A view of the principal deistical writers, that have appeared in England in the last and present century; with observations upon them, and some account of the answers that have been published against them. In several letters to a friend.

Front matter

A view of the principal deistical writers

V

A VIEW

Preface To The Fifth Edition

No man that is not utterly unacquainted with the state of things among us can be ignorant, that in the last, and especially in the present age, there have been many books published, the manifest design of which was to set aside revealed religion. Never in any Country where Christianity is professed, were there such repeated . attempts to subvert its divine authority, carried on sometimes under various disguises, and at other times without a disguise at all. The most noted writers on that side have been at liberty to produce their strongest objections ; these objections have been retailed br¬ others ; and many seem to take it for granted, that Christianity hath received very sensible wounds by the several attacks that have been made upon it, and that they have greatly hurt its credit, and weakened its authority.

But whosoever will be at the pains impartially to examine those of the deistical writers that have hitherto appeared among us, and to compare them with the answers which have been made to them, will find, that upon a nearer view they are far from being so formi¬ dable as some have been apt to apprehend. And since there are few that have leisure or patience for a particular inquiry into the several writings which have appeared in this controversy, some judicious persons, who wish well to the interest of our common Christianity, have been of opinion, that it might be of real service to give a summary view of the most noted books that have been published against revealed religion for above a century past, together with proper observations upon them. From such a view, the reader might be enabled to form some notion of the several turns this con¬ troversy hath taken, how often the enemies of revealed religion have thought proper to change their methods of attack, the different dis- • guises and appearances they have put on, and the several schemes they have formed, all directed to one main end, viz. to set aside rev-e¬ lation, and to substitute mere natural religion, or, which seems to have been the intention of some of them, no religion at all, in its room.'

Upon such a comparison between those that have attacked Chris¬ tianity, and those that have been written in defence of it, it would appear, that if it be really true, that deism and infidelity have made a great progress among us, it must have been owing to something else than the force of reason and argument ; that the Christian religion is in no danger from a free and impartial inquiry; and that

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IV

Preface

the most plausible objections which have been brought against it, though advanced with great confidence, and frequently repeated, have been fairly and solidly confuted. Such a view would make it manifest, that the enemies of Christianity have not generally be¬ haved as became fair adversaries, but have rather acted as if they judged any arts lawful by which they thought they might gain their cause. And yet, notwithstanding their utmost efforts for above a century past, they have really been able to say but little against the Christian religion, considered in its original purity, as delivered by Christ and his apostles, or to invalidate the solid evidences by which it is attested and confirmed.

* For these reasons it hath been judged, that a short and compre¬ hensive view of the deistical writers of the last and present age might be of great use. And as the course of my studies hath led me to be conversant in several of those writings which have been published on both sides in this important controversy, it was urged upon me, by some persons for whom I have a great regard, to under¬ take this work. There was one great objection, which hindered me for some time from attempting it, and which still appearetli to me to be of no small weight, and that is, that as, according to the plan that was formed, it would be necessary to give an account of the answers published to the books I should have occasion to mention, this would oblige me to take notice of some of my own. I am sen¬ sible how difficult it is for an author to speak of his own perform¬ ances, in such a manner as not to intrench upon the rules of decency. If he give a favourable character of them, this will be interpreted as a proof of his vanity, any appearance of which is usually turned to his disadvantage. And on the other hand, if he should make no mention of his own books at all, where the nature of the design in which he is engaged makes it proper for him to mention them, this might perhaps be censured as a false and affected modesty. It is no easy matter to keep clear of these extremes ; and, for this reason, it would have been a particular pleasure to me to have seen this work undertaken by another hand ; but as this -hath not been done, I have chosen rather to attempt it myself, than that a work, which I cannot but think might be of real service, should be neglected. It cannot be expected, that a distinct notice should be taken of all the writers that have appeared among us iagainst revealed religion for this century past. This, if it could be executed, would take too large a compass, and be of no great use. A view of the principal of them, or, at least, of those who have made the greatest noise, may be sufficient. And the design is not to give an historical account of the authors, or of their personal

PREFACE.

V characters, but to give some idea of their writings, which alone we have properly to do with.

The method proposed, and for the most part pursued, is this : The several writers are mentioned in the order of time in which they appeared. Some account is given of their writings, and of the several schemes they have advanced, as far as the cause of revelation is concerned. And great care has been taken to make a fair repre¬ sentation of them, according to the best judgment I could form of their design. Some observations are added, which may help to lead the reader into a just notion of those* writings, and to detect and obviate the ill tendency of them. There is also an account sub¬ joined of the answers that were published ; not all of them, but some of the most remarkable, or such as have come under the author’s special notice. And very probably some have been omitted, which might well deserve to be particularly mentioned.

