Sensation and intellection, their character and their function in the cognition of the real and the ideal

Front matter

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BOOK I. Analysis of Sensation and Intellection - - 9-95

PART I —Historical Review - - - 11-42 Chapter I. — Preliminary Outline - - 11-13 Chapter II— The Nature of Intellection 11-21 Chapter III.— Tub Sensational Theory

of Sensation 22-32

Chapter IV.— The Component Theory of

Sensation - 33-37

Chapter V.— The Correlative Theory

of Sensation - 38-42

Chapter II— The Ideal- Real - - 160-1 Index 162-4

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS.

The ambiguous use of technical terms is a great hindrance to the advance of any science, and psychology seems to suffer more in this respect than any other. Dr. Ward, in his article in the.Ency. Brit., puts it none too strongly when he says that "it seems to be the fate of this science to be restricted in its terminology to the illdefined and well-worn currency of common speech, with which every psychologist feels at liberty to do what seems right in his own eyes, at least within the wide range which a loose connotation allows.'' In no case is this ambiguity greater or more confusing than in the use of the term sensation. Sensation and intellection are fundamental characteristics of every stage, process, or content of human consciousness ; yet the definition of neither can be found clearly stated in psychological literature. The necessity of precise definitions has, of course, been recognized, and repeated attempts have been made to give them ; but the definitions have varied with each successive writer, who has generally, since the time of Locke, restricted the scope of the term sensation and broadened that of intellection. In this way the term sensation has been successively narrowed in meaning from Berkeley's sweeping inclusion of "the sun, moon, and stars, and every other object of the senses," down through Hamilton's "subject-object" and J. S. Mill's "signs of Permanent Possibilities," to Herbert Spencer's unconscious "nervous shock," or "ultimate unit of consciousness." And finally, T. H. Green argues that neither sensation nor intellection can have any meaning taken separately ; but that, on the contrary, they are "inseparable and mutually dependent," and "each in its full reality includes the other."

The term sensation being still used in many of these different senses, it becomes highly important to determine the number of essentially different views held concerning its nature, and the relation of these views to one another. In analyzing the nature and relation of sensation and intellection, it is necessary to discuss the relation of the relative and the absolute to the ideal and the real; and in setting forth their functions, it is necessary to set forth the distinction between the ideal and the real, in order to show either the correspondence of the primary sub-divisions of each to the fundamental intellectual faculties, or the function of each of these faculties in cognition. Book I. of this thesis gives an analysis of sensation and intellection, defines each, and determines the relation of each to the other and to consciousness as a whole. Book II. discusses the distinction between the ideal and the real, the correspondence of the primary subdivisions of each to the fundamental intellectual, faculties, and the function of sensation and intellection in the cognition of each.

BOOK I.

Analysis of Sensation and Intellection.

PART I.

Historical Review.

CHAPTER I.

Preliminary Outline.

The attempt to distinguish between intellect and sense grew out of efforts to discover and explain the relation between identity and change. In all efforts to explain change by referring it as an effect to some fixed identity as a cause, there has been a general tendenc}' to refer change as phenomenal, wholly or in part, to an origin in the consciousness of the perceiving subject; and this reference is the basis of most theories regarding the nature of sensation. On the other hand, the fixed identit/y, which is supposed to be causally related to change, is usually postulated as a substance existing independent of consciousness; and the faculty hy which this is cognized is termed intellect, the function of which is intellection. While this association of sense with the perception of change and of intellect with the cosrnition of identitv has formed the basis of all distinctions between sensation and intellection, the real nature of this distinction seems never to have been clearly stated.

