The west in the diplomatic negotiations of the American Revolution

Front matter

■ LLIPS me /iniencan Revolution

Hi s to ry

.iX.ctViJSS

Preface

The aim of this essay is to seek out the truth in regard to one phase of the diplomatic history of the American Revolution, the whole history of which has been befuddled by the suspicions of Jay and Adams. To accomplish this, the archives of Washington, London and paris have been searched; those of Ppain yet remain to be explored. It is not hoped that this study is the final word on the subject, but I do believe that it has opened up new leads to truth regarding the history of the west during those trying times.

This subject was suggested to me by Professor C. W. Alvord' in the spring of 1909, and the work has been done under his direction. I am also indebted for many valuable suggestions to Professors E. B. Greene, 0. S. Ford, W. S. Robertson and to other members of the Department of History of the University of Illinois. Mr. 17, G-. Leland of the Carnegie Institute gave much assistance in my search for materials in the archives of Washington and Paris, and for similar help ir the archives of Pondon my thankc are due to Mr. Hubert Hall of the ' ^ublic Record Office, and to Mr. H. P. Buggar of the Canadian Archives Commission. I wish also to acknowledge the help given me by Piss Anne Applegate of the University of Illinois in the translation and interpretation of manuscripts.

Paul C. Phillips.

Urbana, Illinois I'ay 13, 1911.

Chapter I . The Origins

"The humiliation of Britain I" "the prestige of France'." these were the phrases most often on the tongue of French statesmen in the decade following the close of the -even Years War. To their minds the first was the means to the second. To accomplish their purpose they realized that, in addition to the old coalition of France and Spain, they must raise up a new foe to Great Britain. The shrewd and owl-eyed Choiseul looked across the Atlantic and saw in the liber ty loving English colonies of America, the latent power needed to attain his ends. To the unimaginative Vergennes was left the task of building up this coalition, of guiding its forces against the common foe, and finally of apportioning the spoils of war between the hungry maws of his new proteges and the insatiable greed of his old ally. Both reached out for those territories which had fallen a prey to Great Britain in the former war and did not, on account of the character of their position and population, play a title role in the mighty drama of the world struggle. Around this question of spoils twined the intricate negotiations of the American Revolution, and ut)on its answer depended the success of French diplomacy in forming a triple alliance against the might of Britain. Here was the problem upon which Vergennes was to spend many thoughtful years, only to find at last its solution wrought out by other men, working on principles strange to him and with forces unknown to his reasoning. The final outcome, however, satisfied the aims of Vergennes1 diplomacy. By the independence of the United States and the division of Pitt's great conquests in the :.:i3sissipt>i valley the revenge of France was completed.

The peace of 17^ robbed France of all her possessions in America. Canada and that part of Louisiana east of the Mississippi passed to the dominion of England, and western Louisiana was handed over to Spain as an indemnity for the loss of Florida. Among the English colonies all fear of the enemy of so many generations passed away. The terms of this treaty portended the establishment of the United States, for with the fear of French aggressions before them the colonies would never have dared rebel. That rebellion was to offer France her opportunity. Even before the conclusion of peace in 1763 she was laying Dlans for a new war against her ancient rival. In 1762 the Duke de Broglie was instructed to draw up plans for the contest. These were worked out to the minutest details, but when the death of

Louis XV brought in a new government they were laid aside only to be resurrected at a later date.

To Choiseul, the keen and farsighted minister of Louis XV, America seemed the most natural and easy ground on which Prance could work out her vengeance. Great Britain was still the undisputed mistress of the seas and he turned to the New TCorld as the battlefield on which to dispute this supremacy. He realized the strength of the forces with which England had to contend in America and was astonished at her blindness when he learned she was provoking war, for through his agents he was well informed of conditions there. De Kalb had come o-

ver in 17«7 as such an agent, and perhaps Bonvouloir acted in this capacity on his journey along the whole Atlantic seaboard. ~ London also furnished him the latest intelligence. In the French archives are bundles of reports concerning America, gathered from every source.

