The transition in Illinois from British to American government

Preface

The purpose of the following study is to describe the transition from British to American government, which occurred during the period of the Revolution, in that part of the West known as "the Illinois." It will be understood that the word Illinois does not here exactly correspond in territorial extent to the present state of that name. The view presented is that the result of British administration in the West was a decisive factor in the abandonment of that territory, which, of course, included Illinois, by the English ministry in 1782. Therefore a discussion of British policy respecting the West in general forms a suitable introduction to the subject in hand. An attempt has been made to describe conditions in Illinois during the period of British administration, to trace the progress of events which resulted in the overthrow of British rule and the substitution for it of government by one of the American commonwealths, to show the operation of that government, and to explain conditions in the country at the close of the Revolution. The study concludes with a consideration of the peace negotiations of 1782, so far as they relate to the West, as completing the transition of which it treats.

The materials upon which it is based are indicated in the footnotes and bibliography. I desire to express my obligations to Dr. C. E. Carter of Illinois College, who courteously allowed me to examine a part of his manuscript of a work on British administration in Illinois. That monograph has been awarded the Justin Winsor Prize of the American Historical Association for 1908, and will be published in due time. I gladly take this opportunity to record my indebtedness to Professor William R. Shepherd of Columbia University, under whose instruction I began the study of history

Vlll PREFACE.

some ten years ago. His detailed knowledge of early western history and Spanish colonial policy has rendered his criticisms especially valuable. Professor Herbert L. Osgood of Columbia, also, has read my manuscript and furnished suggestions. The work of Professor Clarence W. Alvord of the University of Illinois on the records of the Illinois villages has, in large measure, made the present study possible. To my father and mother I am under a debt of gratitude of which they and I alone know the extent.

Yale University, April 2, 1909.

Chapter I. British Policy In The West

Colonial charters and the West — Early Exploration — Western settlements and the French— Western settlements and the Fur Trade — Importance of the Fur Trade — Traders— British Policy towards western settlements after 1763 — Proclamation of 1763 — Its objects and effects — Treaty of Lochabor — Possibility of new colonies in the West — Vandalia — Proposed colony in western lands claimed by Connecticut — The Quebec Act and its effects — Illegal settlements in West — Their results — Trade conditions in the West — Suggested remedies — Failure of British Administration 1-16

Chapter II. Illinois Under Great Britain

Boundaries of Illinois — Population — Villages — Indians and Slaves — Occupations of the people — Social classes — Attitude towards British government — Inauguration and nature of British government in Illinois — Communication with the eastern colonies — Easterners in Illinois— Their activities — Their attitude toward the government — Trade conditions in Illinois — Illinois joined to Canada, but left to its own resources — Troops withdrawn — Rocheblave as British Agent — His problems, and relations with the eastern element in Illinois — Sympathy for the revolted colonists among the French of Illinois — Expectation of an American attack on Illinois early in the Revolution. . . 17-33

Chapter III

THE WESTWARD EXPANSION OF VIRGINIA AND GENESIS OF THE EXPEDITION OF 1778.

Western claims of Virginia — Creation of western counties before the Revolution — Western Indians — Western emigration — Dunmor e's War — Transylvania — George

X CONTENTS.

Rogers Clark — Clark in Kentucky — Delegate to the Virginia Assembly — Cherokee War of 1776 — Kentucky organized as a Virginia county — The Revolution in the West — Henry Hamilton — Possibility of an American attack on British posts in the Northwest — Clark's plan — Interview with Henry — An expedition authorized. . . 34-50

Chapter IV. The Overthrow Of British Power In Illinois

Recruiting — Corn Island — French-American Treaty — Clark's route to Kaskaskia. The Taking of Kaskaskia — Clark's Policy — Submission of the other Villages — Reasons for Clark's success — Difficulties of his position — Clark and the Indians — Relations with the Spaniards. . . . 51-61

Chapter V. Hamilton And Clark

Hamilton plans to recover Illinois — He leads an expedition from Detroit for that purpose — His route — Clark misled concerning Hamilton's movements — Hamilton captures Vincennes — His further plans — Clark learns that Hamilton is at Vincennes — He decides to attack Hamilton — He captures Vincennes — Effect of the capture of Hamilton on the Indians — Clark plans to attack Detroit, but is unable to do so — He takes up his headquarters at the Falls of the Ohio 62-76

