McClellan's last service to the republic : together with a tribute to his memory

Prefatory Note

Three of the papers in this volume were originally published in the " North American Review," for April, May, and June, 1880. They are now repubhshed by permission of the editor and proprietor of that magazine. The fourth paper is a tribute to the memory of the late General McClellan, which was first published in " The Star," at New York, November 18, 1885. A few notes are added to this edition, distinguished, as to the time of their being written, by inclosure in brackets. The entire contents of this volume are under the protection of copyright.

Every statement of a fact, contained in these pages, which was not founded on General McClellan's official report of his campaigns, or derived from some other public source, was given to me orally by the General in the spring of 1880, and

4 PREFATORY NOTE.

was written down by me at the time. At my request, he superintended the preparation of the map which shows his position and that of the Confederate troops on the 7th and 8th of November, 1862, and compared it with the military maps issued by the Government after the close of the civil war. — General McClellan died at his home in Orange, N. J., on the 29th of October, 1885.

G. T. C.

Washington, D. C, December i, 1883.

MCCLELLAN'S LAST SERVICE TO THE REPUBLIC.

Part I

A FULL history of General McClellan's services to the country, from the time when he led the Army of the Potomac to a position of safety on the James River at Harrison's Landing, to the transfer of that army to General Pope's command, and thence to the battle of Antietam, has never been written. In that part of McClellan's official report which covers this period, there is hardly more than a skeleton of events, made up of dispatches and letters, connected by a thread of narrative, in which the personal interviews, the oral communications, the anecdotes, and the acts of individuals, are for the most part wanting". That singularly dramatic scene, which witnessed the withdrawal of McClellan's army from the James, the defeat and disorderly retreat of Pope, McClellan's resumption of the command at the sudden and unexpected request of President Lincoln, his restoration of order, his provisions for the safety of Washington, his march into northern Maryland, his repulse of Lee, his advance into Virginia, and his recall at the moment when his preparations had been so made that nothing could probably have stayed his entrance into Richmond, is now to be described. Of the four principal actors in this remarkable drama, Lincoln, Stanton, Halleck, and McClellan, the last alone survives.* In what we shall say of the conduct of each of the three others toward the general who saved the capital, we may present to our readers unexpected explanations of many things which they have been accustomed to view differently, or which have remained hitherto in obscurity. They will understand, however, that we do not speak at random, and that we do not ask for their belief without having had ample means for forming our own.

The present narrative will commence at the point of time when General McClellan delivered personally into the hands of President Lincoln a letter on the general subject of the war, which has long been public, and which has been the subject

* Written and first published in April, 1880. General McClellan died suddenly, October 29, 1885.

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of much criticism. The true history of that letter we are able to give. While General McClellan was encamped on the Chickahominy, in June, 1862, awaiting- the re-enforcements which he so much needed for his advance on Richmond, he said in a telegraphic dispatch to the President, relating to other matters, " I would be glad to lay before your Excellency, by letter or telegraph, my views as to the present state of military affairs throughout the whole country." The President answered on the next day, as follows : " If it would not divert too much of your time and attention from the army under your immediate command, I would be glad to have your views as to the present state of military affairs throughout the country, as you say you would be glad to give them. I would rather it should be by letter than by telegraph, because of the better chance of secrecy." To this General McClellan replied that under the circumstances he would defer for the present the communication he desired to make. It was, however, only deferred. General McClellan felt that what he desired to say to the President was too important to be forborne, but he postponed the preparation of his letter until a more convenient time.

On the 25th of June (1862), McClellan, closely pressed by the enemy, whose force amounted, according to his best information, to two hundred thousand men, telegraphed to Stanton, the Secretary of War, as follows :

Headquarters, Army of the Potomac,

Camp Lincoln, Jane 25, 1862 — 6.15 p. m.

I have just returned from the field, and found your dispatch in regard to Jackson.

Several contrabands, just in, give information confirming supposition that Jackson's advance is at or near Hanover Court-House, and that Beauregard arrived, with strong re-enforcements, in Richmond yesterday.

I incline to think that Jackson will attack my right and rear. The rebel force is stated at (200,000) two hundred thousand, including Jackson and Beauregard. I shall have to contend against vastly superior odds if these reports be true. But this army will do all in the power of men to hold their position and repulse any attack.

I regret my great inferiority in numbers, but feel that I am in no way responsible for it, as I have not failed to represent, repeatedly, the necessity of re-enforcements ; that this was the decisive point, and that all the available means of the Government should be concentrated here. I will do all that a general can do, with the splendid army I have the honor to command, and, if it is destroyed by overwhelming numbers, can at least die with it, and share its fate.

