Schopenhauer's system in its philosophical significance

Front matter

15 ■.

SHAIV FELLOWSHIP LECTURES, 1893

SCHOPENHAUER’S

Preface

This book is substantially the outcome of the public lectures delivered by me in the Logic class-room of the University of Edinburgh, in the months of October and November, 1893, at the close of my tenure of the Shaw Fellowship.

Following the precedent of previous holders of the Shaw Fellowship, Professor Sorley of Aberdeen and Professor Mackenzie of Cardiff, and also in accordance with the natural necessities of the evolution of the work in my own mind, I have departed altogether from the lecture form, and have presented my matter in the shape of several continuous philosophical essays. Some of these chapters may appear to be of undue length. As each, however, was intended to reflect to some extent the system of Schopenhauer as a whole, as well as to indicate his views upon the particular topic in question, it seemed undesirable to curtail too much. Taken together, they represent a series of attempts to suggest the significance of Schopenhauer’s thought as an organic whole. The order of the series is partly natural and partly logical.

As to the justification for the volume, I desire the title to be partly explanatory. I have not directly attempted to give an exposition, or even an exposition and criticism, of Schopenhauer’s philosophy. This has been done sufficiently well in many different ways by many English and foreign

Vlll

PREFACE.

writers. I have rather tried to connect Schopenhauer with some few broad lines of philosophical and general thought and — so far as I could — with some few broad principles of human nature. It seems to me that the time has come for this. My best hope for the book is that it may afford reflective matter to those who have, for any reason whatsoever, an interest in Schopenhauer. Nowadays it is almost impossible to escape being brought more or less under his influence. He has even got into the comic papers of most countries. 'Wliile to a certain extent presupposing some elementary knowledge of Schopenhauer/ I have tried to give enough positive statement from and about him to render what I write intelligible to the ordinary reader.

I have tried to strike a mean in the matter of the connection of Schopenhauer’s philosophy with his personality. I am inclined to resent the practice of attributing the exaggerations of his philosophy to his personality, when such attribution does not rest upon a broad perception of the philosophy of such a personality as Schopenhauer’s. It is time the public should be prevented from being misled by much extravagant statement in this connection.^

The first chapter is general in its character, and suggests only the scope of Schopenhauer’s significance and the spirit in which we ought to study his system. The next two chapters,

^ Such knowledge, for example, as may be had from a recent article in the ‘Westminster Review’ (April 1895) by Mr E. Todhunter, or from Mr Bailey Saunders’s excellent translations (published in very convenient form by Sonnenschein), or from such an essay as that by Professor E. Rod in ‘ Les Iddes Morales du Temps Present,’ or from the “Britannica” article of Professor W. Wallace (or from my own in the ninth edition of ‘ Chambers’s Encyclopaedia ’), or from Professor W. Wallace’s book in the “ Great Writers ” Series, or from the instructive article of the late Mr E. Wallace in the ‘Westminster Review’ (No. 59, p. 388).

E.g., “No philosopher so readily explains himself as Schopenhauer. His philosophy was simply the formulation of his own special disease, the expression of his own ineffably petty and uncomfortable disposition. He was a small philosopher with a great literary gift.” — ‘The Religion of a Literary Man,’ by Richard le Gallienne. I select this quotation only on account of its recent character. Many others might be given.

PREFACE.

IX

I imagine, will demand a somewhat closer attention on the part of the reader than the first. They constitute an attempt to trace out the theoretical roots of Schopenhauer’s philosophy.^ The fourth chapter occupies itself with the practical bondage of life, from which art and ethics and religion are supposed by many people (and by Schopenhauer himself) to set us free. The following four chapters present the Schopenhauer that is known to the thought of the nineteenth century. Chapter ix. tries to show the fundamental philosophical character of Schopenhauer’s thought. It takes up, incidentally, the threads of chapters ii. and iii., and interweaves them with the other chapters of the book and with the system as a whole. Chapter x. attempts some general positive statement about Schopenhauer. In it and in the Epilogue points are suggested which might form the material for further study and exposition. Before this, however, one would have to devote some attention to von Hartmann.

