Herbert Spencer and his critics

Preface

The character of this work, so far as it consists of extracts from the writings of others, will be seen from the following letter from one who is well known in the literary world, and who himself maintained a discussion with Mr. Spencer, carried on on both sides with great brilliancy and power:

38 Westbourne Terrace, London, W.,

Fernhurst, Sussex, Aug. 20, 1898.

Dear Sir: 1 beg to thank you for your courtesy in forwarding to me the series of papers in the Boston- Investigator, which I should have acknowledged much sooner but for the fact that it was sent to the publishers whilst I was away from home and about the country.

The extracts you have so carefully prepared seem to me to have been made with great accuracy and intelligence, and I think they should be satisfactory to Mr. Spencer, as they are to myself.

I am yours faithfully,

Frederic Harrison.

Interspersed with and following the extracts here referred to, the author has made criticisms of his own, which, it is hoped, will at least ba found worthy of thoughtful consideration.

Contents

PAGE

Chapter I.. ..The New Philosophy — Doctrine of the Unknowable 1 " II.. ..The New Philosophy continued — Doctrine of the Knowable 8

" III.. ..The New Philosophy continued- Doctrine of Evolution 12

" IV.... The New Philosophy continued- Spencers Biology 20

" V.. ..The New Philosophy continued — Spencer's Psychology 27

" VI.. ..The New Philosophy continued- Subjective Psychology 34

" VII. ..The New Philosophy continued- Spencer's Sociology 41

" VIII.. ..The New Philosophy continued- Principles of Ethics— Work on Education— Essays, etc 49

" IX.. ..Criticism by Malcolm Guthrie 58

u X... .Spencer and John Stuart Mill 66

M XI... Spencer and Frederic Harrison 72

•' XII... .Criticisms and Eulogiums— Watson— Bowne— Robertson 80

" XIII.... Criticisms continued— Mansel— Caird — Hodgson — Max Mueller— Sidgwick— James Martineau — Moulton — Professor Green 87

" XIV.. ..Criticisms continued— Mears, Atwater— Wynn— Stebbins— Alger 94

u XV.. ..Criticisms continued— Bascom— Lilly— Barry— The Quarterly — Fairbairn 101

PAGE

Chap. XVI... .Criticisms continued — Review by

Orestes A. Brownson 108

" XVII... .Criticisms by Professor Birks and

Mons. Littre* 114

" XVI1L... Criticisms concluded- Wilfred Ward —St. George Mivart— A. J. Bal four 121

" XIX.. ..Space and Time— Consciousness 128

XX.. ..The Unknowable.— First Cause 137

" XXL. ..Doctrine of the Unknowable— Creation— Atheism— Agnosticism 144

" XXII.... Doctrine of the Unknowable— Dim

or Vague Consciousness 153

" XXIII.. ..Doctrine of the Unknowable— Antithesis of Thought 161

11 XXIV. . . Doctrine of the Unknowable— Idealism 169

" XXV.. ..Reconciliation between Science and

Religion 177

INDEX OF AUTHORS

Alger, W. R., 99, 100.

Atwater, T. H., 96.

181.

Barry, Wm., 103,104.

Bascom, John, Dr., 101,102.

Berkeley, Bishop, 36, 174.

Bowne, B. P., 80-84.

113, 148.

Caird, Principal, 88.

Comte, Auguste, 9, 56, 70,

Cousin, 81, 82, 165.

Darwin, Charles, 97, 121.

Descartes, 83.

Fiske, John, Prof., 97, 183.

Green, Prof., 93.

Guthrie, Malcolm, 58-65.

Hamilton, Sir Wm., 64, 82,

Hume, David, 36, 174.

Kant, Emanuel, 89, 90.

Kepler, 17.

Larousse, 63.

Lilly, W. S., 102, 103.

Locke, 90.

Malebranche, 144, 146.

Mansel, Henry L., 87, 88,

148, 149, 163.

Mivart, St. George, 122, 123.

Moulton, J. F., 92, 93.

Mueller, Max, 90.

Newton, 68.

Pestalozzi, 54.

Quarterly, The, writer in,

104, 105.

Robertson, John M., 84-86.

Scaliger, 159.

Stebbins, Rufus P., 99.

Tyndall, John, 11.

Voltaire, 83, 84, 163.

Von Baer, 24.

Ward, Wilfred, 121,122.

Watson, R. A., 80.

Whewell, Dr., 67.

Youmans, Prof., 79, 97.

