Survey of smoking opium

Foreword

The Executive Board of the Foreign Policy Association presents a survey of smoking opium conditions in the Far East submitted by Mr.

Herbert L. May as a result of his visit to the countries concerned. Mr. May, before visiting the Orient, studied carefully the literature on the subject, and consulted with persons qualified to advise him, both in the United States and in Europe, so that he was well informed on the subject before he went to the East.

Without associating itself in the opinions expressed, for which Mr. May is solely responsible, the Board believes that the survey should be brought to the attention of persons interested in the opium question for their information. It is being distributed among such persons and is not being published as a report of the Foreign Policy Association. The Board submits the survey as one made by an observer in whose honesty of purpose and care in observation it has absolute confidence.

Contents

PART I. page

Scope and Method of Investigation 5

Statement of the Smoking Opium Problem and Conclusions 6

Part I

IT IS difficult to draft a report on “Opium” that will be sufficiently technical for the expert and at the same time simple enough for the ordinary reader. Moreover, there are, in this highly controversial problem, so few admitted facts, or indeed so few facts of any kind as distinguished from opinions, that the form of a legal brief is impracticable. Again, to burden the report with a narrative of the observations on a tour of the Far East would be to lose the thread of argument. Accordingly, the form best adapted to this purpose is to embody in the report proper merely the conclusions and a brief resume of the reasons therefor, relegating all details to a series of annexes.

A general knowledge of the opium problem as it existed in 1926 is presupposed on the part of the reader. Those persons who wish more details of conditions in, for example, the Philippines, China, the Netherlands East Indies, British Malaya and Hongkong are referred to Annex I of this report.

Scope and Method of Investigation

The scope of this study has been an unprejudiced and dispassionate investigation of conditions in those parts of the world where the question of the control of opium smoking is most pressing, an analysis of oft repeated statements which seem of doubtful validity, of the sources of information, the factors influencing progress, the various methods of government control, and the attitude of governments toward the problem. The primary purpose has been to evaluate international policies ; the secondary to suggest paths along which a more complete knowledge of the subject may be attained, so that future action may be based upon information and less upon theory, rhetoric and emotion. About a year was devoted to this study; half of the time on books and documents, and the other half on visits to some of the capitals of Europe and America, the Secretariat of the League of Nations and the sessions of the Assembly in Geneva, and then to the large centers of India, Ceylon, Federated Malay States, Straits Settlements, Netherlands East Indies, Philippines, Hongkong, China and Japan.

There are few real facts in the problem to work from. We know that in various parts of the world certain varieties of plants grow whose products have a beneficial effect in the treatment of disease and a vicious effect if used for self-indulgence; beyond this point we get into the realm of statistics which are for the most part unreliable, and opinion which is meaningless without interpretation. It was my custom in each country to interview government officials, churchmen or missionaries, educators, business men, natives and physicians. In many places I talked to employers of native labor, sea captains, excise commissioners, army officers. League of Nations representatives, consuls, police, secret service agents, editors, newspaper correspondents and bankers. Only sufficient time was spent to procure a cross section of this opinion, to appraise it, and observe the working of the methods of control. The results as embodied in this report, therefore, are of value only to the extent that the writer is a competent appraiser of opinion and is capable of a judicial approach.

Accordingly, the personal equation must be taken into acount; but it should be explained that where I give an opinion it is not based upon pure rationalization but upon extensive reading and a consideration of the opinions of persons, in the Far East and elsewhere, who are competent to form an intelligent judgment.

There is no satisfactory terminology in the documentary study of habit-forming drugs. Unfortunately “opium” is commonly used as a broad term to include every variety of habit-forming drug, thus diverting attention from such as cocaine and hashish. In this report, in order not to confuse the reader accustomed to the common terminology, and for want of a better one, I shall use the word “opium” (with quotation marks) in its broad sense indicated above; opium (without quotation marks) as meaning the gum opium from the poppy ; and “manufactured drugs” or “drugs” (with quotation marks) to include all classes of habit-forming drugs produced by chemists in a laboratory, whether from the poppy or from the other plants mentioned in the Hague Treaty of 1912. References to raw opium for eating and prepared opium for smoking will be so noted.

Statement of the Smoking Opium Problem and Conclusions

Existing treaties provide for the “gradual and effective suppression” of opium smoking; that is, for eventual prohibition. Why not immediate prohibition? Two factors prevent this, in my opinion.

(1) The possible “drug” menace. The restricted smoker may turn to “drugs”; hence, prohibition of smoking must imply adequate “drug” control.

