The theories of Darwin and their relation to philosophy, religion, and morality.

Front matter

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CHAPTER. I: THE NATURO- PHILOSOPHIC SUPPLEMENTS OF THE DaRrwints THEORIES, i e

The Origin of Self. Conner and of Free Moral Self- Determination, - : - - The Origin of Sensation and of Mavens:

The Origin of Life, - : : The Elements of the World; the Phas of Mone and the Mechanical View of the World, - - -~ -

CHAPTER II —— Rea i= METAPHYSICAL CONCLUSIONS DRAWN FROM THE DARWINIAN THEORIES. i

$1. Elimination of the Idea of Design in the World —Mo- e

CONTENTS. LE

PART SEHOOND:

THE POSITION OF THE DARWINIAN THHORIES IN REFERENCE TO KELIGION AND MORALITY.

sO MGM dhe HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL.

Plan of Treatment, - - 2 - : “ 2 : Seto

A. THE DARWINIAN THEORIES AND RELIGION. CHAPTER I.

- MorE orn LeEss NEGATIVE Postrton IN REFERENCE TO RELIGION.

§1. Extreme Negation: L. Biichner and Consistent Materialism, - - - - - - - 188 32. Replacement of Religion Through a Releions Worse of the Universe.—Strauss. Oskar Schmidt. Hiickel. 190 $3. Pious Renunciation of the Knowability of God.—Wilhelm Bleek. Albert Lange. Herbert Spencer. - - 193 $4. Spinoza and Hegel in the Garb of Darwin.—Carneri,

Ed. von Hartmann,~ - - - - - 203 $5. Reécho of Negation on the Side of the Cheatin View of

CHAPTER: dL.

REFORM OF RELIGION, OR AT LEAST OF THE SCIENCE OF RE- LIGION, THROUGH DARWINISM.

81. Heinrich Lang. Friedrich Vischer. Gustav Jager. - 210 CHAPTER IIL

PEACE BETWEEN RELIGION AND DARWINISM.

§1. Darwin. Wallace. Owen. Asa Gray. Mivart. Mc- Cosh. Anderson. K. E. von Baer. Alexander Braun. Braubach, and others, - - - - - . Sih Gi

#9 CONTENTS.

B. THE DARWINIAN THEORIES AND MORALITY.

Preiminary View, =~ +) .--) "2.9 18 8) 1s ee CHAPTER IV.

ANTAGONISM BETWEEN DARWINISM AND MORALITY. $1. Objections to Darwinism from an Ethical Standpoint, - 230 CHAPTER © V; ReEFoRM OF Morauiry THRouGH DARWINISM. $1. The Materialists and Monists. Darwin and the English Utilitarians. Gustav Jager. - : - - - 2388-

CHAPTER VL.

NEUTRALITY AND PEACE BETWEEN. DARWINISM AND MORALITY.

$1, Mivart. Alexander Braun, and others, - - - - 245 BO OR SLE: ANALY TICALA

Preliminary View, - “ Bh Pete ie =| bua - 249

A. THE DARWINIAN THEORIES AND RELIGION.

CEDATES L ralvaacks ‘THE DARWINIAN THEORIES AND THE THEISTIC VIEW OF THE WoRLD.

a. The Position of Purely Scientific Darwinism in Reference to T heism.

$1. Scientific Investigation and Theism.—The Idea of Creation, - : = - : 2 2 A FE - 252

B. THE DARWINIAN THEORIES AND MORALITY.

81. £2,

CONTENTS.

The Descent Theory and Theism, . ears : The Evolution Theory and Theism, - - - : The Selection Theory and Theism, - . - - The Darwinistic Philosophemes in their Position Regarding T heism.

The Naturo-Philosophic Supplements of Darwinism and

Theism, - - E : . i : 3 ‘ Elimination of the Idea of Design, or its Acknowledgment and Theism,- - - - i 4 : ‘

CHAPTER II.

THE DARWINIAN THEORIES AND POSITIVE CHRISTIANITY.

