The Russo-Japanese conflict : its causes and issues

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The Riversive Press Cambridge REFERENCE LIBRARY a ORY OYE OYE YE YE YEO YE YE YE YE YE PE YEPE

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Introduction

Tue issues of the conflict that forms the topic of this little volume are bound inevitably to influence the future of the civilized world for many years. Dr. Asakawa presents them with a logical thoroughness that reminds us of the military operations of his countrymen now in evidence elsewhere, and recalls very pleasantly to my own mind the sane and accurate character of his scholastic work while a student at Yale. Itis the sort of presentation which a great subject needs. It is content with a simple statement of fact and inference. It is convincing because of its brevity and restraint.

The generous and almost passionate sympathy of our countrymen for Japan in this crisis of her career has aroused some speculation and surprise even amongst ourselves. The emotion is, doubtless, the outcome of complex causes, but this much is obvious at present: the past half-century has brought both America and Japan through experiences strikingly similar, and their establishment at the same moment as new world Powers has afforded both the same view of their older competitors for first rank among nations. Both have earned their centralized and effective governments after the throes of civil war ; both have built navies and expanded their foreign vi INTRODUCTION commerce; both have arrested the belated and rather contemptuous attention of Europe by success in foreign wars. No state of Christendom can appreciate so well as America the vexation of enduring for generations the presumption or the patronage — of those European courts who have themselves been free for less than a century from the bonds that Napoleon put upon the entire Continental group; and Japan has suffered under the same observance. With the acknowledgment of the existence of these two Powers of the first class on either shore of the Pacific, the bottom drops out of that system whereon was based the diplomacy of nineteenth-century Hurope, and the jealousy with which they are both regarded establishes a certain rapprochement between the two newly arrived nations.

The attitude of the American people does not appear to me to be greatly influenced by prejudice against Russia. It is likely, indeed, that we had less to fear directly from the ambition of the Great Colossus than any other state. Yet we have been among the first to discern that Japan is doing the world’s work if, by reducing the pressure of Russia’s assault upon Eastern Asia, she removes China in the crisis of her awakening from the list of those derelict states whose present decrepitude offers such deplorable temptation to the military nations of the West. There would seem to be fresh need, moreover, of convincing modern statesmen that a policy of conducting diplomatic intercourse by means of tergiversation and lies is unprofitable in the long

INTRODUCTION vii run, and therefore unjustified by the most cynical school of political ethics. Without debating the righteousness of her pretensions, it is obvious that Russia cannot proceed further in her headway without materially affecting the legitimate ambitions of other peoples of proved vitality, nor can her characteristic diplomacy secure success without debauching the political morality of Christendom. While apprehension of Russian aims need not involve dislike of the Russian people, we have an abiding idea in this country that both alike lie under a necessity of chastisement, and that Japan, as the only nation now really at home on the Pacific, is the hand to hold the rod.

In conclusion —if I may be allowed to extend these reflections a little further —the situation before us suggests the possibility that Asia may at this moment be passing the threshold of a renascence similar to that which awakened Europe at the opening of the sixteenth century from the lethargy of her dark ages. As the able editor of the North China Herald has observed, native Asia from Korea to Siam is to-day no more deeply immersed in the mire of poverty, ignorance, and superstition than was Europe in the Middle Ages, nor was the task of relief and enlightenment less hopeless to human agencies then than now. Yet with the Age of Discoveries came not only new worlds and new paths of commerce, but the end of the tyrannies of scholasticism, the church, and the despot. Within a century were laid all the foundations of these