Chapter VI

Illinois under Clark — Clark's popularity with the inhabitants — County government for Illinois established by Virginia — Todd appointed County-Lieutenant — Henry's instructions to him, to Clark, and to Montgomery — Inauguration of civil government by Todd — Establishment of courts — Paper money — Land speculation — Support of the troops — Difficulties of Todd's position — He leaves Illinois— Characteristics of American frontiersmen — Grievances of the people of Illinois — Emigration of the better class from Illinois — De la Balme episode — Expedition against St. Joseph — Fear of British and Indian attacks on Illinois — Plan to establish a fort at the mouth of the Ohio — Attack on Cahokia and St. Louis — Fort

CONTENTS. XI

Jefferson — Rogers, Bentley and Dodge — Inhabitants of Illinois left to their own resources — Decline of Virginia's interest in Illinois — Further activities of Bentley — Their results — Clark instructed to lead an expedition against Detroit — Failure of the plan — Possibility of restoring British authority in Illinois — Views of Gerardin — Virginia retains nominal possession of Illinois till 1784 77-in

Chapter VII. The Peace Negotiations And The West

The Transition in Illinois completed by the Treaty of Paris — Rockingham Ministry — Appointment by Congress of Peace Commissioners — Franklin and Oswald begin informal negotiations — Views of Congress respecting the West — Letter of Livingston — Instructions to Jay — Franklin and Canada — Fox and the Negotiations — Shelburne's Ministry — The Policy of Spain — The Problem before the American Commissioners — Prominence of Jay in the Negotiations — Franklin's Conditions of Peace — Aranda — Rayneval — Policy of Vergennes — Jay's independent move — Shelburne's response — Separate negotiation between England and the United States — Arrival of Adams in France — His attitude — A theory of French policy — Provisional Treaty — Explanation of the abandonment of the West by Great Britain. 112-140

Chapter I— Introduction. British Policy In The West

The expression "the West" is here used specifically to designate the territory between the Alleghanies and the Mississippi, the Great Lakes and the Floridas. This territory did not become important in English colonial history until the eighteenth century. It was included, however, at least nominally, in one or another of the colonial charters which emanated from the English crown in the seventeenth century. By the Virginia charter of 1609 the territory of that province was declared to extend "from sea to sea." The grant made to the New England Council in 1620, the Connecticut charter of 1662, the charter to the Lords Proprietors of Carolina in 1663, and the Georgia charter of later date, contained similar provisions. The Massachusetts charter of 1691 declared that the territory of that province should extend "towards the South Sea, or westward as far as Our colonies of Rhode Island, Connecticut, and the Narragansett country." With the exception of the Georgia grant these charters were issued at a time when the vaguest and most inaccurate ideas prevailed regarding the configuration of the North American continent. The South Sea was supposed to be not very remote from the Atlantic, and the crown was quite ignorant of the real extent of territory embraced in the grants. In many cases they overlapped, and conflicting claims resulted.

During the last quarter of the seventeenth century, the French discoveries and explorations upon which Louis XIV based his claim to sovereignty over the Mississippi valley advanced geographical knowledge and disclosed something of the true extent of the continent. Claimed by France, the West assumed a real importance in the minds of British statesmen.

The small beginnings of English colonial exploration west of the Alleghanies date from the seventeenth century.

The journal of a party of Virginians sent in 1671 to discover "the ebbing and flowing of the water on the other side of the Mountains, in order to the discovery of the South Sea," has been preserved.1 They probably reached the Kanawha river. In the seventeenth century, also, the possibilities of the fur trade were beginning to be realized, especially in New York. In 1686 traders under license from Governor Dongan went to the Great Lakes.2

Governor Spotswood of Virginia took an intelligent interest in the West and understood the danger from the French power in Canada, on the Lakes, and on the Mississippi. He saw that it virtually surrounded the English settlements,3 and believed that, if unchecked, it could not only monopolize the whole fur trade, but actually conquer the English colonies.4 In view of this menace he deemed it of the greatest importance that settlements should be made on the Great Lakes, and possession acquired of those passes over the mountains necessary to safeguard communication with them.5 From what he learned while on an expedition over the Blue Ridge in 1716, he believed that the plan was practicable. Basing himself on the charter of 1609, he asserted that "most of the Lakes and great part of the head branches of Mississippi" were included within the limits of Virginia, while the French settlements on the lower Mississippi fell within the boundaries of South Carolina.6

