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a system of moral science

laurens p. hickok · 1856 · Scanned text · Free in the US

106,664 words · about 7 h 28 min to read

Period artwork: Interior of the Bodleian Library, 1845
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About this book

Author
laurens p. hickok
Language
English
Published
1856
Length
106,664 words · about 7 h 28 min
Sections
22 reader sections
Text
Scanned text, read from page scans by OCR; may contain errors
Rights
Public domain in the United States

 

Contents (22)

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Front matter

Pe ae a, ps Gye ae e Re ‘. ry fa es SYS ey ae “

\& GB. MUMFORD a> at

.

Preface To The Second Edition

Tur first edition has gone into use in Colleges and Academies as extensively as was anticipated, and the de- ‘mand for another edition has come sooner than was expected. From public notices and inquiries by letter, there has seemed the need for some changes in particular portions, by which the meaning might be more clearly or more completely expressed. The principle which runs through and gives system to the whole work, and the methods of its application to the prominent points of ethical doctrine and duty, have found no occasion for change.

That the system of Moral Science was needed in the work of ethical education, has now been pretty clearly manifested, and in the extent to which it shall continue to subserve that end, by this cheaper stereotype form, must be the appreciation of its utility,

UNION COLLEGE, 1855.

Contents

PAGE INTRODUCTION. Tue SpxcraL Province or Mora Sorencn, 13 CHAP. I. DIFFERENT THEORIES OF THE ULTIMATE RULE IN MQ RIATSN vere « spans: cvepeis eis tse Hosea 25 CHAP. II. THE ULTIMATE RULE OF RIGHT,............-. 35 CHAP. III. Tus Hssentian ATTRIBUTES OF THE ULTIMATE BEEGHERIY Sy syacet oy oi aa sicouey ora tar eaYo ate tevere oaer diav es, Naren 47 CEU SIV GRNERAT MNURTHOD nr yiiciten s/s sls see tisinsnenees OD FIRST PART.

OHAP. I. I. PrrsonaAn During. Self-conirol,.....0.sss0..0% 64 General Maxim. BEAR AND FORBEAR.

Particular Maxims.

CHAP. III. I. Renative Doris. Kindness,........2..0..- 99

General Maxim. Do Goop TO ALL MEN AS YE HAVE OPPORTUNITY. Particular Maxims.

CONTENTS. 1x

Particular Maxims.

LT. Not wantonly 10: Mr NAUUTE, ©. ones wens c ews e 134 2. Convert nature to thy Use, ..2....6...++ 0s ‘fete 135 8. Beautify and perfect nature, .......6----+-eseees 135 4, Huplore nature scientifically, ........-2612005e> 135 5. Use nature as a discipline in virtue, .. 1... cee e eee 136 CHAP. Viz IL Dummy 10 GOD, .. sc. cess conn ee eset nees 138 General Maxim. “ WorsuIp Gop.”

Particular Virtues.

CONTENTS.

SECOND PART.

POSITIVE AUTHORITY.

PAGE I. OCCASION FOR POSITIVE AUTHORITY,........-seeecceceees 146 II, PECULIARITY OF AUTHORITY, 2.00. .scecccsesecesoucesss 148 FIRST DIVISION.

CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

CHAP. I. IDET SEAN, eleva lee © ctetarsl ae ie iacels eA Pctc.s . 151 GEARS LI: Tue STATE MAY COERCE FOR THE END OF PUBLIC RH WD OM crcie store eaeicrele acces nr omnia seotereealets atari: 158 CHAP. III. THe STATE HAS A NECESSITY FOR LAW,....... 164 GHAP. IV. THE RECTITUDE OF STATE AUTHORITY, .,.,.... 170 J. THE POINT IN WHICH SOVEREIGNTY SHOULD BHP LAQMO cy ersterenetslereyeyeatel= Selatehelaiotelaaietere) AL UD CHAP. V. II. THE LINES WITHIN WHICH SOVEREIGNTY BHOUED AUT nteeietewerstemets orn te aia Nererene OU CHAR, Vil. Tom BANOTIONS OF GCLVI LAW, ..<. sc .nce << 185 1. The design of sanctions to civil law,.... Sooo (es 2. The necessity for legal sanctions, ..... Aiea. iets) OHAP. VII. 3. The degree of legal sanction,.......... vee ALON 4. Ground of the rectitude of legal sanctions,.... 194 CHAP. VIII. THE POSITION OF THE CITIZEN IN REFERENCE TO THR SUAVE, sy ale rete ti arene tek rem ieregereisteretere saehey LOO 1. In some respects beyond civil pee ee mere 200) 2. No right to evade civil law,........ Sooo All 8. No right to sympathy against law,.......... 205 4, The citizen can stand on mere legality, ...... 206 5. The citizen may righteously expatriate himself, 208 6. Merit or demerit is as the sanction of law,.... 210 CHAP. IX. THE POSITION OF THE STATE IN REFERENCE TO THE OLLIZEN, 1. vee 0s cle,ens stetueaie ete er 213 The State can be satisfied with nothing bul obedience to its laws, 214 SHC. 1.” Judicial Oaths. eerie eee 215 Sec. 11. Taxes'and Imposts.......:..s200001 224