1. Archives de la Inline, B 4, Vol. 135, pp. 4-fi . This plan, however, involved as its most important measure a descent on the coast of England.. It was the general opinion in France that the monarchy would never again interfere on the continent of America. Before 1774 Choiseul alone seems to have conceived this idea.

2. Tlharton, Diplomatic Correspondence, I, 371, note. 3 • Ibid, I, 417.

The Spanish people likewise hated the British nation for their losses by war. Although they distrusted France the two crowns were bound together in common interests and purposes, and were particularly united by the Family Compact, according to the terms of which, there was a mutual guarantee of their possessions, and a mutual promise of aid in case of attack. For this their hatred of England and

to red fee »w

desire for vengeance was a pledge. That France war willing hers was

A

evident when in 1774 Spain and Portugal were on the verge, of war over

i 1 the boundaries between Brazil and Uruguay. France took the side of

Spain, Great Britain that of Portugal, and for a time it seemed that war would result. But the Bourbon powers were not ready for war, and the conflict was postponed till a more favorable opportunity.

In the midst of these troubles the old king Louis XV died. His successor, Louis XVI, in the selection of his ministry, passed over the supple Choiseul and chose for the foreign office Charles Gravier, Comte de Vergennes, at that time ambassador to Sweden. Vergennes had few of the characteristics of the wily Choiseul. Although jhe had spent his whole life in diplomacy he never displayed that fi- Inesse which has co^e to be regarded as characteristic of French statesmen. He was narrow in his views, blunt and direct in speech, and cold and haughty in manner. Particularly marked was his deficiency in the vivacity and optimism so general among the French people and his appearance of always laboring under a load of anxiety and responsibility. But he was a man of clear understanding and resolute purpose, who pursued unhesitatingly to the end the policy upon which he had decided. In his public life as well as in his private relations he was frank and sincere. His opinions often apnear narrow and unreasonable, and his bluntness in expressing them often exposed him to the

1. Doniol, Transcripts, XVIII, 36.

charge of lack of tact. He sometimes showed a violent temper in dealing with the other ministers and his ambassadors and even towards foreign representatives such as the American commissioners. In general, however, he was patient and courteous. He was not a lovable character, but his uprightness and ability gained for him the friendship and respect of such opposite characters as Franklin, Louis XVI, and Marie Antoinette.^" Such was the man who at the age of fifty-seven years took charge of the foreign affairs of Prance. No abler minister could have been chosen and his honesty and loyalty were beyond suspicion. Patriotism was his greatest passion, and for the betterment of his country he gave his life.

At the beginning of his ministry he had one disadvantage. His whole diplomatic career had been connected with the east and north and when called to office in 1774 he had little special knowledge of the problems that confronted him in the relations of France with Spain and England. His lack of previous acquaintance with the subject made it difficult for him to work out the details of his foreign policy, but he set himself resolutely to the task, with a success to be hereinafter described. Vergennes was in one respect like Choiseul. He was determined to avenge French defeats at the hands of Great Britain and to restore French prestige abroad. This was the keynote of his whole policy, and it was this that led him in 1773 to recognize the independence of the United States and to make every effort to keep the alliance and friendship of Spain. J He keenly felt the depths to which

1. This characterization of Vergennes is drawn from his letters and diplomatic despatches. Franklin paid a tribute to him in 1781, in speaking of "the sincerity of this upright and able minister, who never promised me anything which he did not punctually perform." Franklin, '.7orks (Smyth ed.), VIII, 302. At the time of Vergennes' death Franklin again wrote: "So wise and good a man, taken away from the station he filled is a great loss, not only to France but to Europe in general, to America and to mankind." Ibid, IX, 575. For a common idea of Vergennes see John Jay's characterization in Magazine of American History, XIII, 7,1.