(2) The smuggling factor. Smuggling is the chief obstacle to any form of government control of smoking, but particularly to prohibition, because smuggling increases as barriers are raised against the commodity; prohibition where a demand exists is the highest possible barrier. Smuggling, generally speaking, exists where there is overproduction in one country and a demand in another, with a barrier against its satisfaction. To wipe out smuggling entirely some form of limitation of production is necessary.

To refresh the reader’s mind on the main facts of the smoking opium problem, I will remind him that the chief producing countries of opium for smoking are China, Persia and India. In China, poppy-growing and the manufacture and use of prepared opium for smoking are prohibited by law, but thousands of tons are produced annually and used within China or smuggled to other opium consuming countries of the Far East. In Persia there is neither limitation of production nor control. In India there is a government monopoly of poppy-growing and the sale of opium. India began in 1927 a policy of eliminating her export for smoking within ten years, ten per cent a year. She exports only on order of other governments.

There are three possible ways of limiting production: (a) each country growing enough opium to meet its own needs (an impracticable method, in my judgment) ; (b) certain countries producing enough to meet their own needs, and a surplus for export, carefully controlled to reach only those countries desiring the product (the Indian method) ; and (c) a limitation of production to medicinal and scientific needs, which would cut out opium for smoking unless supplies for smoking addicts would be considered “medicinal.” Because of the fact that smokers, if restricted, may turn to “drugs” I believe that limitation of production of “drugs” and control of the traffic should proceed along with limitation of production of opium for smoking purposes.

If this idea is sound, a considerable period of time must elapse; yet some form of control of opium smoking is in the meantime advisable. The various methods of control are outlined hereafter. Prohibition, under existing conditions of uncontrolled supplies, cannot function. In my opinion, a modified form of government monopoly, with proper safeguards, is the best method in preparation for eventual prohibition.

“Drug” Control before Further Smoking Restrictions

Time and again the fear was expressed by persons whom I interviewed that opium smokers (or eaters) if deprived of the product, or if more restricted in its purchase or use, would resort to “drugs” or bad brandy. China, said to have had at one time a liquor problem and having later a smoking opium problem, seems to have acquired in more recent years a “drug” problem, although some students of the question allege that since the recrudescence of opium smoking on a large scale in China the rate of increase in “drug” addiction has ceased to grow. There is too little knowledge of this tendency to shift from smoking to “drugs” and it is one that needs study by persons with technical training. On the insufficient evidence available, it is my opinion that the inhibited opium smoker is a potential “drug” user, and that restrictions upon smoking lead to increase of “drug” addiction.

For this reason, I should say that strictness of “drug” control should by all means precede, or at least keep pace with further smoking restriction. As we are dealing here more particularly with the subject of control of opium smoking, the allied question of “manufactured drugs” is treated in an annex.

Smuggling the Chief Difficulty in Control

A perusal of Annex I will indicate that, no matter what method of control is employed, smuggling is the chief obstacle to success. Smuggling is possible, indeed inevitable, where a demand exists at one point with restrictions on use or price, and an uncontrolled supply exists in some other country. If each opium smoking country grew and manufactured its own opium, produced only enough for its own needs, and prevented the product from leaving the country (if that were possible), there would be no smuggling problem; but some countries produce none and others more than they need, and some of the latter countries exercise no effective control over the product, by monopoly or otherwise. If production be limited to domestic needs and export forbidden, or if a surplus is produced and export limited to other governments, there is still the chance, as experience has shown, of some of the production getting into illicit channels. With production limited to medicinal and scientific needs the chances of smuggling on a large scale are very much reduced, particularly if the plants are grown under government monopoly, for a government can control its own crops better than it can a licensee’s, as India’s experience has shown. Smuggling can be curtailed by proper effort, but it can only be reduced to a negligible factor by limiting production to medicinal and scientific needs.

Limitation of Production

Control of the use of opium for smoking and drugs, no matter what form the control takes, is a necessary step while awaiting limitation of production and eventual prohibition. Limitation of production, when it is actually begun on a world-wide scale, will undoubtedly be progressive ; that is to say, the reduction will be a certain percentage each year. If production of opium be reduced even to ten per cent of the present production, the narcotic effect of that much opium converted into “manufactured drugs” would probably be greater than the effect today of the entire production of raw and prepared opium and “drugs” derived therefrom. Unless “drug” control precedes drastic restrictions on eating and smoking opium, that ten per cent will be mostly converted into “drugs,” and the smokers will be, by that time, probably “drug” addicts. For, if there is not enough raw material to supply both smokers and “drug” manufacturers, the latter can outbid the former, even for opium of low morphine content. It is, therefore, necessary that “drug” control precede drastic limitation of production.