CONTENTS. xi

PAGE

SEC ULE | Reliant rer. tesye)telatets Soantormeanee 229 Src. IV. IEYGnTG ATOM ae accuse ncretsteneterereeters Rie hae sa 233 Sec. V. IDO} NORAD sooo Ss on.o0 Sosheis lols fefers see 24 Sec. VI. Internal Improvement, ............ a sh SHoOteVillin = SCOmMMErCes xc.c, afer ieeren: hice ate 254 Sec. VI0l, Postal Arrangements... <a.% a0 «<1 256 Sno. IX. Prohibitory, dawn (cree s1.- 6 cfussls Scone iS Seo. X. Sumptuary, Sanitary, and Poor oo 260 Src. XI. Weights, Measures, Currency, Interest, 263 SHOX. Revolutions... ceeaaesecne Sodaueoe eae: CHAP, X, THE POSITION OF A STATE IN REFERENCE TO OTHERS, 273 1, The sovereignty of each State is independent,...... ne U3 2. International regulations rest on Pure Morality, .... 275 Seo. I. Comity of Nations,........ pcogdacone: Mate Szo. IT. PT OALIOS rnivs, clbne autora sietaictoleete ss Aen Sa Ur § SHO. MES ee Alliances acest eeti ae tae. sbondnoaooo xe) SEO. lV) wComtederationdwestele cern. calc soccmoad wees Src. V. Republics:). ii wer. a1. FAST ADO oD COOBEM 284 SO! AVEL Wiar, Rocraeten nceee ie or dioeets tee siaisieeche sie) 200 Seo. VII. <A Congress of Nations,...... FON DORON

CHAP. L CHAP. II.

CHAP. III.

CHARS LV:

Chap. VI. Chap, VII

SECOND DIVISION.

DIVINE GOVERNMENT.

Gop’s BrIn¢ AND COMMUNION WITH MAy,...... 995 Enp oF Divine LEGISLATION, ............. ye SOG

THE PROCESS OF THE DIVINE ADMINISTRATION IN AUG TIO Nay ats ete ver stay crePa. eo cas Bie os en ain oie s averavake 311

ERRNO cistlere slave cisticdseisieiislsieie. daces ecootco eet! PROCESS IN GRACE FOR SUSTAINING AUTHORITY,. 334 PROCESS IN GRACE FOR STRONGER INFLUENCES TO

GENERAL RESULT FROM A GRACIOUS ADMINISTRA- GOON Bmooooobtc Milaieleierelsisteleitetetiaielereier oO 4 xi

CHAP CHAP. I.

CHAP. III.

CHAP. IV.

CHAP. V.

CHAP. VI.

CONTENTS.

THIRD DIVISION.

PARENTAL GOVERNMENT.

PAGE

2. Righteous Domestic Slavery, ......++.0+ 404

3. Unrighteous Domestic Slavery, .........5 410

Introduction

THE SPECIFIC PROVINCE OF MORAL SCIENCE.

Moran ScrencE must be preceded by a familiarity with Mental Science. Without an accurate and somewhat profound knowledge of the human mind, it will be impracticable clearly to distinguish the specific province which a system of morals is to occupy; and an error, in reference to the proper field of morality, will infallibly vitiate the whole attempted science. But a clear apprehension of some of the foundation-facts in mental philosophy, will give a direct and intelligent introduction to the appropriate field which is herein to be examined: and this is the first thing to be attained.

Man is compounded of the animal and the rational being. ‘These are so intimately blended, that they together make one existing man; yet is it always possible to distinguish the animal from the rational being, and apprehend each in its own peculiar operation without any confusion.

