A war minister and his work : reminiscences of 1914-1918

Chapter I Paoe

The Beginning — To Berlin — My Appointment as War Minister — Reflections on the Housing Situation at the End of the War - 13

Chapter II Field-marshal Count Von Moltke

The Laws of War — My Knowledge of Moltke's Plans during my Term as Chief of the Operations Department— Moltke's Principles — Moltke not a Soldier by Temperament — Moltke and the Kaiser - 20

FIELD-MARSHAL COUNT WALDERSEE.

Waldersee as Chief of the General Staff — His Plan of Operations Against France — His Views on the Training of the Officers — His Attitude to Politics - 33

FIELD-MARSHAL COUNT VON SCHLIEFFEN.

My Acquaintance with Count von Schlieffen — His Reputation for Taciturnity — His Development of the System of General Staff Rides — His Work for the Kriegsacademie — His Preparations for the War — The Development of Heavy Artillery — Not a Fighting Temperament — A Hard Worker 39 viii CONTENTS

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GENERAL VON MOLTKE.

My Term as Chief of a Section under Him — I am Appointed Deputy Chief of Staff to Him and take the Field with Him as Quartermaster-General at the Beginning of the War — He Continues the Methods and Traditions of His Predecessor — The Kaiser and Liege — He is taken 111 during the Battle of the Marne — His Sudden Death — His Achievements are not to be Measured by Results - 52

The Relations between Politics and Military Plans— The Attitude of our Prospective Enemies — The Opening of the War and our Plan of Operations — The March Through Belgium— The Question of Right - - 58

Chapter IV Mobilisation

My Command of a Division in East Prussia — The Impossibility of a Secret Mobilisation — Confusion at Deutsch-Eylau — My Appointment as Quartermaster- General — I go to Berlin — I report to von Moltke — Moltke's Opinion of the Situation— THE CONCENTRATION —In the West— The Capture of Liege - - 65

Chapter V War Days

Ludendorff and Liege — Headquarters Transferred to Coblenz — The Recall of Hindenburg and Appointment of Ludendorff — The Movements in the West — Headquarters Transferred to Luxemburg — Daring Requisitions — The Failure at the Marne — I Visit the Armies — A Visit to Rheims — " You Have Been

CONTENTS ix

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CHAPTER v. — Continued.

Sacrificed for Me ! "—I am Appointed to the Command of the XIV. Reserve Corps— From Lorraine to Cambrai —Fighting in the North— On the Somme— Trench Warfare Begins— My Headquarters at Martinpuich— Our Relations with the Civilian Population— Pleasant Memories— A Visit from the Kaiser— Trench-digging —A Shortage of Ammunition— In the Front Lines— The Monument in Bapaume Cemetery— Bapaume— Air Heroes— The English Offensive on the Somme - 74

Chapter VI

My Unfamiliarity with the Ways of the War Ministry— An Awkward Building— The Routine— The Creation of an Aviation Department— The Administration Department—The Billeting Department— The Medical Department—The General War Department— The Ammunition Shortage— Anxieties— The Powder Question —Man-Power—Measures to Meet the Crisis— The Central Department— The War Bureau— Its Popularity with the Reichstag— Special Legislation and the Censorship— The War Press Office— The Question of an Imperial War Ministry— Relations with the Reichstag - ' IIQ

Tales of the Reichstag— The Demands it made on my Time —My Work on the Auxiliary Service Law— Its Evil Effects on the Troops— The Reichstag and the Auxiliary Service Law— The Reichstag and the Prussian Franchise— The Reichstag Resolution of July, 1917— Its Effects at the Front— The Longing for Peace— The Reichstag lacked Political Instinct for Questions of Peace and War— Hardships and x CONTENTS