But, if the result of the action which will probably occur to-morrow, or within a short time, is a disaster, the responsibility can not be thrown on my shoulders ; it must rest where it belongs.

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Since I commenced this, I have received additional intelHgence, confirming the supposition in regard to Jackson's movements and Beauregard's arrival. I shall probably be attacked to-morrow, and now go to the other side of the Chickahominy, to arrange for the defense on that side. I feel that there is no use in my again asking for re-enforcements.

Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War.

On the 26th, the day upon which McClellan had fixed for his final advance, although the re-enforcements which he had so earnestly and repeatedly called for had been withheld from him, he was attacked by the enemy in strong force on his right. He was thus compelled to turn his attention to the protection of his communications and depots of supply. '' This," he says in his report, " was a bitter confirmation of the military judgment which had been reiterated to my military superiors from the inception and through the progress of the Peninsular campaign." Then followed The Seven Days, through which he fought his way for a change of base to the James River, in a series of desperate coniiicts, in every one of which the Confederates were baffled, until, on the night of the 3d of July, the last of the wagon-trains reached the new base at Harrison's Landing, and the wearied Army of the Potomac, which had battled with such lO MCCLELLAN'S LAST SERVICE

heroic endurance under his skillful guidance, rested in security, protected by their own batteries and the gunboats which lay in the river. The three following days were occupied by McClellan in strengthening and guarding his position, and in a fruitless telegraphic correspondence with the President, to convince the latter that re-enforcements ought to be sent to him, so that he could advance on Richmond from the James. " To re-enforce you,'* said Mr. Lincoln, " so as to enable you to resume the offensive within a month, or even six weeks, is impossible. . . . Under these circumstances, the defensive, for the present, must be your only care. Save the army, first, where you are, if you can ; and, secondly, by removal, if you must."

. While the Army of the Potomac was thus resting in the defensive at Harrison's Landing, General McClellan wrote to the President, on the 7th of July, the letter which he had obtained permission to w^rite. It is but fair to take his own account of the motives which actuated him in making this communication to the President. *' While General-in-Chief," he said in his report, " and directing the operations of all our armies in the field, I had become deeply impressed with the importance of adopting and carrying out certain views regarding the conduct of the war, which, in my judgment, were essential to its objects and success. During

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an active campaign of three months in the enemy's country, these were so fully confirmed that I conceived it a duty, in the critical position we then occupied, not to withhold a candid expression of the more important of these views from the Commander-in-Chief whom the Constitution places at the head of the armies and navies, as well as of the Government of the nation." This letter, conceived in this spirit and privately delivered into the President's own hands, is the one that has been so long misrepresented as a political manifesto of General McClellan, intended to promote his personal prospects for the next Presidency.

The letter having been completed and signed, General McClellan was about to intrust it to the hands of General Marcy, his chief of staff, who was going to Washington, for delivery to the President, when intelligence was unexpectedly received that the President was coming down to Harrison's Landing. He arrived on or about the 8th of July. General McClellan went on board the steamer to receive the President, and, after they had been together a short time in the cabin, McClellan placed his letter in the President's hands. Mr. Lincoln read it through, folded it up, and, with no comment save the two words '' All right," put it in his pocket. He remained at Harrison's Landing for forty-eight hours, in constant intercourse with McClellan of the most confidential nature, and never once alluded to this letter with either commendation, criticism, censure, or complaint.^ How this letter, never intended for publication as its context shows, came long afterward to be given to the newspaper press is not known. It was not done by General Mc- Clellan, or by his permission.

Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, Camp near Harrison's Landing, Virginia, July 7, 1862.

Mr. President : You have been duly informed that the rebel army is in our front, with the purpose of overwhelming us by attacking our positions, or reducing us by blocking our river communications. I can not but regard our condition as critical, and I earnestly desire, in view of possible contingencies, to lay before your Excellency, for your private consideration, my general views concerning the existing state of the rebellion, although they do not strictly relate to the situation of this army, or strictly come within the scope of my official duties. These views amount to convictions, and are deeply impressed on my mind and heart. Our cause must never be abandoned ;

* While Mr. Lincoln was on shore at Harrison's Landing, the soldiers exhibited no disposition to cheer him. In fact, the rank and file of the army received him very coldly. General McClellan caused the men to be told that the President should be cheered ; and then he was cheered, but not with the slightest enthusiasm. The men felt too deeply that the Government had left them to encounter terrible perils, without proper support ; and they also felt that, after all their exertions and endurance, they ought to be reinforced and allowed to resume the offensive for which they ardently longed.

it is the cause of free institutions and self-government. The Constitution and the Union must be preserved, whatever may be the cost in time, treasure, and blood. If secession is successful, other dissolutions are clearly to be seen in the future. Let neither military disaster, political faction, nor foreign war shake your settled purpose to enforce the equal operation of the laws of the United States upon the people of every State.