CHAPTER I.

THE NEW PHILOSOPHY — DOCTRINE OF THE UN- KNOWABLE.

No writer of the Nineteenth Century has had greater influence in the world of thought than Herbert Spencer. At the same time no one has been more severely and unsparingly criticised.

These criticisms, with his replies, have exhibited an intellectual gladiatorship such as has seldom been witnessed; one which has had the effect to arouse discussion and to stimulate thought and inquiry all along the lines of his philosophy. His works are now complete. The labors of a life-time have been brought to a close.

Spencer, as a scientist, is one of the deepest thinkers and one of the ablest and most forcible writers of this or any other age. As a scientist, studying the laws of Nature, and tracing those laws in the changing phenomena of the universe, his greatness will be acknowledged by all. But his ambition had a broader scope. He aspired to co-ordinate and combine science with philosophy; not merely with that positive or

2 practical philosophy which consists of the highest generalizations of science, but with metaphysical and speculative philosophy as well. Through such co-ordination and combination, he not only sought to unify all knowledge, but, confessedly going beyond the boundaries of science—venturing into unknown regions — he undertook to establish unknowable existence.

Nor did he stop here. This combined system of philosophical science he now essayed to co-ordinate and combine with theology. His doctrine of the Unknowable he himself calls a "rnetaphysico-theological doctrine." Proposing to identify the unknowable of science and philosophy with the highest conception of Deity, he attempted a reconciliation between science and religion.

To this vast scheme — this combined system of science, philosophy, metaphysics and theology, he gave the name of

THE NEW PHILOSOPHY.

So far as the system is new — so far as it is a departure from the landmarks hitherto established in the fields of science and philosophy — it has undergone the critical examination of many thinkers, and must still be subjected to the crucial test of the sober second thought. It is worthy of note that some of the most trenchant criticisms have been on the speculative side of the New Philosophy. That they have not all been without effect, has been made manifest by

3 such occasional change in the text of Mr. Spencer's works as seemed necessary.

In this work I purpose, first, to give a brief but complete view of the New Philosophy; secondly, to state the salient points of the principal criticisms which have been made upon it; giving such extracts as may best elucidate the points made; and finally, to examine the doctrine of the Unknowable ; especially in reference to the claim that is made, that this doctrine is sufficient to effect a reconciliation between science and religion.

THE SPENCERIAN PHILOSOPHY.

In giving a synopsis of the New Philosophy, let us commence with that which, by the author himself, is ever put foremost:

DOCTRINE OF THE UNKNOWABLE.

The Unknowable of Spencer is not the mere negation of the knowable. He posits the absolute and independent existence of the Infinite as Ultimate Being, and First Cause.

Though Ultimate Being is conceded to be both unknowable and unthinkable, at the same time he maintains that it is ;i known with absolute certainty as existing."

To this Unknowable he gives many names:

Cause — First Cause — Unknown Cause — Ultimate Cause — Incomprehensible Cause — Unconditioned Cause — Absolute Cause — Force — Unknown Force — Pure Force — Absolute Force — Power — Unknown Power — Unknowable Power

— Incomprehensible Power — Creating Power — Sustaining Power — Universal Power — Inscrutable Power — Existence — Keal Existence — Absolute Existence — Ultimate Existence — Being — Absolute Being — Ultimate Being — Unconditioned Being — Reality — Unknown Reality — Absolute Reality — Unseen Reality — Unconditioned Reality — Ultimate Fact — Noumenon — The Unknowable — The Infinite — The Absolute — The Actual — The Creating — The Inexplicable — The Unconditioned — The Unlimited - The Non-relative — The Unformed— The Incomprehensible—The Omnipresent— The Unaccountable—The Inconceivable— The Unthinkable— The Supernatural.

Spencer does not claim to arrive at the existence of the Unknowable by any process of logic. On the contrary, he shows in the clearest manner, that it cannot be reached by any logical process. He first undertakes to prove the existence of a First Cause. But he immediately cautions his reader against adopting the conclusion; stating that the reasoning is illusive and fallacious, because one of the terms in the proposition in each stage of the argument, is unthinkable. The Unknowable cannot be made the subject of logical deduction, because, when logic is employed for the ascertainment of truth, both terms of every proposition must be such as can be formulated in thought.

How, then, is the existence of the Infinite to be posited?

It is to be clone in three ways:

First, from a vague or dim consciousness.

