The battle of Gettysburg, from the History of the civil war in America

Front matter

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Chapter I. Brandy Station

Lee moves forward on the 3d of June. — Reorganization of his array. — Ewell and A. P. Hill. — The artillery. — The cavalry. — Lee's plan. — Hooker's situation. — He finds out Lee's movement. — His plan not approved of at Washington. — His hands are tied. — Howe crosses the Rappahannock — Pleasonton's positions. — Lee at Culpeper. — Stuart and his cavalry — Pleasonton's plan. — He crosses the Rapidan on the 9tli of June. — Fight at P>everly Ford. — Dispositions taken by Stuart. — His perilous situation. — The fight at Brandy Station. — Struggle at Fleetwood Hill. — Side-arms. — Stuart's resistance. — He evacuates Brandy Station. — Pleasonton's retreat. — Results obtaimd. — Hooker would attack Hill. — Advantages of that plan. — Consequences of a march of Hooker on Richmond and of Lee on Washington. — Halleck's orders. — Hooker's hard task. — Scattering of the Federals. — Harper's Ferry and Washington. — Hooker marching on the 11th of June. — His uncertainty. — Lee moves toward the Valley of Virginia. — Ewell takes the lead. — The rapidity of his march. — Description of Winchester. — Milroy ignorant of Ewell's approach. — His positions on the 13th of June. — Ewell appears before Winchester. — :0n the 14th, Early carries Flint Hill. — Desjierate situation of Milroy. — He evacuates Winchester by night. — Disastrous retreat. — Results of Ewell's victory. — Hooker's movements. — Alarm in Pennsylvania. — ^Jenkins at Chambersburg. — Lee's and Smart's movements. — Encounter of tlie cavalry. — Position of Aldie. — Engagement at Middleburg on the 17th. — Hooker is marching westward. — Fight at Middleburg on the 19th. — Engagement of Cromwell Creek. — Fight at Upperville on the 21st.^Information collected by Pleasonton. — Results of these combats. — Pleasonton's retreat. — Lee on the banks of the Potomac. — His letter to Mr. Davis. — Ewell marching on the 22d toward Harrisburg. — Longstreet crosses the Potomac on the 2-5th. — Hill with him at Chambersburg on the 27th. — Cumberland Valley. — Early on the east of the Blue Ridge. — On the 26th he is at Gettysburg. — Burning of the bridge at Columbia. — Hooker's movements. — The authorities at Washington. — Hooker crosses the Potomac. — Lee is not informed of it. — Stuart's expedition. — His plan. — Lee's instructions. — Stuart's situation on the 26th. — He is separated from Lee. — He captures a Federal train on tiie 28th. — Engagement at Westminster on the 29th. — He encounters Kiii)atri(k. — Kilpatrick's movements. — Fight at Hanover on the oOth.— Stuart before Carlisle. — Lee recalls him. — Hooker is replaced by Meade on the 28th. — Halleck's conduct. — Meade's movements on the 29th. — Situation of Gettysburg. — Meade's plan. — His cavalry on the 30th. — viii CONTENTS.

Biiford at Gettysburg. — Meade's orders for tlie 1st of July. — Tlie Pipe Creek line. — On the 2Sth Lee resolves to cro.ss the mountains.— Onlers of the 29tii. — Ewell's movement. — The Confederates are ont.stri])ped at Gettysburg. — Causes of the first encounter at Gettysburg. — The Tennsylvania militia. — Meade informed of Lee's movement. — Keyes' demonstrations on the Virginia peninsula Page