2. Doniol, I, 17.

his country had fallen, and recognized that throughout all Europe French prestige was shattered. "The deplorable peace of 1763", he informed his king, "the partition of Poland, and indeed other causes equally disastrous have struck the greatest blows to the respect for your Crown."1 lie complained that this peace had been purchased at the price of Canada, Louisiana and other valuable possessions. To retrieve the fallen glory of France he held it necessary to strike a blow at England. And here for the first time Vergennes suggested that encouragenent ,and aid be given the British colonies in their opposition to their mother country.

From reports of conditions in America Vergennes was sure that a rupture was near at hand. To make his information still more exact he sent Bonvouloir on a second visit. In his instructions to this agent Vergennes recognized the jealousy of the British colonies of French influence and their fear of French aggression. His agent was instructed to inform the Americans that France had absolutely no designs on the conquest of Canada. It is probable that Vergennes was

the more illing to make this promise because like his predecessor,

IChoiseul, he disliked colonial establishments, and at no time in his career did he seek to acquire them but was content with small islands and commercial ports.

The outbreak of the American Revolution gave the North American continent an international importance greater than it had ever

1. Doniol, I, 13.

3. :.Tharton, Diplomatic Correspondence, I, 333.

4. Vergennes never expressed any desire to establish colonies. On the : contrary he repeatedly declared that France had no designs on American

territory and at the time of the treaty of alliance he willingly a- : greed not to occupy any n^rt of the continent. In the "Reflexions" of 1775 Vergennes shows the utmost indifference to a colonial empire, and at a still later time he declared that France had all the colonies her population and industry could support. See post, p.

before possessed. In previous wars these vast regions had been merely a factor in great European struggles, but now they became the center of a new conflict fought out on different lines. In former struggles it was merely a question of whether Great Britain or the Bourbon mon-' archies should possess these boundless domains, and in every case the might of the Anglo-Saxon had prevailed. Defeated in every conflict with a united Britain, the statesmen of France now faced a divided empire and with the help of a powerful member, they hop^^ loowe-r<.ov«* 1 author of the woes of the House of Bourbon. For them it was n6 longer a contest to decide the ownership of Canada or Louisiana; the reconquest of these had passed beyond their dreams; and they looked for triumph over their foe in the destruction of her commerce, in the dismemberment of her empire, and above all in forming of her richest provinces, a new nation that would forever be a check on British aggression .

In a comprehensive scheme like this, and especially in the establishment of an independent state in America Spain would have no part. She still cherished the dream of a colonial empire and her possessions in America, far greater than those of her British rival, stretched over half of the northern and nearly all the southern continent. It was true that an independent government in the New World would always be a threat and a danger to the British possessions, but it would be equally the same to those of Spain. It would be a constant menace to British dominion in Canada, but it would also be the relentless foe of Spanish control of Louisiana. This difference of interest and of policy could not be reconciled by appeal to the Pacte de Famille and was to produce throughout a lack of unity and harmony in the councils of the two courts.

Spanish fears of American aggression were not wholly groundless. The year 1763 had marked a new era in history of colonial expari si on. Tith the danger of French encroachment removed the British colonies entered upon a period of growth and of independence of thought and action, With the removal of this same danger Great Britain in an attempt to centralize her empire entered upon a policy of restriction and coercion, that ultimately led to rebellion. It is not necessary to discuss here the motives behind this policy; it is sufficient that the policy itself produced the American Revolution, and thus clayed into the hands of France.

In this oeriod between the treaty of Paris and the outbreak of the American Revolution there was much discussion of what to do with the territory conquered from the Bourbons: Florida, Fastern Louisiana and Canada. All this discussion, however, led to but three acts; the royal proclamation of 176^,"^ the treaty of Fort Stanwix in 1768, and the Quebec Act of 1774. The first of these acts marked out the two zones of the Floridas, and the Mississippi valley and provided for the control of each. The Floridas were placed under an arbitrary government, although some forms of popular control were preserved. In regard to the Mississippi territories this act forbade any"grant, warrant of survey, or pass patents for any lands beyond the heads or sources of any of the rivers which fall into the Atlantic ocean from west or northwest". All this territory was to be held, "for the present", for the Indians. It provided, however, for the sale of any of I this land by the Indians to the British government."^ In accordance 1 with the terms of this proclamation the Indians ceded at the treaty

of Fort Stanwiz their claim to all land between the Ohio and Tennessee rivers and the way to the settlement of this region was now open.