The Creation of the World, aie crt oe ad yea at Cine, es

The Creation of Man, - = - - -

The Primitive Condition of Man.—Paradise, the Fall of Man, and Primitive History, - - - : -

Providence, Hearing of Prayer, and Miracles, = ss

The Redeemer and the Redemption, the Kingdom of God, and the Receiving of Salvation, - - :

Eschatology, - - at a. - - . - .

GHAPTER’ Ill: DARWINISM AND Morat PRINCIPLES.

Darwinistic Naturalism and Moral Principles, - . Scientific Darwinism and Moral Principles, - - -

CHAPTER IV. DARWINISM AND Moran LIFE

Darwinistic Naturalism and Moral Life, - - . - Scientific Naturalism and Moral Life, - - -~ -

CONCLUSION, - = . = : 2 i =

13 259

263, 270

321 345

373 370

379 386

391 396

AUTHORS CITED.

Anderson, 225.

Anonymus, “Vestiges,” etc., 33.

172, 202, 288.

Barrande, 54.

Baumeiirtner, Heinrich, 57, 176.

Blanchard, Emil, 54, 106.

Boerhave, 36.

Braubach, 226.

Braun, Julius, 17.

Buch, Leopold von, 52.

Buckle, 17.

Buffon, 31.

Carns, 36.

Christy, 90.

Condillac, 96.

Cotta, Bernhard von, 51.

Curtius, 96. ;

DuBois-Reymond, Emil, 124, 125,

127, 180, 134, 149.

‘‘the Unconscious,”

Ecker, 56.

Escher, von der Linth, 54.

Farrar, 96.

Fechner, 146.

Fichte, Immanuel Hermann, 142, 5;

Fraas, Oskar, 55, 90.

Frohschammer, 175..

Gegenbaur, 56.

Geiger, Lazar, 17, 96.

Geoffroy, St. Hilaire Etienne, 82, 34

Gustav Theodor, 135,

Gerhard, 197.

Giebel, 54.

Goéppert, 54.

Gray, Asa, 222.

Grusebach, 55.

Grimm, Jacob, 17, 95.

Heer, Oswald, 56, 1'76.

Heyse, 96.

Hilgendorf, 82.

Huber, 175.

Humboldt, Wilhelm von, 17, 95.

' Jellinghaus, 94.

AUTHORS CITED. Ae

KO6stlin, Julius, 175, 187.

KO6stlin, Otto, 149.

Kowalewsky, A., 42.

Kowalewsky, W., 838.

Kurz, Johann Heinrich, 306.

Lang, Heinrich, 197, 210.

Lartet, 96.

Leidy, 83.

Linnaeus, 30.

Livingstone, 93.

Malthus, 39.

~ Marsh, 88.

Martensen, 187.

McCosh, 224.

Mill, John Stuart, 242.

Moleschott, 42.

Miller, Fritz, ‘79.

Murchison, Sir Roderick, 54.

Nigeli, 56.

Nitzsch, Karl Immanuel, 361.

Noiré, Ludwig, 281.

Peschel, Oskar, 279.

Pfaff, 54.

Pfleiderer, Otto, 187.

Planck, Carl Ch., 105, 110.

Rathke, Heinrich, 81.

Reichenbach, 42.

Renan, 18.

112,

Réville, Albert, 334.

Ritschl, 364.

Riitimeyer, 56, 83.

Sandberger, 55, 82.

Schaaffhausen, 56, 85, 177.

Schelling, 109.

Schiller, 180.

Schleicher, 17, 96.

Schleiden, 42, 51.

Schleiermacher, 190.

Schopenhauer, 128, 190.

Schrader, Eberhard, 345.

Semper, Karl, 84, 181.

Snell, Karl, 42, 262.

Spinoza, 204.

Stael, Madame de, 2384.

Steffens, 109.

Steinthal, 17, 96.

Swammerdam, 36.

Thomson, Sir William, 188.

Triimpelmann, 209.

Tiibingen School, 18.

Tylor, 91.

Virchow, 56, 85.

Vogt, Karl, 42, 56.

Wagner, Moriz, 52, 56.

Wedgewood, 96.

Weismann, 56.

Wundt, 142.

Wiirtemberger, 82.

Zittel, 56.

Tue Trrortes oF Darwty,

AND THEIR RELATION TO

PHILOSOPHY, RELIGION, AND MORALITY.

