A short study of ethics

Preface

This little book regards ethics from the philosophical standpoint. It endeavours to give, t'n small space, an account as well of the metaphysical basis as of the ethical superstructure : an attempt which, so far as the writer knows, has not been made in any other recent book. Three excellent works — excellent for their brevity as for their scientific value — have appeared of late years, which present what is substantially the same general view as that taken in these pages : Professor Dewey's Outlines of a Critical TJieo)')' of Ethics, Mr. Muirhead's Elements of Ethics, and Mr. Mackenzie's Manual of Ethics. But all three build without a foundation. To the reader who is familiar with Professor T. H. Green's ethical method, the lucidity of these books is admirable. But the writer cannot help wondering ai

1059699

VI A SHORT STUDY OF ETHICS

whether his enjoyment in reading them would have been as great as it was if he had not previously made the acquaintance of the great Prolegomena.

It may seem almost useless to essay to crush the perplexing questions which lie at the threshold of ethical study into the {q.\n pages which go to make up Part I. of this little book. But the attempt is surely worth making, if there is even a chance of engaging the attention of readers who may be repelled by the formidable bulk and difficulty of the great works which give to these questions a more elaborate consideration.

Among all modern English contributions to this great literature the Prolegouicna to Ethics stands easily first. And, though not able to accept in its entirety the Hegelian conception of the spiritual principle as presented in that book, the writer finds it impossible to express adequately the greatness of the debt which he owes to its teaching. He must also acknowledge his indebtedness to the writinsfs of the present Master of Balliol, to Mr. F. H. Bradley's Ethical Studies^ and to the three smaller works mentioned above ; all of which have done

PREFACE Vll

much to stimulate that movement of ethical thought which seems to be rapidly taking place among the cultivated.

Special acknowledgments are due to Professor Bernard and Mr. N. Colgan for their kindness in reading the proof-sheets and making many valuable suggestions.

Introduction

PAGE

I. Definition of Ethics

xxi

2. Conduct ....

xxi

3. The terms "Ethical " and " Moral '

xxii

4. Ethics as Science .

xxii

5. The Ethical Distinction

xxiv

6. Appeal to Philosophy

XXV

PART

I

THE PHILOSOPHICAL BASIS OF ETHICS

SPIRIT AS

KNOWING SUBJECT

I. Method of the Inquiry ..... 3

2. Subject and Object .

3. The Object .

4. Matter and Motion .

5. Function of the Subject

6. Relations and Things

7. Object and Cosmos

8. Summary of Results

II

9. What is the knowing Subject ? 10. Definition of the Subject

Note to Chapter I. — On some Objections .