The animal part of human nature finds the end of its activity in the gratification of its constitutional appetites ;

and it rests in the attainment of such gratification until some new craving of nature returns. The appetites may be originally of greater or less variety, and may be more or less refined by cultivation; but, however comprehensive and refined, the sole end of animal appetite, in its promptings, is gratification. Happiness is its highest law; and with such a being, whether the life be mortal or immortal, it is the life of the brute only. There is a faculty which learns from experience ; draws deductions from facts which have come within the sense; and judges and regulates the acts in gratification from prudential considerations ; but in all this, man only participates in common with the endowments of his fellows of the stall, and has in this no distinguishing prerogative above the brute that perisheth.

The rational part of man’s being finds its end of activity in its own intrinsic excellency. Its conscious dignity demands that its whole activity be such only as is due to itself, and required in its own right for the securing of its highest worthiness of character. Its impulses are no promptings of appetite, but the urgency of an imperative. Not what is craved as a desire, but what is claimed as a duty; not what it wants as an appetite, but what it ought in the right of its own excellency ; these constrain the action and control the whole conduct. ‘The spirit is competent to self-knowledge, and thus to get rules immediately in the light of its own excellency, without any doubtful judgments in the generalizations of experience. Its own rules enable the spirit even to judge and determine how experience itself should

THE PROVINCE OF MORAL SCIENCE. 15 be. In this right of what is due to itself, there is a spring to an alternative in the conflicting impulses of passion, and the capacity for holding itself steady against the stream of natural appetite and freely to maintain the integrity of its own worthiness. In this having of itself is its capability to behave ; and here lie all the prerogatives and responsibilities of a free personality. The imperative, to fulfil the claims of its own excellency, is perpetual, and thus the spirit needs no rest and knows no cessation of motive.

Such is humanity; not all animal, and thus wholly the brute; not all spiritual, and thus altogether an angel; but both in one—spirituality incarnate. We can never say of mankind, they are sense or spirit; but must ever affirm, that man is sense and spirit. ‘ The law in the members,” and ‘ the law of the mind,” are perpetually interworking through all humanity.

And now it is quite obvious to remark. that the province of morality must lie altogether within the sphere of man’s rational and spiritual being. The animal part has no law but happiness. Interest, expediency, prudence, are its controlling motives; and while from past experience, as he has found it to be and forecasts that it will be, he may deduce the dictates of prudence in highest happiness; yet can he in this never find the righteousness of the happiness, nor feel any other gratulation in gaining it, than that of skillful self-interest. Even his benevolence is only prudence; for he finds himself so linked into the connections of nature, that his own highest happiness is attained in making others happy. He can never say, so experience should be; but so I find it is, and therefore so it is prudent for me to shape my conduct. Why the Author of Nature has made it thus, and not otherwise, can only be resolved by saying that he found himself with such a craving want within, he must so make nature, or be himself perpetually miserable. The chain of nature thus wraps itself around the Creator, and there is no place found for the imperatives of pure morality anywhere, but solely the principle of highest price in barter. A spiritual excellency must be apprehended, that may command for its own sake, and find something due to itself in the conscious right of its own intrinsic dignity, or we can find no possible province for morality.

But even the rational spirit of man is not all ethical. A deeper analysis of the human mind must be effected, or we shall not attain to the province of pure morality, nor be able to give a completed science. ‘The spirit attains other necessary and universal principles than such as control in morals, and we must be able fully to distinguish each in its own grounds, or it will not be possible for us, as ethical philosophers, to determine our proper position.

1. Man, as rational, has the capacity to apprehend the necessary and universal principles which determine Beauty, and can thus apply the rules of Taste in the fine arts; and hereby he introduces himself into the province of Asthetics.

The word form has a broad application. It may be used in reference to anything which can be limited and

THE PROVINCE OF MORAL SCIENCE. 17 brought within definite circumscription. When only the limit is regarded, without respect to that which is limited, it is known as pure form. We may thus have pure form as mere shape in space, or, in the degrees of intensity, pure form also as mere tone in sound. The blending of forms in space by colors gives figure, and the blending of forms in sound gives tune. We may thus modify colors in outline to represent any figure, and modulate tones to represent any tune; and when only the form, without any regard to that which fills it, is apprehended, we shall have pure figure or pure tune.

