Outlines of psychology

Front matter

Book .r \;

COPYRFGHT DEPOSIT?

AN ELEMENTARY TREATISE WITH SOME PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS

Preface

A NUMBER of years since I was a contributor to a large volume entitled, In Sichtess and in Health — the joint work of a number of authors. The volume was intended as a popular guide regarding various aspects of public and private hygiene, of nursing, and of related topics. The treatise, however, contained introductory statements, composed by different writers, and setting forth the most general outlines of Anatomy, of Physiology and of Psychology. It was my own task merely to contribute to this volume the sketch of some of the elementary principles and practical applications of Psychology. The later essays of the volume were the work of physicians. The introductory statements were accordingly very strictly hmited, as to their plan and as to their contents, by their relation to the highly practical treatise in which they formed so subordinate a part.

By the consent of the publishers of the work thus prepared, I have been able to use the material of this, my former very summary sketch of Psychology, as the core of the present elementary book. I have indeed revised such of the former discussion as I here use ; and I have added a proportionately large amount of new text, and have endeavoured to give the present volume its own unity. What remains from the original sketch is, however, especially the tendency to make a number of practical applications of psychological theory at various

VI PREFACE

places in my discussion — a tendency which may be of service to some readers who, like myself, are fond of defining a good many of the problems of teaching, and of practical life, more or less in psychological terms, so far as they are able to do so. Otherwise, as I hope, the present work speaks for itself.

This is not a book upon the Philosophy of Mind, nor does it deal with any philosophical problems. Such problems I have indeed discussed at length in other publications of my own. But the reader of my various philosophical inquiries will already know that I make a sharp difference between the business of the student of philosophy and that of the psychologist. In the present volume, I am concerned solely with certain problems of the natural history of mind ; metaphysical issues are here not at all in question. On the other hand, this volume is indeed no effort to summarise the more technical results of modern Experimental Psychology, although I believe thoroughly in the importance of Experimental Psychology, and personally take no small interest in following, so far as I can, the labours of my colleagues of the laboratories ; and although I hope that this book shows a good many signs of my having profited by such an interest. My plan has led me, however, to concern myself here with elementary principles rather than with technical details, and to attempt, to some extent, practical applications of these principles, rather than statements of the fascinating, but complex special researches of recent laboratory Psychology.

PREFACE vil

For the same reason, this volume makes no attempt to deal with the special Psychology of the senses, with the details of the theory of space-perception, or with any of the other special regions where modern Experimental Psychology has already won its greatest triumphs. I do not, indeed, undervalue what has been accorapHshed in those fields. But I have no desire to try to compete with the numerous recent expositions in which the later conquests of Experimental Psychology have been summarised. On the contrary, I hope that my reader's curiosity may be aroused in such wise that he may be led to look elsewhere for what I do not pretend to give him. My own purpose, and my chosen limitations, assign to me another task.

I presuppose, then, a serious reader, but not one trained either in experimental methods, or in philosophical inquiries. I try to tell him a few things that seem to me important, regarding the most fundamental and general processes, laws, and conditions of mental life. I say nothing whatever about the philosophical problem of the relations of mind and body, and nothing about the true place of mind in the universe. Meanwhile, I try to view the matters here in question in a perspective which is of my own choosing. The treatment of mental phenomena, under the three heads of Sensitiveness, Docility, and Initiative, is especially characteristic of the plan of my book. This arrangement and classification of well-known facts involves a point

Vlli PREFACE

of view which seems to me to possess a certain relative novelty. The entire subordination of the usual distinctions of Feeling, Intellect, and Will, to these deeper distinctions, which my own division of the phenomena of mind is intended to emphasise, — -"the persistent stress that I lay upon the unity of the intellectual and the voluntary processes, which, in popular treatises, are too often sundered, and treated as if one of them could go on without the other, — these are also characteristic of the present discussion. Furthermore, in the chapter on the Feelings, I have presented views which are in some respects of my own devising. The traditional view makes Pleasure and Displeasure the sole elementary qualities of Feeling. Wundt has recently insisted upon the existence of three different "dimensions" of feeling ; i.e. he has maintained that there are three " pairs of opposing qualities," to be found amongst the elementary feelings, — pleasure and its opposite together constituting ojie only of these pairs. I have here attempted, provisionally, a i^W(9-dimensional scheme of the elementary feelings. The interest of my hypothesis, if it has any value, lies in the statement which it makes possible concerning the relation of Feeling and Conduct. I am able to define, in terms of my view, the possibility of certain forms of conduct, and of certain tendencies of the attention, which the customary pleasure-displeasure theory, as I think, is unable to describe.