PAGE

CHAPTER 11

SPIRIT AND NATURE

1. Experience and Nature

2. The Personality of God

3. Examination of Objections ,

17 18 18

WILL

1. Fundamental Importance of the Problem of the Will

2. What is meant by the Will ? _3. The term " Free Cause"

4. Knowledge and Will

5. Freedom and Necessity

6. Determinism

7. Desire

8. The Motive

9. Character and Circumstances 10. Characteristic Peculiarity of Will

22 23 25 25 27

29 31 32

34 37

WILL AND NATURE

1. Nature dominated by an End

2. The Absolute Good

3. Good and Evil

40 40 41

XI

COMMUNITY

1. Two Questions ....

2. The Point of Discontinuity in all Idealisms J. Personality an Imperfect Definition of the Divine Nature

4. Ultimate Unity

5. Summary ....

6. Human Limitation .

7. The Contingent

8. Another Statement of the Argument

9. The Principle of Community Note to Chapter V. — The Divine Image in Man

PAGE

43 43 46

47 48

50 51

52 52

CHAPTER VI

RESULTS

1. Summary of results

2. Insecure Position of Ordinary Morality

3. Scepticism .

4. Egoism ....

54 55 56 57

APPENDICES TO PART I

ON THE PROOFS OF THE BEING OF GOD

1. The Cosmological Proof

2. The Teleological Proof

3. The Ontological Proof

63 67

Xll

II

ON THE IDEA OF ORGANIC UNITY AS APPLIED TO SOCIETY SECTION PAGE

1. The Organic Mew . . . . . .71

2. The Organic View of the Self .... 72

3. Society and Nature ..... 73

4. Is it inadmissible to apply the idea of Organic Unity to

DEFINITIONS AND E.XPLANATIONS

I. The Right .

2. The Good .

3. Which Conception is Fundamental

4. The Motive

So

5. Motive and Intention

6. Motive and Consequences .

7. Will and Desire

8. Character and Conduct

9. The Good Will

10. The End

THE PROBLEM OF ETHICS

1. First Question

2. Formal Account of Volition

89 89

Xlll

3. Possibility of a Criterion

4. The Problem of Ethics

5. Illustrations from the History of Ethics

6. Another Statement of the Problem of Ethics

7. Can the End be fully defined ?

8. Does any Principle exist ? .

PAGE

89 91 91 92

93 94

DETERMINATION OF THE PRINCIPLE

1. Self-love and Benevolence

2. Egoism and Altruism

3. Self-love

4. Benevolence

5. Common Good

6. How proved ?

7. What is the Ideal Form of the End S. The common Good implicit in Ordinary Morality

96 98

99 100 100 100 103 105

THE PROXIMATE END

1. Is the Principle remote from the Actual Needs of Life ? . 107

2. The Proximate Good . . . . 108

3. Morality covers the whole of Life .... 109

4. The Expedient . . . • . . .no

5. The Ethical Principle provides a moving Standard . in

6. Can the Standard be applied ? .... 112

7. The Principle actually operative in Life . . .112 S. The importance of knowing the Principle . . .115 9. Can a Man rise above the Society to which he belongs ? . 116