The time has come when the Government must determine upon a civil and military policy covering the whole ground of our national trouble. The responsibility of determining, declaring, and supporting such civil and military policy, and of directing the whole course of national affairs in regard to the rebellion, must now be assumed and exercised by you, or our cause will be lost. The Constitution gives you power sufficient even for the present terrible exigency.

This rebellion has assumed the character of a war ; as such it should be regarded, and it should be conducted upon the highest principles known to Christian civilization. It should not be a war looking to the subjugation of the people of any State, in any event. It should not be at all a war upon populations, but against armed forces and political organizations. Neither confiscation of property, political executions of persons, territorial organization of States, nor forcible abolition of slavery should be contemplated for a moment. In prosecuting the war, all private property and unarmed persons should be strictly protected, subject only to the necessity of military opera-

H tions. All private property taken for military use should be paid or receipted for; pillage and waste should be treated as high crimes ; all unnecessary trespass sternly prohibited, and offensive demeanor by the miUtary toward citizens promptly rebuked. Military arrests should not be tolerated, except in places where active hostilities exist, and oaths not required by enactments constitutionally made should be neither demanded nor received. Military government should be confined to the preservation of public order and the protection of political rights. Military power should not be allowed to interfere with the relations of servitude, either by supporting or impairing the authority of the master, except for repressing disorder, as in other cases. Slaves contraband under the act of Congress, seeking military protection, should receive it. The right of the Government to appropriate permanently to its own service claims to slave-labor should be asserted, and the right of the owner to compensation therefor should be recognized.

This principle might be extended, upon grounds of military necessity and security, to all the slaves within a particular State, thus working manumission in such State ; and in Missouri, perhaps in Western Virginia also, and possibly even in Maryland, the expediency of such a measure is only a question of time.

A system of policy thus constitutional and conservative, and pervaded by the influences of Christianity and freedom, would receive the support of almost all truly loyal men, would deeply impress the rebel masses and all foreign nations, and it might be humbly hoped that it would commend itself to the favor of the Almighty.

Unless the principles governing the future conduct of our struggle shall be made known and approved, the effort to obtain requisite forces will be almost hopeless. A declaration of radical views, especially upon slavery, will rapidly disintegrate our present armies.

The policy of the Government must be supported by concentrations of military power. The national forces should not be dispersed in expeditions, posts of occupation, and numerous armies, but should be mainly collected into masses, and brought to bear upon the armies of the Confederate States. Those armies thoroughly defeated, the political structure which they support would soon cease to exist.

In carrying out any system of policy which you may form, you will require a commander-in-chief of the army — one who possesses your confidence, understands your views, and who is competent to execute your orders by directing the military forces of the nation to the accomplishment of the objects by you proposed. I do not ask that place for myself. I am willing to serve you in such position as you may assign me, and I will do so as faithfully as ever subordinate served superior.

I may be on the brink of eternity, and, as I hope for forgiveness from my Maker, I have written this letter with sincerity toward you, and from love for my country.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. B. McClellan.

His Excellency, A. Lincoln, President.

l6 MCCLELLAN'S LAST SERVICE

The President returned to Washington, carrying with him General McClellan's letter, on or about the loth of July, undecided as to the future military operations. The dispatches which followed his return are very important. On the 12th McClellan telegraphed to him : *' 1 am more and more convinced that this army ought not to be withdrawn from here, but promptly re-enforced and thrown again upon Richmond. If we have little more than half a chance, we can take it. I dread the effects of any retreat upon the morale of my men." Again, on the 17th he telegraphed to the President ; " I have consulted fully with General Burnside, and would commend to your favorable consideration the general's plan for bringing seven additional regiments from North CaroHna, by leaving Newbern to the care of the gunboats. It appears manifestly to be our policy to concentrate here everything we can possibly spare from less important points, to make sure of crushing the enemy at Richmond, which seems clearly to be the most important point in rebeldom. Nothing should be left to chance here. I would recommend that General Burnside, with all his troops, be ordered to this army, to enable it to assume the offensive as soon as possible." On the i8th he repeated this advice, adding : '' Am anxious to have determination of Government, that no time may be lost in

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preparing for it. Hours are very precious now, and perfect unity of action necessary."