It was originally part of my intention to consider the general subject of pessimism as treated by both von Hartmann and Schopenhauer. In view of this I read to a fair extent into von Hartmann,^ but soon concluded that Schopenhauer, in virtue of his greater originality and attractiveness, would alone afford enough scope for my first investigation. There are two things that are more satisfactory in von Hartmann than in Schopenhauer : first, his scholarship, and then the historical basis on which he tries to found pessimism. I am quite convinced that Schopenhauer and von Hartmann together represent one-half of modern philosophy. I say of modern 'philosophy, because for the purposes of general philosophy we still sit, and ought to continue to sit, at the feet of

^ These chapters represent matter which I presented partly in two papers in ‘ Mind ’ (O.S., vol. xvi. p. 355 ; N.S., vol. ii. p. 188), and partly in class-room lectures in Cornell University, N.Y.

2 See ‘Mind’ (N.S., vol. ii. p. 188) for a preliminary study of von Hartmann’s theory of knowledge.

X

PREFACE.

the Greeks. It is greatly to be regretted that Schopenhauer did not give more attention to Aristotle than he did. I hope at another time to be able to do greater justice to von Hartmann than I have been able to do in this volume.

I crave indulgence for the supreme liberty I have taken in often speaking for my author and in often perhaps identifying my exposition or criticism or philosophy with his name or his principles. If I have made him speak and appear to be significant, that is all I care about. I have not always fully worked out what I have suggested, but in this I feel justified by the nature of the task. There are, of course, many things ^ in Schopenhauer to which little reference has been made here, and some to which no reference at all has been made.

Xor have I tried to free Schopenhauer from the many charges of inconsistency which may be brought against him. Frauenstadt’s infinite care in this direction, although of great service, seems to me to be often carried too far.

The manuscript and the proof-sheets of this work have been read by Professor James Seth, of the Chair of Moral Philosophy, Cornell University; all the proof-sheets by Mr Henry Barker, of Trinity College, Cambridge ; a part of the manuscript and a part of the proof by Mr Eobert P. Hardie, Lecturer on Ancient Philosophy, University of Edinburgh ; a part of the proof by Mr Horman McLean, Fellow and Lecturer of Christ’s College, Cambridge; and the revised parts of the proof, along with some whole chapters, by my colleague at Northwestern, Professor J. Scott Clark, of the Chair of English Language. All these gentlemen have rendered me important service by their suggestions. To other friends, also.

^ Such are, for example, his views upon the psychology of pain, his views upon mathematics, his theory of colours and his optical researches, his opinions upon literature proper, the extent of his knowledge of Eastern religions, or his opinions upon Kant and Kant’s works.

PEEFACE.

XI

I feel indebted at this time : to some for an active interest in the book or in parts of it ; and to some whose friendship has enabled me to understand much of what I have learned about both philosophy and life. In the latter regard I owe much to nearly ten years of intercourse with Professor Laurie of Edinburgh University, some of whose books (the ‘ Metaphysica ’ and the ‘ Ethica ’) long ago revealed to me something of the reality and the possibilities of a philosophy of the will.

I have endeavoured, by the use of the capital and in other ways, to call the attention of the reader to the difference between the term Ideas ” (the “ Platonic Ideas ”) and the term “ ideas ” (sense-phenomena, objects). The abbreviation “ H. and K.,” in the footnotes, refers to the English translation of Schopenhauer’s ' World as Will and Idea,’ by E. B. Haldane and J. Kemp (Triibner, 1888. 3 vols.) The edition of

Schopenhauer I have used is the sdmmtlicTie Werke. Ziveite Auflage. Keue Ausgabe. Leipzig. Brockhaus. 1888.