Vili INTRODUCTION political and intellectual institutions that distinguish Europe and her children to-day. A like reconstruction may be effected in Asia during the century just begun. The parallel is not altogether inadmissible, and it may be pushed even further. For as the newly awakened Europe of the sixteenth century developed one monster Power whose aggrandizement threatened the liberties of all the rest, so has the present era brought forth a monster fearful in the same fashion to Asia. It was England, a naval folk and a new Power, that struck at Spain three centuries ago, and by that brave adventure not only won wealth and prestige for herself, but rid Europe of a great menace. It is Japan, also a naval race and a new — so far as Continental history is concerned — that strikes at Russia and hopes by her success both to avert the undoing of the ancient states about her and to establish herself as mistress in her own waters. Confident in their understanding of their great mission, we of America may rightfully bid the dazed Asiatic seek his salvation from the children of the Rising Sun, and declare in the Sibylline utterance of the Psalmist, “The dew of thy birth is of the womb of the morning.” FREDERICK WELLS WILLIAMS.

New HAvEN, CONNECTICUT, November, 1904.

Preface

Tuts is an attempt to present in a verifiable form some of the issues and the historical causes of the war now waged between Russia and Japan. Powerfully as it appeals to me, I would not have discussed a subject so strange to the proper sphere of my investigation, had it not been for the fact that no one else has, so far as I am aware, undertaken the task in the same spirit in which I have endeavored to write these pages. Although I deeply regret that I do not read the Russian language and cannot do full justice to the Russian side of the question, the impartial reader will observe, I trust, that this work is neither a plea for the one side nor a condemnation of the other, but a mere exposition of the subject-matter as I comprehend it. When the author offers what he considers a natural explanation of a question, the reader should not read into it a moral judgment. Indeed, I earnestly wish that the kind reader would thrash out of these pages every grain of real prejudice. Nor can I welcome a greater favor from any person than a more complete and just statement of Russia’s case than I have been able to make. After having said so much, it is unnecessary to tell the reader how, when the substance of the introductory chapter to this x PREFACE volume was published last May in the Yale Review, some of its critics ascribed to the writer motives utterly foreign to himself. One of those alleged motives was that I had sought to prove that the American trading interest in Manchuria and Korea would be better served by a final victory of Japan than by that of Russia. I neither proved nor disproved such a theme, but I did state that Japan’s interest demanded the maintenance in those regions of the principle of the impartial opportunity for all nations. Whether the result of this policy would prove better or worse for the interest of any one nation than the effect of an exclusive policy, did not concern me. It did not and does not belong to me to appeal to the commercial instinct of the reader, or even to his sympathy with, or antipathy to, either of the present belligerents. My only plea is that for truth.

The substance of the introductory chapter, as has been said, and also a brief summary of the body of the volume have been published in the Yale Review for May and August of the present year. I am greatly indebted to the editors of the eview for allowing me to use the material in the preparation of this work. I also wish to express my sincere thanks to my friends who have encouraged me in the publication of this volume.

ASAKAWA.

HANOVER, NEw HAMPSHIRE, August 30, 1904.

Contents

INTRODUCTORY Pe LS al 8 os Economie issues: (1) Japan’s side; transition from an agricultural to an industrial stage, pp. 1-10 ; community of interest between Japan and Korea and Manchuria, 10-32. (2) Russia’s side, 32-47 ; comparison, 47-48 ; political issues, 48-51 ; summary, 51-53 ; conclusion, -53-61. Supplementary Note. AAPOR TOs theme

CHAPTER I. Retrocession of the Liao-tung Peninsula . : Primorsk and Sakhalien, 65-67 ; intervention of 1895, 68- 77 ; its historical significance, 77—78 ; its effects on Japan, 78-82.

CHAPTER II. The “Cassini Convention” and the Railway Agreement

The Russo-French Te nN ae Raster tinees Bante 83- 85; the agreement of alliance, 85-87 ; the “ Cassini Convention,” 87-95 ; the railway agreement of September 8, and statutes of December 23, 1896, 95-100.

CuaprTer III. Kiao-chau .

The seizure of Kiao-chau, and te Aereetiont of March 6, 1898, 101-105 ; the conduct of Great Britain, 106-109.

