The science of knowledge : y J.G. Fichte. Tr. from the German A.E. Kroeger

Preface

If modern philosophy goes "back to Kant" at the present time, it is certain to go forward to Fichte again after a due interval.

Kant made a new epoch in the history of philosophy by exploring the subjective factor of cognition. It was obvious to him that knowledge is a product of two factors : the object entering as one factor and the constitution of the knowing subject forming the other. He suggested that in order to solve the problems of philosophy it is necessary to make a careful exploration of the subjective factor of knowledge. If we can learn to recognize the subjective coefficient in our experience — in other words, if we can make allowance for what the mind itself adds to the object in the process of knowing it — we are in a condition to know the object in its purity, or as it is in itself.

On this ground the attempt of Kant and his followers seems promising. They essayed to take a complete inventory of the forms that belong to the constitution of the mind. Long practice in this kind of investigation gave them such power of introspection that for the first time in the history of human thought psychology began to be a real science. We all remember, if we have studied the writings of this school of philosophers, how

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completely unintelligible their language seemed at first. There were words and an apparent statement of progressive insights, but we could not understand even the words, much less verify in our own introspection the progressive insights : we had not any sufficient power of sustained introspection or inward observation. We had rarely ever observed other objects than external ones. We had used our powers of sense-perception only, and had reflected only on their data. When we had contemplated spiritual or mental facts we had done so in a symbolical mode of thinking. We had used mental pictures and images, and thus objectified and materialized the operations of the mind and contemplated them as things existing in space.

By the study of the Kantian writings we came to acquire by degrees the new faculties of introspection. We acquired some power of seeing internal processes without the aid of mental pictures and images. Then the words and apparent statements of progressive insights began to have precise and reasonable meaning to us, and a new realm of knowledge arose before our souls with continually increasing clearness. Its clearness in fact was of such a character that all previous knowledge seemed quite dim in comparison. We found ourselves learning to see truths that are universal and necessary — " apodictic," as Kant calls them. Previous views of truth had not seemed exhaustive. Existence might be otherwise, or perhaps was otherwise, to a different spectator. But now with the newly acquired power of introspection we could see glimpses of the final and exhaustive truth. We felt it now to be in our power to make indefinite progress in this new inventory of ihe world. This progress consists in a descent from the universal to the particular.

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Hence division and analysis brought us to insights more closely related to the world of external observation.

All the forms of the mind within discovered by this power of introspection are necessary forms of existence because they are logical conditions of being. If space and time are forms of the perceiving mind, they are also logical conditions of the existence of the world that it perceives. The laws of space and time as formulated in mathematics are universal and necessary conditions in the world of matter and motion. We shall never discover a plane triangle with the sum of its angles greater or less than two right angles. The knowledge of the structure of mind is not a mere subjective knowledge of "forms of the mind," but also a knowledge of the conditions of existence. It is only a superficial glance at the doctrines of Kant that leads one to believe that he supposes time and space to be forms of subjective mind and not conditions of what we call " existence." It is the illusion of his technical expressions that deceives us. When we have learned how to see his facts of consciousness by our newly acquired power of introspection, we see that he does not deny validity to time and space in the world of experience, but on the contrary affirms their unconditional validity there, as necessary conditions of existence to all things and events. If there is a thing that is not conditioned by time and space, it is not known to us and cannot possibly enter our experience.

This sustained power of introspection, which makes Kant's expositions so difficult to the beginner, is surpassed by the acumen of Fichte. Compared with the insight of Fichte, Kant's power of introspection seems to reach internal facts without their logical relations, while Fichte sees logical relations and can deduce one fact from

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another. He has in short discovered Method — and can proceed from one step to another, without beginning anew.

