Front matter
PURCHASED FOR THE
FROM THE
CANADA COUNCIL SPECIAL GRANT
Part I. Civil Administeation
The Secret of our Rule in India 1
Moral Being . 2
European Officers should not be wasted on Trivial Employments .......... 3
Natural Forces . . . . . . . . .3
The Control of Predatory Tribes . . . . . . 4
Interference with Trade opposed to the Laws of Political Economy .......... 5
The Liberty of the Press '6
On Missionaries ; and the Interference of the State in matters appertaining to Religion ....... 8
Selection versus Examination ...... 9
Reduction of Civil Salaries . * 14
Should Officers unable to Pass in the Language of a District be removed from Office ? . . . . . . .17
Non-Removal of Incompetent Officials . . . . .18
Abolition of Statute Labour advocated . . . .18
Minute on Objections urged against the Abolition of Forced
Labour in Sind .21
Abolition of Forced Labour in Sind . . . . .26 Calculation of Labour Rates in certain Districts . . .34 Wheel-Carriages and Bridges . . . . . .35
Repairs of Roads by Contracts 37
Plans and Estimates versus a Road and Canal . . .38 A Navigable Canal to the Indus, and the Requirements of Kurrachee as a Port . . . . . . . .40
Public Ferries ..... . . . .41
h vi
CONTENTS.
PAGE
Eemarks on a Railway to connect the Indus with the Seaport ofKurrachee 43
Travellers' Bungalows and Serais . . . . ,49
Trade creates a Market, but does not necessarily follow a Market-place ......... 50
Political Science related to all Science ^ . . . .51
Customs and Pier Dues . . . . . . .52
Frontier Trade Returns 52
The Indus Flotilla and Forest Conservancy beyond the sphere
of the State's Functions 53
Engineer and Normal Class Scholars should not be limited to Government Employ . . . . . . .54
Remarks on the Revenue System of the North- West Provinces 55 Revenue Settlement . . , . . . . .57
Titles to Land, and Leases 59
Artificial Encouragement to Agriculture . . . .71
Management of Pastoral Hill Tracts 71
Tax not the Desert . .73
Restoration and Duties of Village Accountants . . .73
Salaries to Village Accountants 74
Protection of Bunds by Contracts . . . . .76 Tank-Digging . . . . . . . . .78
Effect of removing Dams 79
Increased Cultivation followed by more abundant Rain in the
Desert 80
Moral Influence exerted as an Element in securing large numbers of Labourers among I^ude Tribes . . . .80
Military Commissions as Courts of Civil Judicature . . 83 Police Confessions . . . . . . . .83
On the Supply of Carriage in a Free Market . . . .84
Part II. On Military Matters
On the Arming of a Free People ; and on the true Principles of the Organisation of the Armies of England . . .93
The Defects of the Bengal Army 101
Comparison between the Systems obtaining in the Armies of
Bengal and Bombay , . . . . . .117
CONTENTS.
Vll
PAGE
Remarks on the State of the Native Army of India in general ; upon the Principles whereon its Efficiency depends ; and on the Means whereby its existing Defects may be remedied . 124
Silidar Horse ......... 135
On granting Compensation to Silidar Corps . . . .164
Sihdar Rifle Corps 168
Three Memoranda on the Constitution of the Sind Irregular
Horse, as exemplifying the Silidar Principle . . .170 Carriage Arrangements of the Sind Irregular Horse . .189 Camp Supplies and Baggage Corps . . . . .193
The MiHtary Fund 203
Furlough Regulations 204
Daily Orderly-Room to be held by every Commanding Officer . 209 The Vices of the Seniority System in the Native Army . .211 Fixed Head-Quarters for Regiments . . . . .213 The Obedience of Soldiers not to depend on their own pleasure 214 On the Pui'chase of Horses by Government for Military Purposes . . . . . . . . . . 214
Stud-bred Horses . . 217
The Military Board and Audit Department . . . .219
MISCELLANEOUS SUBJECTS.