This may suffice to give a general idea of the following work ; at the end of which there are some reflections subjoined, which seem naturally to arise upon such a view as is here given. Observations are made on the conduct of the deists in the management of the argument. And the whole concludes with a brief representation of the evidences for the Christian religion, and its excellent nature and tendency.

What has been now laid before the reader, is taken from the Pre¬ face to the first edition : and it gives a just account of the original nature and design of this work, which was at first intended only to make up one volume. But not long after the publication of it, I was put in mind of a considerable omission I had been guilty of in making no mention of Mr. Hume, who was looked upon to be one of the most subtle writers that had of late appeared against Christianity. About the same time was published, a pompous edition of the works of the late Lord Viscount Bolingbroke, in five volumes quarto, the last three of which seemed to be principally intended against revealed, and even against some important prin¬ ciples of what is usually called natural, religion. Some persons, for whose judgment and friendship I have a great regard, were of opinion, that, to complete the design which was proposed in publish¬ ing the View of the Deistical Writers, it was necessarv to take a distinct notice of the writings of Mr. Hume and Lord Bolingbroke : and that in that case it might be of use to make more large and particular observations upon them, than could properly be done where a number of writers came under consideration. This produced a second volume, which, though it had the same title with the former, viz. A View of the Deistical Writers , yet differed from it in

VI

PREFACE.

this, that it did not contain strictures and observations upon a variety of authors, but a large and particular consideration of the only two there examined, viz. Mr. Hume and the late Lord Bolingbroke, especially the latter. And this was judged necessary, considering his Lordship’s high reputation as a writer, and that there are scarcely any of the objections against Christianity which he hath not repeated and urged in one part or other of his works, and that with a peculiar confidence, and with all the strength of reason and vivacity of imagination he was master of. And as I then thought I had finished the design, that volume ended with an Address to Deists andprofessed Christians, which appeared to me to be a proper con¬ clusion of the whole.

But after the second volume was published, some letters were sent me, relating both to that and the former volume, which put me upon reconsidering some things in them, and making farther additions and illustrations, which I thought might be of advantage to the main design. These were thrown into a Supplement, which made up a third volume, and was published separately for the use of those who had purchased the two former.

It gives me some concern, that this work is become so much larger than was at first intended, which I am afraid will prove a disadvantage to it, and disgust or discourage some readers. But I hope favourable-allowances will be made, considering the extent of the design, and the variety of matters here treated of. I believe it will appear, that there are few objections which have been advanced in this controversy, but what are taken notice of in the following work, and either sufficiently obviated, or references are made to books where fuller answers are to be found.

May God in his holy providence follow what is now published with his blessing, that it may prove of real service to the important interests of religion among us, to promote which, as far as my ability reaches, I shall ever account the greatest happiness of my life. And it should be the matter of our earnest prayers to God, that all those who value themselves upon the honourable name and privileges of Christians, may join in united efforts to support so glorious a cause, in which the preservation and advancement of true religion and virtue, the peace and good order of society, and the present and eternal happiness of individuals, are so nearly concerned.

I have nothing farther to add, but that in this as well as the former editions the whole is conducted in a series of letters, which were written to my most worthy and much esteemed friend, the reverend Dr. Thomas Wilson, rector of Walbrook, and prebendary of West¬ minster, in the form in which thev now appear.

Introduction

The comparative inefficiency of controversy, for the establish¬ ment and propagation of truth, lias long been a point of general agreement. The almost impossibility of supplanting the notion of an opponent by this means, has passed into a proverb ; and the lists of polemical contest, in particular, resemble not so much a field of battle for the dispute of territory, as an arena for fencing, in which the antagonists practise the use of weapons for the mainte¬ nance of scanty frontiers, which are often the grounds of an endless litigation, neither admitting of decision nor appeal.

It is further observable, in theological controversy, that the acri¬ mony which it has displayed, has generally been in inverse propor¬ tion to the importance of the points at issue ; so that, what may be called the civil dissensions of divines, have ever been the most ran¬ corous; and where the proximity of the parties has enabled them tograpple each other closely, the strife has been marked by the dead¬ liest bitterness.