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CHAPTER vii. — Continued

Complaints in the Army — The Agitation for the Reduction of Punishments in the Army — The Reichstag Fails the Nation in its Hour of Need — The Conflict of Parties — Our Pacifists — Not all Innocent — The Vision of Universal Peace — The Attitude of England — The Internationale and Bolshevism — The Independent Socialists and Bolshevism — Their Dealings with the Bolshevik "Ambassador," Joffre — The Efforts of Michaelis and Capelle to prove Complicity frustrated by the Reichstag— The Reichstag ignored in the Revolution - . 143

Chapter VIII Governments

The Prussian Ministry and the Other States— The South German States Unsuccessful in Politics — Prince Max as an Example — The Prussian Ministry not a Foe to Freedom— The Spirit of Bethmann-Hollweg— Ludendorff on Bethmann-Hollweg — Michaelis — My Relations with Count Hertling— Prince Max of Baden - 175

Chapter IX

The German Army of 1914 the Best that has ever entered upon a War — Reserve Formations and Active Formations take the Field together for the First Time— The Officers' Corps — Recruited from all Classes of the Population— Popular Theories about the Training of the Officers— The Vindication of the Officers of the Reserve— Untrue Allegations that the Officers of the Reserve were not Appointed to Posts on the Higher Staffs— The Attacks on the Officers— The Question of Promoting N.C.O.'s— The Men— Difficulties with the Prisoners returned from Russia — Cases of Mutiny — The Insubordination of the Younger Classes of Recruits

CONTENTS xi

PAOE

CHAPTER ix. — Continued.

— The Older Largely Exempt — The Lines of Communication— The Nefarious Work of the Independent Socialists — The Demoralisation of the Army — The Influence of the Mutiny in the Navy - 183

Chapter X The Allies Austria

The Question of the Nationalities — The Attitude towards the War — Early Deterioration of the Austro- Hungarian Army — Jewish Influences — The Officers — Faint -heartedness in the Empire — The Ministers — Czernin — Efforts for Peace in Austria-Hungary - 218

BULGARIA.

Lack of Conscience among the Bulgarians — Radoslawow and Neidenoff — Anti-German Agitation — Quality of the Bulgarian Troops — The King — The Crown Prince - .... 233

THE TURKS.

True Orientals in Business Affairs — The Turkish Soldier — Enver and Talaat — Our Relations with the Turks - - 237

Chapter I

WHEN the world war broke out I closed my house in Deutsch-Eylan, and consigned my possessions to God's care. I went away to the war and, at first, my daughters went to stay with relations and acquaintances. When Deutsch-Eylan seemed threatened by the Russians my belongings were packed up by strangers, and sent to Berlin to be stored. My daughters went to join the nursing staff of the Army of the East, and my son fought against the Russians, while I was busily engaged with the French and English. We found ourselves without a home of any sort, but service to our Kaiser and country was sufficient compensation for everything.

When I was appointed Minister of War in the autumn of 1916, I found at first that the War Office only afforded restricted quarters, as the officials'

14 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK residence was still in occupation. However, one room for my office, and an adjacent one, was all I required. When my daughters returned from Russia to take over my housekeeping they had to make shift in the same way until the official residence was vacated, and its luxurious rooms were ready for us. This official residence was very fine in many respects, but with its unfamiliar appointments, it never seemed to me really homely. I put a few of my things into some of the rooms, just to feel that from time to time I could be alone among surroundings with which the memories of a lifetime were associated. But the greater part of my belongings had to remain in store. How much has been lost or destroyed that was once laboriously collected and carefully preserved and looked after !

When I was a child I was once plunged into deep grief, when another boy said to my brother and me : ' You have no home ; when your father dies you will have to clear out." Of course we did not know we were living in an official residence. Besides, even places like these can be a real home, if one can stay in them undisturbed until the children go out into the world.

I like to think of the old, cramped and unpretentious parsonage in which I spent my childhood, and often found my haven of refuge even after I had grown up. Those who spend their lives going from one furnished house to another are even worse off ;

they become mere nomads. All the same, I have lost all feeling for it.