,; Besides that definite consciousness of which Logic formulates the laws, there is also an indefinite consciousness which cannot be formulated.'' " To say that we cannot know the Absolute, is by implication to affirm that there is an Absolute. In the very denial of our power to learn what the Absolute is, there lies hidden the assumption that it is; and the making of this assumption proves that the Absolute has been present to the mind, not as a nothing, but as a something."— [First Principles, Sec. 26.

Spencer holds that we are obliged to form a positive though vague consciousness of that which transcends distinct consciousness.

" Our consciousness of the unconditioned being literally the unconditioned consciousness, or raw material of thought to which in thinking we give definite forms, it follows that an ever-present sense of real existence is the very basis of our intelligence. As we can in successive mental acts get rid of all particular conditions and replace them by others, but cannot get rid of that undifferentiated substance of consciousness which is conditioned anew in every thought; there ever remains with us a sense of that which exists persistently and independently of conditions. At the same time that by the laws of thought we are rigorously prevented from forming a conception of absolute existence; we are by the laws of thought equally prevented from ridding ourselves of the consciousness of absolute existence: this consciousness being, as we have seen, the obverse of our self-consciousness. And since the only possible measure of relative validity among our beliefs, is the degree of their persistence in opposition to the efforts made to change them, it follows that this, which persists at all times, under all circumstances, and cannot cease until consciousness ceases, has the i validity of any." [Ibid.

Hence the existence of the Unknowable is considered by Mr. Spencer the most certain of all t rut lis.

Another mode in which he posits the Unknowable, is by the antithesis of thought:

M Prom the very necessity of thinking in relations, it follows that the Relative itself is inconceivable, except a- related to a real Non-relative. AVe have seen that unless a real Xon-relative or Absolute be postulated, the Relative itself becomes absolute, and so brings the argument to a contradiction." " In the very assertion that all our knowledge, properly so called, is Kelative, there is involved the assertion that there exists a Xon-relative."'— [Ibid.

Hence the Non-relative is posited as the antithesis and correlative of the Relative — the Unlimited and Unconditioned is posited as the antithesis and correlative of the limited and conditioned, and the Infinite as the antithesis and correlative of the finite.

The third mode of arriving at the Unknowable, is by postulating it as the highest generalization of science.

Since the highest generalization of science is

the persistence of force, and since the nature of

this force is unknown, it is assumed to be the

( ratable Power behind all phenomena, which

4 in matter and motion.

This Unknown Force is the Incomprehensible

r manifested in all phenomena. n The

idea in religion, also, is the acknowledgment of the existence of an Inscrutable Power. Thus science and religion are brought together, and the conflict which has lasted for ages, is brought to an end.

This is the reconciliation of religion with science.

CHAPTEK II.

THE NEW PHILOSOPHY CONTINUED— DOCTRINE OF THE KNOWABLE.

Coming into the region of the Knowable, Mr. Spencer defines Philosophy as knowledge of the highest generality. This is by some writers designated as practical or positive philosophy, as distinguished from speculative philosophy. But he prefers simply the term Philosophy.

" Science," he says, "consists of truths existing more or less separated; and does not recognize these truths ntirely integrated."— [First Principles, Sec. 37.] "As each widest generalization of Science comprehends and consolidates the narrower generalizations of its own division, so the generalizations of Philosophy comprehend and consolidate the widest generalizations of Science Knowledge of the lowest kind is un-unifled

knowledge; Science is partially -unified knowledge; Philosophy is completely -unified knowledge."— [Ibid.

Again: We have this statement of the scope and province of science:

' Science concerns itself with the co-existences and ,uences among phenomena; grouping these at first into generalizations of a simple or low order, and rising gradually to higher and more extended generalizations.'' [Ibid.

Having thus established the boundary line between science and philosophy, the next step is to find some data of philosophy; some means by which the student of philosophy may know when he is making any advance. This data is found in the assumption that the congruities and incongruities of phenomena, which are attested by our consciousness, do really exist.

44 The assumption that a congruity or an incongruity exists when consciousness testifies to it, is an inevitable assumption."— [First Prin., Sec. 41.

This is one of the data of philosophy; but this is in the process of thought. There must also be a datum In the product of thought.

Auguste Comte thinks it impossible to subject to a critical analysis the relation between subject and object. Mr. Spencer, however, thinks otherwise; and undertakes to analyze this relation. The conclusion is,

44 That the manifestations of the Unknowable fall into the two separate aggregates constituting the world of consciousness and the world beyond consciousness."— [First Prin., Sec. 45.