Chapter II. Oak Hill

Lee's entire army is marching on the 1st of July on Gettysburg. — The battlefield of Gettysburg.— The three Jiills: Oak Hill, Cemetery Hill, the Itound Toys. — Peach Orchard. — The crossway. — Buford's iiold resolution. — His fighting dispositions. — He is attacked by Heth. — Movements of Hill and Keynolds. — Meade's dispositions on the moi-ning of the 1st of July. — His orders to Reynolds. — The latter calls the First corps to Gettysburg. — Wadsworth's arrival. — He saves the cavalry. — Reynolds' death. — Rout of Archer's brigade. — Defeat of Butler's brigade. — Tho Confederates are stopped. — The Federals are reinforced. — Heth's new attack. — Howard at Clettysburg. — Position of the Eleventh corps. — Ewell approaches Gettysburg. — Rodes occupies Oak Hill. — Howard's imprudent movement. — The First corps is attacked at the same time in front and on the right. — Sanguinary struggle. — Rodes is repulsed.— Pender comes to Heth's rescue. — Fight of the Eleventh corps and Ewell. — Easy defeat of Schinnn el pfennig. — Early attacks Barlow. — Struggle around the almshouse. — Barlow's defeat. — Rout of the Eleventh corps. — Perilous position of Doubleday. — His energetic resistance. — He retreats on Gettysburg. — Position of the Federals on Cemetery Hill. — Meade's orders on July 1st. — Hancock at Gettysburg. — He re-forms the army. — Lee should have attacked Cemetery Hill without delay. — Ewell dares not attempt it. — Lee's orders. — Movements of the Army of the Potomac on the 1st of July. — Meade's orders on the night of the 1st. — Lee's plan. — Meade's arrival. — His situation. — Distribution of his forces on the morning of the 2d. — Distriljution of those of Lee. — Meade rectifi>.s his positions. — Descri])tion of the ground.— The strong and the weak points of the Unionist line. — Sickles' position pointed out by Meade. — Sickles wishes to rectify it. — The Federal right. — Various plans presented to Lee: retreat on South ^Mountain; defensive battle; direct atiack; manoeuvres. — Discussion of these plans. — Lee chooses the direct attack.— Faults in the execution of that plan. — Loss of precious time. — Role assigned to Longstreet. — Orders given to Ewell. — Excessive length of the Confederate line.^Delays in Longstreet's march. — Waiting of the two armies. — Engagement in the morning at Warfield. — At eleven o'clock Sickles orders his corps to move forward. — Misunderstanding between Meade and himself. — His new position. — Weakness of his line. — New delays of Longstreet. — Lee's impatience. — Hood's movement. — At half-past three o'clock he is on the point of attacking the Round Tops Page

CONTENTS. is.

Chapter III. Gettysburg

Hood attacks Birney's division. — Struggle at Devil's Den. — Attack on Little Eound Top. — Fight in the corn-field. — Hood's success. — McLaws' movement. — Birney is reinforced. — New struggle. — Warren has Little Eound Top occupied. — Vincent arrives in time. — Fierce struggle. — The Confederates are repulsed.— Losses on both sides. — Birney reinforced by . Caldwell. — Struggle against McLaws. — Fresh attack on Round Top. — It is repulsed. — McLaws attacks the orchard. — Sickles' line is broken. — Anderson attacks Humplireys. — The Conftderate left. — Humphreys' retreat with the Unionist left. — Longstreet's victory. — New line formed by Hancock. — Combat on the Eound Tops. — Longstreet's advance. — The Federal artillery.— Concenti'ation of foi'ces on Meade's left. — Hill remains motionless. — Last eflbrt of McLaws and Anderson. — They are not supported. — They are repulsed about eight o'clock at night. — Positions of the Federal riglit. — Meade unmans it.— It is attacked by Johnson. — Fierce struggle on Gulp's Hill. — .Johnson is repulsed at ten o'clock at night. — Early attacks Cemetery Hill. — His defeat. — Eodes' inaction. — Movements of the cavalry. — Situation of the Confederates. — Faults committed. — Forces engaged by Lee. — Grave situation of the Federals. — Council of war. — Preparations for the battle of the following day. — Dispositions of the Confederates. — Lee's orders. — At daybreak on the 3d the fight is resumed on Culp's Hill. — Sanguinary and fierce struggle. — Last effort of the Confederates at eleven o'clock. — Success of the Federals. — Interruption of the battle. — Long preparations of the Southern right. — Pickett's position. — Farnsworth's fight on Plum Eun.-^Lee's dispositions to su|iport Pickett's attack. — General cannonading. — Positions of tlie Federal left. — Its artillery. — Results of the cannonading. — The Federals cease firing. — Pickett's movement. — He is supported right and left. — Description of the ground. — Strength of the Federal positions. — Pickett makes the assault. — He is isolated. — Fierce struggle with side-arms. — Mel^e on the hill. — Defeat of Trimble and Pettigrew on Pickett's left. — Pickett's division annihilated. — On the right Wilcox is repulsed. — Rout of the assailants. — Lee and Longstreet in their midst. — The Fedi^-rals' situation. — INIeade dares not take the ofiensive. — Eesults obtained. — Rtti'eat of Law and McLaws. — The latter alone is disturbed. — The cavalry forces. — Stuart's plan. — Federal position. — Encounter of the cavalry forces. — Figlit of Cress' Ridge. — Charges and counter-charges. — Stuart's movement is interrupted. — General mel^e with side-arms. — The two parties are separated. — Lee's situalion on the 3d at night: he is defeated. — Necessity of the retreat. — Fortune deserts the Confederates' cause. — Concentration of the Soutiiern army. — The Federals' situation. — The two adversaries during the day of tlie 4th. — Commencement of Lee's retreat. — Uncertainty