XOETHWESTERN UNIVERSITY,

Evanston, III., U.S.A., March 1896.

Chapter I. General View Of Schopenhauer’s Significance

Scope of the present Inquiry — Objective and Subjective Elements in a philosophical System— The Reason and the Emotions — Insight and Genius and Reason — That which Schopenhauer compels Philosophy to notice : Schopenhauer and the Zeit-Geist at the beginning of the Century — Naturalism and Idealism — Evolution and Hegel and Schopenhauer : The attitude of mind incident to the study of Schopenhauer : The relation of Mind and Body — Transcendentalism and Positive Psychology : Schopenhauer and the Scientific Spirit — The Restrictive and Negative Aspects of Schopenhauer’s teaching : Whether Schopenhauer’s Philosophy is Materialistic : Whether Schopenhauer knew Science — The Philosophy of Genius : Schopenhauer’s Platonism — The Reasons for his antipathy to the “ Hegelians ” — His attitude to History — His Significance : Kant’s infiuence over Schopenhauer — Speculative Dogmatism— Man the Key to the World : The Philosophy of Religion Pp. 1-59

Chapter II. Schopenhauer And Idealism

S ome different aspects of Schopenhauer’s attempt to reduce the world to unity — His Starting-point in Philosophy — Idealism and the different forms of the same : I. Subjective or Naif Idealism — The Reference of all things to the Knowledge or to the Activity of the Self — The Reason of Schopenhauer’s being so much under the Influence of the Presuppositions of Idealism — The Notion of a Bridge between the Subjective and the Objective ; H. Ordinary or Dogmatic or Phenomenological Idealism — That, whether True or False, Idealism tends to become Illusionism — Illusionism in Schopenhauer — That, despite Illusionism, Schopenhauer thinks Idealism to have been proved true — That his own Positive Philosophy is more Real than Idealism ; III. Transcendental Idealism — All Things Related to Each Other — And to Will — Or to Purpose — Results ..... 60-111

XIV

Contents

CHAPTER HI.

SCHOPENHAUER’S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE.

The Relation sustained by the System of Schopenhauer to the Theory of Knowledge — W]ia.f.-Sp.bnpp.nhauer learned from Plato and Kant — His Charge against Kant : I. The Element of Kn6\Hedge to which Schopenhauer attaches Im^rtance : Perceptions, both lower and higher — (Schopenhauer on the Mutual Relations of his three Elements of Knowledge) ; Conceptions, their Nature and Utility — (Schopenhauer ever eager to insist on the Dangers of Conceptual Knowledge) ; The Ideas, the higher perceptions of the mind ; Criticism of Schopenhauer’s treatment of these three Mental Elements — That they ought not to be so sharply marked off from each other — Nor from our Total Experience of Reality — A Theoretical Reason for Schopenhauer’s Illusionism. — II. That Reason to Schopenhauer represents an Indirect Way of reaching Reality — The Principle that Everything that is in Reason comes from Perception — That Schopenhauer is apt to recur to his idea that Knowledge is a poor way of reaching Reality. — III. The idea that there are Different Ways of Knowing Different Sides of Reality — Schopenhauer’s Dialectic Difficulty and the Different Forms that it Takes : (a) The alleged Opposition between Formal and Real Knowledge — The Ideas and the Things of Sense — Schopenhauer’s Attitude to the Alleged Reliability of the Knowledge of the Self ; (i8) That Nature becomes more and more difficult to Comprehend as we Ascend in the Scale of Being — The Philosophy of Causation — That Causation in the last resort means Volition — That Volition, however, is Difficult of Comprehension ; (7) The Apparent Difference between Fact and Necessity — That Real Knowledge has Little Form and Formal Knowledge Little Reality ; (5) That Knowledge becomes Purer and more Objective with the Growth of the Brain — The Difficulty of this Position. — IV. Criticism of Schopenhauer’s Confusion between Consciousness and Self- Consciousness — That we cannot say that Knowledge Falsifies or Phenomenalises things. Renders them Unknowable, — V. Some Theoretical Advantages of regarding the World as Will — (Characteristic Defect of Schopenhauer’s in regard to the Judgment) — Resume of some Important Features of Schopenhauer’s Theory of Knowledge ..... 112-170