Now, certain measures of figure and tune express the sentiments and emotions of living beings. ‘The vital spirit in human nature gives itself out to the perceptions of the senses in certain shapes and tones, and one emotion will have one form of expression peculiar to itself, while other emotions will come out in their peculiar forms. In this manner, every sentiment or emotion of living beings may embody itself in some color, shape or tone in nature, and the pure form in which that expression is made will be at once the expressive representation of that living sentiment. And herein is determined the entire sphere of the Beautiful. Not at all the matter contained in the form, but the pure form itself, which only the mind’s eye and not any organ of the sense can apprehend, is the Beautiful. Nor is all pure form, but only such as gives expression to some living sentiment, to be apprehended as beauty. The pure form, which represents some emotion of a living being, is an zesthetic object; and no form, that does not express sentiment, Saks: re can be of any significancy in the fine arts. With this full comprehension, the only adequate and complete definition of beauty is pure living form. When such pure living form carries up the sentiment expressed in it, to be an emotion of the supernatural and the divine, the Beauty also rises and loses itself in the Sublime.

Here is the province of art. The sculptor gives some living expression in the shaped outline of the statue; the painter blends his colors into more complicated forms upon the canvas; the bard throws his entrancing sounds of song upon the ear; and we apprehend the Beautiful in them all, solely because we have here the living forms in which beauty is. Nature, also, in her thousand colors, forms and tones, is perpetually expressing some touching sentiment, and thus throwing beauty all about our paths. Not because nature is an imitation of some higher copy, nor from any surprise and delight that art should be found to imitate nature so well, but both in nature and art, solely because the mind’s eye catches the pure form which is expressive of some living sentiment, do we awake to the consciousness of the Beautiful or the Sublime.

The rational spirit can itself create its own pure forms, which shall express the living emotion more full and perfect than can be embodied in any media of nature or of art; and thus the cultivated genius has his own absolute ideal Beauty, as the highest and purest conception of the living sentiment in any particular case; and this he makes his ultimate criterion to judge of any representation m nature or art, and becomes the critic, measuring and estimating every actual form of beauty that he finds,

THE PROVINCE OF MORAL SCIENCE. 19 and pronouncing it fine or faulty, in proportion as it squares with his own absolute ideal.

The eye and the ear are the only organs which give the perceptions that take on these pure living forms, and hence the sight and the hearing are the only senses that can be recognized in the fine arts. But even these organs are of use, only as they may give the phenomenal matter which takes on these pure forms, and so far only has sense at all any part in beauty. The pure form itself is only for the mind’s eye, and with which the bodily organ has nothing to do; and it is wholly by the rational part of man also, that the pure ideal is created in which lies the absolute Beauty, and by whose application he criticises all forms of beauty which art or nature may anywhere present to either eye or ear. ‘The absolute Beauty is only in the reason, and all outer beauty is judged and determined by this. It is so far of sense, that its pure forms can only find their expression in some objects of sense; but the Beauty itself is nothing that the sense gives; for if the pure form any way express the living sentiment, the taste is quite indifferent what material object it may be that represents it. That material will be the most desirable which will intrude itself the least upon the mental vision, and leave the pure form in the most unhindered manner to express the living sentiment.

We have in this the field of Alsthetics, which no merely animal eye or ear can enter, inasmuch as it is reason in her freedom which creates the ideal Beauty, and cares nothing for the material part, except merely that it may communicate and preserve the pure living form which is put upon it. This faculty is of the rational part of man, and has an intrinsic excellency which controls the animal appetite for its own end, and will not permit that its beauty should be bartered for bread or any sensual gratification. But though controlling the sense for its own higher end, yet can it not rise to the dignity of an ethical imperative. It controls by taste and not by duty; its retributions are disgust and loathing, not remorse and despair. Its ugliness is not that of vice, and its deformities are not the debasement of guilt. It fills an important province in the domain of the reason, but is wholly separated from morality.

2. Man, as rational, has the capacity to apprehend Truth, and to apply necessary and universal principles in science, and thus to introduce himself into the field of pure Philosophy.

All possible diagrams may be constructed in pure space. In these diagrams, skilfully arranged, a succession of intuitive steps may be taken which shall lead out from axioms to the most remote demonstrations. So, also, in the mind’s passing from point to point along a mathematical line, it may attain the apprehension of succession in pure time. As this intellectual agency is contemplated as standing in the successive points, and thus giving so many émstants, or, as moving from one point in the line to the next, and thus giving so many moments, all possible pure periods, and in these, all possible pure numbers may be attained. Such pure numbers

THE PROVINCE OF MORAL SCIENCE. 21 may be skilfully arranged, in such a variety of ways, as to indicate the results of all arithmetical processes.