44 The manifestations of the Unknowable, separated into the two divisions of self and not-self, are re-divisible into certain most general forms, the reality of which Science, as well as Common Sense, from moment to moment assumes."— [Ibid.

SPACE, TIME, MATTER, MOTION, AND FORCE.

44 Our consciousness of Space is a consciousness of co-existent positions."— [First Prin., Sec. 47.

"And since a position is not an entity— since the congeries of positions which constitute any conceived portion of space, and mark its bounds, are not sensible existences, it follows that the co-existent positions which make up our consciousness of Space, are not co-existences in the full sense of the word, (which implies realities as their terms,) but are the blank forms of co-existences left behind when the realities are absent; that is, are the abstracts of co-existences."— [Ibid.

Space is purely relative.

" Is there an absolute Space which relative Space in some sort represents ? Is Space in itself a form or condition of absolute existence, producing in our minds a corresponding form or condition of relative existence? These are unanswerable questions." — [Ibid.

Parallel remarks are made concerning time.

" Our conception of Matter, reduced to its simplest shape, is that of co-existent positions that offer resistance, as contrasted with our conception of Space, in which the co-existent positions offer no resistance." — [First Prin., Sec. 48.

" The conception of Motion, as presented or represented in the developed consciousness, involves the conceptions of Space, of Time, and of Matter. A something that moves; a series of positions occupied in succession; and a group of co-existent positions, united in thought with the successive ones— these are the constituents of the idea." — [Ibid.

Force is the ultimate of ultimates.

" Though Space, Time, Matter, and Motion are apparently all necessary data of intelligence, yet a psychological analysis (here indicated only in rude outline) shows us that these are either built up of, or abstracted from, experiences of force. Matter and Motion, as we know them, are differently conditioned manifestations of Force. Space and Time, as we know them, are disclosed along with these different manifestations of Force as the conditions under which they are presented." — [First Prin., Sec. 50.

Our author next proceeds to comment on the indestructibility of Matter, the continuity of Motion, and the persistence of Force.

The persistence of the relations among forces, ordinarily called uniformity of law, is a necessary implication from the fact that Force can neither arise out of nothing nor lapse into nothing.

The Rhythm of Motion forms the subject of a chapter, in which Mr. Spencer claims that all motion is rhythmical. In this doctrine he was supported by Professor Tyndall.

Chapter III. The New Philosophy Continued —doctrine Of Evolution

"An entire history of any thing must include its appearance out of the imperceptible and its disappearance into the imperceptible." — [First Prin., Sec. 93.

The sphere of knowledge is co-extensive with the phenomenal. Whenever any thing acts upon our senses under a sensible form, unless it acquired its form at the moment of perception, and lost its sensible form the moment after perception,

"It must have had an antecedent existence under this sensible form, and will have a subsequent existence under this sensible form. These preceding and succeeding existences under sensible forms, are possible subjects of knowledge; and knowledge has obviously not reached its limits until it has united the past, present, and future histories into a whole." — [Ibid. " Setting out abruptly as we do with some substance which already had a concrete form, our history is incomplete; the thing had a history preceding the state with which we started. Hence our theory of things, considered individually or in their totality, is confessedly imperfect so long as any past or future portions of their sensible existences are unaccounted for." —

[Ibid.

Philosophy has to formulate this passage from the imperceptible into the perceptible, and again from the perceptible into the imperceptible.

The general law of the redistribution of matter and motion, which is required to unify the various kinds of changes,

" Must also be one that unifies the successive changes which sensible existences, separately and together, pass through."— [Ibid.

In recognizing the fact that Science, tracing back the genealogies of various objects, finds their components were once in diffused states, and pursuing their histories forwards, finds diffused states will again be assumed by them, we have recognized the fact that the formula required for reducing knowledge to a coherent whole, mnst be one comprehending the two opposite processes of concentration and diffusion.

"The change from a diffused, imperceptible state, to a concentrated, perceptible state, is an integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of motion; and the change from a concentrated, perceptible state, to a diffused, imperceptible state, is an absorption of motion and concomitant disintegration of matter."— [First Prin., Sec. 94.

"When taken together, the two opposite processes thus formulated constitute the history of every sensible existence, under its simplest form. "—[Ibid.

But neither of these processes is ever wholly unqualified by the other:

" For each aggregate is at all times both gaining motion and losing motion."— [First Prin., Sec. 96.