Chapter IV. The Bondage Of Man

Schopenhauer’s quasi Positivism and Determinism — The Limitations of Knowledge and the Primary Fact of Volition — I. The Complex Character of Will — Conscious Actions and Reflex Actions — That Conduct is an Organic Whole — The Biological Idea and the Deterministic View of Conduct — That in Will as Rational Conduct two prominent Psycho-physical Tendencies must be distinguished— How Conduct may be systematised — The notion that the Sole

CONTENTS.

XV

Function of Conceptions is to Furnish us with Motives to Action — Whether this notion can be applied to the Fact (Idea?) of Self-Consciousness — That Determinism is not necessarily a Wholly Unsatisfactory Philosophy — What the Science of Human Nature seems to teach on the point — What a Libertarian may legitimately contend for in regard to Conduct — That the Intellect needs to be schooled into true Service of the Will — What Self-Knowledge or Objectivity of Intellect can mean — II. The Explanation of Human Life in terms of Necessity — The Conscious and the Unconscious in Man — Have the Ideas a Relation to the Will ? — That the Ultimate Explanation of Life is a Practical Explanation — Whether Spontaneity resides in the Intellect or the Will — That Schopenhauer insists more strongly on the Feebleness than on the Utility of Thought — What his Philosophy represents in this regard — Another Reason for the Sense of Illusion that it seems to awaken — III. The Philosphy of Pain — The Idea that Pain exceeds Pleasure — The Real Cause of the Pessimistic Mood — That Men seemed Fated to Form Erroneous Estimates about Life — What to Schopenhauer is the Deepest Pain in Life — IV. What this Chapter has Suggested — That there is much that is Illusory in Life — History reveals a series of Illusions — MTiat is most Depressing in Schopenhauer — Another Word on Freedom — Conclusion . 171-227

Chapter V. Schopenhauer’s Philosophy Of Art

Schopenhauer’s Treatment of Art — As compared with that of other Philosophers — Genius and Common-sense — The Emancipating Intellect in Schopenhauer — Whether Schopenhauer can allow for Spiritual or Ideal Volition — Religion as “ Art and Science ” — That Art is an Affair of Perception rather than of the Understanding — I. Knowledge of the Ideas as Different from Scientific Knowledge — Illustration from Schopenhauer — Art and Insight into Human Life — That Matter cannot Express the Ideas — “ Pure Cloudless Knowledge ” — That the Different Arts Express the Different Grades or Ideas of the Will — The Uniqueness of Artistic Perception — That Everything is in a sense Beautiful — II. The Philosophy of Art and the Philosophy of Genius — That Schopenhauer writes more upon the Insight afforded by Art, than upon the Artistic Sense for Life and Reality — The Meaning of This — That Beauty should be Closely Connected with Life — Art and the Restless Will — III. The Nature of the Reality with which Art deals — Schopenhauer’s treatment of Art too Negative — Schopenhauer and Plato and others upon the Nature of Artistic Reality ....... 228-260

CHAPTER VI. SCHOPENHAUER’S PHILOSOPHY OF ART — continued

(a) Limits of Schopenhauer’s treatment of Fine Art — The Personal Equation therein — That his Treatment is Metaphysical — Transcendentalism in Art —

XVI

CONTENTS.