In this manner a pure geometry, and a pure arithmetic are possible ; and the whole field of mathematical truth lies open. ‘This does not rest upon the experience in sense, but the intellect works out its own figures and numbers, and the mind’s eye sees the consecutive steps and apprehends the ultimate conclusion. Because man can thus use pure space and pure time, he can see in his pure constructions necessary and universal truth, and thereby affirm not only what zs, but what any experience must be. The sense has, here, no more relevancy than in the fine arts. The pure mathematical figures may be filled by some matter, just as the pure living forms of beauty may be; yet the reason regards the matter filling the pure forms as of no importance, and uses it only to retain or communicate the intuitions, while the entire science lies only in the pure figures of the mind’s own construction.

And so, also, the phenomena given in sense must be connected in determinate places in space, and determinate periods in time, or they cannot come into any order of experience. They are else a mere rhapsody of appearing and disappearing visions. And such determined order of connection cannot be effected by the senses. The reason must give the notion of permanent substance in which the phenomenal qualities znhere, or they could not be determined to their places in the*connections of universal space: and must also give the notion of perduring cause to which the phenomenal events adhere, or they could not be determined to their periods in the connections of one successive time: and must, further, give the notion of action and re-action through which all passing events cohere, or they could not be determined as contemporaneous in one and the same time. The reason determines, not so experience is, but so, if there be any experience in space and time, it must be. With these pure notions of substance, cause, and counter-causation, as connecting all possible phenomena of the sense, the whole field of pure physics lies open to us and we can build up absolute systems of natural science at pleasure. The sense has no more importance in a pure philosophy, than in esthetics and mathematics. The qualities and events constituting a nature of things may be given in such connection; but whether actually given or not, the philosophy is valid.

Not then at all in the animal, but only in the rational part of our being, is the field for mathematical and philosophical truth. And this province is also entirely distinct from the field of beauty in esthetics, though both these belong to the region of the rational —the field of fine art being limited to pure form, expressive of living sentiment; the field of mathematics being confined to pure figure, as giving successive intuitive steps in a demonstration; and the field of pure philosophy being confined to the pure notions of substance, cause and counteraction, as giving the pure connectives for the phenomena of sense into an order of experience in determinate space and time. In this last, from the pure love of science, man may freely subject the animal appetites and refuse

THE PROVINCE OF MORAL SCIENOK. 23 to prostitute philosophy to any craving of pleasure. He may also withdraw all attention from art, and fully devote himself to science. But while, thus, science is clearly discriminated from the province of taste, it still does not come within the field of morality. The excellency of science, far transcending animal happiness, is still other and lower than the excellence of virtue.

3. Man as rational may know himself. The intrinsic excellency of his spiritual being may be clearly apprehended, and in this knowing of his own true dignity, he knows in himself what is due to himself. Herein he finds a law written upon his imner being, and which is imperative for the end of his own worthiness of character alone. ‘This will introduce us at once to the precise field for which we are seeking, namely, that of moral Truth and Obligation.

The spirit of man knoweth the things of a man, but it is spiritual not sensual discernment. Not the animal nature of man can search out these depths of his own being and adequately know his own spiritual excellency and dignity, but his rational spirit only can have this self-discernment. ‘There is something reverent and awful in his own being, and every man is forced at times to feel himself subdued and responsible in the presence of his own spirit. There is an inner shrine where he must stand with uncovered head, and before the tribunal of which he must bow with unquestioning subjection. The Shekina in his own bosom compels respect for its majesty and authority, and he feels bound, alone by himself, to sacrifice appetite, and subdue sense, and subject the body to the worthiness of the spirit. He is often made conscious how terrible js the retribution which comes from within him, in the sense of his own degradation and conviction of personal debasement, when he has bowed his soul as a bond-slave to some appetite of the desh. This inner authority is wholly in and of the spirit, and it uses the sensible world only as worthy to be subdued and subjected to its own ends. It does not want nature that it may represent its own pure forms within it, like beauty; nor, that it may study its own necessary connections in it, as philosophy ; but that by its use of it, it may make the spirit itself more worthy. It is competent to stand in itself, an everlasting law of life, when flesh and sense shall cease, and this mortal shall put on immortality.

Here exclusively is the field of Morals. This province we are now to explore, and find and practically apply the necessary principles. Knowing our precise position, we can precisely determine our Moral Philosophy, and therein possess a science from necessary principles, and not a guess from general consequences.

SYSTEM OF MORAL SCIENCE.