Introduction

Wirn the appearance of Darwin’s “Origin of Species,” on the 24th of November, 1859, a new impulse began in the intellectual movement of our generation. It is true, the whole theory advocated and inaugurated by Darwin is, in the first place, only one of the many links in the long chain of phenomena in the realm of the intellectual development of our century, all of which have the same character, and give their stamp to the entire mental work of the last decades. This stamp consists in the tendency of science, which has nearly become universal, not only to consider all phenomena, both of the physical and the mental life, in connection with their preceding conditions in space and time, but to trace them back more or less exclusively to these conditions, and to explain them exclusively by means of the same. What a Wilhelm von Humboldt, and, still more, a Jacob Grimm, prepared the way for in the realm of philology, a Lazar Geiger and a Steinthal, and (under direct influence of Darwin) a Schleicher and a Wilhelm Bleek further developed; what Julius Braun did in the realm of the history of art; what a Buckle and a Sir 2 (7)

John Lubbock tried to do in the realm of the history of civilization; what a Max Miiller did in the realm of the history of religion; what the Tiibingen School began and its disciples carried out in the realm of the exegesis of the Bible; what a Strauss and a Renan, and in a cer- | tain sense also a Keim, did in the realm of christology; what, finally—without being so closely connected with individual: names — was also done in the realm of the world’s history: this, Darwin did in the realm of the history of the organic kingdoms, seconded by the geological principles of Sir Charles Lyell and by the investigations in biology and comparative anatomy of a number of scientists. From this point of view, the movement which was inaugurated by Darwin seems to us but the reflex of the universal spirit of the present time upon a particular realm; namely, that of natural science. But since, soon after the appearance of the before-mentioned work and long before the publication of Darwin’s ‘‘ Descent of Man,” man also was included in the consequences of the evolution theory, and his existence was explained as a wholly natural development out of lower animal forms; since Darwin himself unreservedly adopted this theory of the descent of man from the animal world as an entirely natural consequence of his doctrine of the origin of species, the evolution question has gone far beyond the proportionately narrow and limited bounds of natural philosophy and of merely theoretical scientific interest — has surpassed in interest all the before-mentioned investigations, however lively this interest was and is to-day, and has stirred up the minds of all most thoroughly, not only in their scientific but also in their religious and ethical depths, some in

INTRODUCTION. 19 acknowledgment and admiration, others in aversion and repugnance, and only a few in sober and unprejudiced judgment. While some see in Darwinism the flambeau which now lights mankind to entirely new paths of truth, and also to spiritual and moral perfection, others see in it only an unproved hypothesis, threatening to become the torch which might change the noblest and greatest acquirements of the culture of past centuries into a heap of ashes; while some date from it a new period of culture, others see in it a deep descent of the present from the scientific, religious, and moral height which mankind has ascended.

Under these circumstances, it has become an impossibility for religion and the moral interest as guardians of the highest and most sacred acquisitions of mankind, and still more for theology and ethics as the scientific representations of religion and morality, to remain idle spectators. It would certainly be more agreeable to them, and more profitable, if they could delay their judgment until the question became better cleared up. For the whole question presented by Darwin has not yet passed beyond the stage of problems and attempts at solution ; and there is always something unsatisfactory in being compelled to deal with theories which in their fundamentals are still hypotheses. But since all tendencies of the present which are hostile to Christianity and to the theistic view of the world, from the most extreme materialism up to the most sublime monism (as pantheism and materialism of to-day have begun to call themselves), seemingly with the confidence of complete victory, take possession of Darwinism as the solid ground from which they hope to destroy all and every belief connected with faith in a living creator and master of the world, it has also become impossible for those to whom the religious and ethical acquisitions of mankind are a sacred sanctuary to take any longera reserved and expectant position. Silence now would be looked upon only as an inglorious retreat; and thus nothing remains but openly to face the question: What position must religion and morality take in reference to the Darwinian theories ?

In order to treat of the question with that objectivity which it requires, we have to begin with a synopsis of the theories themselves. In this representation we have to discriminate strictly between the merely scientific theories and the naturo-philosophical and metaphysical supplements and conclusions which have been brought into connection with them. For precisely in the mixing of the most different problems which are to be considered here, lies the main cause of the confused and superficial judgment which is so often heard upon these questions.