If it was found difficult to understand Kant and verify his inventory of facts of introspection, it is still more difficult to follow Fichte's deductions, involving as they do not only those recondite facts, but also a still more recondite reflection upon their nature. The facts of consciousness are not facts of mere being — being as opposed to activity — but they are all facts of activity as Fichte sees clearly. To think an activity distinctly involves a compound act of the mind, while the thought of mere being seems to be simple in comparison. The mental effort to perceive an activity is therefore necessarily a process comprehending many elemental acts. But the result is a logical whole, and the elements are seen to have truth not in their isolation, but in their relation — in their reciprocal unity.

Here we see the germ of the discovery of the dialectic, that becomes so important in the system of Hegel. If an insight of introspection demands a logical procedure through general terms of thought, the movement is a dialectic one and may be regarded as an objective movement — a movement of the thing itself (Sache selbst). For the thought of it requires this movement, and it is not our arbitrary reflection on it that connects it with others. But this claim for the dialectic has proved the bane of the Hegelian philosophy. It has led to a sort of hypostasis of the " dialectic method " — making it a kind of developing energy in the world, something like the principle of evolution which science has formulated. It does not require any real insight to think with such a principle of dialectic. To see this

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dialectic movement does not require an exercise of this wonderful new power of introspection which we have described as revealed in the writings of Kant and Fichte. The true dialectic is transformed into the far less subtle intellectual power of thinking by the aid of mental images and pictures. The dialectic as a power of transcendental deduction is entirely wanting to it.

Having thus degenerated, the true remedy is to go "back to Kant," and thenceforward to Fichte, and revive this new faculty of introspection that can behold the necessary sequence of ideas, which is the true dialectic.

In these considerations I have essayed to indicate the true position of Fichte. He is the greatest genius in psychology to be found in the history of philosophy. This does not of course claim for him the highest place in all science nor in all philosophy. For there is undoubtedly much else in human knowledge than psychology, even if psychology is as fundamental as it is supposed to be. There is ontology and the philosophy of nature ; the philosophy of history, of aesthetic art and literature ; of ethics, of the social organism, of laws and constitutions ; of language, and of many more departments of human life. All these may find or must find their principles of explanation in psychology, but they are not psychology.

The ignorance of Kant and Fichte in the fields of the history of philosophy, though it is perfectly accounted for by the contempt for former systems of philosophy with which an insight into a new method had filled them — ■ this ignorance of the history of Philosophy is the occasion of what we must regard as the chief defects in their application of philosophy to other departments.

Looked at from the standpoint of the history of all

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European philosophy, the Kantian movement shows its true significance. There are only two original philosophic movements in history — the Greek and the German. The Greek has an ontological principle and the German a psychological one. The former considers the necessary form of being, while the latter sees the necessary element of thought.

Plato finds that true being is a totality, independent and self-active. He names it Idea. An idea has all its potentialities realized, and hence it is not a changing somewhat nor a becoming. It is not dependent on others. Strictly considered, every dependent being must be a part of an independent being. Aristotle has the same thought, but gives it a different technical designation. He calls true being entelechy. This too is wholly real, having no unrealized potentiality (dvvafiis) or matter (v\r)). It is all form (etSos). Form means self-activity, and he calls this active reason.

Ontology when completed arrives at pure activity in the form of Absolute Reason as the explanation of the world. Bui ontology does not and cannot demonstrate its method or subjective procedure. Hence it is possible to attack it from the standpoint of scepticism. Scepticism may ask : how do you know your "true being"? Or it may go farther and attempt to demonstrate our subjective incapacity to know such true being if it really exists. This scepticism is evidently founded on introspection, and it marks the transition from the objective attitude of ontology to the subjective attitude of psychology.

The main movement in the attack on Greek ontology takes the form of the doctrine of Nominalism, the doctrine that universal ideas are factitious unities or

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mere subjective devices of classification, and that they have no objective being corresponding to them. This movement reaches its culmination in the philosophy of Hume. This intrepid thinker draws out its extreme consequences and denies both Causality and the identity of the Ego, as a self transcending its stream of conscious states.

At this point in history begins the German movement inaugurated by Kant. German philosophy has the task of exploring the subjective field exhaustively. Scepticism had explored it partially. Kant and Fichte complete this subjective inventory of facts and processes of consciousness ; Schelling and Hegel compare the results with those of the old philosophy based on Greek ontology and demonstrate their substantial identity.

