requirements of honesty when I have refrained from giving false information about it ? It would be impossible to state all the various solutions which would be offered for a problem of this kind ; they would differ as widely as the characters of those who offered them. I should say, then, that so far as men are in clear agreement with regard to the details of conduct, it is in cases where the issues are not obviously important, — where, in other words, the morality of the act is not clearly brought into question. Consider, however, the following : we say that a man ought to pay his just debts ; but suppose that the payment of a certain debt means that his family will inevitably perish from starvation ; can we say that the obligation is still clear, or that the verdict would be unanimous ? Or, again, it is accepted that a man ought to be allowed to determine the disposition of his own efforts, — in other words, to retain his property ; yet ought he to be allowed to do so if the right is exercised to the general disadvantage of the community? On all questions where the issues are clearly important and where the problem is clearly a moral one, we find not unanimity and clearness but divergence and confusion, and it is this confusion which constitutes the problem for ethics. On this account we may say that the ethical problem is not only practically important but of the highest practical importance.

io INTRODUCTION

Ethics is productive of practical results. This statement also requires emphasis, because it is sometimes held (usually by those who deny the existence of a practical problem) that after a course of study in ethics a man's conduct is just what it was before. Now among the practical results which ethics has to offer I do not include a code of rules, by a mere reference to which a man may solve all the problems of life. Such a code would be desirable if it could be constructed, but it happens that our life is far too complex to be dealt with so simply. Granting, however, that results of this definite kind are impossible, ethics may still furnish us with some general guidance as to the direction which our life ought to take. And granting further that positive results in ethics are largely complicated by divergences of theory, still it is true that in the analysis and discussion of conflicting theories we obtain a clearer idea of the nature of the problem and of the direction in which we must look for a solution. The moral standpoint which a man adopts as his own is largely, no doubt, the expression of his individual character and tendency ; but, whatever it be, it will represent a larger view of the moral problem, and hence a more adequate response to moral demands, after the systematic study of conduct than before.

It is useless, however, to discuss the value of that which we can hardly help doing. This is the case in ethics. We do not create the moral problem ; it is thrust upon us. And we do not deliberately choose to discuss it, but take it up spontaneously and inevitably before we are even aware that it is the moral problem we are discussing. We rarely discuss any subject into which it does not enter. Most of our conversation deals, more or less directly, with the actions of our fellows, either of those in public life or of our more immediate associates ; and in talking about them we inevitably, and often unconsciously, make an interpretation of their motives and pass judgment upon their moral character. In so doing we are at the same time giving an unconscious expression to our own

SCOPE AND METHOD OF ETHICS u

theory of morality ; and any one who is familiar with ethical doctrines may easily trace, in the conversation of a group of persons, all the theoretical tendencies represented by the several schools of ethics. Now it is certainly better, if we are to discuss conduct at all, that we should, as far as possible, deal with it systematically and coherently. And in this respect, if in no other, ethics has a distinctly practical value : for it reduces the common and vague expression of moral opinion to a state of relative order and consistency. 1

3. THE OBJECTIVE CHARACTER OF ETHICS

The study of ethics presupposes an objective standard. I say ' presupposes,' because it must be admitted that the standard by which we measure conduct is a relatively undefined presupposition of our thought rather than a principle which is clearly stated and universally recognised, like a standard of weights and measures. For this reason some persons refuse to recognise its existence. One man, says the sceptic, prefers to hoard his wealth, another to devote it to the welfare of society ; each has his own point of view and each believes himself to be right. Any one who should venture to decide between them would simply be introducing a third point of view peculiar to himself. Who, then, is to say that one is right and another wrong? Well, perhaps we may not be able to say offhand who is right, but it is clear that, if we discuss the subject at all, we presuppose some standard of right and wrong which is not dependent upon individual preference or opinion, and which is therefore objective. The very fact that men are interested in ethical problems, that they pass judgments of approval and condemnation, and attempt to convince their neighbours of the lightness of their own actions, shows that they have in mind an

