Some loose stones; being a consideration of certain tendencies in modern theology illustrated by reference to the book called "Foundations,"

Preface

ILENCE, in print, is a virtue rarely found

where theology is in question. But there comes a point at which, as, with the fags watching the football-match in ‘‘ Tom Brown,” the worst-equipped onlooker becomes impatient, and must needs rush into the fray, at whatever peril of ridicule, in his shirt-sleeves.

This is not a theological book. I have no claim and no competence to write a theological book. It should rather be called a study in psychology. For we are never allowed to forget, nowadays, that psychology is the key to everything, more especially in matters of religion. We investigate the psychology of the Prophets, or of the Apostles, or of the Fathers, or of the Schoolmen, or of the Deists; and even (God forgive us) the psychology of Jesus of Nazareth. This book purports to open up new ground by investigating a far more intricate psychology—that of the modern theologian. The great argument used now against any theological proposition is not, that it is untrue, or unthinkable, or unedifying, or unscriptural, or unorthodox, but simply, that the modern mind cannot accept it. It is the modern mind that accepts this and rejects that, that expresses itself in terms of A rather than in terms of B, that thinks along these lines rather than along those,

Vii viii Some Loose Stones that shrinks, or ratifies, or demands. And after reading a few paragraphs of such ostensibly psychological discussion, I find myself sorely tempted to exclaim, in an equally psychological spirit: ‘‘ If the modern mind has really got all these peculiar kinks about it, then, in Heaven’s name, let us trepan it.”

The history of the present work is as follows. About two years ago I was privileged by an invitation to join a sort of Eranos, a body of eight Oxford Fellows who met in each others’ rooms, on Fridays throughout the term, for Sext, luncheon, and None. It had included, I think, all, and still includes several, of the Seven Oxford Men who wrote “ Foundations.” I was aware of the imminence of that production ; and long before its appearance set about writing a parody of Dryden’s ‘‘ Absalom and Achitophel ”’ to greet its birth. The parody, which appeared in the ‘‘ Oxford Magazine ’’ almost immediately after the book itself had been published, laid itself open to two criticisms. Old-fashioned theologians, who were distressed at recent evidences of the trend of modern theology, asked why I couldn’t attack the book in earnest. More “ Liberal” thinkers were under the impression that there was something cowardly about a style of criticism which, after the manner of guerilla warfare, hid itself behind the rock of Satire and discharged irresponsible shots into the somewhat broad target presented to it. There is only one way of satisfying both criticisms, which was not then open to me, as I had not read “‘ Foundations ”’ itself; and that is to write a serious criticism of it.

But I repeat, it is in the first instance psychological, not theological. This description must not be taken to imply any truckling to Pragmatism, a philosophy

Preface ix which all good men rightly reject. If a position is stated in cold logical form, clothed in words that represent the truth as nearly as a man can express it, then it is nonsense to enquire who the man is, what is his ancestry and station in life, or his views on other matters. Nobody wants a biography of Euclid. But ‘‘ Foundations,” in spite of the fact that it was launched on the world with something of the solemnity of a manifesto, does not seem to me a plain logical statement. Many of us would agree that he who teacheth ought to wait on his teaching, and he that exhorteth on his exhortation. But the teaching of ‘‘ Foundations’”’ is so interwoven with exhortation that the plain reader is likely to lose his way in it. The very language is largely unfamiliar to him. Words like “‘ static,’ “‘ corporate,” °* inclusive,’’ ‘‘ experience,’’ above all, ‘‘ restatement ”’ recur continually, jarring upon the ear with the strangeness of a partially understood dialect, hypnotizing rather than enlightening us. We have to face a new vocabulary and a new atmosphere, wholly modern and largely “ Oxford.’ And this book is an attempt to get behind that vocabulary, that atmosphere, and point out in language as simple as I can make it where this modern theology is carrying us; and why (in my thinking) it is hopelessly discontinuous with the tendencies of historic Christianity.

I am aware that the position I adopt is likely to be described as obscurantist. If obscurantism means a tendency to obscure things, that is, to conceal the importance of things which one knows to be true, then I cannot plead guilty to the charge ; indeed, it seems that nowadays it is the “ Liberal ”’ thinker who x Some Loose Stones is far more tempted to practise economy in his representation of the truth. It is the Liberal who makes his appeal to the practical necessities of religion, rather than to abstract truth. He is content to reduce the deposit of faith to the smallest possible dimensions, in order to attract the largest possible number of converts. It is the ‘* obscurantist,”’ oddly enough, who goes up to the house-top, and speaks in the light that which he has heard in darkness; acquiring by his importunity some of the unpopularity which must attach to a theological enfant terrible.