It should also be clear that limitation of production and eventual prohibition are only feasible through international agreements, and that such

S agreements can only be carried out by governments having effective control of production and use. In my opinion such control can best be exercised by a modified form of government monopoly along the lines suggested. So long as the uncontrolled opium production of China and Persia is floating about the world seeking smokers, no form of control can prevent considerable illicit trade. The reason why government monopoly is stressed in this report is that it seems to me the form of control best adapted to prepare for eventual prohibition. The only progress in limiting production is India’s recent move for curtailing that part of the production that is exported so that the exports vnll be reduced at the rate of ten per cent each year until the entire export trade for smoking is wiped out, an action made easy through control by government monopoly.

Methods of Control: Government Monopoly Now, Prohibition Later

Methods of control throughout the Far East vary from a simple sales tax to the prohibition method in use in the Philippines.

(1) No restrictions on sale, but simply a tax, or customs duty, or both, as in Persia.

(2) Government monopoly, “farming out” to individuals, or to licensees, the right to sell all that they can. This system is employed in Macao (Portuguese).

(3) Government monopoly, the government operating its own shops with government employees engaged at a fixed salary; in force in British Malaya, Netherlands East Indies, and elsewhere. This removes the incentive to push sales.

(4) Government monopoly with the smokers registered, licensed and rationed to consume a limited amount, but permitting new names to be added from time to time to the list of registrants, as in some parts of the Netherlands East Indies.

(5) Same as (4) except that the list is closed and that no new names may be added ; in effect a sort of limited prohibition applying to all except addicts. This system is in force in some other parts of the Netherlands East Indies. When the addicts are supplied through public hospitals or dispensaries, this becomes an almost complete form of prohibition, with the treatment of addicts considered as a medicinal use of prepared opium.

(6) Prohibition. There are two classifications which should be recognized as distinct: Prohibition in a district where the vice has never been practiced, and prohibition where it has. It is the latter class of prohibition which one has to deal with in the Philippines, China and Korea; the former class in some parts of the Netherlands East Indies.

In Annex I of this report, these methods of control in various countries of the East are discussed. A reading of these accounts will show that prohibition is not working in the so-called prohibition countries, while government monopoly, no matter what legitimate objection can be made to it as a permanent solution, is more immediately practicable. A comparison of the two methods — government monopoly and prohibition — at least shows that a law which involves a saving to the government treasury is usually better enforced than one where a mere matter of abstract morality is concerned. In China prohibition is not being enforced because (to mention but one reason) the “war lords” are not willing to part with opium revenue. In the Netherlands East Indies, government monopoly, although not quite so ambitious in its aims as prohibition, is apparently producing more genuine results. No statistical comparison of the relative merits of prohibition and government monopoly is possible, since the extent of the illicit trade remains always an unknown factor.

It should be noted here that at the time of the Hague Convention of 1912, which provided for gradual and effective suppression of opium smoking, all of the countries where the problem existed except China and the Philippines, were using some form of government monopoly. Most of them had advanced through successive stages from partial to complete control. On the other hand, but a few years previous to 1912, China and the Philippines had skipped most or all of the steps and jumped right up to step (6), prohibition. The United States, in trying to solve its liquor problem, made the same jump, while some other governments that did likewise returned later to some form of government monopoly. If the fear is expressed that democratic governments might shy at government monopoly, it should be remembered that at the 1926-27 session of the United States Congress, the Secretary of the Treasury and the head of the prohibition enforcement division strongly recommended a bill for a government monopoly of the manufacture and sale of medicinal whiskey.

Let me repeat here that any one who makes a close study of the smoking opium problem will come to the inevitable conclusion that today smuggling stands in the way of any form of really effective control. A reading of the annexes will show that restrictions on use, height of monopoly price, distance from source of supply and efficiency of a patrol and preventive system are all factors which affect the amount of smuggling; and that illicit opium fills one hundred per cent of the demand in the “prohibition” countries and a much lower percentage in the government monopoly countries.

With the reservations mentioned below as to China and the Philippines, I should say that the “prohibition” countries would gain by a temporary change to some form of government monopoly, subject to the conditions r am about to describe, particularly regarding profit. Under evaded prohibition they do not know who their addicts are, where the supplies come from or anything about the evil ; it is all subterranean. As a preparation for real prohibition, the government should have control of the sources and the outlets to enable it properly and progressively to dry up the stream, and to identify or “tag” the addicts.