Ten days passed away, and still no decision had been made at Washington. On the 28th McClellan telegraphed to Halleck, the General-in-Chief : *' My opinion is more and more firm that here is the defense of Washington, and that I should be re-enforced at once by all available troops, to enable me to advance. Retreat would be disastrous to the army and the cause. I am confident of that." On the 30th he again telegraphed to Halleck : '' I hope it may soon be decided what is to be done by this army ; and that the decision may be to re-enforce it at once. We are losing much valuable time, and that at a moment when energy and decision are sadly needed."

We must pause here to explain that, at the time of this indecision on the part of the Government, the question was whether the enemy should be attacked by McClellan advancing on Richmond, and be thereby confined to the defense of his capital, or whether he should be allowed to advance on Washington by way of Fredericksburg, thus compelling the Federal Government to defend their capital. As a military question, considering the comparative advantages of attack and defense, and the dangers that would follow from a defeat of the Federal forces in the front of Washington, there was not much room for doubt. If McClellan were to be re-enforced and ordered to attack Richmond, the troops of the Confederates would have to be concentrated for its defense. If McClellan had been defeated in this attempt, his defeat must have cost the enemy so much that he could hardly have been in a condition to seriously menace Washington before a sufficient force could have been interposed for its defense. McClellan, be it observed, did not ask for all the forces that were at the disposal of his Government ; he asked for all that were " available," which he explained to mean " everything that we can possibly spare from less important points " — a meaning that the military authorities in Washington must have understood. On the other hand, if McClellan's army were to be withdrawn from the James, the enemy would be practically invited to advance on Washington ; and, if he should defeat the Federal armies gathered in front of that capital, it would be in a great peril. A vast deal, too, would depend upon the commander who was to be intrusted with the defense of Washington, in case the Army of the Potomac should be withdrawn from the James, thus encouraging the enemy to stake his utmost efforts upon a great battle, or a series of battles, in front of the Federal capital. At the time when this momentous decision was to be made by our Government, they contemplated a reliance upon General Pope to encounter General Lee ; and to encounter Lee, not after he had been crippled by a previous contest with McClellan, but in the full strength which would remain to him without that contest. It is impossible, therefore, to read McClellan's dispatches at this period of the President's indecision, without being impressed by the conviction that McClellan was right in his military judgment, even if we do not look forward to what actually followed. The elements for a sound determination were as patent to the authorities in Washington, between the loth of July and the 6th of August, as they were to McClellan. But, unfortunately, other counsels prevailed over his.

Between the 30th of July and the 3d of August the enemy made some attempts to feel McClellan's position, by demonstrations with hght batteries, but they were driven back toward Petersburg, and Coggin's Point, on the south side of the James, was occupied on the same day by McClellan, and fortified. On that day also he sent forward a force of cavalry on the south side of the river, which drove back a body of five hundred of the enemy's cavalry in confusion. His whole position on the James was now therefore secure, and he was in a condition to advance, if he could have Burnside, whom he again asked for on the 2d of August. '' Give me Burnside," he telegraphed to Halleck, " and I will stir these people up."

On the 30th of July the Government was apparently still undecided, but, from the tenor of Halleck's dispatches of that day and the next, McClellan had some reason to expect orders to advance on Richmond. Thus on the 30th Halleck sent two dispatches. The first said: ''A dispatch just received from General Pope says that deserters report that the enemy is moving south of James River, and that the force in Richmond is very small. I suggest that he be pressed in that direction, so as to ascertain the facts of the case." But again, on the 30th, Halleck telegraphed, rather ambiguously : '' In order to enable you to move in any direction, it is necessary to relieve you of your sick. The Surgeon-General has therefore been directed to make arrangements for them at other places, and the Quartermaster-General to provide transportation. I hope you will send them away as quickly as possible, and advise me of their removal." And, on the 31st, Halleck telegraphed, "General Pope again telegraphs that the enemy is reported to be evacuating Richmond, and falling back on Danville and Lynchburg." These were the only data Mc- Clellan then had, from which to form an opinion as to the intentions of the Government. They had, in fact, at this time, no fixed intentions, but the dispatches looked as if McClellan might be allowed to advance.