Kant’s ^Esthetic 'Philosophy — Its Merits, according to Schopenhauer — That Art completes Intellectual and Critical Philosophy — That Schopenhauer’s Treatment is too Abstract, too Unhistorical, too Impassive — That it Overlooks the Facts of Artistic Production — And does not Connect Itself with the Will — Classical and Gothic Architecture, and the Modern Feeling for Beauty — (/8) Other Omissions in Schopenhauer’s Treatment — Art and Illusionism and Realism — (The Conflict between the Will and the Idea again) — (7) Schopenhauer’s Esthetic and the Philosophy of the Universal — Artistic Creation and Function and Development — That Art completes the Teleological view of the World and of Human Life — Art and Ordinary Reality — Formal Conditions of the Beautiful — Beauty and Adaptation — That the World is what we make it to be — (5) Beauty and Pleasure — (Genius and Life) — The Height of Hlsthetic Feeling — Beauty and Life and the Expression of Life — Closing Reflections .... 261-305

Chapter VII. Schopenhauer’s Moral Philosophy

That to Schopenhauer the Last Meaning of the World is Ethical — I. The Fact of Moral Conduct the Key to the Transcendental Meaning of Things — The Sense in which it is this — II. How Schopenhauer approaches the Problem of Ethics — What he thought of the Ethic of Socrates — That True Nobility of Soul is an Affair not of the Intellect but of the Will — Schopenhajj^rl^ujQpiiiions^on the Ethic of Kant — That Moralit^annot be ex^Hined in an “ Exter^ nal^Manner— IScliop^hauer’s own Statement of the Facts of Mo^ity — His Black Picture ofVKe~Facts of* Human Nature — SympatEy~and the Denial of all Selfish Volition — That in these two things a Metaphysical Perception is involved — The “ Affirmation of the Ideas ” — III. Criticism of Schopenhauer’s Views upon Ethics — Whether he overlooks Duty — Whether his Facts are Typical — Whether he is fair to Socrates and Kant — His Attitude to Life that of an Extremist — That the Spirit of the Eighteenth Century is Reflected in his Difficulties — That he overlooks the Complexity of the Facts of Conduct — Evolution and Sovereignty and Naturalism — The Fundamental Fact of Morality to Schopenhauer — The Will in a State of Natural Conflict with Itself — The Facts of Feeling and Volition more important to Ethics than Abstract or A Priori Knowledge — That the Knowledge implied in Goodness is Intuitive and Mystical, not Rational — IV. The Facts of Conduct and Illusionism — The Difficulty of Pronouncing Correct Moral Judgments — What alone we Know about Ourselves — Schopenhauer’s Philosophy of Conscience— Erroneous Assumptions upon which Ordinary Discussions of Freedom proceed — Whether Men Know what they Mean by Freedom — V. The Difficulty of a Beginning in Ethical Philosophy — The Difficulty of Knowing the Moral Self — The Natural Element of Illusion and Contradiction in the Moral Life — Whether this is surmounted by the Philosophy of Spirit — VI. Significance of the Opposition between Egoism and Altruism — The Possible Irrelevancy and Superficiality of a One-sided Altruism — Some Practical Reflections— That Ethics leaves us with a Dualism or Hlusionism 306-366

CONTENTS.