So long as the French power existed in the West the British government was disposed to favor western settlements, to urge that their charters carried the colonies indefinitely westward, and to assert that the French were trespassing on English territory.7 In 1748, in connection

1 Fernow, The Ohio Valley in Colonial Days, 220 et seq. 1 Ibid., 66-67.

* Collections of the Virginia Historical Society, new series, II, 329-330. 4 Ibid., 296. 6 Ibid., 296-297. 8 Ibid., 295. 'Force, American Archives, 4th series, I, 182.

with a proposed grant in the West to the Ohio Company, the Lords of Trade reported that "the settlement of the country lying to the westward of the Great Mountains in the colony of Virginia, which is the center of all His Majesty's provinces, will be for His Majesty's interest and advantage .... inasmuch as his Majesty's subjects will be thereby enabled to cultivate a friendship and carry on a more extensive commerce with the nations of Indians inhabiting those parts, and such settlements may likewise be a proper step towards disappointing the views and checking the encroachments of the French."8 The claim that charters extended the colonies to the South Sea, and the assertion that the French claim to the Mississippi was not just, were made by the president of the Virginia Council in I749-9 Governor Dinwiddie in 1756 advanced the most extensive territorial claims for his province. Virginia, he said, was supposed to include all lands west of the Alleghanies between the northern boundary of Carolina and the southern boundary of Canada.10 He was willing, however, to consider settlements which had been made near the Ohio as "the present boundary to the westward."11 He was convinced of the necessity of erecting forts as a barrier against the French.12 Governor Pownall desired the establishment of western colonies for the same purpose.13 This, also, was, no doubt, the purpose of the recommendation made by the colonial commissioners assembled at Albany in 1754 that measures should be taken for the establishment of Protestant settlements in the West.1* It was in Franklin's mind when in the Albany Plan of Union he proposed the founding of western colonies.

10 Colls. Va. Hist. Soc., new series, IV, 339. u Ibid., Ill, 381.

" Pownall, Administration of the Colonies, 26. ed., London, 1765 ; appendix, 47-48. 14 O'Callaghan, Documentary History of New York, II, 356.

Western settlements were favored not only as a barrier against the French, but also because it was believed that they would aid in the development of the fur trade. This feature of western colonization was referred to by Spotswood early in the century. It was dwelt upon by Governor Gooch of Virginia in 1747, in connection with the grant to the Ohio Company, already referred to.15 Dinwiddie was fully aware of the possible profits of the fur trade, and believed that it would be stimulated by western settlements.16 But he thought that if the French remained in possession of the Ohio, the English would be entirely deprived of the trade.17

The problem which confronted the British government at the conclusion of the Seven Years' War was not easy. By the Treaty of Paris in 1763 Great Britain came into possession of the great peltry-bearing regions, Canada and the West. The belief, indeed, seems later to have been common among her revolted colonists that the desire to control the fur trade had been a leading object of her policy in prosecuting the French war.18 An immense waste of uninhabited country was a profitable acquisition only by reason of its trade.19 From this standpoint it was felt by the nation to be an asset of distinct value.20 The ministry, moreover, had preferred the possession of Canada and the West to that of the French West India islands. For political reasons their choice had to be justified.21 The new possessions must be made profitable. This could be done only by the monopolization and development of their sole immediate source of wealth, the fur trade. Furs could be secured in large quantities only by traffic with the Indians. They belonged to the class of "enumerated" articles, which could legally be exported from British colonies only to a

18 Colls. Va. Hist. Soc., new series, III, 94-95. 17 Ibid., 217.

w Collections of the New York Historical Society for 1886, 272.

19 Annual Register for 1763, 6th ed., 18. "Ibid., 18-19.

British port. If, therefore, the tribes refused to do business with English traders, or if the latter illegally exported their goods to foreign ports, the objects of mercantilist policy would be frustrated. No benefit would be secured by the British treasury, British manufacturers, British shipping interests, or by the consuming public. The possession of the peltry-bearing regions would be of no value.