b

XIV

THE UNITY OF THE TRUE GOOD

ECTION

PAGE

I. Classification of Duties . . ,

2. Duty to Self

3. The Case of the Suicide

4. Principle of Reconciliation .

5. Duty to our Neighbour

6. Duty toward God .

CHAPTER VI

MORAL CODES

1. The Legal Aspect of Morality

2. External Law

3. Internal Law

4. What are Moral Laws ?

5. Difficulty of framing a New Law

6. The True Universal

128 128 130

131 132

CHAPTER VII

OBLIGATION AND RESPONSIBILITY

I. Moral Necessity , . .

. 136

2. External Constraint

3. Command of God ....

U7

4. Autonomy .....

5. The Categorical Imperative

XV

6. The Religious View of Obligation

7. Rights

8. Responsibility

PAGE

141 143 145

CHAPTER VIII

CONSCIENCE

I. What is Conscience ?..... 148

2. The Universal Conscience .

3. The Particular Conscience

4. The Sensitive Conscience .

5. Three Elements in one Whole

6. The Individual Conscience

7. Moral Sense

•• 152

8. Conscientiousness .

CHAPTER IX

THE SUBORDINATION OF THE DESIRES

1. Morality as the Subordination of the Desires

2. Relative Ethical Importance of the Desires

3. Confusion occasioned by Words

4. The Interests in Science and Art .

156 158 160 161

CHAPTER X

VIRTUE AND THE VIRTUES

1. What is Virtue? ...... 167

2. A more searching Investigation of the Nature of Virtue

becomes necessary . . . . .168

XVI

3. In what sense Virtue is Habit

4. The Unity of Virtue

5. The Classification of the Virtues

6. The Religious Aspect of Virtue

PAGE 172

CHAPTER XI

THE ETHICAL STRUGGLE

I. Goodness and Self-denial .....

2. Goodness involves Struggle . ■ • •

6. Lawlessness .....

7. Selfishness . . . • •

Note to Chapter XI.— On the Secondary Sense of Freedom

CHAPTER XII

MORAL INSTITUTIONS

1. The Embodiment of the Idea in Institutions

2. Social Value of Institutions

3. Specialisation of the Function of the Individual

193 195 197

CHAPTER XIII

MORAT, PROGRESS

1. How far Moral Progress demands Consideration

2. Progress of Society as a Whole

3. The Widening of the Social Area .

199 201 203 xvu

4. Growth in Social Complexity

5. The Social Reformer

6. Realisation of the Ideal

7. Individual Progress

8. Raising the Individual Standard

9. The Conditions of Progress 10. Reformation

PAGE

CHAPTER XIV

PERPLEXITY OF CONSCIENCE

1. How far a Moral Theory can be expected to solve Particular

Difficulties

2. The Causes of Perplexity .

3. Conflict of Rules

4. Cases not covered by any Rule

5. General Considerations

215 216 217 219 219

APPENDICES TO PART II

THE CIRCLE IN THE ETHICAL ARGUMENT

1. The Circle ......

2. Explanation of the Difficulty

221 221

II

FUTURE LIFE

1. Kant's View

2. The Spiritual Nature of Man

XVlll

3. Theism, the Final Justification

4. Proof from the Incompleteness of Life

PAGE

224 225

INTUITIONALISM

1. Limits of the Discussion

2. Intuitionalism, a Special Theory of Conscience

3. Difficulties in the Theory .

4. The Last Resource of the Intuitionalist

5. The Form of the Dicta of Conscience

229 230 230 232 2^2

HEDONISM

1. Ancient Hedonism .

2. Modern Hedonism .

3. The Speculative Basis of Hedonism

4. Pleasure the End of Conduct

5. Pleasure as the Criterion of Conduct

6. Quality of Pleasure

7. The " Sum of Pleasures " Theory .

235 236 236

239 241

XIX

UTILITARIANISM

1. The Principle of Utilitarianism

2. The Difficulty of Utilitarianism — Mill's Solution

3. Professor Sidgwick's Solution

PAGE

243 244 245

EVOLUTIONARY ETHICS

1. Evolution and Ethics

2. Characteristics of Evolutionary Ethics

3. The Social Organism

4. Ethics and Natural Selection

6. Evolutionist Doctrine of the Self .

7. ,, Account of the Good .

8. ,, Account of Duty

9. Evolutionary Hedonism

247 248 249 250

251 252

254 258 261

FORMAL ETHICS

1. Kant's Ethical Doctrine

2. Objections .....

3. The Principal Fault of the Kantian Ethics

4. Kant's Examples ....

5. The Conflict of Laws

6. Inconsistency of Kant's Ethical Philosophy

7. Kant's Chief Contribution to Ethical Science

INTRODUCTION

Ethics is the Science of Conduct. This definition is the § i-

... _ . , 1 u i Definition

commonest and most famihar. It is also the best, ^f Ethics. Ordinary language provides a plain yet accurate definition, because Ethics is concerned with the commonest experiences of life. It is, however, necessary to inquire into the meaning of the word conduct, and the precise force of the term science, when used in this connexion. Familiar expressions are almost always more or less ambiguous.

It is evident that Conduct cannot include purposeless § 2. action. 1 Conduct has therefore been defined : " Acts adjusted to ends." ^ But this definition is insufficient, for even among inorganic processes there are acts adjusted to ends. It would be absurd to speak of the conduct of a watch-spring in uncoiling, though the action is adjusted to an end. Again, in the organic world, the closing of the leaf of the sun-dew round an insect, the blinking of the eyelids, the action of sneezing in men or animals, are instances of acts adjusted to ends, but it would be an abuse of language to call any of these acts conduct. The name conduct can, then, be applied only to a kind of acts adjusted to ends, and the question is. What kind ? Some of the acts mentioned above as excluded from conduct

^ See Spencer, Data of Ethics, chap. i. g 2.

XXll are consciously performed. The mere consciousness, then, that an act is performed is not enough to include it in conduct. And the reason is sufficiently obvious : such acts, though consciously performed, are involuntary. To constitute conduct in the strict and accurate sense of the term there must be, not merely consciousness, but also the exercise of ivill. Conduct may therefore be defined "voluntary action." ^ Ethics is the science of voluntary action. § 3. The It is well to note that for scientific use the term Moral

" Ethical" ^^ to be regarded as identical with the term Ethical, and ^ meaning simply relating to conduct or voluntary action. Ethics is frequently termed Morals or Moral Philosophy. The word moral is also used in more than one special sense. But, with one exception, all special meanings must be carefully excluded from the scientific use of the term. The one exception which it is practically impossible to exclude is that in which the moral- is contrasted with the immoral, and so made to cover a part only of the whole field of conduct. The definition of Ethics as the science of voluntary action is likely to suggest a doubt. The question may be asked : If action is voluntary, due, that is, to the operation of will, is it not incalculable, and does it not on that account lie outside the province of science? The doubt is important, for it reveals a fundamental distinction. In the ordinary acceptation of the word, science means the classification and explanation of facts. And facts are not treated by science as if they were random, disconnected things. Science presupposes everywhere the necessary connexion of cause and effect, and, working upon this

^ See Muirhead, Elei>ients of Ethics, § 14. ^ See Dewey, Otttlmes of Ethics, § 2.