In addition to these matters, relating to the theoretical

PREFACE ix

aspects of my book, there is one further topic which may interest some more technical readers. In the chapter on Mental Initiative, I have, namely, stated certain views regarding the origin of novel modes of conduct, and novel forms of consciousness, — views which, as I hope, are worthy of some consideration, and which are, in some respects, relatively independent. They are introduced into this book especially for the sake of their practical bearings. But they also have a theoretical aspect which may interest the more professional reader of this volume.

To my mind, namely, an interesting side-light has been shed upon the well-known controversies between the associationists on the one hand, and the school of Wundt, and the partisans of " mental activity " generally, on the other, by the stress that Professor Loeb has recently laid upon the part that what he calls " tropisms " play in the life of animals of all grades. By a " tropism," Loeb means a response, on the part of an organism, to some type of physical or chemical stimulus, — a response taking the form of some characteristic movement, which may or may not be adaptive in any particular case, but which is determined by the nature of the stimulus and of the organism. Loeb's "tropisms " are exemplified by the actions of such organisms as turn toward the light, or as flee the light, or as find their way into crevices, or as do any other characteristic thing, with a mechanical certainty, whenever they are

X PREFACE

stimulated in special fashions by light, by the touch of solid objects, or by other stimuli, e.g. by chemical stimuli. The moth's flight into the candle-flame is an instance of such a "tropism." As thus appears, the " tropism " need not, in any one case, prove to be an adaptive response to the environment, although the resultant of all of the "tropisms" together must in general, in any organism, tend to the survival of the type of organism in question.

Now it is especially notable that the "tropisms" of Loeb are not, like the " reflex actions " of the usual theories, modes of activity primarily determined by the functions of specific nerve-centres. Furthermore, they are more general and elemental in their character than are any of the acquired habits of an organism. At any one moment when they are called into activity, they may run counter to the acquired habits. In brief, Loeb's concept of a " tropism " is different from the ordinary concept of a reflex action, and is different, too, from the concept of an acquired adaptive habit of action. Loeb has insisted that the new concept is more fundamental than the old ones, and that both habits and reflex actions must ultimately be explained as results of "tropisms." Now it has occurred to me to maintain, in substance, that the factor in mental life which Wundt's school define as " Apperception," and which others so often call "spontaneity," "active attention," "conscious activity," or, sometimes, " self-activity," may well be

PREFACE xi

treated, from the purely psychological point of view, as the conscious aspect or accompaniment of a collection of tendencies of the type which Loeb has called " tropisms." These tendencies appear at once as elemental, and at the moment at which they are aroused, as sovereign over acquired habits and associations of ideas ; in other words, as directive of the course of our conscious life.

In thus reducing the physical accompaniment of the process which Wundt calls "Apperception," and which others call " self-activity " to the type of what Loeb calls "tropisms," I am able to explain, in so far as the point of view of the psychologist requires such explanation, the frequent appearance in our mental life of a factor which (i) is more general than is any specific mental function due to our acquired habits, and which (2) seems at any moment to be capable of directing the course of our associations, rather than to be merely the result of experience and association. Yet in order to explain the presence of such a factor, I am not obliged to go beyond the presuppositions which determine the point of view of the psychologist. Wundt has insisted that his " Apperception " is no disembodied spiritual entity. I conceive that Loeb has indicated to us, in the concept of the "tropism," how a power more or less directive of the course of our associations, and more general than is any one of the tendencies that are due, in us, to habit, or to specific experience, can find its embodiment in the most elemental activities of our organxil PREFACE

ism. Wundt's opponents, on the contrary, insist that all our activities must be due to inherited reflexes, modified by experience, and organised by the law of habit ; and that consequently the law of association must determine the sequence of all our mental states. Loeb shows how the " tropisms " are more elemental than the reflexes, and how they are capable of suddenly modifying our habits. The result must be, as I maintain, that the associationist view of mental life must have its limitations.