The net outcome is the same in both. Psychology presupposes an absolute ego identical with Aristotle's purely active reason. (Scholasticism understood this actus purus to be God.)

In Fichte's system we may see all the steps of demonstrating this astonishing result. Moreover, we may see in his various works all the stages of a consciousness awakening to realize the true significance of the consequences that he derived from his own philosophy.

This is a strange phenomenon in the history of philosophy. We are surprised to see a philosopher unconscious of the consequences of his own system. Kant was vividly conscious of his deductions, but he was not aware that there was a second series of deductions to be made from his system. Fichte discovered this second series, and united into one whole the critique of Pure Reason, and the critique of Practical Reason. He showed how the fundamental principle ot conscious-

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ness — u the ego is the ego " — unfolded into two principles, one of which is theoretical and leads to the "Pure Reason," while the other is a principle of the will, or " practical reason."

But this second series (Fichte's) of deductions or consequences from the first series (Kant's) gave rise to a third series of deductions or consequences ; namely, a series of inferences as to the Absolute Ego or First Principle presupposed by the Science of Knowledge. Fichte gradually became conscious of this third series of deductions, making continual progress as long as he lived.

The question whether Fichte changed his system or not has been much discussed in recent years. If a change of system means a repudiation of his earlier system, there was no change on the part of Fichte. But if the progressive discovery of a further series of consequences flowing from his Science of Knowledge is a change, then a change cannot be denied. Fichte continued to bring out " new expositions " of his system until his death. I count eleven of these (and have named them below). Now these new expositions will be found to be occasioned by his own progress in discovering the ontological consequences of his system. He felt impelled to make these repeated expositions in order to absorb those consequences into the Science of Knowledge itself. His first attempt in this direction produced the remarkable exposition of 1797, published in the " Philosophisches Journal" (vol. vii. 1797). In this he had begun to unfold more concretely what had been vaguely contained in the non-ego and in the general or absolute ego. He began to speak frequently of " existence for itself," " Absolute ego as absolute form of knowledge," "absolute being," etc. In the episode that

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soon followed — the accusation against him for atheism — we find that he had been led by his impulse towards ontology to state prematurely his idea of God as a moral world-order.

The reader of the present work may turn to •' The Doctrine of Religion" (in the excellent translation of Dr. William Smith, published by Messrs. Triibner & Co.) for Fichte's most advanced conclusions in ontology. The system is the same as the Science of Knowledge, but in the Doctrine of Religion Fichte reveals to us a nearly complete third system of deductions founded on the Science of Knowledge. This third system is an ontology derived from " critical " psychology (the word " critical " is used to mean founded on the doctrine of Kant's Critiques) and in harmony with the ontology of Plato, Aristotle, and St. Thomas Aquinas.

Fichte found the finite ego necessarily limited by the non-ego in order to produce consciousness. God therefore, he had at first reasoned, cannot be a conscious ego because He cannot have a not-me like man.

But in his Science of Knowledge he showed how the ego may have itself for object and become self-conscious by knowing its own nature as expounded in that science. So too in the practical part, and in the sciences of Morals and Rights he showed again how the ego may have the Absolute for its object and become conscious of its absolute self. This at least was the true logical consequence, and it was deduced in Hegel's system. Had Fichte lived to old age it is likely that he would have fully recognized this consequence to his system. It was Plato's doctrine of the Logos or eternally begotten Word that provided for the consciousness of God — who must behold himself in an eternal not-me that is likewise

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an Ego or independent Person. God is not limited by his not-me or object, but He is reflected by it. For his not-me is himself as self-object, and an independent Person, and yet one with Him. This insight into the unity of opposites through reflection is Hegel's. It was really implied, though not here fully expressed, in Fichte's dialectic. Because there is no end to the dialectic movement forward to new antitheses unless the system comes to an antithesis in which the first term is perfectly reflected by its opposite.