> 1. Alvord, "Genesis of the Proclamation of 176 5" . Michigan Histori- | cal Collections, XXXVI, 20.

2. Alvord, British Ministry arid Treaty of Fort Stanwix. Proceedings of the Wisconsin Historical Society, 1908, p. 24.

Even before the treaty of Fort Stanwix the British ministry was confronted by two policies in regard to the unoccupied lands of the west. One was to throw them open to settlement, the other was to keep them in wilderness inhabited only by Indians and traders. The Americans supported the first of these policies and their chief advocate was Franklin. Lord Hillsborough on the other side urged the prohibition of settlements in the back countries, and the reservation of these lands for the Indians.1 In the early seventies it seemed that the ministry favored settlements in the country south of the Ohio, and that these regions would soon be peopled. Large numbers of frontiersmen wandered at will through the forests of Kentucky and Tennessee, and numerous trading poets were built up in Fest Florida and along the lower Mississippi.

To the north of the Ohio a different law was enforced. Settlements were discouraged and throughout the whole extent of this territory the only male inhabitants were Indians and a few hundred French "habitants" gathered peacefully together in ancient, littli, drowsy villages. Across the prairies of this country roamed fur traders of English, French, or Spanish nationality, knowing no control but their own wills. Although these lands were not open to settlement, they were regarded as a part of the thirteen colonies, but in 1774 this claim was swept away. The Quebec Act2 of that year incorporated jthe country north of the Ohio and west of the Alleghanies with the province of Quebec and it appeared to the colonists along the Atlantic

.1. In 1772 when the Vandalia scheme providing for an extensive grant of land west of the Alleghanies was before the Privy Council, Franklin supported it and Hillsborough opnosed. The Council decided in favor of the grant and Hillsborough resigned in disgust. Life and Writings of Franklin (Smyth ed.), V, 466 et seq.; X, 255 et seq.

,2. Coffin, The Province of Quebec and the Early American Revolution. (University of '"isconsin, Bulletins, I, no. ~, 189R ) .

that they were to be always forbidden the use of the vast regions behind them. By this act a half of the back countries was definitely separated from the influence of the Anglo-Saxon colonies and entrusted to the arbitrary rule of a military governor under French law. Protests against this act were unavailing, but its enforcement, together with other unpopular measures of the royal government, was fast driving the colonies to rebellion.

Thus the acts and regulations of the British ministry divided the conquests of the Seven Years T"ar into four districts differing in character, and each of these districts was to be a distinct issue in the diplomacy of the Revolution. Canada with its distinctive population and institutions, was not in sympathy with the ideals of the Anglo-Saxon colonies; but its ultimate possession was to the end of tte struggle a matter of doubt. The Northwest, as yet unpeopled, was still claimed, under their charters, by the seaboard colonies; ancient Eastern Louisiana was held under the same title, and with less contradiction by Virginia, the Carolinas and Georgia. On the south, the Floridas, like Canada on the north, formed a colony, distinct in population and government . ^

Beyond the Mississippi stretched the unexplored domains of Spanish Louisiana. Only a few years before it had been the pride of the French colonial empire, but this power, in order to reimburse Spain for her losses in the Seven Years War, had ceded it to her southern neighbor. New Orleans was the most important post and controlled the commerce of the 1'ississippi. Other Spanish villages were scattered up the river as far as St. Louis, which had been established at the close of the Seven Years War, and had become a refuge for

1 . West Florida was the more important and the center of Fnglish influence here was Fensacola. From here the British commanders sought to control the trade of the Mississippi and to hold the Indians of western Georgia in subjection. Of scarcely less importance were the [posts of :..obile and Natchez. The population was mostly French and

Spanish, but there were many British and American traders. Colonial Mobile .