In the autumn of 1918, when I was removed from my position as Minister of War, I failed to find a house in Berlin or its suburbs although I tritd every possible means. The obstacle to removal to a distance was the difficult railway situation. But many others were in the same boat. Every day the papers displayed advertisements in which hundreds of marks were offered for information about houses to let. In these circumstances further search held out no prospects of success, and as the official residence had to be vacated, there was nothing for it but to put our household goods back into the store where, for the matter of that, the bulk of our belongings had been all the time. I should have actually found myself without a roof over my head if I had not been allowed to use a few empty rooms in the War Office.

My uncomfortable and harrowing stay there was prolonged by the misfortune to all our servants, who fell victims to the ravages of influenza. We were not going to leave faithful followers in the lurch. Whenever I entered or left the house I was under observation from the Soldiers' Councils or the sentries who shared their political sympathies, so that I might almost as well have been in prison. The manner of the sentries was often most provocative, and they clearly regarded themselves as masters.

How many homeless folk had the same experience at the time and how many others have still to face it ! I am thinking first and foremost of our warriors who have already returned or will shortly do so. For years they have been living in a strange land, often without a roof over their heads, and death hovering round them all the time. Where will they find a home of their own now ? All kinds of difficulties as regards housing were encountered after the short and victorious war with France. This time the whole matter was to be taken in hand in good time ; the deplorable conclusion of the war and the confusion at home put an end to the preparations,

A great many people are under the impression that there must be plenty of houses available because so many thousands have never come back. That is a fallacy. The widows and their children are left behind ; many new families have been founded, and the masses pour into the centres of attraction — the great towns. The result is that the shortage of houses is not felt uniformly all over the country, but it is certainly the greatest at those points where its consequences are the most serious.

If I remember rightly, the bread-winner of a family was, and probably still is, threatened with the workhouse if he does not provide his family with a roof. Often enough even decent people have found themselves with no other last resort than the poor-house. Reuter, in his poem " Kein Husung,"

gives an affecting and distressing picture of the way in which quite a modest fortune is dissipated when a home is lacking.

We are thus faced with a crisis, the solution of which must be the task of the State and all private citizens. If we are ever to become a stable State once more this will be one of the means by which our recovery will be facilitated. The impulse in that direction is already alive and active. It will become more effective when men have not only a roof over their heads but at any rate a small piece of land to link them up with Nature and the productive forces of the earth.

What man in a large town has ever stopped to ask himself from what source the necessities of his daily life are supplied ? The baker delivers the bread, vegetables pour out from the greengrocer's, milk makes its appearance from the milk-cart. Thought travels no further back than that. The needs of the times have broadened our outlook.

The first result of that process is that antagonism has sprung up between town and country > an antagonism which has to be cured before enlightenment can do its blessed work. The soldier living daily in the trenches has learned to watch the growth of the plants, a phenomenon he has never observed before. He has taken to growing flowers and cultivating vegetables on a small scale. He must

never lose the benefit of those experiences. The

B i8 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK

existing difficulties of our food situation — difficulties which will remain for a long time yet — compel us to co-operate in the production of even the simplest and most essential necessaries of life.

I was anxious to leave Berlin. The dumb witnesses of the great past of Prussia and Germany, with their silent lamentations and accusations, struck me to the heart. Only one pleasure was left to me — the entry of the first troops. Many a man among those well-tried warriors shed bitter tears. He who had drawn his sword with the enthusiasm of a good conscience, he who had held himself ready to die for the greatness and honour of his Fatherland, might well weep over the shame and disgrace, over faithlessness and betrayal. But at any rate the Prussian and German colours once more fluttered in the breeze. Were they now to speak of the past or should they now point to a new future ?

They alone could make the parting painful. The same could not be said of the great mass of the people who filled the streets. Many among them seemed to be quite unconscious of the difficulties and shame of the times. They were laughing and fooling about. " Fieldgreys " were offering their belongings for sale to hawkers. Some of them were selling newspapers and pamphlets. What a world of self-mockery and self-accusation was in their tones as they cried out the merits of a certain book, " William the Last " ! Berlin had become a thoroughly demoralised city.