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THE PURELY SCIENTIFIC THEORIES.

THE SCIENTIFIC PROBLEM.

The interesting problem which underlies Mr. Darwin’s theories is the answer to the question: How did the different species of organic: beings on the earth originate? We find ourselves in the midst of an endless variety of organic beings, animals and plants ; we see ourselves, so far as regards the entire physical part of our being, in relationship with this organic world — especially with the organization and physical functions of the animal body. The organic individuals come and go. They originate by being begotten by and born of individuals of the same kind, or they spring up through the formation of germs and buds; and they produce in the same way new individuals, that resemble them in all essential characteristics. Like always begets like, so far as our observations go. But not only the individuals, but even the species to which they belong, must have originated at some definite period of time—and, indeed, as_ geology tells us, not all at once, but in a long series, which stretched through immeasurable epochs of the earth’s history. Thus we come face to face with the question, already put, which we can now formulate more precisely : ZZow did the jirst individuals of each organie species come into existence ?

No human being ever has observed, nor ever could observe, the origination of a new species, because man, as it seems, did not appear on the earth until all the other organisms were in existence. For this reason, - the scientists for along time thought it unprofitable to occupy themselves with this question ; and even in our time a great many of them declare the question to be absolutely insolvable, and every attempt at answering it to be an unjustifiable use of hypotheses. But the impulse toward investigation admits of no limitation so long as there is any probability of extending its field of action. Especially in the province of nature, so many things which could not be discovered by mere observation have been traced indirectly, and so many important and established facts have been added to our stores of knowledge, by first starting from hypothetical premises, that man has again and again endeavored to approximate an answer to the question of the origin of species by taking the indirect course of hypothesis and induction, whenever the direct way of observation did not lead to any result. Religion of course gives a solution to the problem by stating that the species have been originated by the creative act of God. It is wrong to say that this solution is opposed to the above-mentioned impulse toward investigation ; for this solution suffices for religion, whether a natural progress in the origination of species be established or not. For, to the believer in religion, the whole universe, with all its objective phenomena and growth, is the work of God as well as the individuals of the already existing species; and a

THE SCIENTIFIC PROBLEM. 25 closer acquaintance with the manner of their origin is not only no disturbance to his ground of belief, but, on the contrary, an addition to his knowledge of the method of God’s action. In every man of sound mind, the religious faith is not antagonistic or even indifferent to the scientific impulse toward investigation, but stands upon a most intimate footing with it. Hence the human intellect again and again makes the attempt to find an answer to the problem of the origin of species in a scientific way, and each endeavor of this kind necessarily ends with the dilemma that either the first individuals of a species, no matter whether it be the highest or the lowest, have been evolved out of inorganic matter, or they originated by descent from the most closely related species of their predecessors. The denial of the first part of our dilemma, and the affirmation of the second, is the ‘‘ Theory of Descent.”

But this theory of descent leads us at once into another dilemma. If the species originated by descent from the most closely related lower species, and under eertain circumstances also from species of the same rank, and even by degeneration from the next higher, it must have occurred in one of two ways: either by leaps called by naturalists ‘‘metamorphosis of germs ” or ‘“heterogenetic conception”—or by a succession of imperceptibly small alterations of the individuals from generation to generation. Each of these changes would have been no greater than the differences we observe to-day — between the individuals of the very same species, but became in the course of time so massed and strengthened in one direction that new species have been evolved. This hypothesis is called the ‘‘ Theory of Development,”

or ‘‘ Evolution.” We retain this name, although well aware of the fact that the authors do not agree in their use of the term ‘‘evolution.” Professor Wigand, who adopts only the theory of a descent from one primordial cell to another, and who positively rejects the idea of a progress from one fully developed species to another, claims among other things that one value of his own theory is that he secures for the idea of evolution its full meaning. The expression still has a meaning for those who reject the real descent of the species or their primordial germs one from another, and acknowledge only the ideal bond of a common plan in their successive manifestations. But as soon as we examine more closely the literal and logical meaning of the word, we shall find it of most weight when we understand by it the before-mentioned gradual evolution in opposition to the theory of progress by leaps or new creations. Moreover, it is well known that long before this no other term than evolution was used to designate the growth of a single — organic individual from the primordial cell and egg to its fully developed form and vital function. Besides, we find ourselves also in harmony with most of the authors, so far as they have distinct conceptions of the different scientific problems, if we use the term ‘‘ theory of evolution” for the gradual development of one species from another, in opposition to the hypothesis of a metamorphosis of germs, or even of a genealogy of primordial cells.