On the whole, the peculiarity of Fichte's expositions — as contrasted with the general significance of his system above considered — is his insight into free activity, spontaneity, — the being which is an essential activity rather than activity which depends on a being. For the ego is not unless it acts — it is a pure activity without a substratum of being, but its activity furnishes a substratum of being. Quiescent being cannot be a substrate, but requires or presupposes a substrate of pure activity. In a letter to Reinhold, cited by Professor Kuno Fischer (Geschichte der neuern Philosophic, Bd. V. s. 453), Fichte says — " My system is from beginning to end only an analysis of the idea of freedom."

The beginner who wishes to increase his powers of mind by adding a new faculty — the faculty of seeing pure activity — to his already existent faculty of seeing external being and forming mental images or pictures of it — will not grudge the labour necessary to master this difficult work of Fichte. To him who studies a philosophical book only to store his memory with dogmatical conclusions, Fichte's works are apt to prove sterile. But Fichte can teach him, if he will do some deep thinking, how to behold at first hand those subtle processes of the

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mind which escape all ordinary perception, and are only a matter of hearsay to those who dwell in external intuition and the understanding. " To writers of the English school," says Professor Adamson in his very able work on Fichte in the "Philosophical Classics for English Readers " (published by William Blackwood & Sons), " the restriction of philosophical inquiry to experience has always meant that phenomena of inner and outer life are known in the same way, and that beyond the knowledge thus obtained there is nothing standing in need of investigation or capable of being investigated. ' Psychology/ says Huxley, 'differs from physical science only in the nature of its subject-matter, and not in its method of investigation. ... It is not putting the matter too strongly to say that the categorical rejection of this psychological method is the very essence of critical philosophy."

Mr. Kroeger, the translator of the present work, commended the Science of Knowledge to the public in these words : " The few students whom this work may interest I would beg not to be discouraged by any possible failure to comprehend it at its first, second, or even

third reading The Science of Knowledge is not a

book to read, but a work to study, as you would study the science of the higher mathematics, page by page, and year after year. Five or ten years may be needed to get full possession of it ; but he who has possession of it has possession of all sciences."

Of the present work Mr. Kroeger said : " I omitted all those sentences and paragraphs which I considered out of place in a book presentation — though probably very much in place in a lecture presentation [the work was printed- directly from the lectures given at Jena]; and I added the whole of the second portion of the theo-

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retical part which in the German edition is published as a separate work, but which really belongs where I have placed it — additions and omissions which, in my judgment, make my English version of the Science of Knowedge of 1794 much superior to the German original."

In order to make clear what the " additions and omissions/' alluded to by Mr. Kroeger, are, I give here a general statement of the contents of this work. This translation contains :

I. Introduction. Concerning the conception of the Science of Knowledge generally (pp. 11-60). This is a translation of Fichte's " Ueber den Begriff der Wissenschaftslehre oder der sogenannten Philosophic" Weimar, 1794. It was written as a sort of programme or statement of his point of view to be read by his hearers preparatory to his course of lectures at Jena, just before entering upon the duties of his professorship. Its fitness as an introduction here is obvious.

II. Fundamental Principles of the whole Science of Knowledge (pp. 61-331, except pp. 189-255, which contains the treatise described under III., below)* This is the translation of Fichte's first course of lectures, given at Jena in 1794, and printed while the lectures were in progress. Its title was " Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre. Als Handschrift fuer seine Zuhoerer." Jena, 1795.

III. Second part of the Theoretical Part of the Science of Knowledge (pp. 189-255). The title of this work, published separately, was "Grundriss des Eigenthuemlichen der Wissenchaftslehre in Ruecksicht auf das theoretische Vermoegen. Als Handschrift fuer seine Zuhoerer." Jena, 1795. This work completes with great

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minuteness the theoretical deduction, and, as Mr. Kroeger said, belongs in this place.