But if obscurantism is simply to believe, that there are limits defined by authority, within which theorizing is unnecessary and speculation forbidden ; that there are some religious principles of such a priori certainty, that any evidence which appears to conflict with them does not destroy them, as it would destroy a mere hypothesis, but by conflicting with them proves itself to have been erroneously or inadequately interpreted, then I would welcome the title, contenting myself with the remark, firstly that all of us, except the blankest agnostics, do in fact hold such a priori principles on certain questions, and secondly that if we did not religion could never be a practical thing, because a continual flux of first principles is (as a matter of observation) necessarily incompatible with any stable development of the spiritual life. I suppose therefore that the “ obscurantist ’’ is not one who takes things for granted, but one who takes too much for granted. I hope in the following pages to discuss the delimitation of that province.

But I should like here to enter a protest against

Preface xi the assumption, very widely made, that the obscurantist, having fenced himself in behind his wall of prejudices, enjoys an uninterrupted and ignoble peace. It is, of course, in a sense true, that to them which have believed there is rest, even in this world. But there is another side to it. The soldier who has betaken himself to a fortress is thereby in a more secure position than the soldier who elects to fight in the open plain. He has ramparts to defend him. But he has, on the other hand, ramparts to defend. The soldier in the plain can retreat, if he takes care to retreat in good order, and take up a new line of defences behind that which he has abandoned. But the soldier in the fortress has let himself be surrounded; he has to defend every inch of his walls, since a single breach makes the whole stockade useless. For him there is no retreat: to be beaten back a step means loss absolute and irretrievable, the surrender of the flag.

The application of the parable to theology is easy. To have burnt your boats, to have nailed your colours to the mast, is not necessarily peace. The ring-wall of authoritative dogma lessens the fierceness of the attacks of doubt, but it also adds a fearful responsibility. The whole position stands or falls by the weakest parts in the defences: give up one article of the Nicene Creed, and the whole situation is lost ; you go under, and the flag you loved is forfeit. You have not done with doubt because you have thrown yourself into the fortress ; you are left to keep doubt continually at bay, with the cheerful assurance that if you fail, the whole of your religious life has been a ghastly mistake; you must set out again, under new colours. And this battle against doubt, though

Xi Some Loose Stones it is not unceasing, has nevertheless a way of making itself felt when you would most fain be rid of it: it finds you out in moments of weakness and depression : it banishes your sleep when sleep is most needed : most importunely of all, it assails your meditation. People should be more careful when they say, ‘‘ So-and-so has stopped thinking.’’ What they mean is that he has stopped speculating about the Faith. That may be, but he has not stopped bothering about it (if I may use an expressive term), unless he has fallen into complete religious indifference.

One more protest must be made, by way of preliminary. There is a still harsher word commonly - used by modern theologians than the word “ obscurantist.”’ I mean the word “ bigot.’’ Those who believe in certain doctrines because they are received doctrines, because they are handed down by authority, are often supposed to view with an unchristian hatred all such as disagree with them; while those who make their appeal (in the loose popular phrase) to ‘“‘ reason,” are more broad-minded, have a better eye for the true points in their adversary’s position, more sympathy for his difficulties. This may be so in some cases: I can only say that it is not so with myself. Faith is to me, not an intellectual process, but a divine gift, a special privilege. This being so, I have the utmost sympathy for those who are without it, just because I can give no clear explanation of how I came by it myself. And I can see the strong points in my adversary’s position, just because if I, in my unworthiness, were not gifted with faith, they are precisely the points I should emphasize myself. The extraordinary thing to me is not, that there should be so much unbelief, but that anyone

Preface xiii should believe at all. I can feel every argument against the authenticity of the Gospels, because I know that if I approached them myself without faith, I should as likely as not brush them aside impatiently as one of a whole set of fables. It is rather reason that makes me bigoted. Believing by faith in the Resurrection, I can, I hope, have all patience with the unbeliever, because the thing itself is from his point of view so unlikely. But having arrived, by what I conceive to be a process of pure reasoning, at the conclusion that (let us say) the Ninth Book of the Iliad was written by the author of the first book, I find it very hard to have patience with the man who can read, and apparently follow, my argument, and then disagree with me. Him I do feel tempted to accuse of intellectual dishonesty, or invincible stupidity. ‘“‘I would have sent Wolf to the stake,” I assure myself, “‘ but not Darwin.”’