MiHtary Rules on High Caste Men 220
Sepoy Mutineers and their Officers . . . . .220
Powers of Commanding Officers, and Candidates for EnKstment 221 Prize Property ......... 221
Fortifications . . . . - . . . . . 222
Flank Companies and Sizing . . . . . .222
Qualifications of Staff Officers . . . . . .222
Night Attack by Shere Mahomed 222
The Sepoy's Musket 223
Cavalry Swords ......... 224
The Point and Cut 225
Cloth Pantaloons versus Leather Breeches for Mounted Men . 227 Horse Artillery and Cavalry Charges ..... 228
Good Tools do not make Bad Workmen .... 228
The Greatest Danger to our Indian Empire . . . .229
Removal of a Prohibitory Order ...... 230
Cavalry Charges should succeed . . . . . .230
European and Native Soldiers on Service . . . ,231 viii
CONTENTS.
PAGE
Directions for a Saddle r. .232
Memoranda on Rifles, in their Application to the Purposes of
War, and on Rifle Practice . . . . . .233
Penetration of Jacob's Iron-pointed Rifle Balls . . .275
Best Army Rifle 275
Explanation of the Diflerence between the Minie and Jacob
Rifle BaU 280
Part III. Relating To The North-west Frontier Of India
Memoir of the First Campaign in the Hills North of Kutchee, to the North- West of the Frontier of Sind . . . 287
Subsequent Proceedings on the North West Frontier of Sind up to the close of the year 1847 317
Appendix to the Memoir 326
Arrangements carried into effect for the Security and Prosperity of that portion of the North- West Frontier forming the Boundary between Sind and Beloochistan, comprising —
Memorandum on the Principles of Procedure on the North- West Frontier of Sind 349
Summary of Arrangements made on the North-West Frontier of Sind 353
Military System introduced for the protection of the North- West Frontier of Sind 356
Disarming of the North-West Frontier .of Sind . . .362
Mistaken Leniency towards Marauders . . . . .364
Standing Orders for the Frontier Posts of the North-West Frontier of Sind 367
Assessment on the Land of the Frontier District of Sind . .367
Advice to a Native Prince . . . . . . .369
The Brahooees, Aifghans, and Pathans, considered as Recruits for our Armies ... ..... 370
Suggestions towards the Permanent Defence of the North-West Frontier of India 375
Memorandum of Proposed Arrangements in case of a British Force being stationed at Quetta, or at other convenient Spot above the Bolan Pass . . . . . . .385
CONTENTS. ix
Part IV. Relating To The Persian War
PAGE
Its Policy 401
On the Policy of invading Persia ...... 403
The Valleys of the Karoon and Euphrates; and Russian
Policy 403
Cavalry for Transport by Sea to the Persian Gulf . . .406 Military Requirements in the Expedition to the Persian
Gulf 407
On Holding our own Ground after Victory .... 408
Kuzistan having become ours by Conquest, should be permanently occupied . . . . . . . .409
Water Supplies at Bushire and Karrack . . . .411
Mohumra, Karrack, and Bushire, considered as places for Troops to summer in . . . . . . .411
Insalubrity of Mohumra 412
Supplies from Bombay 413
Supplies from the Valley of the Euphrates . . . .413 Employment of the Men in Hutting themselves . . .414 It is better to be, than to seem, strong . . . . .414 Bushire as a Point of Embarkation . . . . .415 Orientals are commanded, not by Etiquette, but by Habitual
Nobility of Being 415
The School of Smooth Words . . . . . .416
Part V
OBSERVATIONS ON THE PRESENT CONDITION OF INDIA, AND ON THE REORGANIZATION OF ITS CIVIL AND MILITARY ADMINISTRATION.
Three Extracts on the present Condition of India . . .419 A Scheme for the Reorganization of the Civil and Military
Administration of India 425
Reply to some Observations on the Scheme of Reorganization . 439
X
CONTENTS.
ADDENDA.
PAGE
Security for the Good Conduct of Eecruits .... 447 Order relative to the Mahomedan Festival of the Mohurrum . 448
Index 451
Preface
We frequently find theorists advocating the application of Natural Law to the affairs of men. We more frequently find the legislators and actors in these affairs working in contempt or ignorance of that law. But it is of very rare occurrence to meet a man possessing at once the ability, will, and opportunity himself to apply the Law of Nature in many departments of common business. And believing that General Jacob has both faithfully and successfully so applied it, I have collected some of his views, and now lay them before the public, in the hope that they may become as useful to others as they have been to myself.