A tactful and conciliatory attitude towards the Indians became, therefore, a necessary policy for Great Britain. The success of the French traders had been mainly due to their consideration for the savages. Unfortunately, from the British point of view, English traders had long since acquired a bad name with the Indians. This seems to have been chiefly due to the bad character of the average trader.22 As early as the administration of Governor Spotswood there is evidence that the Indians were being maltreated by English traders.23 In 1756 Dinwiddie attributed friction with the Indians mainly "to the traders among them, who are the most abandoned wretches in the world, and, in respect to society, as uncivilized as the Indians themselves, and less to be trusted in regard to truth and probity.24 The Albany commissioners in 1754 dwelt upon the evils of unregulated traffic with the Indians,25 and Franklin's Plan sought to place Indian affairs under collective control.26 In the opinion of the commissioners the trade should be made subservient to public rather than to private interests.27 The abuses practised by traders on the Indians were referred to by Lieutenant-Governor Golden in 1764 as of long standing.28 The necessity for a comprehensive Indian policy which would remove the evils of unregulated traffic,

11 Collections of the New York Historical Society, Publication Fund Series, IX, 383. For a statement of the reasons for the hostility of the Indians towards the English see Beer, British Colonial Policy, I754-I?(>5, 253, 255.

23 Colls. Va. Hist. Soc., new series, II, 145.

28 Ibid.

and extend British influence over the tribes, was felt several years before the end of the Seven Years' War.29

By 1763 British policy regarding western settlements had undergone a decided change. One cause of the previous desire for their establishment no longer existed. The French power having been overthrown, such settlements ceased to be needed as a barrier for protection. The principal motive in causing the government to alter its policy related, however, to the fur trade.30 Everything that would antagonize the Indians must be avoided.

As early as 1756 Sir William Johnson informed the Board of Trade that the advance of white settlements was an eyesore to the Indians, and "infected them with jealousy and disgust towards the English."31 The Board showed itself awake to this danger.32 The probability that advancing settlements would cause trouble with the Indians, and prove injurious to the fur trade, was a commonplace among British officials. "It does appear to us," wrote Hillsborough, president of the Board of Trade, in a well-known report in 1772, "that the extension of the fur trade depends entirely upon the Indians being undisturbed in the possession of their hunting-grounds ; and that all colonization does in its nature and must in its consequences operate to the prejudice of that branch of commerce."33 Towards the close of the war the Board of Trade proposed that the king should issue a proclamation establishing an Indian reservation "within certain fixed bounds," such lands to be reserved for the Indians and for purposes of trade.3* From the British imperial point of view, then, unrestricted western settlements and unregulated trade with the Indians were evils which must be guarded against.

50 Cf. Farrand, "The Indian Boundary Line," American Historical Review, X, 782 et seq.

" For the report see The Works of Franklin, Sparks' ed., IV, 303 et seq.

84 Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York, VII, 535-536.

Soon after the Seven Years' War the British government addressed itself to the administration of its new territorial acquisitions. On October 7, 1763, a royal proclamation was issued creating civil governments for the four new British provinces of Quebec, East Florida, West Florida, and Grenada. Under this proclamation civil government was inaugurated in Quebec, the most important of the new provinces, in 1764, and this document served as its constitution till the Quebec Act went into operation in I775.35 But the West was not then included within the limits of any province or provided with any form of civil government. It was reserved temporarily for the use of the Indians. In it settlements and individual purchases from the Indians were forbidden, and the governors of the eastern colonies were ordered not to grant warrants of survey, or pass patents for lands beyond the sources of the rivers which empty into the Atlantic. Governors of the new provinces were not to suffer any extension of settlements beyond their respective limits. The serious consequences of Indian hostility were forcibly impressed upon British officials by the uprising associated with the name of Pontiac. It was constantly asserted in the English newspapers that this uprising had been caused by maltreatment of the Indians.36 Had an attempt been made in 1763 to extend civil government over the West, the result might have been disastrous. If the English were to enjoy profits from the fur trade, if the possession of the West was to be made lucrative, measures of conciliation were imperative. This consideration, it is believed, explains to a large extent those parts of the proclamation which relate to the West and to the Indians. The proclamation attempted, moreover, to prevent the evil consequences of unregulated traffic with the savages. Trade was declared to be open upon license to all British subjects. But traders were required to give security that they would observe such regulations as the crown or its

35 Coffin, "The Province of Quebec and the Early American Revolution," Bulletin of the University of Wisconsin, Economics, Political Science and History Series, I, 275-277.

commissioners might make. The proclamation was thus an outgrowth of British experience and policy.