With these caveats I enter at once on the task I have set myself, without apology for its manifest effrontery. I will only pray, that if there is any word in this book calculated to give offence to any person unnecessarily, or any word contrary to the defined truths of our most holy Religion, it may be blotted out from the minds of all who read it, and from my record too, when the judgment is set, and the books are opened.

aM venta een

ANALYSIS OF CONTENTS

Chapter I How Much Will Jones Swallow ?

PAGE Ought Christianity to save us from a Situation ?—The political situation cannot expect a Christian solution—do modern political conceptions affect theology ?—The demand for efficiency and the doctrine of Creation—Kingliness and fatherhood, used as Christian metaphors, equally uncongenial to modern temperament—The intellectual situation, produced by nineteenth-century enlightenment, formidable only because of the wide diffusion of Thought— hence our theology has become apologetic, because everyone is concerned to make Christianity palatable to his neighbour—the case of Jones—Jones the hero of ** Foundations ’—Accommodating attitude of ‘‘ Foundations,”’ illustrated by the selection of Mr. Streeter to deal with the Resurrection—does the really modern mind demand such accommodation ?—an age of positivism, i.e. of appeal for something positive in religion—the true doubter needs dogmatic answers, not evidences—especially since Christianity has now rivals in the field—need for a ““shop-window ” theology which shall be lucid; Christianity made simple, not Christianity made easy—Natural distrust of “‘ restatements ’—The revolt of Woman from the Church, and her demand for clear issues—impatience of the indefinite—demand for clearness of thought intensified by difficulties of Foreign Missions . ; . 1-19

Chapter II Hypothesis And The Cacodaimon

Not the results, but the methods of modern Biblical criticism give cause for alarm-—The issue between induction and deduction, between hypothesis and a priori presupposition —Presupposition necessary in the case of mathematics —the law of the Uniformity of Nature, on which Science is based, itself a presupposition—The doctrine of the

XV

Xvi Some Loose Stones PAGE goodness of God, and the ultimate triumph of Good over Evil, is also a presupposition—not a proved hypothesis, as may be seen by examination of a rival hypothesis, covering the same facts equally well, of Creation by a malicious demon—This latter hypothesis does not shake our trust in Providence—although a large proportion of mankind does not share our confidence—Disbelief in miracles a presupposition; it will not work as a hypothesis— Further presupposition held by those who believe in the inerrancy of Scripture—not assailable by argument, as a mere hypothesis would be—yet not illogical, for it does use logic, but argues downwards from an a priori certainty, not upwards from recorded facts—As may be seen in the case of the two genealogies of 8. Joseph—Orthodox theology does not really need literal inerrancy, but infallibility in matters affecting the Faith—what matters do affect the Faith, might well be decided by common sense—but, for an additional safeguard, has been decided by Church tradition—Scripture and Tradition, the two head-lights of the believer—This double light must be fully taken into account before, not after, we investigate the results of modern criticism—otherwise our beliefs would be in constant danger of revision—The “ modernizing’’ process in theology really a progressive one, and therefore alarming—But we are told that the effort of revising our theology when necessary is part of our probation in this world—curious argument of Mr. Rawlinson on the subject—Deductive reasoning is necessary, owing to heresy, but not hypothetical—for, if intellectual probation were really parallel with moral probation, it would actually be our duty to resist and to flee from doubt— but, as a matter of fact, no ‘‘ duty ” can be proved in connexion with the use of our reason one way or the other .20-40

Appendix To Chapter II

The claim that Scripture and Tradition should be consulted before we apply critical methods to religious data, is not based on distrust of criticism as such, but on distrust of the errors into which criticism is frequently ensnared— The blinding effect of working with a hypothesis in view, illustrated from the Baconian problem—and from the theory of the ‘‘ Progressive Reverence”’ of the Three Synoptic Gospels—The tyranny of the dominant hypothesis over the public mind—This is so strong that it flourishes even when the induction it rests on has been proved erroneous—as in the case of certain aspects of the Homeric problem, and of the Two-document Hypothesis in Gospel criticism—The fallacy of economy, which inclines people to account for two facts by one single hypothesis, instead