XVll

Chapter VIII. Schopenhauer’s Philosophy Of Religion

Schopenhauer’s Philosophy of Religion and the Rest of his Thought — I. The Uniqueness of his Treatment of Religion — His Objections to Ordinary Dogmatic Religion — To Rationalism — The Kinds of Religious Phenomena that he Studies — The Religious Literature he cares for — Formal Defects of the Various Philosophies of Religion — How Schopenhauer Classifies Religions — His Opinions on the Leading Philosophical and Historical Religious Systems — II. What his own Philosophy of Religion is — The Eternal Necessity of all Things — The Evil Inherent in the Will — The Negation of the Merely Natural in our Lives, and the Consequences of this Negation — The Philosophy of the Fact of Death — That in Schopenhauer’s Philosophy the Strongest Possible Theoretical Support for Altruism may be found — How Schopenhauer Thinks of the World and of Ordinary Reality — Why we Cannot literally Deny the World — Schopenhauer’s Attitude to the “Two Cardinal Points” in Religion — A Reflection upon the Philosophy of the Idea — The Necessity of taking firm hold of the Positive Element in Schopenhauer’s Philosophy — The Supreme Difficulty in the Study of Schopenhauer — The Crux of the Religious Problem — III. That Religion Presupposes Pessimism — That it Presupposes Idealism — That its Origins must be studied in Connection with the Will— The Inadequacy of Rationalism in Religion — Limitations of Schopenhauer’s Treatment of Religion — What Objective Reality in Religion means — The Philosophy of the Notion of the Objective — The “ Argument from Design ” — The Vitality and the History of Religious — IV. Theoretical Defects in Schopenhauer’s Philosophy of Religion — His Attitude to Apologetic — The Nemesis that Overtakes his Hostility to Rationalism and “ Externalism ” — Illusionism again — How to take hold of the Positive Elements in his Teaching— The Value of Eastern Religions — The World Illusory to the Egoist — That Philosophy Should Not Doubt the Reality of its Conclusions — That Schopenhauer is a true Kantian — How he Looks at the History of the World — Perfection and Reality an Affair of the Will . . 367-431

Chapter IX. The Metaphysic Of Schopenhauer

The Spirit of Schopenhauer’s Metaphysic — I. Illusionism — That each Phase of the System seems to find Illusion in our Experience — The Apparent Opposition between the Will and the Idea — II. The Main Facts of the System — Its Fundamental Idea — The Relative Truth of the Same — That the World is Best Understood When Understood Practically —That in both Philosophy and Science Ontology becomes Teleology — The “ Personal Equation ” in Illusionism— That we Must Not be Misled by the Fact that Reality Presents Itself to us in Different Phases — A certain Amount of Illusionism Incident

XVlll

CONTENTS.

to the Philosophy of Will — III. That Schopenhauer Causes us to Alter our Ideas about the Problem of Philosophy — And to Look at the Self in a Different Way — That Many Facts seem to Justify the Expediency of this — lY. Criticism of Schopenhauer’s Inability to Correlate Different Ways of Looking at Reality, and of his Idea that the World is Necessarily Unintelligible— The Illusionism Incident to the Philosophy of Purpose or Volition — That Individual Effort is not Necessarily Meaningless — Schopenhauer’s Reflections on the Point — Positive Element in Illusionism — What a Teleological View of the World means — How Philosophy might Systematise Knowledge and Reality — The Extreme Danger of Belie^ing that Things are not what they Appear to be — Philosophy A Rehours — V. The Foundations of the System, again — The Broad View of Will — That we Know the World through Action — The Intellect only a Partial Sense for Reality — Not that the World is Irrational— Our Knowledge as Real as the Continuity of our Experience — That Nature has Intended that we should Think our Lives — Schopenhauer on the Intellect and the Will — His Neglect of Feeling — And of History 432-48.5

Chapter X. The Positive Aspects Of The System

Schopenhauer’s Suggestiveness — Philosophical Affinities of the Different Parts of the System — Some of the Main Lessons it teaches — To whom these are of Value — The Necessity of Pain and Difficulty — That Schopenhauer Himself Knows that Most Estimates of Life are Subjective — That Philosophy itself Must be Viewed as an Effort — What Reality is, on Schopenhauer’s Principles — Illustration of this from Physics and Psychology — The “ Relativity ” of Definitions of Reality — That Schopenhauer’s Philosophy seems to take the World as it is — That Man’s Life is an Effort to Idealise the Real — How Experience Ought to be Interpreted — The Economy of Pain and Disappointment — Schopenhauer and Naturalism and Evolution — Some Metaphysical Advantages of Regarding the World as Will — Logical Dangers of Idealism — That Idealism has a Tendency to Pessimism — The Element of Contradiction and Illusion in Experience — What to do in View of the Existence of this Element — Criticism and Optimism and Pessimism — Concluding Reflections . 486-521

529-5.38

SCHOPENHAUEE’S SYSTEM.