IV. The Dignity of Man : Speech delivered by Fichte at the close of his first course of lectures on the Science of Knowledge. This is printed on pages 331-336. Its original title is " Ueber die Wuerde des Menschen. Beim Schluss seiner philosophischen Vorlesungen gesprochen," 1794. Its great importance is due to the fact that Fichte gives hints in it of the ontological views that he developed in later expositions.

V. The Religious Significance of the Science of Knowledge (pp. 338-377). This is an appendix containing fragments from Fichte's writings in defence of his system against the charge of atheism. They are found in the polemical writings written early in 1799 and left incomplete, but published only in the complete edition of his works after his death, under the title, " Rueckerinnerungen, Antworten, Fragen. Eine Schrift die den Streitpunkt genau anzugeben bestimmt ist, und auf welche jeder, der in dem neulich entstandenen Streite ueber die Lehre von Gott mitsprechen will, sich einzulassen hat oder ausserdem abzuweisen ist."

We have seen that Fichte wrote out many expositions of his Theory of Knowledge. His wonderful originality is manifested in the ever fresh devices of technique and illustration, by which he strove to make clear his subtle insights into the operations of mental activity. The following are the titles and dates of these expositions : —

1. The exposition in the present volume described above under " II." and u III." 1794, 1795.

2. Versuch einer neuen Darstellung der W.L. (Wissenschaitslehre ). Published in the " Philosophisches

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Journal," edited by Fichte and Niethammer, vol. vii. 1795. This was translated by Mr. Kroeger and published in the "Journal of Speculative Philosophy," St. Louis, 1869.

3. Die Bestimmung des Menschen. Berlin, 1800. ("The Vocation of Man.") This is the most popular and impressive of all the expositions of the Science of Knowledge and the least technical, though as profound as any. A translation is contained in Johann Gottlieb Fichte's Popular Works, with a Memoir, by William Smith, LL.D. London, Triibner & Co., 1873.

4. Die Anweisungen zum seligen Leben, cder auch die Religionslehre. Berlin, 1806. A course of lectures on the Way to a Blessed Life, or the Doctrine of Religion. For a good English translation see the work by Dr. Smith, above referred to. I include this among the expositions of the Science of Knowledge, because in laying down the grounds for religion Fichte was obliged to state the fundamental grounds of his system.

5. Darstellung der W.L. aus dem Jahre 1801. Printed in 1845 from the (till then) unpublished manuscript.

6. Die W.L. 1804. The lectures of 1804 printed in the posthumous (nachgelassene) works.

7. Die W.L. in ihrem allgemeinen Umrisse. Berlin, 181 o. Of this wonderful outline of Fichte's W.L. as related to the doctrine of the Absolute, there is a translation by Dr. Smith in the second volume of Fichte's Popular Works as published by John Chapman; London, 1849. Fichte treats the system of Knowledge after the manner that the doctrine of the Logos is treated by the Platonists. It is a brief summary of the doctrine expounded in the Way to a Blessed Life (see No. 4 above).

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gehalten an der Universitaet zu Berlin in Winterhalbjahr 1810-1811. "The Facts of Consciousness," printed in 181 7. An English translation of this work, by Mr. Kroeger, was printed in the " Journal of Speculative Philosophy," in volumes v., vi., vii., xvii. and xviii* (years 1871, 1872, 1S73, 1883, 1884). This work might perhaps be classed more appropriately with the introductions to the Science of Knowledge given below.

9. Die W.L. vorgetragen im Jahre 181 2. Lectures published in the posthumous works.

10. Die W.L. vorgetragen im Fruehjahr 1813. Lectures delivered in the Spring of 1813 and left incomplete on the outbreak of the war (vol. ii. of the posthumous works).

11. Die Thatsachen des Bewusstseyns, vorgetragen zu Anfang des Jahres 18 13. " Facts of Consciousness : " lectures delivered early in 181 3, published in the posthumous works.

The " Facts of Consciousness " goes over the immediate data for which the W.L. finds a ground in the ego. But Fichte could not help interpreting these data in the process of inventorying them. Hence we are justified in placing these two expositions (No. 7 and No. 9) here as versions of the W.L. They furnish interesting views of the W.L. from an opposite standpoint — *.*., they show us the W.L. approached from the ordinary consciousness which looks upon its objects as facts and things.