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Analysis of Contents Xvii of two different ones, is a logical error, often vitiated by the ** plurality of causes ’’—cf. the modern view of what was meant by ‘“‘ speaking with tongues”. , : .41-51

Chapter III Miracle

Miracles and special Providences—Mr. Streeter in ‘‘ Foundations ’’ gives a definition of the former which would include the latter—But Special Providences, though marvellous, are not miraculous—A miracle properly so called traverses the Law of the Uniformity of Nature—A Law implies a lawgiver behind it—and even a “force” implies a Person who exercises it—Nature is therefore controlled by a Person, but he does normally express himself in accordance with certain laws—Does he ever correct his laws on “‘equity’’ ? Or does he confine his interference to Special Providences ?—Wrong-headedness of the idea that the notion of Providential overruling is more difficult to entertain in the mind than that of miracles—illustrated by reference to the Prayer-book Calendar—Possibility of miracles thus only difficult to persons holding preconceived ideas—which must be either materialistic, deistic, or pantheistic—But, granted the possibility, would God do miracles ?—Yes, for purposes of evidence—Special providences are never evidential, for at best they may always be called coincidences—But miracles were, as a matter of fact, produced as evidence by the early Church—and, however difficult they may be for us, they clearly would, if they happened, produce conviction at first-hand—This evidence does not dispense with the moral witness, which is clearly needed to supplement it—but the witness of power was also needed, because the Apostles were, on their own admission, slow at heart to believe—Truth of the ecclesiastical miracles in genere—concluding remarks on the faculty of the imagination . : : : : , : 52-67

Chapter IV Cui Bono ? An Enquiry About The Empty Tomb

Double problem of the Resurrection, the reappearance of our Saviour’s outward form, and the disappearance of his body—theories attempting to account naturally for the former of these: (1) that of a “subjective vision”’; (2) that of an “ objective vision”; (3) Mr. Streeter’s view, that the Risen Body was immaterial, because glorified— A “restatement ”’ of the Resurrection of the Body on Mr. Streeter’s own lines; it is not the physical particles that

XViii Some Loose Stones PAGE rise, but only the ‘“‘form” or organizing principle of the body—On this view, we might suppose that our Lord rose as we shall rise (“‘ with our bodies’’), and yet the physical particles of his body remained in the tomb— But in that case the Resurrection was not evidential, for this ‘‘ Resurrection Body ’’ would be no more convincing to the Apostles than an astral body—and in fact the view runs counter to the evidence—Evidence against the physical Resurrection : (1) the Silence of S. Mark, how explained, (2) the abnormal movements of the Risen Saviour, how explained—Evidence for the physical Resurrection, (1) the eating and drinking, and invitation to S. Thomas, (2) the quotation from the Psalms in Acts 13. 35; special force of this—The empty tomb, Mr. Thompson’s theory that it was not empty—Mr. Streeter’s suggestion that the body had been removed by the Romans, for fear of a disturbance of some sort—but if Pilate removed the body, why did he guard the tomb ?—And why should he fear any disturbance from the routed friends of the Crucified —or from his enemies, who were above all interested to see that the body remained where it was, in the tomb ?— Either Pilate had heard of the prophesied Resurrection, in which case he would have guarded the body, but not removed it or allowed it to be removed; or he had not heard of any such prophecy, and then he would have taken no precautions at all—The only convincing naturalistic theory of the disappearance is, that the Apostles stole the body, which Mr. Streeter rejects on a priori grounds—If miracles are impossible, this is the best explanation: if they are possible, then a physical Resurrection is the best explanation—Corollary of this, an Ascension by which the physical particles of our Lord’s body disappeared from the earth . : : 68-85

Dangers of inductive argument on our Lord’s Incarnate Nature—Accentuated by the work of Schweitzer, which represents Christ as an ignorant fanatic—Refusal of ‘** Foundations”? to approach the subject with any preconceived ideas, and consequent questioning as to the omnipotence and omniscience of the Saviour—But the only passage quoted against his omnipotence is one where the incapacity ascribed to him may quite as well be a moral, as a physical incapacity—and therefore should not affect our judgment in any way—Our view, that the helplessness of our Saviour was at every moment a voluntary helplessness, can claim more devotional value than the rival view— But does not the Temptation on the Temple pinnacle suggest a limitation of power, or at least of consciousness