But each evolution theory leads again to new theories, aS soon as it has to be proved in a scientific way. For it can claim a scientific worth only when sustained by earnest attempts to find and prove the produc-

THE SCIENTIFIC PROBLEM. OF tive power, agencies and laws of such an evolution of species. Those attempts can be made in various ways. As a philosophical question, many attempts at solution have been made, both in ancient and modern times; but being mainly in the realm of metaphysics, they do not come within the limits of our scientific essay. Asa question for investigators of natural phenomena, only two attempts of sufficient importance to be mentioned have been made. The first one was made by’ Lamarck, who, taking the really different ideas of descent and evolution as one, made use of the hypothesis of transmutation; thus becoming the pioneer of Darwinism. The other attempt was made by Darwin in his theory of natural selection, or struggle for existence, and is called the ‘‘ Theory of Selection.”

In defining our problem, therefore, we find ourselves under the influence of a scientific law of development. The simple problem which we started from has developed into a trinity of problems and attempts at solution. The simple question of the origin of species led us into the dilemma of a generatio cequivoca, or a descent; the hypothesis of a descent led to the dilemma of a heterogenetic conception, or an evolution ; and the hypothesis of an evolution rendered necessary the attempt at explaining this evolution, and showed Darwin’s method of explaining it by his selection theory. It will be well for the reader to keep distinctly in mind the difference between these problems and theories, in following our investigations, even 1f we cannot arrange our historical sketch according to the natural principle of division arising from these differences.

For it lies in the nature of the question itself, that these theories, in their historical progress, did not appear singly, but together. Those who inclined to the theory of a descent of species could claim for it the attention of scientific investigators only after having also made the attempt at conceiving this descent in a con- — crete way, and according to certain ‘analogies of observation. The only analogy of the kind appeared in the sphere of individual development and individual differences on the one hand, and in that of closely related characters of allied species on the other; and thus led” of itself to the evolution theory. Assoonas the naturalists thought they had found the causes of such an evolution of the species, they naturally placed these causes in the foreground of their demonstrations, and erected upon them the structure of their entire theory; thus treating descent, evolution and selection as one single and indissolubly connected theory. But this manner of treating the question had also its dangers, which have already caused a great deal of confusion and misunderstanding, as well as much unprofitable controversy. Often friends and enemies of the theories placed that which was in favor of the theory of descent to the credit of the evolution or selection theory; and, on the other hand, that which seemed opposed to the selection theory was often held to be a weakening of the evolution and descent theory; and this was done, not only by amateurs, but often enough by the highest authorities also. In reality, however, it is quite conceivable that the idea of a descent may prove correct, and possibly the idea of an evolution of the species will have to be replaced by that of a heterogenetic generation, or by the theory that certain groups in the organic system are originated

THE SCIENTIFIC PROBLEM. 29 by heterogenetic generation, and others by evolution ; and so the evolution theory must share with the theory of heterogenetic generation, or of a metamorphosis of germs. On the other hand, it is conceivable that even where the evolution theory is confirmed, the evolution can be accounted for wholly or partly by other reasons than those derived from the selection theory. And even this result of present investigations is not inconceivable : that the reasons for and against the different theories will be found to balance one another to such a degree that they will sooner or later lead science, in answering the question of the origin of species, to the old confession of Socrates—‘* /gnoramus.”

We shall, therefore, have to arrange our historical sketch according to the historical order of the appearance of the theories, and treat the problems more or less as an undivided whole. But we shall keep in mind, during our historical sketch, not only the logical separation of the problems in question, in order not to lose clearness of judgment, but we shallalso at the end of our review, if we consider the present condition of the problems, have to examine the same once more in detail, so far as regards the above mentioned separation.