I would suggest certain conditions, however, to be imposed upon government monopoly : ( 1 ) There should be a clear and unequivocal statement by the government as to a policy of administration beneficial to the addicts; (2) there should be no reliance upon the revenue for general budgetary purposes; (3) as definite a time or contingency as possible should be fixed when prohibition will take the place of a monopoly; (4) in the meantime there should be prohibition for non-addicts, and addiction (smoking or “drug”) should be treated as a medical problem, — this involves a registration plan, with registration easy at first, and eventually some form of rationing until cure or death; (5) the monopoly should be under the control of a public welfare, social welfare, or health department and not in a finance department; (6) to dispense with the revenue, the government could supply addicts at cost (not a good plan), or could use the profits for treatment of addiction, educational and propaganda work, social amelioration for the victims, and preventive social institutions. The objection that a decrease in consumption will mean a reduction of the funds available for these purposes is not one of any force, for as smoking decreases the need for these funds will probably decrease, as the social and economic burden of addiction is lessened. If not, other sources of revenue can be found, particularly from a people economically improved by a reduction in smoking.

Applying these various conclusions to the opium smoking countries (except China and the Philippines) I should say that the modified form of government monopoly indicated above is the best form of control in preparation for eventual prohibition. All of these countries which have not yet done so should install the government-clerk-on-a-fixed-salary form of shop keeping to remove the incentive to push sales, and should register consumers and record purchases. The value of rationing for the present is chiefly as a means of preventing increased purchases and resale. So far as Hongkong (which is practically a part of China) is concerned, the simplest form of registration possible without rationing must be sufficient until conditions in China improve.

Logically, and ignoring political feasibility, the same line of reasoning applies to China and the Philippines, but there are special factors which must be taken into account. China has certain treaty obligations which may make an out-and-out government monopoly inadvisable, and she has a certain amount of intelligent opinion against the abuses of opium smoking that it would be regrettable to thwart. A reading of the annexes will indicate that an enforcement of prohibition along the drastic lines of the 1907 period is hardly possible after the awakening that the Nationalist movement has brought about ; that her most likely hope of success lies in a temporary control, honestly administered, when she gets a stable central government, with the “squeeze” idea eliminated; and that the control now being exercised by the Cantonese group in the territory under their control (which is virtually a government monopoly under the “face-saving” device of a “suppression monopoly,” with the expressed purpose of prohibition by 1929) is an acceptable and practical compromise, even if the fixing of 1929 as a date for prohibition be too optimistic. The sincerity and practicability of the Cantonese program yet remain to be tested. It may be interesting to note that the four-year period of preparation for prohibition set by the Cantonese (see Annex III) corresponds pretty closely with the period recommended in the 1905 Report of the Philippine Commission of which Bishop Brent was a member, which period was, however, much curtailed in practice.

As for the Philippines, neither reasonably increased appropriations for the preventive service nor such changes in personnel as are feasible would materially affect the present failure of prohibition of opium smoking; the present law cannot work under existing world conditions of opium supply. It is to be doubted whether the actual amount of smoking in the Islands would greatly vary, whether under prohibition or the kind of government monopoly herein described ; but the latter would not only be more honest but a better preparation for an eventual enforceable prohibition law.

Considering all the methods of control preparatory to prohibition, I should say that the Dutch system in the East Indies is at the head of the list for efficiency, practicability and flexibility. It is not as complicated as it seems on paper, and it allows properly for all sorts of varying conditions. Existing government monopoly prices almost everywhere, however, are too high, especially in the Netherlands East Indies. Not only do they induce smuggling but they constitute a high penalty against the man who obeys the law by buying government opium and a high reward for the one who buys smuggled opium at the much lower price. Divans (public smoking establishments) apparently have a social feature which makes smoking more attractive. Therefore, since the object is to reduce or stamp out the vice, divans should not be permitted.

My opinion is very definitely that the improved form of government monopoly (accompanied by world “drug” control) is the only reasonable way of handling the problem of opium smoking today. Prohibition is for the present unworkable and a source of corruption and disrespect for the law. It drives underground a trade which is much better controlled in the open.

Prof. H. F. MacNair, of St. John’s University, Shanghai, writes: “What may be opined, however, is that prohibition does not prohibit, and that careful regulation based on a slowly but gradually enlightened public opinion, rather than sudden mass legislation at one fell swoop, may be one key to the problem.” (Essay: “An Analogy in Stimulants,” in “China’s New Nationalism and Other Essays,” Commercial Press, Shanghai, 1925.)