Besides these expositions of the Theory of Knowledge in its essentials, there are several writings that are called " Introductions " (Einleitungen), in which Fichte undertook to lead the reader up to the conviction in which the Theory of Knowledge takes its root. These works are : —

1. The Introduction to the present work already

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named above, a work not prefixed to the W.L. by Fichte himself, but placed in the hands of his students at the beginning.

2. Erste Einleitung in die W.L. This was printed in the " Philosophische Journal," vol. v. 1797. (Translated by Mr. Kroeger and printed in the Jour. Spec. Phil. 1867.)

3. Zweite Einleitung in die W.L. fuer Leser die schon ein philosophisches System haben. " Second introduction to the Theory of Knowledge for readers who already have a philosophical system." Printed in the " Philosophisches Journal," vols. v. and vi. 1 797. (Translated by Mr. Kroeger and printed in the Jour. Spec. Phil, for 1867.)

4. Sonnenklarer Bericht an das groessere Publicum ueber das eigentliche Wesen der neuesten Philosophic Ein Versuch die Leser zum Verstehen zu zwingen. Berlin, 1801. "A sun-clear statement to the larger public concerning the nature of the most recent philosophy. An attempt to compel the reader to understand it." (Translated by Mr. Kroeger and published in Jour. Spec. Phil. 1868.)

5. Bericht ueber den BegrifT der W.L. und die bisherigen Schicksale derselben. " A statement of the idea of the W.L. and the history of its reception up to this time." Written in 1806 and published in 1834. (English translation by Mr. Kroeger in the Jour. Spec. Phil., vols. xii. and xiii. 1878-79.)

6. Einleitungsvorlesungen in die W.L. " Lectures introductory to the Theory of Knowledge," delivered in the autumn of 181 3 at the University of Berlin, and published in 1843.

Here are eleven expositions of the Science of Know-

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ledge and six introductions to it, left us by the author of the system. One might suppose at first that this number was due to the fact that Fichte could not satisfy himself as to the requirements of his description of its necessary steps. But, as I have already suggested above, the gradual unfolding in his mind of the ontologica consequences of his system may have been one of the causes of this impulse to modify the exposition at each new course of Lectures. Another cause was doubtless this : He saw so clearly the logical necessity of his system that he could not understand the difficulties which his students found in following him. Hence he described again and again the characteristics so vividly and originally conceived whenever he came to lecture anew upon his theme.

In order to assist the reader, I add the following hints as to the development of the thought of this work, referring him, if he wishes to compare his progress in gaining an insight into Fichte's argument with the re-statements of the thought by others, to the work cf Professor Adam son above cited, and to the able exposition of the Science of Knowledge by Professor C. C. Everett (in Griggs & Co.'s " German Philosophical Classics," Chicago, 1884).

Given first the fact of consciousness, I am I. The ego posits itself — it is through its own activity. Instead of being a " fact" (German Thatsache means a deed-thing), Fichte would call this fundamental act of consciousness a Deed-act (" That-Handlung " instead of " Thatsache "), because it is not a thing or fact but an act — its very being is an act. Much of the obscurity of Fichte'r. Science of Knowledge is due to this distinction. Fichte always bears in mind that the being of the ego is its

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activity, and it is not a being which has activity only as a transient state of it. Its activity is its immanent state or its very essence. Cease action, cease consciousness ; the self ceases to be for itself and thus ceases to be. Hence Fichte often in his expositions opposes existence or Being to the Ego, calling the latter freedom. The being of the deed-act is pure activity, while the existence that we learn to know in the world seems to be a quiescent being which takes on movement or activity as a transient state that does not affect its being. Here is found the chief ground of Fichte's seeming atheism. The ego is not an existence, but something more fundamental— it posits existence. So it might be said the Absolute Ego or God is not existence, but the pure