I must away ! At the station we took a short but extremely moving farewell of our own people. My orderlies had been with me throughout the whole period of the war. That is a link which lasts through life. They had stood by my side in bad times as in good, and for that reason I shall always count them among my friends.

Luck was with us, for we not only found room in the train (which was full to overflowing), but even friendly fellow-travellers. Our destination was the Harz, at the foot of which I was born. The old home received the homeless ones once more. We found shelter in the market town of Braunlage, right under the Brocken.

There, in the cheerful and hospitable house of Herr Dumling, are these lines written. I have brought with me no books, no notes or other aids for my work. Everything I write about my thoughts and experiences is from memory. For that reason much may seem to have little relation to space or time. One's point of view is affected by the nearness of events and a one-sided knowledge of the context.

Yet for all that it may not be without a certain value to draw directly on my memory.

Chapter II

EXPERTS and other people may argue until the end of time about the relative importance of personality and mass movements in the making of history. I, for my part, shall never cease to believe that it is individuals who exercise the greatest influence in the affairs of this world, and who are alone able to determine the directions that events ultimately take. All that is happening to-day only confirms me in this belief ; for, while on the one hand I behold the masses bent only upon the work of destruction, on the other I have everywhere heard the cry and clamour of the multitude for a man.

Thus, in these pages, the reader will find that certain men are made to stand out who, though they may not have stamped their age with their personality to the same extent as Bismarck did, have yet been able to wield enough directive power in their own particular department, in order to influence to no small extent the course of the war. I do not propose to relate the history of their lives in this volume ; but simply to consider and call attention to those aspects of their work which happen to come under my notice either through my personal contact with themselves or their activities. If at times I should appear to concern myself also with the purely human side of their natures, this will be only with the object of bringing them more to the readers as fellow-men, and of avoiding the common error of presenting mere mortals in immortal guise.

FIELD-MARSHAL COUNT VON MOLTKE

An old officer who had been through the campaign of 1870-71 said to me at the beginning of the year 1915, " If old Moltke had been among us, we should have been victorious long ago, and the war would have been at an end." These words demonstrate the amazing and unbounded confidence which this great whilom chief of the German General Staff once enjoyed. But I must not be surprised that he inspired this confidence from the start — not by any means — even after he had shown himself successful. I have had quite intelligent people assure me that there were other generals of whom they thought even more highly than of him. It was not uncommon on such occasions to hear the name of Blumenthal mentioned.

But at the present day there is no one who would venture to doubt the supreme greatness of the Field- Marshal. But how is it, we may ask, that this greatness has been brought home to the meanest intelligence ? Only through the persuasive powers of success. If only Hindenburg and Ludendorff had been able to remain successful until the end, they too would now have been elevated to the skies by a jubilant and wildly enthusiastic multitude. As it is, however, every fatuous coxcomb now thinks himself justified in pronouncing his foolish criticism against them.

It was Moltke who once said that success only attends the able man. But not every able man has had success, nor is he likely to have it in the future, and this despite the fact that a general no less great than Moltke has said : " Let all careers be open to men of ability." 1 For have not a number of leaders of men — from Hannibal to Napoleon himself — been wrecked in the end, and perished under a cloud ? Even the most powerful of great men may be hampered by the smallness of those about them. Thus the words that old officer said to me, which I have quoted above, should not be too readily regarded as true. The circumstances of the Great European War cannot be compared with those of the war with France. It should be borne in mind that behind Moltke in those days there stood that simple, wellbalanced and strong-minded man, Kaiser Wilhelm, not to mention the towering genius of Bismarck, The French Army, moreover, had then not quite

recovered from the wars in the Crimea and Italy, let alone the adventure in America. We, on the other hand, possessed a magnificent army, flushed with the triumph of two campaigns, and superior at least in numbers to that of the enemy.