Neither of these features, however, have characterized the great preliminary discussion, on the decision of which depends the very existence of all the minor points of variance among divines. The deistical controversy may be regarded as the most momentous that ever attracted the notice, and employed the energies of the human mind. In it are involved no less than the claims of the word of God on the attention of men, the truth or imposture of the entire system of Christianity, and, by inference, of every other form of religious belief ; so that the eternity of man’s existence, the dignity or insig¬ nificance of his nature, the whole compass of his interests, the ex¬ treme possibilities of good and ill — all hang suspended on the issue of this mighty contest.

With these considerations, the earlier disputants, on both sides, seem to have been deeply impressed. The purer and more pro¬ found school of Freethinkers, though they had no personal joys and consolations dependent on the result of their labours, and nothing' to hope from success but the insignia of victory, yet seemed consci-

INTRODUCTION.

cntiously convinced of the truth of their opinions, and not altogether insensible to the magnitude of the question. Accordingly, they wrote for the moist part with seriousness and dignity ; they ever maintained at least the semblance of reasoning ; and even, when be¬ trayed into sophism, they rarely seemed to lose sight of the intrinsic greatness of the subject they were discussing. It seems natural to expect, that the advocates of Christianity, whose dearest interests were embarked in the system they maintained, should conduct their part of the dispute with the most intense energy, and at the same time with a trembling cautiousness, lest a cause of such universal interest should suffer even a temporary disadvantage through any oversight of theirs. Accordingly, the writings of the earlier de¬ fenders of revelation supply some of the most invaluable models of fair and philosophical investigation of which our literature can boast.

• Massive learning, relieved of its cumbrousness by masterly arrange¬ ment-close and compact argument, which disdained in its progress any declamatory flourishes which could indicate a premature triumph — unassuming boldness and steadiness of purpose — the candour that scorned an unfair advantage, and the generosity that spared the fallen and the misguided — such were the attributes which distinguished, throughout the contest, these illustrious de¬ fenders of the faith. The more recent aspect of the controversy has been somewhat different. In the battle waged by philosophers, victory had plainly declared on the side of Christianity. The wretched and desperate adherents of the conquered party, have sub- • sequently seemed to fight, not for conquest, but existence. In their desperation they have lost their discipline ; and their opponents, consequently, in the security of success, have in some instances deemed it sufficient to chastise their insolence with the appropriate scourge of ridicule.

The earlier annals of the deistical controversy have been recorded, with equal ability and fairness, by Dr. Leland, in that invaluable work of which anew edition is now offered to the public. It should not, however, be regarded as merely historical. It constitutes of itself a most masterly defence of the Christian religion. It abounds with unanswerable arguments against every species of infidelity, and con¬ fers upon its author the rank of an eminent defender of the authen¬ ticity and authority of the Bible. It will be the design of the writer, in the following introductory pages, to present a cursory, but, as far as he is able, a comprehensive view of the deistical wri¬ tings which have appeared since the publication of Dr. Leland ’s treatise ; and of those productions, on the evidences of the Christian religion, to which they have given rise. In one respect the execu-

INTRODUCTION.

tion of this task must of necessity be defective. On the one hand, the infidel writers of modern times have, for an obvious reason, be¬ taken themselves to arguments which are undeserving of a parti¬ cular mention here, as they have long ago been exposed and refuted. While, on the other hand, the extended promulgation of sceptical opinions in modern times, has called forth a series of works in defence of Christianity, not so substantially different as to require a separate analysis— a process inconsistent with the limits allotted to this Introduction.

The most recent impugner of divine revelation, whose writings underwent the scrutiny of Dr. Leland, was David Hume His philosophical writings, in general, were subjected to a searching analysis, and, had no other reply appeared, they would have been regarded as fully and fairly refuted. Since that time, however, the most strictly argumentative, and therefore the most formidable of his writings, (the Essay on Miracles), has been answered by Dr. George Campbell, in a work, which for perspicuity and force of reasoning, and for the candid and catholic spirit which it displays throughout, will ever be regarded as one of the highest models of theological controversy, and one of the grandest bulwarks of the Christian faith. Although the learned author of the following work has bestowed much of his labour and ingenuity upon that part of it which he has devoted to Mr. Hume’s celebrated essay, yet, as Dr. Campbell’s refutation has ever been regarded as the most complete and triumphant, it may be proper to present, in this place, a brief view of the line of argument he has adopted.