and immobility of Meade. — Causes of Lee's defeat. — Meade's faults. — Strength of the two armies. — Their losses. — The news of the battle of Gettysburg in the North and the South Page 160

THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG.

Chapter I. Brandy Station

ON the 3d of June, 1863, Lee put his army in motion. The future of America was about to be decided for ever. Til is army bore but little raserablance to the brave but undisciplined troops that had defended the Manassas plains two years before. It had even become, through its organization and discipline, its experience in fighting and marching, much superior to what it was the preceding year, when its chieftain led it into Maryland for the first time. The extreme confidence that animated it, as we have observed, imparted to it immense strength on the field of battle, but it also inspired it with an imprudent contempt for its adversaries. From the day foUoMang the battle of Chancellorsville the government and the generals had applied themselves to the task of reinforcing and reorganizing it. The return of the three divisions that had been besieging Suifolk, the forwarding of new regiments which had been withdrawn from points of least importance for defence, and, finally, the arrival of a large number of recruits, had during the latter part of IMay carried its effective force to eighty thousand men, 68,352 of whom were infantry. The latter had been divided into three army corps, each comprising three divisions. Up to this time the nine divisions of the Army of Northern Virginia had been partitioned between Longstreet and Jackson, to whom Lee allowed srreat freedom of action over the whole extent of the battlefield where each happened to be in command. Being deprived of the services of him who, of his two lieutenants, was most accustomed to exercise independent command, and obliged thenceforth to give more personal attention to the management of battles, Lee felt that it was necessary to reduce the size of his army corps in order to render them more manageable. Longstreet retained the

First ; Ewell and A. P. Hill were placed at the head of the Sec ond and Third, and each of them had the rank of lieutenantgeneral conferred upon him. If these last two officers, to recall the comparison made after the death of Turenne, were the " small change " for Stonewall Jackson, it might be said with truth that the minor coins were of sterling value.

No one could dispute to Ewell the honor of succeeding Jackson in the command of the Second corps. We have seen him at his l^rilliant debut charging the gate of INIexico in 1847 Avith Kearny's squadron. A Virginian by birth, like Lee and Jackson, he possessed on that soil, so fruitful in valiant soldiers, a beautiful residence near the city of AVilliamsburg, in the heart of the old colony of English Cavaliers. This dwelling, of brick and Avood, square built, with a lofty flight of steps, of sombre aspect, and standing alone in the centre of a vast clearing, surrounded by a magnificent forest, had been for a year in possession of the Federals. After having almost invariably played the principal role in the operations directed by Jackson, Ewell, severely wounded at Gainesville, had not been able to look on liis domain for rest and health. Finally, after nine mouths' absence, he rejoined on crutches the army which had not forgotten his services. JNlore fortunate than his old chief, he had, thanks to his robust and active temperament, successfully borne the sufferings consequent upon amputation, and seemed to be sufficiently restored to health to fight for the recovery of his patrimony. Having lost one leg, he had himself fastened to his saddle and resumed his command. B[e had the required energy, firmness, and activity to be the leader of soldiers who, knowing their own value, were severe judges of the qualities possessed by their chiefs; but he lacked the unerring quickness of perception of his predecessor, Avhich could discover instantaneously the weak point of an adversary.

A. P. Hill, like Ewell, Avas a Virginian. Having also participated in all the labors of Jackson, he had been slightly wounded, almost at the same time as the latter, in the terrible affair of Dowdall's Tavern. Gifted with a degree of perseverance equal to any emergency, he M'as always ready to take charge of the most difficult undertakings, and inspired his chiefs, his comrades,

BBAXDY STATION. 3

and his subordinates with equal confidence. His force of will overcame the weakness of a shattered constitution, which had emaciated his manly face. He was never sick on the day of battle. We have stated that his name was the last uttered by Jackson's lips as he lay on his deathbed. He waited for the completion of his task to respond to this call and to join his chief* The latter had fallen in the midst of victory ; A. P. Hill perished in the last hour of the war, wlien all hope was lost save the privilege of dying like a soldier with SAvord in hand.