Upon the basis of the ideas thus indicated, I have sketched, in Chapter XVIII of my text, a theory of how the apparent " originality," or " spontaneity," or in another phraseology, the Initiative, of the organism, and of the individual mind, are to be treated from the point of view of the psychologist. Meanwhile this theory has indeed deeper relations, in my own mind, to certain philosophical views of mine as to the real nature of individual choice and originality. These views I have elsewhere in part already set forth ; but they are not in place in a book dealing with Psychology. And they are indeed far enough from the views which Professor Loeb has in mind in his researches.

I have thus indicated, not only to those readers to whom I especially appeal, but also to the more technical student, wherein lie some of the more characteristic of the features which this little book possesses. The less technical reader, however, for whom my text, especially in its more practical discussions, is chiefly intended,

PREFACE xiii

need not trouble himself as to what is mine or is not mine, nor as to the deeper problems of theory which I touch upon, nor as to how my views are related to those of other students. I have tried to help such a reader, who may often be, as I hope, like myself, a teacher, to understand some of the best known of the results of psychological study, and at the same time to view those results in a light that may sometimes justly appear to him to be novel. I have also tried to help him a little to apply his knowledge in practice.

I have still to acknowledge my constant indebtedness in this book, first, to the one who was amongst my earliest guides in the study of Psychology, namely, to my honoured friend and colleague, Professor William James, and secondly to Professor Baldwin, to whose treatment of the problems of Mental Evolution my own discussion of Mental Initiative owes not a little, and whose discussions of the social factors in mental development have also much influenced my own.

The fact that I have been forced to correct the proofsheets of the present volume, during a temporary leave of absence from my usual place of work, and while at a distance both from my publisher and my library, may help to explain some of the errors which may have crept into the printed text, and which may have escaped

my notice.

JOSIAH ROYCE.

Chapter I Page

Introductory Definitions and Explanations .... 1-19

§ I. Definition of psychology. Contrast between mental and

physical phenomena ....... I

§ 2. In what sense mental phenomena are internal . . 3

§ 3. A science of mental phenomena is made possible by the

fact that mental phenomena have physical expressions 5 § 4. Such a science is further made possible by the fact that

mental phenomena occur under physical cojiditions . 9 §5. These physical conditions include certain nervous processes 10 § 6. Nervous functions that are attended with mental life and

those that are not so attended; their general relations 11 §7. The three essential undertakings of psychological study . 12 §8. Psychological methods: (i) The study of the expressive signs of mental life; (2) The study of the relations between brain and mind . . . . . -13

§ 9. Psychological methods: (3) Introspection; (4) Psychological experiment , . , . . . .16

CHAPTER II The Physical Signs of the Presence of Mind . . 20-57

§ ic. The signs of mental life. The discriminating sensitiveness of beings that possess minds .... 20

§ II. The forms of this sensitiveness: (i) The signs of feeling 22

§ 12. The forms of discriminating sensitiveness continued:

(2) The signs of sensory experience .... 24

§ 13. Practical uses of the foregoing class of signs of mental

life. Difficulty of estimating these signs correctly . 27

XV xvi CONTENTS

PAGE

§ 14. The signs of sensory discrimination may seem to be present where there still may not be the corresponding consciousness. The heliotropism of plants and Loeb's general conception of a " tropism." Practical consequences as to these signs of mind .... 28

§15. The signs of mental life continued : The eigns of the influence of former experience upon present conduct . . 32

§ 16. Inherited instincts and acquired habits. The latter as

furnishing the signs of the influence of experience . 34

§ 17. Relation between the signs of the influence of experience

and the signs of sensitiveness ..... 36

§ 18. General definition of docility ...... 37

§ 19. The signs of mental life continued : The signs of what

seems to be spontaneity ...... 38

§ 20. Difficulty of asserting the existence of spontaneity in the actions of any being. Docility may lead to what seems spontaneity 39

§ 21. Examples of what seem to be more genuine instances of

spontaneity ......... 42

§ 22. Provisional definition of the concept of mental initiative . 46

§ 23. The relation of the signs of initiative to the signs of

§ 24. Initiative in relation to what is often called " self-activity," and to the questions as to the influence of heredity and environment ........ 53

§ 25. Summary : The signs of sensitiveness, of docility, and of initiative as the three classes of the signs of mind. Division of the later discussion ..... 55

CHAPTER III The Nervous Conditions of the Manifestation of Mind 58-80

§ 26. The structure of the nervous system. The neurons

§ 27. Sensory and motor nerves .....