Evolution, then, " Under its simplest and most general aspect, is the integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of motion; while dissolution is the absorption of motion, and concomitant disintegration of matter."— [First Prin., Sec. 97.

Simple Evolution may also be stated to be, a change from a less coherent form to a more coherent form, consequent on the dissipation of motion and integration of matter. — [Ibid.

This is the simplest form of Evolution. But there is not only a primary but a secondary redistribution of matter in the parts of an aggregate; and this brings us to compound Evolution.

This compound Evolution may be stated thus :

" The primary redistribution ends in forming aggregates which are simple where it is rapid, but w r hich become compound in proportion as its slowness allows the effects of secondary redistributions to accumulate." —[First Prin., Sec. 105.

"To say that the primary redistribution is accompanied by secondary redistributions, is to say that along with the change from a diffused to a concentrated state, there goes on a change from a homogeneous state to a heterogeneous state. The components of the mass while they become integrated also become differentiated."— [First Prin., Sec. 116.

This is the second aspect under which to study Evolution. While the first is progressive integration, this is progressive differentiation.

Both of these forms of Evolution are explained by illustrations drawn from the various sciences : From astronomy, from geology, psychology, biology, sociology, philology. Also from the arts: painting, sculpture, architecture, etc., poetry, and music.

Evolution may now be defined as a

" Change from an incoherent homogeneity to a coherent heterogeneity, accompanying the dissipation of motion and integration of matter."— [First Prin., Sec. 127.

But there is another phase to the doctrine.

"At the same time that Evolution is a change from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous, it is a change from the indefinite to the definite. Along with an advance from simplicity to complexity, there is an advance from confusion to order— from undetermined arrangement to determined arrangement. Development, no matter of what kind, exhibits not only a multiplication of unlike parts, but an increase in the distinctness with which these parts are marked off from one another."- [First Prin., Sec. 129.

Here again, many illustrations are given, drawn from the various sciences. In illustrations from the solar system, references are constantly made to the nebular theory as probable. In every instance it is found to accord with the doctrine of Evolution. Though the nebular theory is not here adopted, it should be stated that in his Essay on the Nebular Hypothesis, as revised in 1890, Mr. Spencer says: " Practically demonstrated as this process now is, we may say that the doctrine of nebular genesis has passed from the region of hypothesis into the region of established truth."

" The more specific idea of Evolution now reached is— a change from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity. to a definite, coherent heterogeneity, accompanying tlio dissipation of motion and integration of matter."

[First Prin.,Sec. 138.

This is the third phase of Evolution.

But the synthesis is not yet complete.

Thus far, only the redistribution of matter has been attended to; the accompanying redistribution of motion having been neglected.

" In proportion as Evolution becomes compoundin proportion as an aggregate retains, for a considerable time, such a quantity of motion as permits secondary redistributions of its component matter, there necessarily arise secondary redistributions of its retained motion. As fast as the parts are transformed there goes on a transformation of the sensible or insensible motion possessed by the parts. The parts cannot become progressively integrated, either individually or as a combination, without their motions, individually or combined, becoming more integrated. There cannot arise among the parts heterogeneities of size, of form, of quality, without there also arising heterogeneities in the amounts and directions of their motions, or the motions of their molecules. And increasing definiteness of the parts implies increasing deiiniteness of their motions.

"In short, the rhythmical actions going on in each aggregate, must differentiate and integrate at the same time that the structure does so."— [First Prin., Sec. m.

This is the fourth and final phase of the doctrine of Evolution, which must now be stated as follows:

" Evolution is an integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of motion; during which the matter from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity; and during which the retained motion undergoes a parallel transformation."— [First Prin., Sec. 145.

Having thus completed the synthesis, and having stated the doctrine of Evolution in its ultimate form, we must now look for some allpervading principle which underlies this all-pervading process.

"Just as it was possible to interpret the empiricai generalizations called Kepler's laws, as necessary consequences of the law of gravitation; so it may be possible to interpret the foregoing empirical generalizations as necessary consequences of some deeper law." —[First Prin., Sec. 14(>.

This law is found to be the persistence of force. — [First Prin., Sec. 155.

There is another cause of increasing complexity — another cause which necessitates a change from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous; and which, when joined to the first, makes the change more rapid and more involved. This is the multiplicity of effects following from a single force.

The general interpretation of Evolution is not yet complete.