Parmenides appears to have been the first to distinguish between reason and sense. He regarded reason as the source of the knowledge of reality, and sense as the source of the illusory appearance of change. Plato further emphasized the distinction made by Parmenides, giving to intellectual cognition the name yvdtats and to sense-perception the name tfiirihqets, Aristotle restored unity to these divorced aspects of sentience by making them supplementary factors of one process, instead of two conflicting processes. Since Aristotle's time, philosophers have generally overlooked the correlative nature of these two aspects of consciousness, and represented them as two separate activities. By some writers they have been represented as of equal importance; and b} r others each has been represented as of sole importance. The distinction between intellectual perception and sense-perception, however, has gradually been changed into a distinction between intellect and sense, and this again into a distinction between intellection and sensation. In tracing the history of the distinctions made between these two contrasted terms it will be both easier and clearer to follow in connected sequence the treatment of each separately. It will also be much clearer to trace fully the history of each, before giving a critical analysis of the same, than it would to mingle history and criticism together. In order clearly to set forth the correlative theory of sensation it is necessary first to analyze the nature of intellection, hence the two terms, sensation and intellection, will be treated in an order the reverse of that in which they appear in the title.

The names of the writers most prominently associated with the treatment of intellection are Descartes, Geulincx, Malebranche, Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, and Herbart; and the treatment of the subject by them in successive order has been that of a continuous development. The treatment of sensation, on the other hand, is marked by the development of three essentially different views. The first theory developed identifies sense-perception, either entirely or in part, with sensation; and hence may appropriately be called the Sensational Theory. It has appeared in three distinct forms. The first form, which identifies sense-perception in its entirety with sensation, was supported by Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley and Hume. The second form, which identified sensation with a sub-division of sense-perception, the peiception of so-called svibjective percepts, has been supported by many writers, prominent among whom are Reid, Hamilton, J. S. Mill, Lotze, Murray and Sully. The third form, which identifies sensation with the incipient stages of sense-perception, originated with Fichte; but has been re-

PRELIMINARY OUTLINE. 13

cently supported by Ward and James. The second theory developed reduces sensation to the subordinate rank of a component element in sense-perception; and hence may appropriately be called the Component Theory. It has appeared in two distinct forms. The first form, which reduced sensation to the formless matter of sense-perception, originated with Kant and was supported by Reinhold. The second form, which regards sensations as ultimate units of consciousness, separately unconscious, has been supported by many writers, conspicuous!}' by Spencer, Lewes, and Fick. The third theory, the last to be developed, has never been definitely formulated; but as it denies any separate existence to either sensation or intellection and claims that each includes the other, it may appropriately be called the Correlative Theory. It originated with Green, has been more fully developed by Dewey, and is supported by Ladd. Each of these three principal theories will be made the subject of a separate chapter in both the historical review and the critical analvsis of sensation.

CHAPTER II.

The Nature of Intellection.

Modern writers, as was stated on p. 7, have shown a general tendency to widen the meaning of the term intellection at the expense of the term sensation, yet different theories of the former, corresponding to those of the latter, have not appeared. In fact, intellection seems never to have been precisely defined by psychologists. It has been alluded to, on p. 11, as the funcion of the intellect; but just what this function is, can best be shown after both intellection and sensation have been analyzed, since the distinction between the two enters into the definition of each. In general, however, intellection may be said to include the fundamental principles of finite knowledge, the primary laws resting upon them, and the universal processes of thought governed by these laws. The disclosure of these principles, laws and processes has progressed from the particular to the general; and hence it will be easier to analyze and define them in their historical order.

Socrates led the way in the discovery that universal processes of thought dominate every individual consciousness in every field of thought. Before his time such processes had been recognized in the subject of mathematics, but he disclosed their presence also in the defining of concepts and in the field of morals.

Plato made the first attempt to systematize universal processes of thought, and to set forth their relations to objects of sense. But inasmuch as he regarded change as belonging to the individual objects of sense-perception, he held all universals to be unchangeable entities existing independent of consciousness; and hence his system of ideas, although each was supposed to sustain a generic relation to a multitude of sensible objects, were indefinable and incapable either of enumeration or of classification among themselves. Had Plato understood the nature of his problem, had he realized that he was dealing with universal processes of thought instead of unchangeable things, he doubtless would have perceived that the universal aspect of consciousness, or intellect, could have no meaning or existence except in connection with the variable aspect, or sense. But failing to perceive this, he discarded sense-perception as deceptive; and thus reduced universal processes of thought to mere abstractions, and rendered the classification of sense-objects meaningless.