The reorganization of the artillery completed the changes eifected by Lee in the distribution of his forces. Up to this time the batteries were divided between the divisions, sometimes even specially attached to some particular brigade : they had to be detached in order to employ them singly or unite them in groups, hence a miserable scattering on the battlefield. They were all now placed under the command of General Pendleton, a brave and energetic officer who had been tried under fire. Some of these batteries formed an independent reserve ; the rest, while still remaining under his control, were assigned temporarily to the army corps. The artillery consisted of fifteen battalions, each composed of four batteries of four pieces — sixteen guns in all. These battalions, commanded by experienced officers, while remaining under the controlling direction of General Pendleton, were divided between the three corps, each receiving five — making eighty pieces of artillery. Three of the battalions were each specially attached to a division, while the other two formed a reserve. Five mounted batteries of six pieces each composed the light artillery of Stuart's cavalry division.

The cavalry, reinforced and newly mounted under the super vision of Stuart, had, after Chancellorsville, taken up its old quartei*s at Culpeper, and occupied the triangle comprised between the Papidan and the Rappahannock, watching the right wing of the Federals along this latter river, and still menacing their lines of communication. In this position it covered the roads that the Confederate army had to follow if it desired to advance in the direction of the North. In fact, as Lee could not think of crossing the Rappahannock by main force in the face of

Hooker's army, he had only two plans of campaign to follow if he assumed the offensive : either to tui'n his right wing in order to forestall hira at Manassas and before Washington, or to push forward toward ]\Iaryland by the valley of the Shenandoah, masking liis movement behind the Blue Ridge. The first plan, wdiich had proved successful the preceding year against Pope, was too hazardous to be tried again a second time in the face of an adversary taught by experience. Lee adopted the second, which left the enemy in a state of uncertainty for a longer space of time and enabled him to outvie the latter in speed.

This movement was not without danger, for it consisted in turning the right wing of the Federals ; and in order to accomplish this the latter had to be detained before Fredericksburg by a large display of troops while Lee's heads of column reached the banks of the Shenandoah. His army was thus stretched along a line which throughout its entire length exposed its flank to the attaclvs of the enemy. The utmost secrecy could alone ward off the danger of these attacks.

The forest of the Wilderness had resumed its wonted stillness, disturbed only by the footsteps of Confederate scouts ; the grass had covered the corpses and the debris of every kind which lay scattered among the woods ; the Federal trenches, the torn and shattered trees, and the vestiges of fires, alone recalled to mind the conflict of the 3d of ISIay. Precisely one month to a day had elapsed since this battle when Longstreet's First division, under McLaws, penetrated this henceforth historical Wilderness. Another division followed it closely ; the Third, under Hood, was already on the banks of the Rapidan, and the whole army corps, crossing this river, reached the neighborhood of Culpeper Court-house on the evening of the 7th.

"~- A portion of Ewell's corps had started in the same direction on the 4th ; the remainder moved forward on the morning of the 5th : Hill's corps, therefore, was the only one left to occupy the positions from Taylor's Hill to Hamilton's Crossing in which the army had passed the winter, and it had to be deployed along this, line in order to conceal the departure of two-thirds of the army. The vigilance of the outposts had, in fact, prevented Hooker's spies from reporting this departure to him : no one had been able

BRANDY STATION.

to cross the river for several days. But the movements of troops caused by the removal of Hill's divisions could not altogether avoid attracting the attention of the Federals. Besides, they knew their adversaries too well not to anticipate an attack the moment that they did not resume the aggressive themselves.

A few words on the situation of the Army of the Potomac for the last mouth will enable the reader to understand why, contrary to its tactics of the preceding year, it lay waiting, inactive in its positions, for the Confederates to take the initiative of a new campaign.

Whilst the latter saw their ranks filling up, those of the Union army were thinning out in an alarming manner. The expiration of their terms of service carried off five thousand well-tried men in the month of May, and ten thousand in June ; the fatigues of a short but distressing campaign and the first heats of summer increased the number of sick ; desertions had not been entirely stopped ; and the recruiting of regiments already organized was almost at a standstill.