Whatever one’s personal views may be as to the advisability of some day prohibiting opium smoking as the method of controlling its abuse, the fact remains that eventual prohibition is a treaty obligation under the Hague Convention of 1912. The argument herein advanced is that, under existing circumstances, immediate prohibition is impracticable, and that, to secure the expected benefits, it is first necessary to bring about a strict international control of “manufactured drugs,” also a control, preferably by government monopoly, of the production, manufacture and use of prepared opium for smoking, and a limitation of production. I say “under existing circumstances”: these may change rapidly in the course of the next five years, owing to possible action by the Persian Government as indicated in its memorandum (filed with the League of Nations as a comment upon the report of the League’s Persian Commission) wherein it appears that it is possible that a reduction in poppy production may be tried after a three-year preparatory period ; and owing furthermore to the uncertainty as to whether China will be able to bring production and use under control as suggested by the Cantonese group. Accordingly, some of the conclusions advanced in this report are subject to change as the situation alters.

Relative Importance of the Opium Smoking Problem

Opium smoking and the use of “manufactured drugs” are, in my opinion, two distinct problems, as different, for example, as the problems of whiskey drinking and the injection of a powerful stimulant like strychnine. The difference is not merely one of degree; in the use of liquor and the smoking of opium there are different social and other factors, to ignore which is to make impossible a rational approach to the problem. The difference in the nature of the two questions, smoking opium and drugs, was apparently recognized, at least in part, by the holding of two separate conferences in Geneva in 1924 and 1925, the first on smoking opium and the second on “manufactured drugs” ; and this separation of the question was evidently one of the chief causes of friction between China and the United States on one hand and the rest of the interested powers on the other. The real mistake of the First Conference was to include as full members only those countries where opium smoking is still permitted. The United States and China should have been included as full members, for, as will be shown in Annex I, prohibition of opium smoking is not functioning in the Philippines or in China, and the problem is as acute there as in countries where smoking is still legal.

It is a matter of common knowledge today that the use of “manufactured drugs” is a more harmful habit than the smoking of opium, and that the former is a growing menace the world over. Yet during the past twentyfive years the emphasis has been put, in the United States, upon the lesser evil, which exists almost exclusively in the Orient.

At this point I wish to present what seems to be the prevailing viewpoint on opium smoking among officials and most Europeans and many natives in the Far East; namely, that it is no more abused than the drinking of liquor and that it is indulged in for the same reasons. Several missionaries made the statement that the whiskey sot is worse than the opium sot, one of them adding that nothing he ever saw in the East was as bad as Glasgow on a Saturday night. The reason the West is so aroused by opium smoking is that it was a new vice to the Occidental missionaries and others who first came to the East, differing from the drinking vice and making more of an impression on them. Besides, the abuse was more prevalent in those days and there was more emaciation, “opium face” and suffering from the habit. The use of “manufactured drugs” was not then in evidence. It is the opinion, however, at least in the British and Dutch possessions, that since the powers have agreed by treaty that opium smoking is an evil, to be prohibited eventually, the question of ethics is an academic one, and there is nothing for the colonial officials to do but comply with the treaty. They declare that they will do so, at no matter what cost in revenue, but they claim that they cannot be expected, when their opium revenue is gone, to spend money on police duty or preventive service to enforce a Western standard of “morals” which Oriental public opinion does not support. They fear that the forbidden opium smoking will be supplanted by the use of “drugs” and bad brandy, and the officials will have a worse problem of disorder and crime.

Further light on the official attitude of the East on opium smoking may be found in a Hongkong document : “Report of the Committee Appointed by H. E. the Governor to Consider the Colony’s Position with Regard to the Obligations Incurred under the International Opium Convention of 1912.” (See Annex IV).

Reference is frequently made to the great bulk of opium production used for smoking and eating, and the much smaller percentage used for “drugs.” The former is estimated by some at over ninety per cent and the latter at less than ten per cent. But it may not be generally realized that the narcotic effect of the smaller percentage in “drug” form is greater, and worse in the amount of harm done, than the large percentage smoked or eaten.

The matter of over-emphasis of the opium smoking problem, and the possible reasons therefor, have been set forth at this length because I feel that the Western world should re-adjust its perspective and give more serious attention to “drug” control.

The International Situation and the United States

The “limitation of production” idea espoused by the United States at the Geneva Conference was basically sound, but there could be no practicable plan for putting it into effect immediately. As has been pointed out herein, there are several necessary preliminary steps, and, if I am correct in my conclusions, the insistence upon a definite date for prohibition to begin was not justified. Criticisms of United States policy were directed against its failure to be informed, or its unwillingness to face the facts, on the non-functioning of prohibition in the Philippines and general conditions in the Far East, and its over-emphasis of the smoking problem at the expense of the “drug” problem.

This country needs a better informed and more continuous international policy on smoking opium, which concerns it principally because of the Philippines. At present there are too few who understand the problem. These insufficiently informed officials are likely to dictate the policy.