Aristotle again restored unity to consciousness by uniting the functions of sense and intellect in every activity of thought. This enabled him to systematize a classification of generic and specific names for objects of sense and to adapt this classification to the variable inductions of individual experience.

Another advance which he made upon Plato was his definite enumeration of the categories, or universal processes of thought. And his distinct recognition, in opposition to Plato, of the validity of the data of sense-perception, further showed itself in the fact that his list of categories, viz., substance, quantity, quality, relation, where, when, action, passion and possession, includes several in which the sensational element is prominent.

A third and most important advance made by Aristotle was the formulation of the law of identity and contradiction. From the fact that his system of classification was perfectly adapted both to sense-objects and to the quantitative relations of pure-mathematics, and from the further fact that the law of identity and contradiction applied equally to both, Aristotle failed to distinguish between empirical and a priori judgments. This necessarily led him somewhat astray in regard to both. His treatment of a judgment as the inclusion of a minor term in a major does not strictly appb r to inductions of experience; and, on the other hand, the law of identity and contradiction applies to a priori judgments onry when they express mathematical relations.

Descartes, in modern times, took a more advanced position, when he made the conscious ego the basis of all certitude in thought. This makes the conscious self a correlate of every object of thought; yet Descartes so far failed to see this that he set up an antithesis of spirit and matter, making thought an attribute of spirit, and extension an attribute of matter independent of thought. From Descartes' classification of ideas into fictse, adventitial, and innatia?, the theory of innate ideas originated; and in this theory the categories assumed the character of innate ideas.

Geulincx, in his doctrine of occasionalism, caught obscurely an important principle, which is an advance upon Aristotle's reference of all phenomena to an origin in an unmoved cause of motion. This advance consisted in making human consciousness an intermediate «agency between infinite consciousness and the origin of phenomena. Geulincx, however, reversed the true logical order by representing human consciousness as the originating source, and infinite consciousness as the medium of expression.

Malebranche corrects this position in two respects. He made human consciousness intermediate between infinite consciousness and phenomena, and he also represented the manifestations of conscious activity as governed b\ r fixed laws instead of by occasional impulses.

Spinoza showed bv his method of reasoning from the finite to the infinite that he consciously transcended the law of identity and contradiction, and grasped the principles underlying two other primary laws of thought, one governing the use of strict correlatives, and the other restricting the application of categories when they come into mutual conflict. His conception of the infinite was incompatible with his conception of an efficient cause, for the latter implied and the former precluded temporal limitations. Spinoza therefore discarded the category of cansalit\ T , and reasoned to the infinite from the finite through the principle of correlativity. Had he, however, comprehended the nature of this correlation, as affected by Des^ cartes' reference of all objects of thought to the conscious ego as a correlate, he never would have made thought an attribute of substance, but would have made substance a category of thought.

Leibniz did philosophy a great service by counteracting the pantheistic tendency which Spinoza's doctrine of substance had given it. Having rejected Spinoza's conclusion, Leibniz naturally rejected his method of reasoning also; but feeling the inadequacy of the principle of causality, he sought a better one in what he termed the "principle of sufficient reason," "principium rationis sufficientis." This principle has never been defined otherwise than as "necessity in thought;" but as necessity in thought comes only through the law of identity or the law of correlation, it must come under one of these laws. As the principle of sufficient reason is usually employed, it is the same as that of correlativity. Leibniz' monadology, although full of inconsistencies, has done much to maintain the view that finite consciousness is characterized by individuality and spontaneity^.

Contemporaneous with this last group of writers, to whom we are greath^ indebted for the elucidation of the principles of intellection, was a class of sensational writers, whose work, even though it held to the principle "Nihil est in intellectu quod non ante fuerit in sensn" greatly helped to bring to the front the laws and principles of intellection. Thus, Locke really rendered an important service to the intellectualists by his polemic against innate ideas. Hume's challenge concerning the principle of causality but forced them to a new and an important advance. From the sensational standpoint, the category of causality must either come through the senses or be an illusory fiction ; yet Hume proved that it could not come through the senses. The intellectualists then had to give a satisfactory account of it, or surrender it as illusorv. To surrender it was to surrender all claim to either science or philosophy. Hume's challenge met a master intellect in Kant, who not only gave a satisfactory account of the origin of the category of causality, but also disclosed the fundamental fallacies of sensationalism.