It was the design of Mr. Hume to prove, that miracles wrought in support of a system of religion, could be rationally received only by those who witnessed them. He declares, that “ a miracle sup- • ported by any human testimony, is more properly a subject of derision than of argument;” and, again, that “no testimony for any kind of miracle can ever possibly amount to a probability, much less to a proof.” His argument ■ in ^support of this position, has been thus compendiously stated by Dr. Campbell.

“ Experience is our only guide in reasoning concerning matters * of fact. Experience is in some things variable, in some things uniform. A variable experience gives rise only to probability ; an uniform experience amounts to a proof. Probability always sup¬ poses an opposition of experiments and observations, where the one side is found to overbalance the other, and to produce a degree of' evidence proportioned to the superiority. In such cases we must balance the opposite experiments, and deduct the lesser number from the greater, in order toa know the exact force of the superior

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INTRODUCTION.

evidence. Our belief or assurance of any fact, from the report of eye-witnesses, is derived from 'no other principle than experience ; that is, our observation of the veracity of human testimony, and of the usual conformity of facts to the reports of witnesses. Now if the fact attested partakes of the marvellous, if it is such as has sel¬ dom fallen under our observation, here is a contest of two opposite experiences, of which the one destroys the other, as far as its force goes, and the superior can only operate on the mind by the force which remains. The very same principle of experience, which gives a certain degree of assurance in the testimony of witnesses, gives us also, in this case, another degree of assurance against the fact which they endeavour to establish ; from which contradiction there necessarily arises a counterpoise, and mutual destruction of belief and authority. Further, if the fact affirmed by the witnesses, in¬ stead of being only marvellous, is really miraculous ; if, besides, the testimony considered apart and in itself amounts to an entire proof; in that case there is proof against proof, of which the strongest must prevail, but still with a diminution of its force, in proportion to that of its antagonist. A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature ; and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire, as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined. And if so, it is an undeniable consequence, that it can¬ not be surmounted by any proof whatever from testimony. A miracle therefore, however attested, can never be rendered credible, even in the lowest degree.”

The fallacies into which such writers as Mr. Hume are betrayed, will be generally found to reside in those elementary premises, in which error lies so contiguous to truth, that its divergence is the least perceptible. Accordingly, we find in his definition of a miracle, an inaccuracy which his opponent has not fully exposed. He describes it as a transgression of the laws of nature, or, as he elsewhere less figuratively expresses it, a “ violation of the usual course of nature.” It might seem captious, to infer from this latter expression, that every unusual event must be regarded as miraculous. A far more vital objection, however, may be urged against it. Let it be remembered, that by the very nature of his argument, the evi¬ dence of testimony is excluded, and therefore, that our judgment respecting the ordinary course of nature must be formed solely upon personal observation. But with how few, comparatively, of the operations of nature are we personally acquainted ; in how much fewer cases can we trace them to their efficient causes ; and in how very few instances do we understand the mode or principle by which

INTRODUCTION.

XI those hidden causes effect the results which we observe ! • In short, after all our dogmatizing respecting the usual course of nature, the only universal principle that we can lay down is, that every effect must • have had an adequate cause; and with this relation of cause and effect, the arguments in favour of miracles never interfere. It is, on the contrary, contended, that a peculiar cause was in these instances put into operation, and one fully adequate to the production of the effect. The evidences of which extraordinary interposition are to be found, not only in the miracles themselves, but in collateral direc¬ tions, — as in the circumstantial fulfilment of prophecy, where the s. occurrence of the event, and the antecedent delivery of the predic¬ tion, rest on the same kind of evidence with the most undoubted historical facts ; the execution of Charles I, or the existence of General Washington.

' These observations derive their importance, from the constant and mischievous use which the essayist makes of his definition. Dr. Campbell, however, chiefly confines his reply to that part of the argument which respects the evidence of testimony; and, on this ground, has produced a refutation which must satisfy every-candid and intelligent mind. In the execution of his design, he first de¬ monstrates the fallacy of Mr. Hume’s position, that the evidence of • testimony is derived solely from experience, by showing, that prior to experience, the declarations of others have a natural, and inde¬ pendent influence on our belief. This he illustrates by noticing, • that the fullest assent to testimony, however supported, is given by children, and inexperienced persons; and that increased experience inspires a diffidence rather than confidence in the statements of others. He establishes, that the presumption prior to personal knowledge, is in unison with the testimony, not against it; and removes the objection, that experience often corrects the misrepre¬ sentations of others, by showing, that the same fact is equally true of the reports of our own memory; though it would be highly absurd to infer from hence, that the evidence of memory is derived from experience. He then adverts to the next principal position taken by the essayist, which he proves to be equally untenable. “ When the fact attested,” says Mr. Hume, “ is such as has seldom fallen under our observation, there is a contest of two opposite experi¬ ences, of which the one destroys the other, as far as its force goes, and the superior can only operate upon the mind by the force which remains.” After exposing, with great felicity, the show of arithmetical precision exhibited in the above argument, he proposes a case in confutation, the statement of which may be thus abridged.