The laws set forth furnish a key to the re-arrangement of parts which Evolution exhibits, in so far as it is an advance from the uniform to the multiform. We must now have a key to this re-arrangement in so far as it is an advance from the indefinite to the definite. This key is found in the law by virtue of which such portions of the permanently effective forces acting on any

18 aggregate, as produced sensible motions in its parts, work a segregation of those parts. This is called the law of segregation.

The redistributions of matter going on around us, are ever being brought to conclusions by the dissipation of the motions which affect them. In all cases, there is a process toward equilibration. This law of equilibration is deducible from the persistence of force.

There is a gradual advance toward harmony between man's mental nature and the conditions of his existence. Hence we have a warrant for the belief that Evolution can end only in the establishment of the greatest perfection and the most complete happiness.

Dissolution is a process the reverse of that traced in the history and genesis of Evolution. The law of equilibration and the law of the rhythm of motion render probable alternate eras of Evolution and Dissolution.

There is no guaranty for the permanent existence of the race. The outcome of the processes of equilibration constantly going on, not only on the surface of the earth but in the solar system, must be omnipresent death. — [First Prin., Sec. 176.

Carrying the argument still further, based upon what may be called the rhythm of the universe, we are led to infer a subsequent universal life. +>

"And thus there is suggested the conception of a past during which there have been successive Evolutions analogous to that which is now going on; and a future during which successive other such Evolutions may go on — ever the same in principle but never the same in concrete result." — [First Prin., Sec. is3.

In closing a summary of the New Philosophy, it is claimed that it is neither materialistic nor spiritualistic; or rather, that it is as much the one as the other.

"Though the relation of subject and object renders necessary to us these antithetical conceptions of spirit and matter; the one is no less than the other to be regarded as but a sign of the Unknown Reality which underlies both." — [First Prin., Sec. 194.

The foregoing outline of the New Philosophy must now be rilled up with a summary of Spencer's Biology, Psychology, and Sociology: also of his "Data of Ethics"; with a glance at his other writini

Chapter IV. The New Philosophy Continued — Spencer's Bi- Ology

In the first volume, the author treats of the general principles of the science, as connected with the doctrine of Evolution.

The four chief elements which, in various combinations, make up living bodies, are oxygen, hydrogen, nitrogen and carbon. Three are gaseous, and are known only in the aeriform state, while carbon is known only as a solid.

There is a certain significance in this, when we take into account the fact that the phenomena of Evolution imply motions in the units that are involved in the redistribution of matter and motion. There is a probable meaning in the fact that organic bodies, which exhibit the phenomena of Evolution in so high a degree, are mainly composed of ultimate units having extreme mobility.

A portion of organic matter of a living organism, contains several of these elements, and their mobility is an aid to the vital processes.

Mechanical forces produce important changes (20)

in organic bodies; but the agency of chief importance is chemical affinity.

Life. — Life is the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations. The degree of life varies as the degree of correspondence.

Inductions of Biology. — These are: Growth — Development — Function — Waste and Repair — Adaptation — Individuality — Genesis — Heredity — Variation — Classification — Distribution.

Growth is dependent on the available supply of such environing matters as are of like nature with the matters composing the organism. The available supply of assimilable matter being the same, and other conditions not dissimilar, the degree of growth varies according to the surplus of nutrition over expenditure. This surplus of nutrition over expenditure, is a variable quantity; and, other things being equal, upon it depends the limit of growth.

Development is primarily central. All organic forms of which the entire history is known, set out with a symmetrical arrangement of parts round a center. This central development may be distinguished into unicentral, where the product of the original germ develops symmetrically round one center; or multicentral, where the development is in subordination to many centers.

Stkucture and Function. — Does Structure originate Function, or does Function originate

22 Structure? The answer is not easy; but the author considers that Function must be regarded as taking precedence of Structure. Both Structure and Function progress from the homogeneneous, indefinite and incoherent, to the heterogeneous, definite and coherent.

In discussing the question of Waste and Repaik, the author comes to the conclusion that there are certain physiological units which are concerned in this process, and which possess an organic polarity not possessed by chemical units nor by morphological units.

Adaptation requires that organic types should be comparatively stable. The structure of any organism being a product of the almost infinite series of actions and re-actions to which all ancestral organisms have been exposed, it follows that any unusual actions and re-actions brought to bear on an individual, can have but an infinitessimal effect in permanently changing the structure of the organism as a whole.

Individuality. — We may consider as an individual, any center or axis that is capable of independently carrying on that continuous adjustment of inner to outer relations which constitutes Life.