CuHapTeR IV. Port Arthur and Talien-wan s Russian warships at Port Arthur, 111- 112 ; Berek deena for the opening of Talien-wan, 113-118 ; Port Arthur and Talien-wan, the Britishand Russian Cate 118-125; Wei-hai- Wei, 125-129 ; the Agreement of March 27, 1898, and supplementary agreements, 129-132 ; the administration of the leased territory, and Dalny, 132-134.

CuapTerR V. Secretary Hay’s Circular Note . The circular of September, 1899, ee the Povens: replies, 136-138.

PAGE

61 65

. 135 xii CONTENTS

CHAPTER VI. The Occupation of Manchuria Russia’s attitude toward the Boxer trouble in North Ching. 139-143 ; the Manchurian campaign, 143-146.

Cuapter VII. North China and Manchuria Characteristics of Russia’s diplomacy regarding Bienele: ria, 147-148; the distinction made between North China and Manchuria; the circular note of August 25, 1900, 148- 155.

CuapTer VIII. The Anglo-German Agreement : The Northern Railway affair, 156-157; the Aerioten man Agreement of October 16, 1900, 157-158; the Powers’ views, 158-160; Germany’s view, 160-161.

CHAPTER IX. A Modus Vivendi: the Alexieff-Tséng Agree-

ment .

policy, 162-165; the Alexieff-Tséng Agreement of Novem-

ber, 1900, 165-168; the protests of the Powers, 168-169; Count Lamsdorff’s explanation, 169-172.

CHAPTER X. A “Starting-Point ” — the oe See ay

Convention . A

peal, and the Powers’ protests, 176-178 ; Rina detached

herself from the allies, 178-181; the Re Meera of March,

1901, 181-182; the British and Japanese remonstrances, and withdrawal of Russian demands, 182-188.

CHAPTER XI. Further Demands . : M. Lessar’s demands in August, 189- 190: in sOotaber 190-193; protests, replies, and delays, 193-196,

CHAPTER XIJ. The Anglo-Japanese Agreement and the

Russo-French Declaration

A growing sympathy between Great Bein “tél Ee

prior to the conclusion of the agreement, 197, 198; diplo-

matic steps toward the conclusion, 199-202; the Agree-

ment of January 30, 1902, 202-209; the Russo-French declaration of March 16, 209-213.

CuapTeR XIII. The Convention of Evacuation : The Russo-Chinese convention of April 8, 1902, 214-296, an analysis of the document, 226-232.

. 139

. 147

. 156

Loe

. 173 wlO7

. 214

CONTENTS

CHAPTER XIV. The Evacuation The first evacuation, October 8, 1902, 233 : ind neintnal character of the evacuation, 234-237 ; Niu-chwang, 237- 238.

CHAPTER XV. Denna i in Seven Articles . The second evacuation, 239-241 ; new Russian domnael April 5, 1903, 241-244 ; the ated of three Powers to the demands, 244-246 ; Gans Lamsdorfi’s disclaimer, 246— 248 ; Count Cassini’s statement, 248-251 ; diplomacy at Peking, 251-256.

CHAPTER XVI. Diplomatic Struggle in Korea, I . Japan’s failure and Russia’s success at Seul, the murder of the Queen, 257-261 ; the flight of the King, 262-263; the Yamagata-Lobanoff Protocol, June 6, and the Komura- Waeber Memorandum, May 14, 1896, 263-268 ; a decline of Russian influence, 268-271 ; the Nishi-Rosen Protocol, April 25, 1898, 271-272.

CuapTerR XVII. Diplomatic Struggle in Korea, II : Pavloff and Hayashi, 273 ; the Masampo affair, 274-278 ; abortive loans, 278-280 ; Russians and pro-Russian Koreans at Seul, 280; the bank-note trouble, 281-282; the Keyserling whaling concession, 282-283 ; the Tumén River telegraph lines, 283-285 ; the Seul-Wiju Railway, 285-289 ; the Yong-am-po affair, 289-295.