I beg the reader to bear in mind, when perusing the following papers, that they are not the effusions of a mere theorist, but contain some of the pungent maxims arrived at by a man whose life has been passed in action. Himself believing in Universal Law, the General has dared to apply its principles to business immediately in hand, presuming that what was true for the whole could not but prove true for xii
PREFACE.
the particulars of this whole. And thus, testing his theory by practice, and finding his assumptions borne out by practical results, he now claims to affirm these with the authority of a master.
The foregoing observations apply equally to the papers upon civil and upon military matters. But it is upon their application to the latter that I propose to remark : for it is but too manifest that our existing military system in India has failed ; and that if England still purpose to hold India, she must do so by means either of undisguised English military occupation, or of a Native army re-organised on sound and lasting principles.
Choosing the former course, we must be prepared to maintain in India an English force as large as, or larger than, we were able to maintain in the Crimea ; to acknowledge before all the world that our rule in India is based, not on the good-will of the governed, but upon palpable military occupation ; to maintain our English army in India, still undiminished, in the event of an European war ; to increase this army in the contingency of our European enemies extending their influence into Asia ; to drain (beyond the drain already involved in our government as foreigners) India of that wealth which is now returned to her in the form of pay and pensions to a vast Native military establishment ; and, lastly, to create and provide for discontent among a large section of our Indian subjects who now trust to the military profession for subsistence.
Choosing the latter course, it is incumbent on us to lose no time in availing ourselves of such material for
PREFACE.
Xlll a loyal and efficient Native army, as may be ready to hand ; and in availing ourselves of all workmen able to fashion this material into shape.
Convinced that neither the present military resources of England, nor the present financial resources of India, could permanently support, in India, an English army equal to holding our Eastern empire ; and convinced, moreover, that if those resources could respond to this demand, England would not be justified in subjecting India to an English military occupation — I accept the alternative of reorganising our Native army ; and I appeal to the military papers contained in this volume, and to the practice upon which they are founded, in proof of the assertion which I now publish — that we have at least one man among us who can discern and point out to us the material for a Native army, and who has shown himself able to organise it into loyalty and efficiency.
It is unquestionable that, standing alone, at the hazard of his commission, and subjected to prolonged obloquy and opposition. General Jacob has during a period of many years past, exposed the vices of the system now failing us ; has predicted that the combined direct and indirect operation of this system would result in failure ; and has, at the same time, advocated, elaborated, and carried into efifect, under very adverse circumstances, and without once faltering, a new system, capable of bearing every test, and which, though often assailed, — and sometimes virulently, — has never yet been shown to be hollow or defective.
Whether for good or for ill these principles, which xiv
PREFACE.
General Jacob has exemplified in the constitution of his regiments of Sind Irregular Horse, have, from the first, had in view the reformation of our Native armies in India. The reformation thus exemplified has, from the first, been declared to be, not in degree, but in essence ; to aim, not at a modification of the existing system, but at a radical, essential abolition of this system, in favour of another by him introduced. This latter was, in the first instance, tried with one, subsequently with a second, and is about to be tried with a third regiment of horse. In the two first instances, the men enlisted were drawn from the very heart of those districts now in revolt. In both these instances, the experiment met with strenuous and continued opposition from all quarters ; and was stigmatised as mere theory, inapplicable to the real practice of war. In both instances it proved, under severe and prolonged trial, to be completely successful.
There remained, however, one supposed objection to the permanent and extended application of the General's system. It was this — that though successful when carried out under his immediate direction, it would fail if entrusted to less able men. Nevertheless, one of the regiments so trained was recently sent on foreign service under the command of a young lieutenant ; was harassed by sea as cavalry seldom have been harassed; and was then scattered under its Native officers to Kurrachee, Bombay, Poona, and elsewhere. Yet those detachments remained staunch under their native officers while mutiny was being enacted in these stations.
PREFACE.
XV by regular troops ; and showed, as plainly as need be, that the School had formed both officers and men.
Meantime, the other regiment so trained remained, under another officer, on the frontier ; and this officers military powers were unavoidably contracted by the presence of a senior officer in command of an irregular corps from Bengal. To the rear of this frontier was the station of Shikarpoor, holding disaffected regular troops ;* to its right front was the Punjaub, in which nearly every regular regiment was in revolt or disarmed ; to its left front was the State of Khelat, in temporary disorder, attributable to the Khan's demise ; and in its immediate neighbourhood was a border chief f striving to awaken rebellion. Yet this second regiment
* The most important arm, the Native Artillery, actually broke out into open mutiny ; while one of the most trusted Subedars in the only Native Infantry regiment at the station of Shikarpoor was arrested, and soon after executed, as ringleader of a plot to mutiny and murder. I should add, that no European troops were stationed within several hundred miles of the frontier.
f This borderer wrote to all his neighbouring chiefs, calling upon them to strike a blow for freedom. He told them it would be in vain to tamper with the troopers of the Sind Horse, but that they should all assemble at Jacobabad on an appointed day, under pretence of making their usual obeisance, and should, then and there, upon a signal to be by him given, rise and murder the European officers, and afterwards raise the surrounding country.