It had, however, other objects than those which pertained to the Indians and to the fur trade. In the report referred to, Hillsborough mentions as purposes of the proclamation, "the confining the western extent of settlements to such a distance from the seashore as that those settlements should be within reach of the trade and commerce of this kingdom .... and also of the exercise of that authority and jurisdiction which was conceived to be necessary for the preservation of the colonies in a due subordination to and dependence upon the Mother Country." According to Dartmouth, it was the invariable policy of the government to prevent settlements where they would provoke the Indians, and where the settlers would be beyond the reach of British control and protection.37 Grenville's view, as given by Franklin,38 that the king's purpose would be accomplished as soon as the western lands were properly purchased from the Indians, seems improbable. A possible purpose of the proclamation in restricting settlements was to discredit the charter claims of the colonies to the West. It was coming to be felt that imperial interests demanded an abridgement of these indefinite and often conflicting claims, but no certainty was yet felt as to where the western boundary of the colonies should be established.39

Hillsborough thought that the proclamation line, that is, the Alleghany watershed, should be permanently maintained as the western limit of colonial settlements,40 but the government did not follow this policy. The proclamation line, confessedly temporary, involved a restriction of settlements, but did not establish an ultimate boundary.41

37 Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society, 4th series,

38 Works of Franklin, Sparks' ed., IV, 339-340.

39 Annual Register for 1763, 20-21.

41 Attempts were later made to show that the proclamation made the Alleghanies the western boundary of the Atlantic colonies. Cf. Sparks, Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution, VIII, 156-160; Correspondence and Public Papers of John Jay,

Washington's view that it was a temporary expedient to quiet the Indians, which did not extinguish the claims of the colonies to the West, probably represents the better type of colonial opinion on the subject. He thought that the restriction of settlements would be removed when the Indians consented to the occupation of their lands.42 There is abundant evidence that the colonies were considered by good authority to extend west of the Alleghanies after I763.43 The Board of Trade, it is true, advocated in 1768 a permanent boundary line between the colonies and the western Indians,44 but it does not seem to have been the policy of the government permanently to reserve the whole territory between the Alleghanies and the Mississippi for the use of the Indians, as Burke in a rhetorical flourish implied.

After the Treaty of Fort Stanwix in 1768, by which the Six Nations ceded to the crown their claim to lands south of the Ohio as far as the Tennessee river, then called the Cherokee,45 the government was willing to allow settlements under authority of Virginia west of the Alleghanies. By the Treaty of Lochabor in 1770, it was stipulated that settlements under Virginia should be bounded on the west by a line from the mouth of the Kanawha to some point on the northern boundary line of North Carolina.48 This new line was, of course, much further west than the line of 1763. Dunmore favored settlements even beyond the new line, but was instructed not to allow them.47

It is probable that but for the outbreak of the Revolution new colonies would have been established in the West under

Johnston's ed., II, 390; Works of Franklin, Sparks' ed., IV, 324, 367; Writings of Thomas Paine, Conway's ed., II, 52.

41 Writings of Washington, Ford's ed., II, 396, and Maryland Historical Society, Fund Publications, No. n, 73.

43 Archives of Maryland, XIV, 381, 479; O'Callaghan, op. cit., II,

44 Docs. Rel. Col. Hist. St. of N. Y., VIII, 22.

45 For the treaty see ibid., 1 1 1 et seq.

46 O'Callaghan, op. cit., II, 543. Colls. Mass. Hist. Soc., 4th series, X, 725-726.

royal charters. Both in the eastern colonies and in England a growing interest was felt in the country beyond the mountains. George Croghan, Sir William Johnson's deputy, who was in London in 1764, reported that, at that time, there was talk of the establishment of a colony near the mouth of the Ohio.48 Proposals were later made looking towards the founding of colonies in Illinois, at Detroit, and at the mouth of the Ohio, but the Board of Trade opposed these schemes, and they were dropped.*9 One reason for the Board's opposition was that such colonies would be injurious to the fur trade.50 That the Board was willing, however, to open up portions of the West for settlement is shown by the proceedings relating to the proposed colony of Vandalia.51 This project encountered much opposition. Hillsborough's attitude is well known. He felt that it was opposed to all sound policy.62 Dunmore had written to him that a colony at such a distance could benefit neither the eastern colonies nor England. No commercial communication with it would be possible. Emigration thither, said Dunmore, would reduce the value o'f lands in the eastern colonies. The establishment of the colony, moreover, would probably involve an Indian war.53 Nevertheless the Board approved the petition for the Vandalia grant,54 and the charter had all but passed the seals, when political agitation in the colonies made it expedient to pause. Care, however, had been taken to establish such boundaries for the proposed colony as would not offend the Indians.55 It is altogether unlikely that the government would have allowed western settlements to