CnHapTteR XVIII. The Russo-Japanese Negotiations, I Japan’s invitation to negotiate, July 28, 1903, 296-299 ; Russia’s assent, 299 ; political changes in Russia, and the Viceroy of the Far East, 299-302 ; Japan’s first proposals, August 12, 302-307 ; negotiations transferred to Tokio, 307-308 ; Russia’s first counter-proposals, October 3, 308-

.311 ; Russian diplomacy at Peking, 311-318 ; the development of the Yang-am-po affair, 318-323.

CHAPTER XIX. The Russo-Japanese Negotiations, II . Japan’s second proposals, October 30, 324-328 ; Russia’s second counter-proposals, December 11, 328-329 ; Japan’s third proposals, December 23, 329-331 ; pacific declarations of Russia, 331-332 ; Russia’s third counter-proposals, January 6, 1904, 332-335 ; new ports opened in Manchuria, 335 ; Japan’s fourth proposals, January 13, 335-339 ;

xiil

. 233

. 239

. 257

. 273

. 296

. 324

X1V CONTENTS military activity of the Russians, 339-341 ; the termination of the negotiations and the rupture of diplomatic relations, February 5-6, 341-344 ; the first acts of war, 345 ; the Russian Manifesto and the Japanese Declaration of War, January 10, 345-348.

Supplementary Note to Chapter 25 2S Se . 348 The Russian communiqué, February 18, 348-349; ie eee sian statement of February 20, 349-351; Japan’s reply to the above, March 3, 352-354; the Russian note to the Powers regarding Korean neutrality, February 22, 355- 356; Japan’s reply, March 9, 357-360 ; Russia’s counterreply, March 12, 360-362.

CHAPTER XX. Chinese Neutrality and Korean Integrity . . 363 Japan’s advice to China to be neutral, 363, 364; Secretary Hay’s note, 364-365; China’s own declaration, 365; Japan’s pledge to China, 366; the Korean-Japanese alliance, 366-368; its nature analyzed, 368-372.

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

MAP SHOWING “ THE REGIONS WHERE THE INTERESTS OF THE TWO POWERS MEET”... . . . .'.. © Frontispiece

Count CASsINI, RusstAN MINISTER AT WASHINGTON, AND PMA Ce ER ING NT Sade UN oni Vet ony SUG 6 ian’ lal ie

Count LAamsporFF, RusstIAN FOREIGN MINISTER... . “ESAT OPER eM POM te? 4 Bote A eee ay A Count KatTsurA, PREMIER OF JAPAN Se ae eblie

M. Lessar, RusstaN MINISTER AT PEKING ..... .

M. Paviorr, LATE Russt1AN MINISTER AT SEUL ... . Copyright, 1902, by George Grantham Bain

Baron KomurA, JAPANESE FOREIGN .MINISTER . . .

ADMIRAL ALEXIEFF, VICEROY OF THE Far East. . .

Mr. Kurino, LATE JAPANESE MINISTER AT ST. PETERSBURG

BaRON DE Rosen, LATE RusstaN MINISTER AT TOKIO

PAGE

INTRODUCTORY SOME OF THE ISSUES OF THE CONFLICT

THE deeper significance of the present dramatic struggle between Russia and Japan over territories belonging to neither of the contestants cannot perhaps be understood, until we examine some of the issues at stake between them. The more fundamental of these issues, however, as in many another international crisis, seem to be oftener understood than expressed, and hence understood only vaguely, although it may fairly be said that:they constitute the very forces which have with irresistible certainty brought the belligerents into collision. For Japan, the issues appear to be only partly political, but mainly economical; and perhaps no better clue to the understanding, not only of the present situation, but also, in general, of the activities at home and abroad of the Japanese people, could be found than in the study of these profound material interests.