§4.

Ethics as Science.

INTRODUCTION xxill

basis, science seeks to discover the particular causal relation which underlies each fact. Thus it comes to pass that the usual method by which science justifies itself and proves its success is by providing a means of prediction. When astronomy was able to predict the occurrence of eclipses, and the recurrence of comets, its claim to be a real and successful science could be doubted no longer. But how can there be a science of that which, in the strict scientific sense, can never be predicted, because it must always remain incalculable ? ■'•

It is possible to make two different answers to this question. It is possible to deny, in company with many distinguished thinkers, the essentially incalculable element in Will, and affirm that all human acts, those called voluntary as well as those called involuntary, are the necessary effects of natural causes. According to this view man is, in every respect, but a part of nature ; and Ethics, supposing such a science to exist, is but a higher branch of natural history.

On the other hand, it is possible to take refuge in a different conception of science. While it is true that most sciences are of the kind described above, there are other sciences which deal, not with facts as facts, but with rules for the guidance of practice. Every such science legislates for some corresponding art. Thus Logic gives laws to the art of reasoning. So also it is conceivable that there should be a distinct science working out the rules of procedure in each distinct art. Sciences of this sort are called Regulative or Normative, because they lay down the rules according to which judgment is given upon practice.

^ See F. H. Bradley's Ethical Studies (Essay i.) for a valuable discussion of the prediction of conduct.

XXIV A SHORT STUDY OF ETHICS

Thus Logic lays down the rules by which we judge of the correctness or incorrectness of any process of reasoning. So also Ethics can be regarded as the science which supplies the rules by which we approve or disapprove of conduct.

There can be no doubt that the latter is the correct view of the nature of Ethics. Ethics is the Science of the Art of Life. It is concerned with the principles which underlie the estimation of conduct. § 5. The The approval or disapproval of conduct is commonly

Distinction, expressed by the words Good or Bad, Right or Wrongs Ought to be done, or Ought not to be done. With perfect confidence we say of one act, "It is right," of another, " It is wrong." Every man arrogates to himself the capacity of giving within certain limits an absolute judgment upon the conduct of his fellows, of pronouncing approval of some actions, disapproval of others. In giving such judgments we speak with the utmost confidence and without hesitation, yet we make very great assumptions. For the questions may be asked : What is meant by saying one action is right another wrong, one is good another bad, one ought to be done another ought not to be done .? On what ground can authority to make these absolute judgments of approval or disapproval be assumed ? What is the standard of ethical judgment? Supposing that the distinction is real and the judgment authoritative, there must be some standard by reference to which each particular case as it arises may be decided.

These questions lead us from our habitual and unscientific practice of the Art of Life, and set us face to face with the science of Ethics. If they can be answered satisfactorily the position of Ethical Science is secured.

INTRODUCTION XXV

Briefly these questions are : —

What is the meaning of the Ethical distinction ?

How is it justified ?

^\'hat is the standard of Ethical judgment ?

It will become sufficiently evident as we proceed that § 6. Appeal ^, . . ^ . ,. . to Philo-

these questions cannot receive a fitting discussion apart sophy.

from philosophy.^ But already it has become apparent

that the subject-matter of our science is of such a kind that

at the very beginning of our inquiry we are forced to enter

into philosophical considerations. We have seen that there

are some authorities who deny the essentially incalculable

element in Will. They hold that every act of Will is a case

of natural causation, and that an intelligence which had

sufficiently grasped the laws of psychology as well as those

of physics, and which knew the exact circumstances of all

individuals, could foretell the whole history of mankind and

every act of choice made by every individual in time to

come. It is obvious that such a view reduces Ethics to a

branch of natural science, and, if consistent, must treat the

Ethical judgment of approval or disapproval as illusive. If

everything must be, it is absurd, or at least needless, to

speak of what ought to be. If man's consciousness is

like some strange phosphorescence fitfully playing over the

surface of an iron necessity of material causation — a mere

by-product of physical forces — and if man's will has no

power of free determination, it is useless to appeal to him

as to one who can choose the right and act accordingly.

' The word philosophy is used here and elsewhere in this book as equivalent to metaphysics^ and meaning the endeavour to attain unity of thought, the attempt to reach those basal principles which we assume to exist, and which, when grasped, will enable the mind to think consistentl}\ In Mr. Bradley's words, metaphysics is "the effort to comprehend the universe as a whole."

xxvi A SHORT STUDY OF ETHICS

If the will is only a link in the chain of physical causation, there is no such thing as responsibility, and the ethical judgment is unmeaning.

But none of those who adopt this view of the will cling to it consistently. Every attempt to treat the problem of Ethics as a problem in natural history is made the introduction to some enforcement of the practical rules of moral conduct as generally understood. The most determined efforts ^ to regard human conduct as the top round in the ladder of organic evolution end in a sudden volte face by which the student finds himself suddenly appealed to as a free intelligence. Consciousness and Will erect an eternal barrier against the attempt to explain the spiritual activities of man by the processes of nature.

It is therefore impossible to attack the main problem of Ethics without a preliminary inquiry into those spiritual activities which occupy so fundamental a position. Before we can understand how man is subject to obligation, and before we can define the nature and extent of that obligation, we must know something of what man is ; that is, we must have some knowledge, even though it be a very imperfect knowledge, of the relations in which man stands to the universe at large. Ethics must rest upon a basis of philosophy.

But, it may be thought, every art might have its corresponding normative science, and no one would deem it necessary, in the working out of each such science, to begin with philosophy. No writer engaged in formulating the science of the art of navigation would dream of beginning with philosophy. Why should Ethics be different ? The answer is not difficult. Ethics is different from the normative science of any of the special arts in that its subject-matter • As with Mr. Herbert Spencer.

INTRODUCTION xxvil

is co-extensive with experience. It deals with life as a whole. It is the science of the art of life. Now the opinion which we entertain as to man's life as a whole and its relation to the universe at large must influence our practice of the art of life {i.e. our conduct), and consequently the view which we take of the science of conduct. If there are any who consistently hold the opinion professed by many that man is an element in the system of material things and nothing more, then to such life cannot be what it is to the man who believes himself a free intelligence. The ethical theory which suits the former cannot possibly satisfy the latter.

It is true that there are many who are repelled by philosophy. With them the name Metaphysics — the usual term for philosophy in English literature — stands for a medley of confused and contradictory opinions, and suggests no idea so much as hopelessness of arriving at any conclusion. But this phase of thought is rapidly passing away. The study of philosophy is exciting a new interest. We are beginning to find out the truth of the old dictum which teaches that man must philosophise. Whether philosophy be successful or not, it is inevitable. It is impossible even to endeavour to think consistently without engaging in philosophic study. And, if this is true of thought as a whole, it is also true of the science of the art of life as a whole. It is impossible to enter into any adequate discussion of the problem of Ethics except through the gate of philosophy.

If the truth of this conclusion has not been made plain, it is to be hoped it will become more apparent in the course of the following pages. ^

^ The reader who wishes to avoid metaphysics may pass at once to chap. vi. of part i. and then to part ii. He is, however, recommended to read §§ 7, 8 of chap. iii. of part

Part I The Philosophical Basis Of Ethics

6+-

B

SPIRIT AS KNOWING SUBJECT

Systematic knowledge of every kind must deal with ex- §i. Method perience. But that attempt at systematic knowledge which ° ^^ is called philosophy deals with experience in a manner altogether different from the manner of science. Science takes experience as it stands, isolates a portion of it, and subjects that portion to analysis. Philosophy, on the other hand, takes experience as a whole and seeks the conditions of its possibility. The proof of this principle and of the method which it involves is to be found in the whole history of philosophy up to Kant. Philosophy was driven back upon this lowly-seeming position when the more daring pretensions of earlier thinkers proved unfounded and their efforts proved fruitless.

The primary condition of all experience is the relation § 2. Subject of subject and object, self and not-self. In all cognition there ^"*^ Object, must be the subject or self which knows, and the object or not-self which is known. This is the fundamental condition apart from which experience of any kind becomes an impossibility. Strike out either the experiencing subject or the thing that is experienced and nought remains behind : experience vanishes.

§ 3. The There is no use in trying to make any further progress Object. j_^y directing attention to the Subject or Self. So approached it eludes the grasp of thought. The not-self must be examined. Taking experience, then, as a whole we note at once a great division in the not-self, an inner and an outer region.

The inner region includes sensations, emotions, thoughts, etc.

The outer region contains all the things we know in the world around us.

Now, in the case of the inner region, it is obvious that it, with all that it contains, is dependent for its very existence upon the subject to which it is correlative. A feeling — sensation or emotion — exists only because there is a subject that feels it. A thought exists only because there is a thinker. The subject is, then, the condition of the possibility of all experiences belonging to the inner region. The thinker is logically prior to all his thoughts. He is the presupposition of their existence.^ His being is the primary condition of their possibility.

It is thus comparatively easy to see that the inner experiences presuppose the thinking subject. They are essentially dependent upon him. They exist for him. But the outer experiences, the things that come under our observation in the world around, seem altogether different. It appears a mere commonplace to say they are independent of the observer. Yet are they independent ? Examine any

^ From this it follows that it is illogical to identify the thinker with the sum total of his inner experiences. This was done by J. S. Mill when {Examination of Si}- IV. Hamilton., chaj). xii.) he described the Mind as a series of feelings. It is strange that, though acutely conscious of the difficulty of his position, he failed to see that he was making a logical blunder of the simplest kind.

Chap. I Spirit As Knowing Subject 5

concrete thing — this table, that chair, that mountain — and it will be found to be constituted by rclaimis} This table is what it is, because of the relations in which its parts stand to one another. These parts are themselves constituted by the relations of their parts. And so on. Not only so, but the thing is what it is, not merely because of its internal relations, i.e. the relations between its parts, but because of the relations in which it stands to the whole surrounding universe of things. Every element of any concrete thing may be shown to be determined by relation. The size of a thing means the space relations of its parts. The position of a thing, the space relations in which it stands to certain conventional limits. .The weight of a thing is relative to an assumed standard. And so on.

It is exceedingly difificult for the mind which is un- § 4- accustomed to this mode of thinking to grasp the case of a Motion. concrete thing, and that for a very good reason which will soon become apparent. Let us, then, for the sake of simplification, take a more abstract illustration. The material universe, it has been asserted, can be explained in terms of matter and motion.^ But what are matter and motion ? This is no modern question. Some of the

1 In discussing this question it is necessary, for the sake of clearness, to avoid psychological complications. The process by which the mind becomes aware of the external world is called Perception. To enter into an analysis of that process here would create confusion and afford no help. So, also, it is well to keep clear of the physical and neural processes which accompany Perception.

- It must be noted that this reduction of the material universe to matter and motion is illegitimate, because it is an effort to explain the concrete in terms of the abstract. That is, it explains by the simple process of leaving out everything which is not matter and motion. Pythagoras went a step further, and explained the universe in terms of numbers by leaving out everything but numbers.

oldest and most threadbare of philosophical conundrums are those which deal with the nature of matter and motion. Such is the question about the divisibility of matter. Matter must, it is said, be infinitely divisible. It can have no ultimate parts. " For each of such ultimate parts, did they exist, must have an under and an upper surface, a right and a left side, like any larger fragment. Now it is impossible to imagine its sides so near, that no plane of section can be conceived between them ; and however great be the assumed force of cohesion, it is impossible to shut out the idea of a greater force capable of overcoming it." ^ This difficulty seems insuperable, but it vanishes in a moment if matter be regarded as constituted by relation. It is the effort to reach something absolute, some final self-sufficing unit — the effort, that is, to eliminate relation — which leads the mind into the snare.

The case of motion is even clearer than that of matter, as the following striking illustration given by Mr. Spencer will demonstrate : —

" Here, for instance, is a ship which, for simplicity's sake, we will suppose to be anchored at the Equator with her head to the West. When the captain walks from stem to stern, in what direction does he move ? East is the obvious answer — an answer which for the moment may pass without criticism. But now the anchor is heaved and the vessel sails to the West with a velocity equal to that at which the captain walks. In what direction does he now move when he goes from stem to stern ? You cannot say East, for the vessel is carrying him as fast towards the West as he walks to the East ; and you cannot say West for the converse reason. In respect to surrounding space he is