Analysis of Contents xix

PAGE of power ?—Not when the true point of it is seen, viz. that it was a temptation to Jesus to convince the Jews, not to convince himself—The belief in our Lord’s omnipotence thus does not conflict with the evidence—positive reason for holding it, that our Lord was God, and it is difficult to see how he was God unless he possessed this divine attribute— This omnipotence was, of course, a faculty our Lord did not always, or often, see fit to call into play—May not the same be said, mutatis mutandis, of his omniscience ?—No difficulty would be presented to such a view by the fact that he asked questions—nor by the fact that he expressed surprise, for surprise, when carefully considered, does not involve the notion of thwarted expectation—nor by the fact that he used the popular language of his day—the single text which seems to deny his omniscience reserved for later treatment—An apprehension as to the possible results of the a posteriori method, when applied to the conditions of the Incarnation : on what grounds do we say that our Lord was sinless ?—If we discard a priori considerations our evidence for the belief will be at best an argumentum ex silentio—Nay, if we are not equally convinced of his omniscience, the evidence is definitely in favour of the view that he committed sin (the Loss in the Temple, etc.) —and that his character, though admirable, was imperfect —In stating the contrary, then, we do depend on a priori considerations—and those not merely considerations

of appropriateness, but of ecclesiastical tradition - 86-108

Chapter VI Eagles Round The Carcase

Modern criticism of the eschatological passages in the Gospels is psychologically conditioned, because modern theologians themselves do not look forward to a Final Cataclysm—cf. Mr. Temple in “ Foundations’’—but to a gradually dawning millennium—a conception for which we have no warrant of history or theology—reasons for pessimism as to the world’s future—we must not let our preconceived notions of Progress come into the question ; the issue as to our Lord’s eschatological statements is not whether he was mistaken about the manner of the end of the world, of which we are no judges, but whether he was mistaken about the date of it—certain texts have been adduced to prove that he thought the world would come to an end soon after his death—The first of these, Matthew 16. 28, etc.—probably to be explained as a mistaken version of the words recorded in John 21. 22 (If I will that he tarry till I come)—Possibility that Matthew 24. 34, etc., should be regarded as another variant—The second text, Matthew 10, 23— xX explanation of the true emphasis of this passage: “till the Son of Man be come” used only as a vague measure of time—further eschatological argument, that our Saviour’s moral teaching was only an interimsethik—this is a bad hypothesis—true significance of our Lord’s emphasis on the Second Coming—The locus classicus for the limitation of our Lord’s knowledge, Mark 13. 32 and parallel—on the face of it, this is a statement about the Eternal Being of the Word, and therefore cannot be produced as evidence of any limitation involved in the Incarnation—Logical implications of the view that the knowledge of Jesus was limited to an extent not hitherto recognized, viz. the breakdown of all certainty as to the Sacraments, the Evangelical Coun-

PAGE sels, and even Christian morality . 5 ; -. 109-124

Appendix To Chapter VI

The long final eschatological discourse, summary of the various passages—S. Luke appears to regard the Second Coming as still a thing of the future, but the Sign of the Son of Man as something already past—probably the “‘Sign’’? was the supernatural experience witnessed by many at the destruction of Jerusalem—it seems therefore as if this part of the prophecy referred, not to the Second Coming, but to the Fall of Jerusalem— in which case the subsequent gathering in of the Gentiles must be, not the gathering to judgment, but the call to conversion—the whole passage re-examined in this light —probability that in 8S. Matthew, at any rate, passages belonging to another and a more strictly eschatological context have been worked in here—cf. Acts 1. 6.—this hypothesis not contrary to the principles of the present work, because advanced only as a hypothesis, the true reason for vindicating our Saviour’s knowledge being a priori—We need not scruple to suppose that 8. Matthew handled his material in this way, when we compare his

Chapter VII

Effects of a Kenotic view of the Incarnation on language used of our Saviour’s Person—the tendency to treat his Person as if it were merely human goes hand in hand with a refusal to discuss the doctrine of the Virgin Birth Impossibility of such treatment, if the truth of the early chapters of SS. Matthew and Luke be admitted, and their contents borne in mind—But we have to account for the silence of 8, Mark, and of 8. Paul—first