Now I am not of those who swear by the belief that God is always on the side of the big battalions, or of superior numbers. Often enough have we seen that the converse is true, without having to refer to Leuthen 1 or any other hostile engagement of the past. Be this as it may, there is truth in the old adage. A Commander-in-Chief to-day cannot create the strongest battalions at a moment's notice ; they have to be mustered and held in readiness for him in peace-time. But what a number of people have to have their say before that can be done ! Occasionally of course, he can by his skill make good the deficiency by concentrating massed forces at a particular decisive point, and content himself with the weaker forces in other quarters. But there are limits even to this form of strategy.

During the whole of the past war we were numerically inferior to the enemy. Nevertheless we carried the day on more than one occasion, and also succeeded in preventing not a few enemy's successes. At the beginning the enemy on the

1 A village in Prussian Siberia where on Dec. 5th, 1757, Frederick the Great with 34,000 men beat the Austrians, who numbered 90,000.

I decisive front usually brought his superiority to bear only on small sectors of the line at a time. And in those days, of course, it was possible for us to confront him with forces as strong as his own, because the rest of our front was not engaged. Later on, however, he attacked on ever-increasing fronts, until at last he realised that he could only make his numerical superiority felt, by attacking along the whole length of the front at once. His wealth in war material and the help of America enabled him to accomplish this. Albeit he was never able to achieve his principal object, which was to paralyse the fighting powers of our armies by his attacks.

The laws regulating the conduct of war are as old as the hills and as simple as they are old. It is, however, not always a simple matter to observe them. Despite the fact that they are valid for all time and never change, they are frequently forgotten and lost sight of. They might in certain circumstances degenerate into a game, as they did in the days of Condottieri, when each side endeavoured, by means of skilful chess moves and with least possible loss of blood, to checkmate its adversary. The first wild ruffian, however, who chose to disregard these subtle rules and to wield his sword with deadly effect destroyed these illusions at one blow.

All the great Commanders-in-Chief have always laid stress upon the old and time-honoured rules of war. Clausewitz developed them in his book on war,1 and bequeathed them as an inheritance to the Prussian Army. Moltke plainly recognised those same rules both in his theory and his practice. The rout of the enemy is achieved by an enveloping movement, and in its most perfect form by means of a complete encirclement of his forces, for which Tannenberg will always stand as the pattern.

We came across a similar case under Moltke's own leadership only once, and that was at Sedan. The enveloping movement at Worth and St. Privat ultimately determined the victory. At Worth, however, it succeeded only after very heavy fighting, and cannot be regarded as a perfect example of the method, while at St. Privat it was not systematically achieved under the directions of the Commander-in- Chief and his staff, but was brought about by the spirit and resolution shown by certain subordinate commanders. Thus it is by no means an easy matter to observe these very simple rules. Many people are now of the opinion that since the last great war, these old rules have been superseded. But where our methods failed in this war was in those engagements in which the ultimate issue of the battle depended upon the unity of our operations. It would first have to be proved that this had been a necessity.

1 Vom Kriege.

In a certain not very well-known essay Napoleon draws a comparison between what he calls a gbntral du terre and a gkn&ral du mer. The latter surveys the whole of his battle area, as also the movements of the enemy ; from the former however, both battlearea and enemy are more or less concealed. He therefore requires to be endowed with a peculiar gift, which Napoleon calls divination — that is to say, something which partakes of the supernatural. Moltke substitutes for this gift the duty of a general to take for granted that the enemy are capable of adopting wise and effective measures, and to arrange his plan of battle accordingly.

But even this in itself is no small undertaking. In order to carry it out, a man must be possessed of a clear and quite impartial mind, so as not to fall into the error of suspecting the enemy of what appears to be his rational course, but which is, in sooth, but the creation of one's own wishes in the matter.