! French inhabitants who desired to escape the rule of the British across the river. It was now a prosperous center of trade"1" with the Illinois country and a menace to British power across the river. So influential were the P'rench in this region that in 1769, the commander of Fort Chartres in the Illinois country wrote to the secretary of war complaining that in spite of all the efforts of the English traders, backed by British soldiers, they carried off all the trade. Furthermore, they influenced the Indians against the British to such an extent as to threaten a general Indian war.

Although France had surrendered Louisiana to Spain she still

possessed an active interest in it, as shown by the numerous accounts of this province during the years from 1765 to 1 774 . J Almost immediately after the treaty there appeared a "Memoire que regarde la Louis-

•7

iane", and in 176P there appeared four extensive memoirs on the same province, describing it in detail, and bewailing its loss to France. The years following were full of discontent and disturbance among the French population, and there were many complaints of Spanish cruelty and tyranny. The French of Louisiana appealed to their countrymen in : Europe for aid and succeeded in arousing great sympathy ajnong all classes. In France there was considerable agitation for the retrocession of this province to its former mistress and in support of this idea there appeared two significant memoirs. mhe first was entitled, "Memoir de Poterat tendant a mettre la Louisiane sous la protecterat francais. Of still greater interest was a memoir of the French ad-

1. Colonial Office, 5, Vol. 88, no. 175.

2. Among these is a memoir from a M . Frances dated Oct. 21, 176^ in which he describes Lord Egremont's plan in regard to "Accadia Canada,

•and the Floridas" . Arc. Aff. Etr. Angeltette, V, 481, no. 10^. Concerning the L'isr.issipri valley there is a better from a M. de Neyon to Loftus in which he concedes to the English the permanent possession of the Illinois. Arc. Col. Louisiane, 44, Di,v. 2, 18 b. It is possible also that a M . Larnier who was in the Illinois country in the early seventies was an agent of Choiseul. Arc. Aff. Etr. Angelterre, V, 501, no. 320.

V*l . FAii I "Milium ; f!i il ill i I m... } T,i,u j ] lL1i ^ Vi-1. jrr ,

4. kemoires et Documents Affaires Etrangenes, Fond Divers, Amerique, II miral D'Estaing, arguing that it was a great injustice to make Frenchmen sub|dtt to Spanish laws, and proposing the freedom of Louisiana under the protection of France.1 He described the country as rich and productive and capable of supporting an immense population which if given its liberty would form a powerful protection to the Spanish possessions in Mexico. The example of a free republic, he suggested, would be a powerful inducement for the English colonies east of the Mississippi to rebel. By thus promoting domestic war among them could 1 France hope to increase her own power.1 The plan of D'Estaing if carried out would have led to the establishment of a great nation in the Mississippi valley and would have meant the detachment from the British dominions of the territory between the Mississippi and the Alleghanies. It was, however, the indication of a policy which the French government never attempted to carry out .

After this flurry over Louisiana the French showed no interest in western affairs until the period of the American Revolution. After the retirement of Choiseul in 1770 and the abandonment of French activities in the Mississippi valley, there sprung up a strong rivalry between the Spaniards and English. British traders had finally gained control of the traffic of the Mississippi valley2 and the Spaniards feared the British ministry had designs on New Orleans. There were many points of dispute between the two nations and it seemed not unlikely that war would result. Both sides were preparing for hostilities and planning extensive operations in the Mississippi valley. Hillsborough, the English secretary of state for the colonies, wrote to General Gage, January 2, 1771, that in the event of war he should

1. Marquey, L'Histoire des Cessions de la Louisiane. Mss. in Bibliotheque Rationale. Nouvelles Acquisitions, francais, 9709. 12. Gyane, History of Louisiana, III, 106. Further evidence of the extent of British trade on the Mississippi is shown by the fact that in one month in 1776 Galvez captured fifteen British trading vessels. The French archives contain freauent references to merchants who have been ruined by English competition.