Analysis of Contents Xxi

PAGE view, that the stories of our Lord’s Infancy are untrue, why not tolerable on a priori grounds—how contradicted by implicit references in 8. Mark, and in the Epistle to the Hebrews—how based, so far as positive reasons go, on logical fallacy—second view, that the Infancy stories were considered unimportant by the earliest writers, is unsatisfactory, at least as regards S. Mark—third view, that the stories were true, but unknown to 8. Mark, unsatisfactory on similar grounds— fourth and only remaining view, that SS. Mark and Paul had special reasons for silence, presumably the unwillingness of Mary to figure prominently in Christian story— If this is the true view, we have no excuse for leaving the Virgin Birth out of our theological considerations— and it does affect logically our view of the Incarnation, since, by parity of reasoning, we should expect One supernaturally born to be supernaturally endowed— and it affects it still more psychologically, in determining the attitude with which we approach the whole subject— a doubt expressed as to the wisdom of repressing devotions

addressed to the Virgin Mary ‘ P : ‘ 132-143

Chapter VIII Restatement In The Balances—the Incarnation

What do we mean by calling Jesus God ?—If the difference between God and Man be only one of degree, how could he be both God and Man at once ?—If it is a difference of kind, does not the Kenotic Christ lack the constitutive elements of divinity ?—Preposterous order of proceeding in ‘‘ Foundations,’”? where the evidence as to Christ’s life is examined before any attempt has been made to determine whether he was God or not, and in what sense—Mr. Streeter’s vindication of the Divinity of Christ, by appeal to History—Inherent fallaciousness of this appeal—Mr. Temple’s explanation of the Divinity —His criticism of the Greek Fathers, who tried to state the doctrine in terms of substance—ancient and modern conceptions of the universal—a suggested modification in the use of the word “‘ substance ’—Mr. Temple’s statement of the doctrine in terms of will—distinction between the form and the content of a will—this distinction is valid in thought only, not in fact—Mr. Temple’s restatement thus breaks down for precisely the same reasons as the old statement he criticizes—our Lord’s humanity, in what sense “inclusive ’’—A bird’s-eye view of the divergence between the rival views of the Incarnation here considered—with a question, whether the term “restatement”? does justice to the extent of the di vergence . ; F : : ‘ ‘ - 144-159

XXii Some Loose Stones

Chapter IX

RESTATEMENT IN THE BALANCES—THE ATONEMENT PAGE Mr. Moberly’s three reasons for regarding the death of Christ as necessary—why does he put the word “save” in inverted commas ?—His allusion to Mr. Peggotty in ** David Copperfield,” in defence of the term Vicarious Penitence—viewed from the legalist standpoint, Vicarious Penitence is quite as “‘ immoral ”’ a transaction as Vicarious Penance—are we then to reject the legalist view, and think of sin, not as something existing independently of ourselves in the past, but merely as a diseased state of our souls ?—this view is surely inadequate to the explanation of Christian language on the subject— Further, if sin is a diseased state, and salvation is its cure, and our penitence, human penitence, cannot complete that cure, what does complete it ?—Is it the Love of Christ supplementing our penitence ? In that case, you have an “immoral” transaction—or is it the Love of Christ stimulating our penitence ? In that case it is human penitence, and not the Love of Christ, which is immediately instrumental in winning our salvation: who then shall be saved ?—Vicarious penitence an inaccurate term—the issue stated; you cannot get rid of the idea of substitution in our Soteriology, unless you are prepared to go back on the tradition of the ages— To satisfy the claim of this, we must recognize in sin not only (1) an effect on our lives, and (2) an effect on the lives of others, but also (3) a disturbing of something in the eternal order of things—Why should we want three reasons for the Death of Christ ?—and do Mr. Moberly’s three reasons explain the necessity of his death, or only of his willingness to die ?—the eternal antinomy . ; ‘ : ‘ ; ; . 160-173

Chapter X Authority And Experience

The principle of Securus judicat ; is it only an appeal to the counting of heads ?—Mr. Rawlinson’s view of the meaning of auctoritas in 8. Augustine—Three shades of meaning in the term—the Christian use of the word involves an appeal to tradition—not, as Mr. Rawlinson seems to think, to Christian experience—this difference illustrated, by reference to Mr. Rawlinson’s account of the development of Eucharistic theology—Sacramental experience is not the basis, but the outcome, of Sacramental doctrine—examination of the conception of experience—three possible connotations of the term: