Sherman's historical raid. The Memoirs in the light of the record. A review based upon compilations from the files of the War Office

Preface

General Sherman in the introduction to his Memoirs,

says:

"What is now offered is not designed as a history of the war, or even as a complete account of all the incidents in which the writer bore a part ; but merely as bis recollection of events, corrected by a reference to his own memoranda, which may assist the future historian when he comes to describe the whole, and account for the motives and reasons which influenced some of the actors in the grand drama of the war."

The object of the present compilation, chiefly from the official records, is to show wherein the Memoirs of General Sherman fall far short of presenting the correct history of many great events of which they treat; how much they lack of giving a complete account of incidents which they relate; how far the author's recollection, even when corrected by his own memoranda, is at fault; and to furnish the future historian with facts which will guard him against perpetuating the error and the injustice which pervade both volumes of the work.

This book is a criticism upon Sherman as a general, only so far as the official records presented furnish such criticism. There is no attempt to contradict his statements, except as the records contradict them. Wherever these show that he has done grave injustice both to the living and to the dead, they are produced with as little comment as is needed to set them in connected order, and point out the refutations which they contain. While by this method of review, his mistakes only

4 PEEFACE.

are presented, there has been no intention to underrate the great and brilliant services which he performed.

If these pages serve in any degree to correct error and do justice, where error uncorrected, and injustice done, affect the reputations of men or officers, who, either in humble position or exalted station, freely periled their lives, or laid them down for the country, the object for which they have been written will be accomplished.

Contents

CHAP. PAGE

I. — Introductory 7

IX — Forts Henry and Donelson — The Credit which Sherman Denies Grant 10

Chapter I, Introductory

General Sherman is one of the most popular heroes of the late war. He has published his book after ten years of reflection upon events in which he bore most conspicuous and honorable part. During these years he has had uninterrupted access to the official records, including their most confidential papers; and in view of his high position, his opportunities for intimate knowledge and his popularity, what he has now written will, in spite of himself, be accepted as history by most readers who have not the means of testing his story by the records. It is believed that the extracts from these, presented in this volume, will prove sufficient to thoroughly fortify General Sherman in the claim that his book is not history, and so in part prevent the injustice which will be done to many distinguished officers and brave armies, if what he has written be received as accurate. No criticisms of the strategy or the tactics of General Sherman will be found in these pages, except such as are plainly called forth by the records produced.

High as is the position which he occupies, great as is the authority with which he speaks, there is nothing in either which should afford him the least protection in the eyes of his countrymen, if he be found detracting from the merit or the fame which belongs to his associates.

It might be pardoned in one who accomplished so much if he had contented himself with moderately magnifying his own achievements, but when he goes beyond this, and claims the

8 INTRODUCTORY.

merit which belongs to others, and steps still beyond and attempts to belittle the deeds of men in no respect his inferiors as generals or soldiers, and does cruel injustice to whole armies, the harmless vanity of the successful general becomes the gigantic wrong of the false historian.

In a broad and high sense, the merit of every man who bore a musket faithfully, and slept finally in the grave of the "unknown/' is as great as his. His Memoirs arraign the dead as well as the living. The files of the War Department afford an answer for both. These orders, letters, telegrams, and reports, written either before, at the time, or immediately after the occurrence of the events ordered, in progress, or accomplished, photographed the truth, and in these the living and the dead find just defense. Here Thomas, McPherson, Stanton, and their companions, speak for themselves, and vindicate themselves from unjust aspersions. Here, in short, truth is made manifest, and exact justice done.

The position which General Sherman occupies now, and that which he held during the war, will naturally, and of necessity, give the force of history to what he has written, in spite of any disclaimer he may make, and this historical character will attach to these Memoirs so long as they remain uncorrected by the official record.

For the benefit of comrades living, who can not conveniently consult these records, and especially in vindication of such as are dead, it should be esteemed a duty by all who can reach the files, to search them carefully, with a view to overthrow error and establish truth. So far as General Sherman's book conforms to official papers, their production can only strengthen him; so far as it fails to agree with these, it not only deserves to be condemned, but its condemnation should be measured by the prominence of the author and his abundant facilities for obtaining accurate information.

Judged by the official record, the verdict must be that the work is intensely egotistical, unreliable, and cruelly unjust to nearly all his distinguished associates. Our erratic General

INTRODUCTORY. 9

thrusts his pen recklessly through reputations which are as dear to the country as his own. He detracts from what right fully belongs to Grant; misrepresents and belittles Thomas ; withholds justice from Buell, repeatedly loads failures for which he was responsible, now upon Thomas, now upon Schofield, now upon McPherson, and again upon the three jointly; is unjust in the extreme to Rosecrans; sneers at Logan and Blair; insults Hooker, and slanders Stanton.

The salient points of the long story are readily found by those who either followed, or made themselves familiar by study with his campaigns. The reader turns naturally for explanations of the surprise and attending disgrace at Shiloh ; the ill-judged and fatal assault at Chickasaw Bayou ; the protest against the move by which Vicksburg was captured ; his failure to carry the point assigned him at the battle of Chattanooga; the escape of Johnston from Dalton and Resaca; the terrible mistake of the assault on Kenesaw; the plunging of his army, marching by the flank, into Hood's line of battle under the supposition that Atlanta was evacuated; the escape of the rebel army from Savannah ; the careless and inexcusable periling and narrow escape of his own army at Bentonville ; and lastly, the political surrender to Johnston at Raleigh: these are points upon which every reader desires light. But instead of gaining it, he finds that for most, the chief aim of the author seems to be to make the darkness more impenetrable.

The succeeding chapters will treat, in their order, of the prominent movements and battles which General Sherman passes in review in his Memoirs, and in each of these the version of his book will be compared with the facts as disclosed by the records now on file in the War Department.

Chapter II

FORTS HENRY AND DONELSON — THE CREDIT WHICH SHER- MAN DENIES TO GRANT.

Of the many remarkable things in General Sherman's book few will excite more comment than the deliberate attempt to take from General Grant the credit which belongs to him for several very important movements, and either assign it to others, as in the case of the move against Forts Henry and Donelson, or appropriate it for himself, as is done in claiming that he planned the "March to the Sea." No one general officer of his rank was under greater obligations to another throughout the war than Sherman to Grant, and on this account any unjust treatment of the latter deserves severer condemnation.

General Sherman wrote his book while in Washington. A staff officer at his headquarters copied the rough manuscript daily. All the records of the War Department, including reports, field telegrams, and all other species of official correspondence pertaining to every movement of which he wrote, and arranged for ready reference, were at his disposal. He had only to ask for them, or to send an orderly after them. And yet, incredible as it may seem, he scarcely availed himself of this collection of records, but wrote from memory and from some portions of these which happened to be in his own possession.

In reviewing the campaign up the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers, Sherman thus gives the credit to Halleck — or to "Cullum or I"— on page 219 of Vol. I:

"Though it was midwinter, General Hal leek was pushing his preparations most vigorously, and surely he brought order out of chaos in St. Louis with commendable energy. I remember one night sitting in his room, on the second floor of the Planters' House, with him and General Cullum, his chief of staff, talking of things generally, and the subject then was of the much-talkedof 'advance,' as soon as the season would permit. Most people urged the movement down the Mississippi River ; but Generals Polk and Pillow had a large rebel force with heavy guns in a very strong position at Columbus, Ky., about eighteen miles below Cairo ; Commodore Foote had his gun-boat fleet at Cairo ; and General U. S. Grant, who commanded the district, was collecting a large force at Paducah, Cairo, and Bird's Point. General Halleck had a map on his table, with a large pencil in his hand, and asked, 'Where is the rebel line? ' Cullum drew the pencil through Bowling Green, Forts Donelson and Henry, and Columbus, Ky. ' That is their line,' said Halleck ; ' now where is the proper place to break it ?' And either Cullum or I said, ' Naturally the center.' Halleck drew a line perpendicular to the other, near its middle, and it coincided nearly with the general course of the Tennessee River, and he said, ' That's the true line of operations.'

" This occurred more than a month before General Grant began the movement, and as he was subject to General Halleck's orders, I have always given General Halleck the full credit for that movement, which was skillful, successful, and extremely rich in military results; indeed it was the first real success on our side in the civil war. The movement up the Tennessee began about the 1st of February, and Fort Henry was captured by the joint action of the navy under Commodore Foote, and the land forces under General Grant, on the 6th of February, 1862. About the same time General S. R. Curtis had moved forward from Rolla, and on the 8th of March, defeated the rebels under McCulloch, Van Porn and Price at Pea Ridge.

"As soon as Fort Henry fell, General Grant marched straight across to Fort Donelson, on the Cumberland River, invested the place, and, as soon as the gun-boats had come round from the Tennessee, and had bombarded the water front, he assaulted; whereupon Buckner surrendered the garrison of twelve thousand men, Pillow and ex-Secretary of War General Floyd having personally escaped across the river at night, occasioning a good deal of fun and criticism at their expense."

If General Sherman had taken the trouble to send for General Halleck's letter-book for the time he mentions above, he would have found a letter to General McClellan, then General-in-Chief of the army, showing that he (Halleck) had no settled plans for a movement up the Cumberland and the Tennessee, and only general ideas of it at most, and that he did not expect such a movement could take place till long after the time General Grant actually captured both Forts Henry and Donelson, and effectually opened these rivers.

This letter, lying at General Sherman's very elbow, is dated at Headquarters Department of the Missouri, St. Louis, Januarv 20, 1862. The following extracts are sufficient to settle the question at issue :

I have received no information in respect to the general plan of campaign, and therefore feel much hesitation in recommending any line of operations for these and other troops which I may be able to withdraw from Missouri. Of course this line must be subordinate to some general plan. I take it for granted General, that what has heretofore been done has been the result of political policy rather than military strategy, and that the want of success on our part is attributable to the politicians rather than to the generals. *

I am aware General, that you are in no way responsible for this; these movements have been governed by political expediency, and in many cases directed by politicians in order to subserve party interest. * * But

is it not possible, with the new Seoretary of War, to introduce a different policy, and make our future movements in accordance with military principles. On this supposition I venture to make a few suggestions in regard to operations in the West.

The idea of moving down the Mississippi by steam, is in my opinion impracticable, or at least premature. It is not the proper line of operations, at least now. A much more feasible plan is to move up the Cumberland and Tennessee, making Nashville the present objective point. This would threaten Columbus, and force the abandonment of Bowling Green. * * * *

This line of the Cumberland and the Tennessee is the great central line of the Western theater of war, with the Ohio below the mouth of Green River as the base, and two great navigable rivers extending far into the theater of operations. But the plan should not be attempted without a large force — not less than sixty thousand effective men. * * '* The main central line will also require the withdrawal of all available troops from this State, also those in Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Wisconsin, and Ohio, which are armed, or still to be armed, and also the transfer to that route, or near it, of all the Kentucky troops not required to secure the line of Green River.

The force at Cairo and on the Ohio River below the mouth of Green River is now about fifteen thousand. Seven regiments have just been ordered there from Missouri.

By the middle or last of February I hope to send fifteen thousand more. If thirty thousand or forty thousand can be added from the sources indicated, these will be sufficient for holding Cairo, Fort Holt, and Paducah, and form the column proposed. * * * *

These suggestions are hastily written out, but they are the result of much anxious inquiry and mature deliberation. I am confident that the plan, if properly carried out, will produce important results. I also believe it to be feasible.

I have not designated any particular line or lines of movement; that must

FORTS HENRY AND DC-NELSON. 13

be a matter for further study, if the general idea should be approved. Perhaps the main column should move from Smithland, between the rivers, by Dover, etc. Perhaps the line east of the Cumberland, or that west of the Tennessee, would be preferable. These questions, however, are matters easily determined. * * *

As General Grant formally proposed, on January 28th, to General Halleek to take Fort Henry, captured it on the 6th of February, moved on Fort Donelson the next day, and took it on the 16th of February, it will be seen from the above letter, that General Halleck, at the time Grant had accomplished this work and opened both rivers, did not expect to have men enough by thirty or forty thousand to begin the vague movement he had in his mind.

But if General Sherman had searched the records with the least care he would have found that even these identical ideas of Halleck, about a move on a line perpendicular to one joining Bowling Green and Columbus were suggested by General Buell.

For the records show that as early as November of the preceding year, Buell had proposed to General McClellan to move around the right flank of the rebels at Bowling Green, and advance on Nashville, while supplies and troops from Halleck should move up the Cumberland, guarded by the fleet. General McClellan urged cooperation on Halleck, who delayed answering dispatches for some time. Finally, on January 3d, at the request of President Lincoln, General Buell wrote General Halleck, setting forth most of the ideas that Halleck afterward submitted as his own to McClellan, and which are given above in the letter dated January 20th.

The records give a connected history of the discussion at this time between the authorities at Washington, and Generals Buell and Halleck.

Washington, D. C, December 31, 18fi1.

General Buell, Louisville, Ky.

General McClellan is sick. Are General Halleck and yourself in concert? When you move on Bowling Green, what hinders it being reenforced from Columbus? Answer. A. Lincoln.

Louisville, Ky., January 1, 1862.

To A. Lincoln, President.

There is no arrangement between General Ilalleck and myself. I have been informed by General McClellan that he would make suitable disposition for concerted action.

There is nothing to prevent Bowling Green being reenforced from Columbus, if a military force is not brought to bear on the latter place.

D. C. Buell, Brigadier-General

Louisville, 11 P. M., January 1, 1862.

To President Lincoln.

I have already telegraphed General Halleck with a view to arranging a concert of action between us, and am momentarily expecting his answer.

D. C Buell, Brigadier General.

Washington, D. C, December 31, 1861.

General Halleck, St. Louis.

General McClellan is sick. Are General Buell and yourself in concert? When he moves on Bowling Green, what hinders it being reenforced from Columbus? A simultaneous move by you on Columbus might prevent it. Answer. A. LINCOLN.

Headquarters Department or the Missouri,) St. Louis, January 1, 1S02. j

A. Lincoln, President U. S. A., Washington.

I have never received a word from General Buell. I am not ready to cooperate with him ; hope to do so in a few weeks. Have written fully on this subject to General McClellan. Too much haste will ruin everything here.

Louisville, Ky., January 1, 1S62.

Major- General Halleck, St. Louis.

I understand General McClellan is sick. Has any concerted action been arranged for us? If not, can any be arranged between us? If possible, it is desirable it should be done speedily.

D. C. Buell, Brigadier- General commanding.

Headquarters Department of the Missouri, ) St. Louis, January 2, 1862. J Brigadier- General Buell, Louisville.

I have had no instructions respecting cooperation. All my available troops are in the field, except those at Cairo and Paducah, which are barely sufficient to threaten Columbus, etc. A few weeks hence I hope to be able to render you very material assistance, but now a withdrawal of my troops from this State is almost impossible. Write me fully.

Headquarters Department of the Ohio, } Louisville, January 3, 1862. J

General W. H. Halleck, Commanding Department of the Missouri.

Generax: I received your dispatch, and, with more delay than I meant, proceed to the subject of it, in compliance with your request, and I may add also, at the wish of the President.

I do not underrate the difficulties in Missouri, but I think it is not extravagant to say that the great power of the rebellion in the West is arranged on a front, the flanks of which are Columbus and Bowling Green, and the center about where the railroad between those points crosses the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers, including Nashville and the fortified points below, It is, I have no doubt, within bounds to estimate their force on that line at eighty thousand men, including a column about Somerset, Ky. In rear of their right flank it is more.

Of their force, forty thousand may be set down as at Bowling Green, twenty thousand at Columbus — though you, doubtless, have more information on that point than I have — -and twenty thousand at the center. Considering the railroad facilities, which enable the enemy to concentrate in a few hours on any single point of this front, you will at once see the importance of a combined attack on its center and flanks, or at least of demonstrations which may be converted into real attacks, and fully occupy the enemy on the whole front. It is probable that you may have given the subject, as far as Columbus and the center are concerned, more attention than I have. With reference to the former, at least, I can make no more than the general suggestion already expressed, that it should be fully occupied.

The attack upon the center should be made by two gun-boat expeditions, with, I should say. twenty thousand men on the two rivers. They should, of course, be organized with reference to the depth of water in the rivers; and whether they should be of equal or unequal strength, would depend upon that and other considerations, and can hardly be determined until the moment of departure. The mode of attack must depend on the strength of the enemy at the several points and the features of the localities. It will be of the first importance to break the railroad communication, and, if possible, that should be done by columns moving rapidly to the bridges over the Cumberland and Tennessee. The former probably would not be reached at first, being some thirty-one miles above the first principal battery that I know of at Dover. The other is eighteen miles above Fort Henry — the first I know of on the Tennessee. If the expeditions should not be strong enough to do the work alone, they should establish themselves firmly at the nearest possible point, and remain at least until they ascertained that reinforcements from my columns, or some other source, would not reach them. By uniting, they could establish themselves permanently under the protection of the gun-boats.

I say this much rather to lay the subject before you than to propose any iefinite plan for your side. Whatever is done should be done speedily, within a few days. The work will become more difficult every day. Please let me hear from you at once. Very truly yours,

D. C Buell, Brigadier- General commanding.

Four days later General Buell telegraphed as follows:

Louisville, January 7, 1862.

General Halleck, St. Louis.

I am telegraphed by the President. Can you fix a day for concerted action *?

D. C. Buell, Brigadier- General.

To which Halleck replied:

St. Louis, January 1, 1862.

General Buell, Louisville.

Designate a day for a demonstration. I can do nothing more. See my letter of yesterday. H. W. Halleck, Major-General.

The letter thus referred to was as follows :

Headquarters Department op the Missouri, ) St. Louis, January 6, 1862. f

Brigadier- General D. C. Buell, Louisville, Ky.

General : I have delayed writing to you for several days in hopes of getting some favorable news from the South-west. The news received to-day, however, is unfavorable, it being stated that Price is making a stand near Springfield, and that all our available forces will be required to dislodge and drive him out.

My last advices from Columbus represent that the enemy has about twenty-two thousand men there. I have only about fifteen thousand at Cairo, Fort Holt, and Paducah, and after leaving guards at these places I could not send into the field over ten or eleven thousand. Moreover, many of these are very imperfectly armed.

Under these circumstances, it would be madness for me to attempt any serious operation against Camp Beauregard or Columbus. ProDably, in the course of a few weeks, I will be able to send additional troops to Cairo and Paducah to cooperate with you, but at present it is impossible; and it seems to me that, if you deem such cooperation necessary to your success, your movement on Bowling Green should be delayed. I know nothing of the plan of campaign, never having received any information on the subject; but it strikes me that to operate from Louisville and Paducah, or Cairo, against an enemy at Bowling Green, is a plain case of exterior lines, like that of McDowell and Patterson, which, unless each of the exterior columns is superior to the enemy, leads to disaster ninety-nine times in a hundred. Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

On the 6th of January McClellan wrote to Buell as follows : "Halleck, from his own accounts, will not soon be in condition to support properly a movement up the Cumberland." And again on the 13th: "Halleck is not yet in condition to afford you the support you need when you undertake the movement on Bowling Green."

On the 10th of January Halleck telegraphed Buell:

Headquarters Department op the Missouri, ) St. Louis, January 10, 1862. J General Buell, Louisville.

Troops at Cairo and Paducah are ready for a demonstration on Mayfield, Murray, and Dover. Six additional regiments will be there next week. Fix the day when you wish a demonstration ; but put it off as long as possible, in order that I may increase the strength of the force.

On the same day Halleck telegraphed Grant : " Reinforcements are receiving arms. Delay your movements until I telegraph. Let me know when the channel is clear."

And on the next day : " I can hear nothing from Buell, so fix your own time for the advance. Three regiments will come down Monday."

Subsequently the following passed between Halleck and Buell:

St. Louis, February 2, 1862.

Brigadier- General Buell, Louisville, Ky.

General : Yours of the 30th ultimo is received. At present it is only proposed to take and occupy Fort Henry and Dover, and, if possible, cut the railroad from Columbus to Bowling Green. * * * But it will take some time to get troops ready to advance far south of Fort Henry. Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

St. Louis, February 1, 1862.

To General Buell, Louisville.

You say you regret that we could not have consulted on tbis matter earlier. So do I most sincerely. I had no idea of commencing the movement before the 15th or 20th inst., until I received General McClellan's telegram about the reinforcements sent to Tennessee and Kentucky by Beauregard. Although not ready, I deemed it important to move instantly. I believe I was right. Fort Henry must be held at all hazards.

From all of which it will appear that General Halleck had not originated, up to the time General Grant was ready to execute it, any such move as the latter was anxious and waiting to make, and General McClellan did not even consider Halleck as prepared to afford a support.

As a matter of fact, General Grant began preparations for the move he had in contemplation the latter part of December, and consequently before the date of the correspondence between President Lincoln and Generals Buell and Halleck. Nor is there any thing in the records to indicate that General McClellan, the President, or General Buell communicated with General Grant upon the subject of a move up the Tennessee or Cumberland. In fact, as he was subordinate to General Halleck, they would not have written him directly.

On the 6th of January, 1862, General Grant, then in command at Cairo, telegraphed to General Halleck for permission to visit St. Louis, for the purpose of obtaining authority from General Halleck to move against Forts Henry and Donelson. At first, leave to visit headquarters was refused ; but on the 22d of January it was granted, and on the 23d Grant started for St. Louis, called on Halleck, and suggested a move on Fort Henry. According to Badeau, who wrote by authority, when Grant " attempted to broach the subject, Halleck silenced him so quickly and sharply that Grant said no more on the matter, and went back to Cairo with the idea that his commander thought him guilty of proposing a great military blunder."

Grant, however, had been quietly engaged for three weeks in preparing for this move, had studied it carefully, and quite set his heart upon it. He was the more convinced of its feasibility, from a report of a partial reconnoissance of Fort Henry, made by General C. F. Smith, and forwarded to General Halleck on January 24th.

Upon reaching Cairo he telegraphed Halleck :

Cairo, January 28, 1862.

Major- General H. W. Halleck, St. Louis, Mo.

With permission I will take Fort Henry on the Tennessee, and establish and hold a large camp there. U. 8. Grant, Brigadier-General.

On the same day Commodore Foote, then in command of the gnn-boats in that section, and in full accord with General Grant, also telegraphed Halleck as follows :

Cairo, January 28, 1862.

Major-General H. W. Halleck, St. Louis, Mo.

Commanding General Grant and myself are of opinion that Fort Henry, on the Tennessee River, can be carried with four iron-clad gun-boats and troops to permanently occupy. Have we your authority to move for that purpose when ready ? A. H. Foote, Flag Officer

On the 29th General Grant wrote Halleck as follows:

Hradquarters District of Cairo,) Cairo, January 29, L862. J

Major- General H. W. Halleck, St. Louis Mo.

In view of the large force now concentrating in this district, and the present feasibility of the plan, I would respectfully suggest the propriety of subduing Fort Henry, near the Kentucky and Tennessee line, and holding the position. If this is not done soon, there is but little doubt but that the defenses on both the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers will be materially strengthened. From Fort Henry it will be easy to operate, either on the Cumberland, only twelve miles distant, Memphis, or Columbus. It will, besides, have a moral effect upon our troops to advance them toward the rebel States. The advantages of this move are as perceptible to the General commanding as to myself, therefore, further statements are unnecessary.