instantly seize New Orleans and all of Louisiana. Spain in turn prepared to defend her possessions in America and erected a number of posts along the west bank of the Mississippi. Her activity attracted

the attention of Hillsborough and he instructed Gage to keep a close watch on movements in Louisiana. It was not long, however, before the excitement in the .ississippi valley died down and military preparations ceased. England continued her trade along the river and Spaniard and Briton alike were enriched. It has already been shown that at the outbreak of the Revolution the thirteen colonies formed but a small extent of the British empire in America. It is true that they contained the bulk of population of the entire territory but it was even then recognized that Canada and the rich valleys of the Ohio and Mississippi contained vast possibilities of development. The English ministry felt that its predecessors had made a mistake in granting such liberal charters to the older colonies and it was its firm intention to hold the new ones under careful supervision. The belief that England was trying to surround the United Colonies by a ring of despotic governments was a strong factor in the opposition that led to revolution .

' ith the outbreak of war the question arose, what is to become of these vast dominions which are not a part of the revolting provinces? TTill they cast their lot with the Revolution anc3 unite wit: the great body of English colonists in repudiating the mother country* They were not strong enough to do this alone and there were many reasons why neither the Floridas nor Canada could unite with the other colonies to form an independent government. In regard to Canada, the natives were of a different race and it was against these same English colonies they had fought twelve years before. The French Canadians,

1. Colonial Office, 5, Vol. 89, no. 1.

long accustomed to a paternal government, had no sympathy with New- England ideas of liberty. Furthermore, the Americans were Protestants while the French were Catholic and against the establishment of Catholicism the former had been mo3t bitter. In the Floridas similar reasons kept the inhabitants from joining the Revolution. Most of the Anglo-Saxon settlers were direct from England and therefore loyal. In addition, the country was strongly held by British troops, sent there to overawe the Indians and protect the country from Snain.

Although the Revolutionary leaders eagerly desired the conquest of both territories, such an undertaking against the British empire while the population was at best indifferent, seemed doomed to failure when it is remembered that, throughout the war, the colonists needed all their troops to protect their own borders. It was only through foreign aid that such conquests could promise success, and to obtain this aid was one of the diplomatic problems of the Revolution.

As to the Floridas, there was another obstacle to their conquest. Spain had not forgotten her former ownership of them, which she desired to regain. She felt that her possession of New Orleans was of little value while another power held the gate of the Culf of Mexico. She was jealously watching events in the New World and ready to seize these provinces at the first opening.

Only the west then offered opportunities of expansion. In this direction the colonial population naturally flowed, and although without legal sanction frontiersmen were spreading over the region south of the Ohio, and establishing settlements in its rich valleys. The colonies backed up their claims to these settlements by appealing to their ancient charters. Against these, however, existed the legal force of various Indian treaties and the Quebec Act. Furthermore, the British held a quasi-military control of the Northwest which the colo-

1. Florida Rlanca to Montmorin, 1778. Espagne, 588, no. 29.

nists were not then in a position to dispute. Clearly, if they were to get possession of this territory it must be by diplomacy or arms. The country south of the Ohio did not offer such a difficult problem. Aa has been described already, it was largely settled by American colonists and the British had no important posts within its limits. Spanish cupidity had not yet seized on this territory and its fortunes seemed linked v/ith those of the seaboard colonies.

As a matter of fact, during the early days of the Revolution the Continental Congress did not consider the Mississippi valley as of much importance in the war. It concentrated its armies in the east and the west was left to shift for itself. In no sense, however, did the colonies abandon their claims to this valley. The Quebec Act was one of the grievances that brought on the Revolution and they never recognized the Northwest Territory as a part of Canada. There were some spirits among the revolutionary leaders, moreover, who looked to a union of all British America against the tyranny of England. Among these may be mentioned Franklin, Tlashington, and Jay.1 There probably could be found no one among the patriots who did not regard the back countries as a part of the colonial territories, and this very unanimity of feeling doubtless forestalled discussion of the matter.

At the beginning of the war, however, the British military commanders were quick to see the importance of the west as a base of operations and on September 20, 1775 General Gage wrote to Lord Dartmouth from Boston, concerning a plan of operations in this region.