Kant successfully terminated the long-continued effort to discover the origin of necessary ideas, by showing that they are the product of universal processes of thought. Profiting by Locke's polemic against innate ideas, he states that "they admit, if separated from sensibility, of no use at all ; that is, they cannot be applied to any possible object, and are nothing but the pure form of the use of the understanding with reference to objects in general." 1 In answer to Hume's sensationalism, he shows that all experience must be organically related to a "unit\- of apperception;" and that this organic unification requires, possesses, and discloses universal and invariable processes of thought. These universal processes of thought are the categories, with the use of which he connected "the concept, or, if the term be preferred, the judgment, ' I think,' " which he styled "the vehicle of all concepts in general."- That Kant failed, however, to perceive the correlative nature of the categories is shown by his agreement with Aristotle on the application of the law of contradiction, by his first two groups of categories, and D3 r his antinomies of pure reason. But that he perceived the necessity for some limitation of the categories when they came into mutual conflict, is shown by his doctrine of phenomena and noumena.

Fichte brought to attention the correlative nature of the universal processes of thought by showing that a category is a s\mthesis of two correlative opposites, and that each correlate included as well as excluded the other. He failed, however, to perceive the full force of the correlative principle, and represented a pair of correlates as inclusive onh* in part and as exclusive only in so far as they were not inclusive. This is shown in his treatment of

1 "Critique of Pure Reason," Max Mueller's Translation, p. "JIG.

limitation. Instead of reconciling the ego and the non-ego in a correlative unity, he reduced the non-ego to a mere limitation of the ego ; and since Kant had disclosed the universal aspect of all processes of thought, Fichte sublated the non-ego in the ego, and the individual^ of the ego in its universality, and so ended with a universal pantheism of an idealistic nature.

He thus confused the principle of correlativity, which underlies the law of correlation, with the principle of relativity, which underlies the law of contradiction. In accordance with the law of contradiction, all sense objects and all quantitative terms of pure mathematics can be classified into genera and species, each genus including several mutually excluding species. But neither the inclusion nor the exclusion of a pair of correlates under the law of correlation is of this quantitative nature. This can be illustrated by means of a line drawn, for instance, north and south. In accordance with the law of contradiction, the two ends may be said each to include half of the line, and both to mutually exclude each other. In accordance with the law of correlation, however, neither the inclusion nor the exclusion has a quantitative signification ; but the mutually including and excluding terms are simply opposed aspects of a unit}', which is quantitatively indivisible in so far as it is characterized by these terms. Thus, if the north half of the line were erased there would still remain a line with both a north end and a south end ; and if the erasing were continued, this would remain true until the line wholly disappeared, when the correlative aspects would vanish together. Applying this illustration to the relation of the ego and the non-ego ; it will be seen that the two are, not quantitative divisions, but correlative aspects of finite consciousness; and that while each, from a separate point of view, excludes the other, both are mutually dependent and inseparable aspects of an indivisible unity.

Schelling, realizing Fichte's failure correctly to set forth the principle of correlative, attempted to remedy the error by reducing the opposition between correlative opposites to a complete indifference. But his total indifference of subject and object, which received the name of "System of Identity," instead of explaining the principle of correlativity, annihilated it.

Hegel set forth the principle of correlativity in its true nature, except that, instead of representing each category as a unit}' of two correlates, he included a transitional mean between them, and thus grouped his categories in threes. In applying the principle of correlativity to his doctrine of the absolute, Hegel very naturally carried it too far, and held "that the Absolute, or Reason, is the unity of subjectivit/y and objectivity;" 1 also "that the common consciousness can demand that a ladder be furnished it upon which it can ascend to the absolute standpoint." 2 These statements violate the law of thought which governs the use of categories when they come into mutual conflict, as they do when applied to the infinite. Finite reason may properh' be called the "unity of subjectivity and objectivity"; but absolute reason transcends such qualifications, except as they refer, not to the infinite in itself, but merely to the aspects which it assumes in finite cognition. Again, while "the common consciousness can" comprehend the correlative relation of the finite to the infinite, it never "can ascend to the absolute standpoint."