Among the most remarkable tendencies of Japan’s economic life of recent years has been the enormous increase of her population, along with an immense growth of her trade and industries. The number of her inhabitants increased from 27,200,- 000, as estimated in 1828, to only 34,000,000 in 1875, but since that year it has risen so fast that it is to-day 46,305,000 *— exclusive of the 3,082,404 * in Formosa and the Pescadores — and is increasing now at the annual rate of nearly 600,000. At the same time, the foreign trade of Japan has grown from 49,742,831 yen in 1873 to 606,637,959 yen in 1903. Up to the end of May, 1904, the total amount showed 274,012, 437 yen, as compared with the 248,506,103 yen of the same period of 1903. The significance of these figures must be seen in the light of the important fact that the bulk of the increase in population and trade has been due to the decisive change of the economic life of the nation from an agricultural to an industrial stage. The new population seems to increase far more rapidly in the urban than in the rural districts, for if we consider as urban the inhabitants of communities containing each more than three thousand people, the ratio of the urban population to the rural may be estimated as | to 3. If only towns of more than 10,000 inhabitants each are included in the urban class, it is seen that their population

Official figures for December 31, 1903. The Fourth Financial and Economical Annual of Japan, 1904 (hereafter abbreviated as the Fourth Annual), published by the Department of Finance, Imperial Government of Tokio, p. 5. The actual numbers may be even higher.

* The Monthly Return of the Foreign Trade of the Empire of Japan for May, 1904, published by the Department of Finance, pp. 91-95.

increases annually 5 or 6 per cent., while the corresponding rate with the rural communities never rises above 3 per cent. and is usually much lower.’ This comparatively rapid growth of the cities also indicates that the new population must be mainly supported by commerce and manufacture.

In 1903, 84.6 per cent. of the total export trade of Japan consisted of either wholly or partly manufactured articles.” On the other hand, agriculture has progressed only slowly,’ and is no longer able either to support the increased population or to produce enough raw articles for the manufactures. The average annual crop of rice may be put at 210 million bushels, and that of

* Japan in the Beginning of the 20th Century (hereafter abbreviated as the 20th Century), compiled by the Department of Agriculture and Commerce, Tokio, 1903, pp. 53-58.

2 Or, 241,891,946 out of 285,971,623 yen. As the term manufacture is expansive, the articles herein included should be enumerated. They are: clothing, chemicals and drugs, metal wares, oil and wax, paper, cotton yarn and fabrics, raw and woven silks, tobacco, and sundries. ‘Teas, grain, marine products and other food-stuffs, and furs, as well as reéxported articles, are excluded. See the Kwampo (Official Gazette of Japan), No. 6199 (March 4, 1904), p. 77, table 7.

® The crop of rice has increased since 1877 from 26.6 million to about 42,000,000 koku ; that of barley, rye, and wheat from 9.6 million to 19 million koku. But the increase has been due more to an improved cultivation than to an extension of acreage. Although the wheat, barley, and rye land has grown from 2.35 million in 1877 to 4.43 million acres in 1901, the rice land has increased from 6,517,000 to only 6,982,000 acres. The crops of hemp and rape are stationary, while those of sugar, cotton, and indigo have largely fallen off. (These figures have been converted from those in the 20th Century, pp. 119 ff. One koku dry is equivalent to 4.9629 bushels.)

barley, rye, and wheat, collectively called muqi, at 94.3 million bushels, while the average annual consumption of these cereals may safely be estimated, respectively, at 228.3 and 106.7 million bushels. In years of poor crops, the importation of rice, wheat, and flour amounts to large figures; as, for instance, in 1903, they together were imported to the value of about 67 million yen.’ Raw material and food-stuffs, consisting of cotton, wool, rice, flour and starch, beans and oil-cakes, the importation of all of which was next to nothing twenty years ago, were in 1903 supplied from abroad to the value of 169,600,000 yen, or 53.5 per cent. of the total imports of Japan.’ Japan will not only always have to rely upon foreign countries for the supply of these articles, but also have to import them in ever increasing quantities. Nor does agriculture occupy in the national finances the position it once did, for in 1875 the land tax, the incidence of which fell, as it still falls, very largely on the farmer, supplied 78 per cent. of the total revenue of the state, while the percentage fell, in the estimated budget for the fiscal year 1902-3, to 16, the actual amount also decreasing during the interval from 67.7 to 37 million yen, and the ex-

1 These figures have been worked out from the Kokumin Shimbun (National News, hereafter abbreviated as the Kokumin) of February 5,10, and 19, 1904. Also see a table and comment inthe Téy6 Keizai Shimpo (“Oriental Economist’’), for May 5, 1903, pp. 17-19.