The active infantry force that Hooker had at his disposal was thus reduced to eighty thousand men. The artillery was tlienceforth too numerous, and out of proportion to the above figures. The cavalry, on the other hand, Avorn out by Stoneman's raid, needed a few weeks' rest to recuperate. The authorities at Washington might have reinforced the Army of the Potomac by discontinuing or reducing the number of useless posts and garrisons, but the most sad experience had failed to induce them to abandon this system of scattering the troops. At the very moment when all the Confederate forces were leaving the coast to join Johnston in the West or Lee in Virginia, a whole army corps was left at Port Royal, one division at New Berne, two at Suffolk, and one in the peninsula of Virginia, to waste away without a purpose, without any plan of campaign ; whilst in the district which the Army of the Potomac was called upon to defend, entire corps, such as the Washington garrison under Heintzelman, Stahel's six thousand cavalry in the neighborhood of Manassas, and Milroy's division in the Valley of Virginia, acted independently of Hooker and under the immediate direction of Halleck; the commander-in-chief of the Army of the

Potomac not being even informed of the orders these officers received. Lee's projects could not have been more effectually subserved.

Hooker no longer inspired his army with the same confidence as before Chancellorsville : the council of war that was held prior to the retreat had given rise to some painful retrospective discussions among some of his generals, the knowledge of whicih had reached Washington. Halleck, without daring to request Hooker's removal, shared the opinion of those who believed that the burden of command was too heavy for his shoulders, and, far from being urged to act, it was recommended to him to wait for a favorable opportunity.

It was during this state of expectancy, about the end of INIay, that vague rumors got afloat foreshadowing the impending movement of the Confederates. The Federals were not alone to suffer from the indiscretions of politicians and journalists : there were also men iu the South who, for the silly satisfaction of being considered well informed, worked incessantly in their endeavors to fathom military secrets, and hastened to divulge them. The Richmond papers published that Lee was about to undertake an aggressive movement, and it was openly announced in the streets of the capital that he would invade Maryland at the head of eighty-five thousand men. Hooker thought justly that his adversaries were not likely to come to attack him in his positions at Falmouth, and try to turn him ; but he was under the impression that they were about to resume the campaign plan of the preceding year, and proceed toward Manassas by crossing the Rappahannock near its source. He was confirmed in this opinion by the gathering of Stuart's cavalry at Culpeper and the increasing boldness of the guerillas who infested the country in his rear; for one of these bands even attempted, at Greenwich on the 31st of May, to capture a train intended for his army. It required, however, the removal of the encampments of Hill's corps on the 4t]i of June to induce him to suspect a serious movement on the part of the enemy, and to decide to emerge from his inactivity in order to make sure of the fiict. On the morning of the 5th the poutonniers were ordered to throw two bridges over the Rappahannock at the point known by the name of Franklin's

Crossing. The Sixth corps, which was encamped in the neighborhood, sustained them and held itself ready to cross the river. This movement might be only a simple demonstration ; it might also be the beginning of an operation which would have proved very dangerous for the enemy. Hooker, with the same sagacity he had shown in planning the battle of Chancellorsville, was fully convinced that an attack upon the weakened lines of Fredericksburg while a portion of Lee's army was probably pushing forward along the Culpeper road was the best means for preventing the invasion projected by his adversary. If the movement of the latter was not yet fully defined, he could thus stop him. If, on the contrary, he allowed him time to advance farther toward the North and to further separate his columns, he could then make a sudden attack with superior forces upon the troops which his presence at Falmouth detained on the Lower Rappahannock, and crush in its isolation one of the army corps whose co-operation was indispensable to Lee for an aggressive campaign.