I have lived for some years near a ferry ; 1 know that the passage-

INTRODUCTION.

bout has crossed the river a thousand times, and as often returned safe ; but I have just met an unknown man, who assures me that it lias foundered, with all its passengers, before his eyes. Here are, what Mr. Hume would call, opposite experiences. How am I to balance them ? Must I set the two thousand instances on the one side, to the single instance alleged on the other ? In this case, I have nineteen hundred and ninety-nine chances to one that my in¬ formation is false. Or must I, before I believe it, have two thou¬ sand times as much evidence for the single instance, as that which I have for any of the opposite ones ? This is impossible, since for many of them, I have the evidence of my own senses. Or, once more, must the evidence I have of the veracity of the witness, be a full equivalent to the two thousand instances which oppose his statement ? This, again, is out of the question, as the witness is, by the supposition, a perfect stranger. Yet these appear to be the only modes by which the contrary experiences can be balanced. But, suppose it be said, ‘ What then, is such weak evidence of tes¬ timony incapable of being refuted V I. reply, by no means ; although the contrary experiences, of which Mr. Hume talks so much, are utterly unable to set it aside. For, first, it may be in¬ validated by contradictory testimony. The next stranger whom I meet declares, that the whole tale is a fiction, for that he saw the boat and all the passengers come to land in safety. Here is a weight, thrown at once into the opposite scale, of more account than all the two thousand opposite instances put together. My former experience vanishes from my recollection ; my mind hangs in suspense between the two contrary declarations, until it is set at ease by corroborations of the second report, by the next three or four persons whom I meet. Again, though I may not meet with any one who can contradict the original report, the testimony of my in¬ formant may be invalidated by individuals who may successively assure me, that he is a notorious liar, and that he is continually forging such reports for the mere purpose of alarming strangers. This, though not so direct a refutation as the former, is a further means of discrediting a testimony. In short, though the direct counter statements, supposed above, may be balanced against each other, as being of a homogeneous kind, yet the two thousand instances and the single instance, cannot be so compared, since they refer to different facts, and though of a contrary nature, are not contradic¬ tory, and may therefore both be consistently believed. Lastly, Dr. Campbell argues, that the conclusion from experience is always general; and runs thus — ‘This is the ordinary course of nature; such an event may be reasonably expected, where all the circum-

INTROn UCTION.

XIII stances are entirely similar.’ But this conclusion must, in parti¬ cular cases, be exceedingly insecure, since, though all the known circumstances may be similar, many of the actual circumstances may be unknown and dissimilar. On the contrary, the evidence from testimony is always particular ; and runs thus — ‘This was the fact in such an individual instance.’ The evidence, therefore, - resulting from experience, is necessarily so weak, compared with that which results from testimony, that the strongest conviction, built merely on the former, may be overturned by the slightest proof exhibited by the latter. Such is an abstract of that beautiful line of argument, by which the boasted metaphysical theory, constructed by Mr. Hume against the miracles of Christianity, was fairly and finally exploded.* At its first enunciation, it occasioned much, perplexity and alarm, to many sincere and even intelligent believers; while it inspired a transitory triumph throughout the ranks of infi¬ delity. Very soon, however, the baseless structure was smitten with . that memorable blow under which it fell, and it is now only remem¬ bered as one of many instances, iif which the proudest champions of scepticism have, after long and loud defiance, done involuntary homage to the majesty of truth, by an ignominious fall, and an irretrievable ruin.

“ Thus I have shown,” says Dr. Campbell, “ as I proposed, that the author’s reasoning proceeds on a false hypothesis. — It supposes testimony to derive its evidence solely from experience, which is false. — It supposes by consequence, that contrary observations have a weight in opposing testimony, which the first and most acknow¬ ledged principles of human reason, or, if you like the term better, common sense, evidently shows that they have not. — It assigns a rule for discovering the superiority of contrary evidences, which, in

* A curious exemplification of that logical acuteness, in which Dr. Campbell so far surpassed his opponent, occurs in the following note, introduced in his first section.