Among the chiefs so addressed was one, of whose tribe some five hundred men had, within the past ten years, been destroyed by the officer then commanding the Sind Horse. Yet he, like all his neighbours, returned for answer that the English Government had xvi
PREFACE.
stood and stands staunch, although in a position, and under temptations, than which it were difficult to imagine any more trying to the loyalty of mercenaries.
I am well aware that, in thus plainly laying the truth before the public, I may incur, from some persons, the charge of undue presumption. But I am not less confident that every man, really careful for the honour and welfare of our Indian Government and its army, will dispassionately consider whether the system advocated and practised by General Jacob is or is not adapted to our requirements ; and, in the event of his denying its suitability, that he will support his denial by valid reasons, and endeavour himself to submit a system which Theory may argue, and practice have proved, to be preferable. Meanwhile, to those who look for precedent I would suggest that our own history affords an example of an army remodelled upon a regiment of Silidar Horse — which regiment was Cromwell's.
Having found occasion to use the term " Bengal,"
been just to them, and that they would take no part in the proposed massacre. Many of them also sent in trusty agents, bearing news of what had occurred.
Upon receiving this intelligence, the officer commanding called for two of his native officers, informed them of the plot, and directed them to provide for its frustration, and for securing its ringleader. They arranged accordingly ; and the borderer had no sooner arrived upon the day appointed, than he was quietly arrested. Yet his plot had been divulged to some hundreds of the men in the lines; and its divulgence was, further, known to many of the border chiefs on the frontier. The traitor alone remained ignorant of hia own betrayal.
PREFACE. Xvii
in connection with the defects of our military system, I deem it on every account proper to explain that I am far from intending to cast reflections upon any officer or body of officers. The development of the present crisis has assured me that our failure is attributable, not to individuals, but to system ; and for the framing of this system the executive are not responsible.
For myself, had not the Indian army, to which I belong, been disgraced by mutiny, I had assuredly remained silent. But as matters are, I should deem myself culpable in neglecting to submit to our legislators, and the English people, information which they should, in the present crisis, possess ; and towards supplying which I chance, by a long residence with General Jacob, on his personal Staff,* to have been favourably circumstanced.
I am convinced that no unprejudiced person, accurately acquainted with the history of our native army, can read these military papers, or become familiar with the practice on which they result, without perceiving that the principles advocated are in exact conformity with whatever has been or still may be worthy in the constitution of that army. I believe there is scarcely a commanding officer or an adjutant of a regiment who would not at once acknowledge that the details in which he has found
* As Assistant in the Revenue and General Department when the General was acting as Commissioner in Sind ; as Aide-de- Camp when he was in Command of the Cavalry Division Persian Field Force ; and as Political Secretary when he was Commander-in-Chief in Persia.
xviii
PREFACE.
himself hampered are those pointed out in these papers. And all who have perused the works of the late Sir John Malcolm, and the selections from the correspondence of the late Lord Metcalfe, recently edited hy Mr. Kaye, will he impressed with the coincidence of the principles enunciated hy these statesmen with those independently practised by General Jacob. One principle, common to all three writers, cannot be too strongly urged. It is this — That from the moment when the command of a Native Regiment becomes less sought for than other employ^ we may date the comraencement of our downfall. To render this command so sought for, we must place the commander in a position to he looked up to hy his own men, and hy society, whether English or native; and we must support him in the exercise of full authority. To do this involves selection, — selection, that is, of officers for a class of appointments more essential to the existence of our rule in India than any other class of appointments whatsoever, he they military or civil,
LEWIS PELLY.
Camp Pokrun,
December 1857.
The opening of the book is shown; the full text loads in the reader.
Loading the full text…
The end
You’ve reached the end of The views and opinions of Brigadier-General John Jacob.