Such a project was at once bold and well conceived : it had, in our opinion, great chances of success ; but there was one obstacle, more difficult to overcome than rivers, or even hostile batteries, which did not allow Hooker to execute it : this was the instructions he had received along with the command of the army. These instructions formally directed him to cover Washington and Harper's Ferry. Washington, surrounded by formidable fortifications perfectly armed, had a numerous garrison, while Stahel's cavalry division, by clearing the approaches for a considerable distance, did not permit the enemy to attempt a surprise against the place. Harper's Ferry, we have already shown, had no strategic importance whatever ; nevertheless, if it was desired to preserve this position, which had been very unnecessarily fortified, there could have been brought to the place five or six thousand men who under Milroy occupied Winchester and the lower part of the Valley of Virginia. But the requirements of General Hal leek for the defence of these two points, after having fettered the movements of McClellan on the Chickahominy and in the Antietam campaign, were not likely to yield to Hooker's representations. On the 5th of June the latter had asked for permission to act independently of these instructions, and to manoeuvre

B his army as he thought proper, in order to be able to strike the enemy wherever he could fiud the occasion to fight him to advantage were he to let him advance northward, while he himself should menace the Confederate capital. This permission was refused. Halleck tried to prove to him that it would be better to follow in the wake of Lee's heads of column, whose direction no one could as yet exactly foresee ; while Mr. Lincoln, recapitulating the scientific demonstration of his military director by a homely comparison, gave the form of an apologue to a telegram addressed to the commander of the Army of the Potomac : " I would not take any risk of being entangled upon the river, like an ox jum^jed half over a fence, and liable to be torn by dogs front and rear, without a fair chance to gore one way or to kick the other."

These instructions were positive and formal. Hooker had no other alternative than to conform to them. He had asked that all the forces which might have to operate against Lee should be united under one single command in order to combine their efforts. General Halleck deemed the superior control exercised by him from his office at Washington as quite sufficient for that purpose. The Army of the Potomac, doomed to act on the defensive, could not thenceforth prevent the enemy from accomplishing his design.

Hooker did his best not to allow himself to be surprised or forestalled by Lee. The bridges had been thrown over the river in the afternoon of June 5th, after a pretty sharp engagement with the Confederate skirmishers. As the latter were harassing the pontonniers a great deal, a Federal detachment had crossed the river in boats and dispersed them, after taking about one hundred prisoners. On the morning of the 6th, Hooker made Howe's division cross over to the right side of the Rappahannock. Lee, alarmed at this movement, caused a portion of Hill's corps to advance, holding himself ready to recall Ewell, who had been on the march since the day previous. But Hooker had his hands tied ; when he saw the display of forces HoAve provoked, he stopped the latter, without having been able to ascertain whether he had the enemy's whole army before him or only a portion of it. As to Lee, he soon discovered the weakness of this demonstration. Perfectly at ease on the point, he made preparations to join Longstreet, instructing Hill to follow him as soon as the movements of which he was about to take the direction had compelled the enemy to abandon the banks of the Rappahannock. — Hooker had determined to feel the enemy at both extremities of his line at once. Whilst Howe was crossing the river he made preparations for a large cavalry reconnoissance in the direction of Culpeper. He was not aware, as we have remarked, that Lee's army was itself on the march toward this point. But he knew that the enemy's whole cavalry was gathered there; that Stuart, reinforced on all sides, had nearly ten thousand sabres at his command ; and, even if the signs and rumors had not informed him, he was too well acquainted with the character of this young general not to feel convinced that he would not remain long inactive with such forces at his disposal.

In what direction w^ould he strike ? Was he about to undertake a simple raid or to cover the movements of the enemy's infantry ? It was necessary to make sure of this, and if possible to baffle his plans by a sudden attack. Unfortunately, the Federal cavalry had not yet entirely recovered from the long march it had made in the beginning of ]May. In spite of the eiforts of its new chief. General Pleasonton, who had deserved this position by his brilliant behavior at Chancellorsville, the three divisions composing it scarcely numbered seven thousand five hundred sabres. In order to make up for Pleasonton's numerical inferiority, it became necessary to add to his command the two infantry brigades under Ames and Russell, detached from the Eleventh and Sixth corps, which counted about three thousand men under arms. Notwithstanding the excellent qualities of these foot-soldiers, their co-operation interfered with the mobility of the column of cavalry, and consequently destroyed part of its chances of success. The troops under Pleasonton's command were all scattered : in order to afford them time to concentrate. Hooker directed him not to cross the Rappahannock until nine in the morning. While he was preparing to strike a sudden blow in the direction of Culpeper, Longstreet, unknown to him, had reached this village with all his infantry on the evening of the 7th. The arrival of Lee, who joined him before evening, was hailed by eveiy one as sure proof that the hour for important operations had arrived. The general-in-chief found his cavahy thoroughly prepared for the rdle it was about to play.