I only came across old Field-Marshal Moltke once, and that was when I was working as a lieutenant on the General Staff, and he took leave of us in August, 1888. His final words of farewell were distributed to the whole staff in the form of a printed letter. But even after that he continued to concern himself with the training of officers, and took an active part in the great final examinations at which they qualified for Staff appointments. The principles he laid down for the training of staff officers remained operative until the time of the last great war. In regard to his general-staff rides, however, and his experimental practice in tactics and the direction of operations, others have written better and more fully than I could possibly pretend to do. From very small beginnings they gradually developed into the elaborate system with which we were familiar at the outbreak of the war.

Though at first they were only designed to apply to mixed bodies of troops and divisions, they were ultimately modified to meet the demands of work with Army Corps and Armies. But the sound and solid basis which he laid down was adopted without alteration by those who followed in his footsteps. The same remarks apply to the work of studying foreign armies, fortifications and works, reconnoitring, the history of war, and the measures to be taken for the various mobilisation schemes.

As chief of the Operations branch, I became acquainted with the preparatory measures by Moltke for the war of 1870, and it strikes me that it is a very remarkable thing how frequently great military commanders who all their lives have advocated aggressive tactics, in their old age incline to methods of defence. Even Clausewitz recommends them as the better policy. After 1871, Moltke, too, based his calculations upon this principle.

Neither of these great men, however, can be said to have recommended lifeless and inactive defence alone ; both of them insist upon the advisability of taking the offensive once the enemy's attack has been met and repulsed. Observation of this rule is by no means an easy matter. For instance, in the light of what the last great war has taught, I cannot think of a single engagement where an offensive on a great scale was developed directly out of a purely defensive position. There may be all sorts of reasons for preferring defensive tactics. For example, they may be the best policy at a time when one is confronting the enemy, either with weaker forces, or with troops of inferior quality ; the dread of the heavy losses incurred in an offensive may also influence one in favour of purely defensive tactics. Moltke had other reasons for preferring them. The Army was to concentrate in Lorraine and wait for the French to attack.

The reason of this is not far to seek. We had no plans of conquest and had achieved all we wished to achieve. The object was to hold what we had won, whereas the French wished to recover what they had lost. That is why Moltke adopted the defensive, and with it the choice of position. Should the enemy advance through Luxembourg and Belgium, in the directions of the Lower Rhine, we were to wheel to the right, cross the Moselle, and attack the enemy in his flank. The defensive tactics were, therefore, not an end in themselves, and were part and parcel of a scheme of offense. Moltke did not work out his plans on the basis of peaceful possibilities ; he always dealt with realities. Until the moment he came into contact with the enemy, he wished to maintain the initiative. Everything beyond that point he regarded as uncertain and unreliable.

On the other hand, he who would win a victory must not recoil from the task of attempting at least to penetrate this veil of uncertainty. And for this, decision and the power to carry it through are necessary, both of which factors are insufficiently appreciated either by the average civilian or by many a critic. In order to realise the whole difficulty of this undertaking a man must have found himself face to face with it in the midst of war. It will be quite wrong to suppose that any good can come out of plunging blindly into the depths of uncertainty. Before attempting to penetrate it, one must first have formed a tolerably clear idea of what the enemy may reasonably be expected to do, so as to shape one's course accordingly.

But this is not such an easy matter as the simplicity of the rules of warfare might lead us to suppose. The conditions in war change much too quickly, and they are too complicated for this to be so. Details about the spirit, strength, style and disposition of the enemy, and all intelligence received about him, may, however, be either supplemented or increased, or altogether confirmed by certain special ruses of one's own. For instance, it is said of Goeben, that being anxious on one occasion to know a little more about his enemy, Faidherbe, and having captured both his horse and his soldier groom, he sent both of these back to the French general together with a courteous letter. On the receipt of Faidherbe's reply, which was contained in a long epistle, Goeben exclaimed, after perusing the letter, " Now I know my man ! "