48 Ibid., 181, and Alden, "New Governments West of the Alleghanies before 1780," Bui. Univ. of Wis., EC., Pol. Sci. and Hist. Series, II, 17-19.

"Docs. Rel. Col. Hist. St. of N. Y., VIII, 27 et seq.

"For the Vandalia proceedings see Alden, op. cit.

82 Works of Franklin, Sparks' ed., IV, 303 et seq.

M Fernow, op. cit., 276-277.

M O'Callaghan, op. cit., II, 578 et seq.

BB Colls. Mass. Hist. Soc., 4th series, X, 726.

BRITISH POLICY IN THE WEST. II

interfere with the fur trade. The sentiment expressed in Hillsborough's report continued by many of the British to be regarded as the proper solution of the problem: "Let the savages enjoy their deserts in quiet. Were they driven from their forests, the peltry trade would decrease." A distinction has been suggested between the territory north and that south of the Ohio. It may have been the government's policy permanently to reserve the former for the Indians.56

On the eve of the Revolution an attempt was made to establish a new settlement in the nature of a commonwealth in that part of the Northwest claimed by Connecticut. On April 2, 1774, Pelatiah Webster of Philadelphia, who understood the potential value of the West and prophesied that its population would in the future control the continent, wrote to Silas Deane of Connecticut, pointing out the importance of the territory near the Great Lakes which was claimed by Connecticut.57 At about the same time Deane, who had already become interested in the West, wrote to Ebenezer Hazard of New York and Samuel H. Parsons of Philadelphia, who were likewise interested.58 In the letter to Parsons, he suggested a settlement on the southwest corner of Lake Erie or on the Mississippi. It would be secure, he thought, whatever the result of the dispute between England and the colonies. If arbitrary measures were pursued, many would flee to this new asylum. In the same year Hazard, Parsons, and Deane formed an association, the rules of which were drawn up by Hazard. To this others were to be admitted on payment of a small sum. The money raised was to be used to purchase from the Connecticut Assembly a quitclaim or release of all the rights of that colony to lands between the western boundary of Pennsylvania and the Mississippi. Every member was to be entitled to one two-thousandth of the lands granted by

57 Hinman, A Historical Collection from Official Records, Files, etc., of the Part Sustained by Connecticut during the War of th\e Revolution, 536.

58 Collections of the Connecticut Historical Society, II, 131-133.

Connecticut to the association. Each was to pay his share for defending the claim under authority of that colony if it should be disputed, and to contribute his proportion of money necessary to purchase the Indian title and to make a settlement. Hazard, who was prepared to invest heavily, went to Hartford in 1774 to procure the quitclaim, but his petition was rejected59 and the plan collapsed. The interest of these men in the West, however, continued, and Deane was one of the first of the revolutionists to advocate Congressional control over it.60

The year which witnessed this unsuccessful attempt at western colonization marked the passage by Parliament of the Quebec Act, which involved the most serious attack ever made by the British government on charter claims to the West. The act included all the Northwest, between the Ohio, the Great Lakes, and the Mississippi in the government of Quebec. The main purpose of this extension of the limits of that province will be discussed later. It had the effect, of course, of nullifying all charter claims of the eastern colonies to this territory. As was foretold by the Opposition in the House of Commons, the bill angered the colonists. Though it was not necessarily connected with the coercive acts affecting Massachusetts passed at the same session of Parliament, the most unfavorable interpretation was placed upon it in the colonies. The Continental Congress declared it to be a violation of colonial rights and demanded its repeal.61 An unsuccessful attempt was made in the Lords the following year to secure this. The act was said to have unduly extended the limits of Quebec and prevented the expansion of the eastern colonies.62 Since, however, it constituted one of the grievances of the revolutionist party, its nullification of colonial claims to the Northwest was by them considered invalid.63