1 On the practical value of moral theory, see Seth, A Study of Ethical Principles, pp. 6 ff. ; Green, Prolegomena to Ethics, Book IV, ch. ii ; Muirhead, Elements of Ethics, \ n ; Dewey, " On Moral Theory and Moral Practice," International Journal of Ethics, Vol. I, No. 2.

objective moral standard. If my standard of right were exclusively mine, and yours were exclusively yours, we could not even talk about right conduct, since the word ' right ' as used by one of us would correspond to no idea in the mind of the other. When we discuss questions of right and wrong, we assume that the word has a common meaning, in other words, an objective meaning.

The objective standard of right is the standard which common sense tends to adopt. It is the standard indicated by the tendencies observable in the progress of human thought. This does not mean that it is the standard more commonly accepted, for the truer principle and the higher form of morality appear rather in the standards of the more reflective minority than in those of the relatively unthinking majority. Nevertheless, in saying that it is the standard which common sense tends to adopt, I mean that it is the standard which all men come to recognise in proportion as they acquire greater breadth of culture and experience. A man may assert a truth against the protest of the whole community and generation in which he lives ; but his assertion would be meaningless if he could not believe that his position would in course of time be universally approved.

In referring the standard of conduct to the verdict of common sense I do not mean that it is determined by the observation of facts as distinct from theoretical reasoning ; nor again, that it is determined by reasoning and not by observation. I wish rather to avoid any implication with regard to the exact manner in which the development of thought is determined. It is clear that both of these factors must in some sense be implied in it ; for we refuse to accept a theory which is unsupported by fact, however consistent it appear from the standpoint of theory ; and similarly we refuse to accept any statement of facts which appears to be fundamentally irrational. But whatever be the principle underlying our thought, it has clearly a tendency to develop in one direction rather than in another.

For example, we may say that all educated men believe, in some sense, in the law of gravitation, and that every man tends to believe in it in proportion as his intelligence is developed. When I refer the Tightness of conduct to the verdict of common sense, I assume that similarly specific tendencies exist, and may to an extent be distinguished and defined, in our sense of moral value.

4. IS ETHICS A SCIENCE OR A BRANCH OF PHILOSOPHY?

Is ethics a science or a branch of philosophy? This question has more than a theoretical value for us, because our answer to it has much to say in determining our method of study. First, however, what is the distinction between philosophy and science?

Philosophy, as I understand it, is an attempt to comprehend the world as a whole ; the sciences confine themselves each to a special department. We need not go far back in the history of thought to reach the point where the two were indistinguishable, and where the term ' philosophy' covered all systematic knowledge. Thus Descartes' work covered the special fields of physics, mathematics, and biology, besides that of metaphysics, or philosophy in the narrower sense. Leibnitz shares with Newton the honour of having formulated the differential calculus. And Kant, who also distinguished philosophy from science, made important contributions to physics and astronomy. It is not many years since works on physics appeared under the title of ' natural philosophy ' ; and within our own time we have had ' mental philosophy ' for psychology, and ' moral philosophy ' for ethics. But the advancement of learning and the consequent accumulation of problems rendered the profession of philosopher in this comprehensive sense no longer a possibility. Practical necessity required a division of labour and a specialisation of problem. The result is that certain aspects of the world, or certain classes of things in the world, according to convenience of treatment or investigation, have become gradually abstracted from the whole and have been made the special objects of research for particular classes of students. In these special departments we have what is known as the sciences as distinct from philosophy or metaphysics. They differ in the extent of their independence of philosophy. None of them can be completely presented without reference to more general philosophical principles. Physics' is, perhaps, the best example of an independent science, yet even the physicist may be obliged to turn metaphysician — when, for example, he begins to discuss the ultimate nature of matter and force. The distinction between philosophy and the sciences is, accordingly, one of degree ; it is a question of greater or less comprehensiveness of subject-matter.