On the 4th of August, General Hooker, by General McClellan's orders, advanced with a large force to Malvern Hill, a strong position of the Confederates fourteen and three quarter miles distant from Richmond, and drove the forces of the enemy back toward New Market. Malvern Hill controlled the direct approach to Richmond. It was equally necessary to occupy it, for a time, whether Richmond was to be attacked by McClellan from the James, or whether he was to be ordered to abandon the Peninsula. On the 5th McClellan was himself at Malvern Hill, and thence he telegraphed to Halleck at I p. M. : " This is a very advantageous position to cover an advance on Richmond, and only fourteen and three quarter miles distant, and I feel confident that, with re-enforcements, I could march this army there in five days." To this there came the answer from Halleck, on the 6th, '' I have no re-enforcements to send you."

The correspondence at this time shows the utmost impatience on the part of Halleck to have the retrograde movement begin, and the utmost exertions of McClellan to comply with his orders. By day and by night McClellan carried on his operations for the removal of the sick by all the means of transportation at his command. On the subject of the withdrawal of the army, it is necessary to follow this correspondence carefully. The determination of the Government to withdraw the army from the Peninsula was made known by a telegram which Halleck sent on the 3d and which McClellan received on the 4th. In this dispatch Halleck said : " You will take immediate measures to effect this, covering the movement the best you can. Its real object and withdrawal should be concealed even from your own officers. Your materiel and transportation should be removed first. You will assume control of all the means of transportation within your reach, and apply to the naval forces for all the assistance they can render you. . . . The entire execution of the movement is left to your discretion."

" I proceeded," says McClellan, " to obey this order with all possible rapidity, firmly impressed, however, with the conviction that the withdrawal of the Army of the Potomac from Harrison's Landing, where its communications had, by the co-operation of the gunboats, been rendered perfectly secure, would at that time have the most disastrous effect upon our cause. I did not, as the commander of that army, allow the occasion to pass without distinctly setting forth my views upon the subject to the authorities." The very impressive dispatch in which McClellan, on the 4th, placed before the

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General-in-Chief the whole of the military argument against the order for the removal of his army is too lengthy to be quoted in full, but it was remarkable for the cogency of its reasoning and the simple earnestness of its tone. It reads now like prophecy, but like the prophecy of one who was too sincerely anxious for the success of the cause to be gratified in the end by the fulfillment of his predictions. Yet he did not refrain, as a patriot should not have refrained, from letting the Government understand plainly what he plainly foresaw. " Your telegram of last evening," he said to Halleck, " is received. I must confess that it has caused me the greatest pain I ever experienced, for I am convinced that the order to withdraw this army to Aquia Creek will prove disastrous to our cause. I fear it will be a fatal blow. Several days are necessary to complete the preparations for so important a movement as this, and while they are in progress I beg that careful consideration may be given to my statements." He then enters into the argument, showing that, with his army then in excellent discipline and condition, he was only twenty-five miles from Richmond, and that the gunboats could supply the army by water during its advance to within twelve miles of that capital, whereas the result of the retrograde movement that had been ordered would be a march of one hundred and forty-five miles to reach the same point, and without the aid of the gunboats and water transportation * He then concludes as follows :

Add to this the certain demoralization of this army which would ensue, the terribly depressing effect upon the people of the North, and the strong probabiUty that it would influence foreign powers to recognize our adversaries, and there appear to me sufficient reasons to make it my imperative duty to urge, in the strongest terms afforded by our language, that this order may be rescinded, and that, far from recalling this army, it be promptly reinforced to enable it to assume the offensive.

It may be said that there are no re-enforcements available. I point to Burnside's force ; to that of Pope, not necessary to maintain a strict defensive in front of Washington and Harper's Ferry ; to those portions of the Army of the West not required for a strict defensive there. Here, directly in front of this army, is the heart of the rebellion; it is here that all our resources should be collected to strike the blow which will determine the fate of the nation. All points of secondary importance elsewhere should be abandoned, and every available man brought here. A decided victory here, and the military strength of the rebelUon is crushed ; it matters not what partial reverses we may meet with elsewhere. Here is the true de-

* Aquia Creek would be seventy-five miles from Richmond, with only land transportation all the way. From Harrison's Landing to Fortress Monroe would be a land march of seventy miles.

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fense of Washington ; it is here, on the banks of the James, that the fate of the Union should be decided.

Clear in my convictions of right, strong in the consciousness that I have ever been, and still am, actuated solely by love of my country, knowing that no ambitious or selfish motives have influenced me from the commencement of this war, I do now, what I never did in my life before — I entreat that this order may be rescinded.