§ 28. Characteristics of cerebral processes : Habit, localization

of function, generalized and specialized habits. " Set

of brain § 29. Relation of the cortex to lower nervous centres. Guid

ance, coordination, inhibition ....

58 61

64 70

CONTENTS xvii

§ 30. Inhibition considered more in detail. Its importance . 70 § 31. Examples of inhibition in relation to mental processes.

The hierarchy of functions 73

§ 32. Practical applications of the principle 6f the inhibitory

character of the higher nervous processes • • • 75

CHAPTER IV General Features of Conscious Life .... 81-118

§ 33- What cerebral functions are attended by conscious life ? . 81

§ 34. The " stream of consciousness " and its " contents " . . 82

§ 35. The " unity of consciousness." What it means and its

general relation to the variety of our conscious states . 85

§ 36. The variety of our conscious states as an essential condition of our consciousness and of its unity ... 89

§ 37. Difference and sameness as inseparable relations amongst the various states present within the unity of consciousness. The relation of sameness and difference to unity and variety and to one another ..... 90

§ 38. Practical applications of the principles regarding the relations of sameness and difference. How we teach people to note resemblances and differences . . 94

§ 39. The unity of consciousness as not only simultaneous, but successive. The "present moment" as possessing a finite length 95

§ 40. The question whether our mental life is a complex consisting of certain ultimate elements. The concept of elementary sensations and feelings .... 97

§ 41. The concept of mental elements more generally stated. Mental elements in relation to cerebral functions. The " blending " of mental elements ..... 100

§ 42. Psychological experiment as a means of isolating and

defining the mental elements 103

§ 43. Examples of the analysis of conscious states. The analysis

of musical sounds and of other complexes . . . 104

§ 44. Criticism of the foregoing theory of the constitution of our conscious life. The " mental elements" exist when they are consciously observed, not otherwise. Analysis alters the consciousness that is analysed . . . 107

XVm CONTENTS

§ 45. And nevertheless the theory of the mental elements expresses important truths. What the experimental analyses do show concerning our consciousness . .112

§ 46. The law that for any ordinary state of consciousness an analysed state or series of states can be substittded. Significance of this law II5

§ 47, Classification of the subsequent discussion . . .117

Chapter V

Sensitiveness. A. Sensory Experience .... 1 19-147

§48. The concept of a sensation 119

§ 49. The relation of consciousness to sensations . . . 120 § 50. Sensations as relatively simple mental states experimentally producible . . . . . . . .122

§ 51. Every grade and form of normal consciousness is affected by the accompanying sensory experience. Practical consequences of this principle. Examples . . . 123 § 52. External and internal sensory experience and their general

relationships . . . . . . . .129

§ 53- Organic and dermal sensory experience .... 131

§ 54. Sensory experiences of taste, smell, sight, and hearing . 134 §55. The attributes of sensation. Quality and intensity . . 136 § 56. Extensity as an attribute of sensory experience. The bases of our knowledge of space. The relation of space to the reactions of orientation .... 139

Chapter VI

Sensitiveness. B. Mental Imagery 148-162

§57. Definition and characteristics of mental images . . 148 § 58. The classes of mental images. Galton's inquiries. The

types of imagery characteristic of different minds . 151

§ 59. Relations of mental images to consciousness in general, to current sensory experience, and to motor processes and tendencies. Practical considerations concerning mental imagery ........ 157

CONTENTS XIX

Chapter VII Page

Sensitiveness. C. The Feelings 163-196

§ 60. The feelings in general. Their traditional relation to the

intellect and the will. Their place in the present study 163

§ 61. Elementary feelings not as extensively to be studied by experiment as are elementary sensations. The " subjective " character of feelings ..... 165

§ 62. The classification of the feelings into those of pleasure and those of displeasure. Apparent difficulty about this classification. Usual answer to this difficulty . 167