Chapter I. Different Theories Of The Ultimate Rule In Morals

‘‘ WHERE there is no law there is no transgression ;”’ and for the same reason, where there is no law there is no obedience. Law, thus, is essential to all moral action, inasmuch as without it there can be no ethical obligation; no merit nor demerit, no punishment nor reward. The faculties of moral agency constitute mere capacity for praise or blame, but except some rule be applied, no occasion is given for calling forth this capacity into the attainment of any moral character. ‘The first inquiry for Moral Science is, therefore, after an ultimate Rule of life, under whose imperative, moral character may be formed and estimated, and from the authority of which, justification or condemnation may be pronounced.

Such a rule must be apprehended by the subject, and thus promulgated to the conscience, and must be so universal that it may come home in its convictions to the consciousness of the race, otherwise there can be no valid ground for a comprehensive science of Morals. Where, then, is the source of a universal ovcHT, which shall press upon the entire conscience of humanity ?

Widely different and very conflicting theories have been here advanced; and as this is so fundamental for the science of morality, the system has of course received its whole character from its foundation-principles. It is in fact a history of Moral Science, to give a history of the ultimate rules which have been adopted as the ground-work of the many systems which have been elaborated. This wide diversity in reference to the very ground of Moral Science might seem very discouraging to any expectation of a final general agreement, and even be taken to indicate that all morality is itself very uncertain, since those who study it most contradict each other in their philosophy. But there is much relief in the fact, that the diversity has been mainly in reference to what has been made a matter of speculation, and not in reference so much to the matter of fact as to what is right; and more especially is discouragement removed, when it is known that former discussion has not been useless. Many of these conflicting theories have had their day, and are now numbered among the things that were, with neither teacher nor disciples. Two or three only now divide the great mass of ethical writers, and the prospect is the more hopeful that the truth shall ere long shine forth too clearly to permit of any radical discrepancy.

Tt will help us in fixing our convictions of what is the ultimate Rule in morals, if we pass in cursory review

DIFFERENT THEORIES OF THE ULTIMATE RULE. 27 some of the more prominent theories which have been advanced by either ancient or more modern philosophical moralists. We will give these in the most concise statement practicable, without any attempt at confirmation or refutation, and leave them by merely specifying their distinctive authors. The simplest statement of the theory is all we need for the present design; and for the more convenient presentation, we may classify them as theories which put the ultimate Rule in something external to the mind, and those that find the ultimate Rule in something within the mind itself. We shall thus have two classes, which may be termed, I. Objective theories of the Ultimate Moral Rule.

IL. Subjective theories of the Ultimate Moral Rule

Under the class of Objective theories we may put,

1. The Authority of the State. Man must live in civil society, and this can not be sustained without political regulations. The state, through its constituted authorities, legislates, and to this the citizen is bound in unquestioning obedience. ‘The conservation of the public welfare would be impossible, if any subject were permitted to question and resist the civil authority. The man is not to go back of the law and judge of it by some imaginary standard ; the civil authority is ultimate, and the citizen has nothing to do but obey. The whole duty, where the state has legislated, is to read the law and act accordingly. Hozzzs.

2. The revealed Will of God. What God wills is ultimate, simply because he wills it. When this is revealed to man in any way, there is no higher rule by which it can be judged ; but that God has so willed, is in that, and on that account, final. If the position be taken that there must be some principle for the direction of the Divine will, it is answered that God can have no superior sovereign to his will, but this may make and unmake principles, and create moral truth as well as natural existences. All moral truth originates in the Divine will; and it is thus, solely because God wills thus. Drs Cartes, and Dymonp.

3. Something inherent in the Nature of Things. This admits of several modifications, in accordance with what it is in the nature of things, that is put as the ground of the ultimate Rule. (a.) One will say, that there is a jitness in things themselves, which lies at the basis of all obligation. There is a “fitness” in returning gratitude for a favor—in the payment of an honest debt—ain love and honor towards a parent, and homage towards God. This “ fitness” in one to be accompanied by the other, is the ultimate ground of obligation, where there is the one to do also the other. Dz.S.Cranxe. (6.) In all things there is a truth, and this seen confers obligation to be regarded and treated as it is. It is ‘‘ true” that man is not a post, and this is a valid reason why he should not be treated as a post. It is “ true’? that he is a rational being, therefore deal with him as such. The Rule is founded in ‘the truth” of things; all disobedience is somewhere acting out a lie. Wortasrow. (c.) There are certain relations between things, in which is found the ultimate Rule. The “relation” of parent and child —- of benefactor and beneficiary —of the state and the

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