Herbart perceived the nature of this law governing the mutual conflict of categories, and also Hegel's violation of it; but instead of formulating the law and defining the principle on which it rests, he meiely indicated its nature hy referring to all conflicting aspects of the infinite as "accidental views" (Erdmann), or "contingent aspects" (Schwegler). Had Herbart accepted Hegel's principle of correlativity and modified his doctrine of "accidental views" accordingly, he might have made a great advance; but in rejecting the principle of correlativity and in applying the law of contradiction to all processes of

1 Erdmann's His. of Phil., Vol. II, p. 687.

THE NATURE OF INTELLECTION.

doctrine of "reals'

pi;

thought, he reduced 1 abstractions.

A summary of the analysis of intellection gives two fundamental principles determining the character of finite knowledge, and three primary laws governing the processes of thought. The principle first disclosed is that of relativity, which has taken two distinct forms underlying two corresponding laws of thought, the law of contradiction, which was formulated b} 7 Aristotle, and the law r of mutual limitation, which was developed by Herbartbut not formulated by him. The second principle is that of correlativity, underlying the law of correlation. This principle was disclosed by Fichte and developed by Hegel, but the law resting upon it has never been formulated. The deduction and definition of the universal processes of thought can best be given in the critical analysis of intellection, after various attempts at their deduction have been criticised; also, the further definition of the fundamental principles of knowledge and the corresponding primary laws of thought can best be given after the categories have been defined and classified.

CHAPTER III. Sensational Theory of Sensation

§1. Sensation as Sense-Perception. — This view originated with Hobbes, was formulated by Locke, and was supported by Berkeley and Hume. Hume, however, restricted the definition of sensation slightly, and so led the way to the second form of this theory.

Hobbes defines sense as follows: — "Concerning the thoughts of man, I will consider them first singly, and afterwards in train, or dependence upon one another. Singly, they are everyone a representative or appearance, of some quality, or other accident of a body without us; which is commonly called an object. Which object worketh on the eves, ears, and other parts of man's body; and by diversity of workings, produceth diversity of appearances. * * * The original of them all, is that which we call sense (For there is no conception in man's mind, which hath not at first, totally, or by parts, been begotten upon the organs of sense.); the rest are derived from that original. * * * The cause of sense, is the external body, or object, which presseth the organ proper to each sense, either immediately, as in taste and touch; or mediately, as in seeing, hearing, and smelling; which pressure, by the mediation of nerves, and other strings, and membranes of the body, continued inwards to the brain, and heart, causeth there a resistence, or counter-pressure, or endeavour of the heart to deliver itself; which endeavour, because outward, seemeth to be somematter without. And this seeming, or fancy, is that which men call sense. * * * But when we would express the decay, and signify that the sense is fading, old, and past, it is called memory.

So that imagination and memory, are but one thing, which for divers considerations hath divers names." 1

Locke defines sensation, and distinguishes between it and reflection, as follows: — "First, our senses, conversant about particular sensible objects, do convey into the mind several distinct perceptions of things, according to those various ways wherein those objects do affect them. And thus we come by those ideas we have of yellow, white, heat, cold, soft, hard, bitter, sweet, and all those which we call sensible qualities; which when I say the senses convey into the mind, I mean, they from external objects convey into the mind what produces there those perceptions. This great source of most of the ideas we have, depending wholly upon our senses, and derived by them to the understanding, I call sensation. * * * Secondly, the other fountain, from which experience furnisheth the understanding with ideas, is the perception of the operations of our own minds within us, as it is employed about the ideas it has got ;which operations, when the soul comes to reflect on and consider, do furnish the understanding with another set of ideas, which could not be had from things without; and such are perception, thinking; doubting, believing, reasoning, knowing, willing, and all the different actings of our own minds; which we being conscious of, and observing in ourselves, do from these receive into our understanding as distinct ideas, as we do from bodies affecting our senses. This source of ideas every man has wholly in himself; and though it be not sense, as having nothing to do with external objects, yet is very like it, and might properly enough be called internal sense. But as I call the other sensation, so I call this reflection, the ideas it affords being such only as the the mind gets by reflecting on its own operations within itself."