§ 63. The antagonism of pleasure and displeasure. Their relation to conduct ........ 171

§ 64. Further difficulties in the way of viewing the foregoing classification as exhaustive. The "mixed" feelings and their complexity . . . . . , -173

§ 65. Wundt's "three-dimensional" classification of the feelings 176

§ 66. Hypothesis of a ^wo-dimensional classification of the feelings. Two pairs of opposed tendencies in feeling: (i) Pleasure and displeasure; (2) Restlessness and quiescence ......... 177

§ 67. Characterisation of pleasure and displeasure. Characterisation of restlessness and quiescence . . -179

§ 68. The quiescent and the restless states of displeasure and

the restless and quiescent pleasures . . . .182

§ 69. Relation of the two pairs of antagonistic feelings to consciousness in general . . . . . . .184

§ 70. The four types of mixed feelings more exactly defined

and illustrated 185

§ 71. The relatively simple states of feeling. Relation of restlessness and quiescence, and of pleasure and displeasure, to the attention 189

§ 72. Review of the whole survey of conscious processes up to the present point. Question as to the completeness of the classification, thus far given, of our present conscious states. Is the, will such as to include still other sorts of mental states ? . . . . . .192

XX CONTENTS

PAGE

§ 73. The place of the will in consciousness. The relation of will to sensory experience, to imagery, and to feeling. Result as to the completeness of the classification up to the present point ....... 193

CHAPTER VIII The General Law of Docility 197-217

§ 74. The evidences of docility are furnished by facts that have

to do both with knowledge and with conduct . . 197

§ 75. The cerebral law of habit and its relation to our conscious

§ 76. The process of formation of a new habit; simplification; welding of partial processes into unity. Training welds simultaneous as well as successive functions . . 200

§ 77. The law of association as the expression of the law of habit in mental terms. Inadequacy of this expression. Simultaneous and successive association . . . 203

§ 78. Consequences of the inadequacy of the mental process to represent the complexity of the cerebral process. Association by similarity. Its reduction to the law of habit 205

§ 79. The theory that association binds mental elements together. Criticism of this theory ..... 208

§ 80. The traditional forms of association ..... 209

§ 81. Inadequacy of the general law of association to determine what one of various possible associations shall prove effective in any one case ...... 210

§ 82. Vividness and recency as factors which determine the

course of association . . . . . . .212

§ 83. Factors which determine the course of association (concluded) : The present " set " of the brain . . . 214

CHAPTER IX Docility. A. Perception and Action .... 218-228

§ 84. General plan of the following discussion . . . .218 § 85. General relation of perceptions to actions. Illustration

from the life of infancy ...... 218

CONTENTS

XXI

§86. §87.

§90.

§91- §92.

%93-

§94- §95-

§96.

PAGE

Perception and action in adult life . . . . .221

The feelings which accompany perception. The feeling

of familiarity ........ 224

Practical consequences of the relations between perception and action = 225

Chapter X

B. Assimilation 229-247

Assimilation, differentiation, and the social aspect of docility as the remaining aspects of docility to be treated in this discussion ...... 229

The assimilation of new habits to old ones as a consequence of the law of habit 231

The mental aspect of the process of assimilation . . 234

Illustrations of mental assimilation. The Herbartian

Illustrations of mental assimilation (continued) : Our memory of the past as an assimilative process. Errors of memory which result ...... 236

Further illustrations of defective memory . . . 239

The assimilative process is never the only aspect of our

conscious relation to our experience .... 242

Assimilation in its relations to the thinking process.

" Explanation " and reasoning as assimilative processes 245

Chapter XI §99. § 100

§ lOI.

C. Differentiation 248-273

The general nature of the differentiation which accompanies the development of the mind .... 248

The derivation of our consciousness of simultaneous

variety from our consciousness of successive variety . 250

Illustration from our consciousness of space . . . 252

Education as an instance of differentiation. Practical

importance of the dramatic element in instruction . 254

Judgment, and the thinking process in general, as a

process of differentiation. Analysis and synthesis . 255 xxil CONTENTS

PAGE

§ 1 02. Practical consequences . . . . . . -257

§ 103. The process of attention as an aspect of the process of

differentiation . . . . . . . .258

§ 104. The limits of differentiation and the "psycho-physic law" 264 § 105. The psycho-physic law as a law not of sensation, but of

the limitations of our docility ..... 268

Chapter XII

Docility. D. The Social Aspect of the Higher Forms of

§ 106. Human mental life as primarily social .... 274

§ 107. The bases of social consciousness : Imitation . . . 275

§ 108. The bases of social consciousness: The love of opposition 277 § 109. The general relations of the thinking process to social

stimulations and habits. Why language becomes so

significant for the development of the thinking process 280

§ 1 10. The formation of general ideas ..... 285

§1X1. General ideas as " plans of action " .... 288 § II 2. Social activities as the means of bringing these plans of

action to clear consciousness ..... 290 § 113. Judgment as dependent for its development upon social

§ 114. The social aspect of the development of the reasoning

§115. The social aspect of the development of self-consciousness 296

Chapter XIII

§ 116. The problem as to the possibility of mental initiative

stated . 299

§ II 7. The early imperfection and the slow development of the

manifestations of our inherited tendencies to action . 302 § 118. Consequences of these facts for the early training of the

§ 119. The persistence of the young organism in acts that are

not yet adaptive 306

CONTENTS XXlil

PAGE

§ 1 20. Illustrations of the restless persistence in acts that are so

far not adaptive in the case of adult animal organisms 312

§ 121. Illustrations of a similar restless persistence in adult

human beings . . . . . . . • S'S

§ 122. Such restless persistence in advance of adaptation as the one source of significant initiative in conduct and in mind ......... 318

§123. Illustrations from the plays of children .... 319

§ 124. Illustrations of a similar initiative in the activities of

§ 125. Illustrations of restless persistence in case of the social

tendencies toward individualism .... 326

§ 126. Ordinary active attention as a process of restless persistence in advance of adaptation. Attention and the " tropisms " of Loeb ....... 328

§ 127. The bases of all initiative are to be found in " tropisms" that lead to a restless persistence in types of action which are not yet adaptive. Practical consequences 330

CHAPTER XIV Certain Varieties of Emotional and Intellectual Life 333-363

§ 128. Recapitulation and survey of further practical applications ......... 333

§ 129. The nature of the emotions ...... 335

§ 130. The relation of the emotions to their physical expression 337

§ 131. The practical aspect of the life of the emotions. Emotional variability. The emotional " undertone " . 340

§ 132. Abnormal emotions. The sexual emotions and their abnormities. Practical considerations as to the abnormities of emotional life in general . . . 343

§ ^33- The intellectual life in general. Principles that preside

over its practical guidance ...... 349

§ 134. The abnormities of the intellectual life. Secondary

impairment of the intellectual life .... 352

§135. Primary intellectual disorders illustrated. Hallucinations

and delusions . . . . . . . . 355

§ 136. Eccentricity of intellectual life. Practical rule for judging " original " characters and persons . . . 360 xxiv CONTENTS

Chapter XV Page

§ 137. The will, in the wider sense of the term, as our whole

consciousness of our activity ..... 364

§ 138. The relation of attention to volition. Choice, and the

will in the narrower sense ...... 367

§ 139. Conscious choice and its unoriginal character. The will in the narrower sense takes its rise in " involuntary " action ......... 369

§ 140. Illustration of volition by the case of the growth of the

speech-function . . . . . . . .371

§141. The practical aspect of the training of the will . . 373

§ 142. Abnormities of volition ....... 375

EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION

As Psychology has taken on something of the aspect of a natural science, it has presented new difficulties to the student. The natural sciences are based on an elaborate series of presuppositions, none of which are tested or examined by those sciences. The older form of psychology began by setting forth its presuppositions, many of them crude and untenable, perhaps, but nevertheless it made the fact clear that the superstructure had a foundation of some sort. Psychology as now expounded is as chary of stating its presuppositions as is physics, with consequent loss of clearness and cogency to the philosophically minded student. As a result, there is constant need for a summing-up and interpretation of the results of special inquiries and investigations. Without this summing-up and interpretation, the student of psychology in its newer forms is lost in a maze of details, whose interrelations he comprehends very imperfectly, if at all.