Berkeley agreed with Locke in identifying sensation with sense-perception; but he tried, by representing sensation as an active function of the mind, to avoid the absurdity of representing extended objects as being im-

1 "The Leviathan." Part I, Chapters I and II.

2 "Essay Concerning Human Understanding." Book II, Chap. I, §§ 3 and 4.

pressed upon the non-extended mind in sense-perception. His great mistake consisted in overlooking tKe distinction between the individual variability- of sensation and the universal invariability- of intellection. Berkeley reduced all knowledge to a sensational basis, and thus virtually committed philosophy- to the scepticism disclosed by Hume. Berkeley 's views are clearly expressed in the following quotations: "Did men but consider that the sun, moon, and stars, and every other object of the senses, are only so many sensations in their minds, which have no other existence but barely being perceived, doubtless they would never fall down and worship their own ideas; but rather address their homage to that eternal invisible Mind which produces and sustains all things." 1 "In short, let any one consider those arguments, which are thought manifesth- to prove that colours and tastes exist only in the mind, and he shall find they may with equal force, be brought to prove the same thing of extension, figure, and motion." 2

Hume states this view of sensation in the following words: "All the perceptions of the human mind resolve themselves into two distinct kinds, which I shall call impressions and ideas. The difference betwixt these consists in the degrees of force and liveliness, with which they strike upon the mind, and make their way into our thought or consciousness. Those perceptions which enter with the most force and violence, we may name impressions; and under this name, I comprehend all our sensations, passions and emotions, as they make their first appearance in the soul. By ideas I mean the faint images of these in thinking and reasoning ; such as, for instance, are all the perceptions excited by the present discourse, excepting only those which arise from the sight and touch, and excepting the immediate pleasure or uneasiness it may occasion." 3 "Impressions may be divided into two kinds, those of sensation and those of reflection. The

1 "Principles of Human Knowledge," Part I., Sec. 94.

3 "Treatise on Human Nature," Green & Grose's Ed. p. 311.

first kind arises in the soul originally, from unknown causes. The second is derived in a great measure from our ideas, and that in the following order. An impression first strikes upon the senses, and makes us perceive heat or cold, thirst or hunger, pleasure or pain of some kind or other. Of this impression there is a copy taken by the mind, which remains after the impression ceases; and this we call an idea. This idea of pleasure or pain, when it returns upon the soul, produces the new impressions of desire and aversion, hope and fear, which may properly be called impressions of reflection, because derived from it." 1 "As to those impressions, which arise from the senses, their ultimate cause is, in my opinion, perfectly inexplicable by human reason, and 'twill always be impossible to decide with certainty, whether they arise immediately from the object, or are produced by the creative power of the mind, or are derived from the author of our being." -

§2. Sensations as Subjective Affections. — Thomas Reid originated the view which identifies sensation with sense-perception, when the latter is regarded as a mere affection of the perceiving subject abstracted from all reference to physical causes. The following are his own statements: — " Sensation is a name given by philosophers to an act of mind, which may be distinguished from all others by this, that it hath no object distinct from the act itself. Pain of every kind is an uneasy sensation. " 3 "Almost all our perceptions have corresponding sensations which constantly accompany them, and, on that account, are very apt to be confounded with them. * * * Hence it happens, that a quality perceived, and the sensation corresponding to that perception, often go under the same name. This makes the names of most of our sensations ambiguous. * When I smell a rose, there is in this operation both sensation and perception. The agreeable odor I feel, considered by itself, without relation to any external