? If sugar is added to the list, the figures will go up to more than 190 million yen, or 60 per cent. of the entire import trade.

penditures of the government, on the other hand, increasing from 73.4 million in 1874, to the enormous figure of 223.18 million yen in 1904-5."

No one can say a cheerful word about agriculture in Japan or the life of her farmer. Exclusive of Formosa, the development of which seems to he in the direction of industry and trade rather than agriculture, less than 13,000,000 acres are under cultivation,” or, about 13 per cent. of the extent of the country, while the arable area of the land cannot possibly be increased by more than 10,500,- 000 acres,’ so that the per capita share of arable land is less than one half of an acre,* which is even below the corresponding rate in England and less

289.2 million yen in 1902-3. The Fourth Annual, pp. 4 and 9, and plate 3. Alsosee the Tayo Keizai Shimpo (“ Oriental Economist’’) for December 5, 1902, pp. 19-21 and chart.

2 Or, less than 7,000,000 acres of wet fields and less than 6,000,000 of upland fields, the latter including mulberry and tea gardens, besides fields for mugi, beans, and vegetables. Based on the 20th Century, pp. 95 ff.

* This figure includes, however, all the land inclined at angles less than 15°,so that, from the practical point of view, it may be considered as highly exaggerated. The actual extent of the reclamation of wild land advances at a slow pace outside of the still largely undeveloped island of Hokkaido. See zbid., pp. 95-96, 104.

* Or, about 23,000,000 acres for nearly 47,000,000 people. If we take only the land under cultivation, on the one hand, and only the farming population, on the other, the ratio still remains the same, for then we have 13,000,000 acres for 28,000,000 people. The aggregate of the capital involved in the agriculture of Japan, including the value of land, buildings, implements, and live stock, is estimated at 7,400,000,000 yen, while the annual crops return about 1,000,000,000 yen. See the 20th Century, pp. 105-106.

than one half of that i China. Japan’s agricultural life can, however, be no more intensively improved than extensively enlarged. The sedimentary soil so well adapted to the rice cultivation and so abundantly blessed with moisture’ is too minutely and carefully tilled, the climate conditions are too cleverly made use of,’ and, above all, the lots of land are too diminutive,’ to make the importation of new machinery and methods always profitable or desirable.* The day-laborers on the farm receive

* The annual rainfall of Japan proper averages between 1300 mm. at Awomori and 2040 mm. at Kagoshima. A fairly rich sedimentary formation of soil is found everywhere, owing to the hilly nature of the country and the short and rapid current of the rivers.

2 Wherever possible, the farmer contrives to raise more than one crop on his land in different seasons during the year. In fact, more than 30 per cent. of rice land yields other crops besides rice, at places mugi, indigo, beans, and rape being cultivated on the same piece of land.

* More than half of the wet fields of the country consist of lots smaller than one-eighth acre, and nearly three fourths are each less than one-quarter acre. The average size of the lots outside of Formosa and Hokkaido is put down as.1 acre for wet fields and .12 acre for upland fields.

* Compare the report of the U. S. Consul-General Bellows at Yokohama in the U.S. Consular Reports, advance sheets, No. 1757 (September 24, 1903). In addition to the conditions here enumerated, it must be remembered that there exists little or no pasture land in Japan, and that nearly all the labor is done by hand, there being only 1,500,000 horses and 1,300,000 horned animals in the country. See the 20th Century, chapters on agriculture; the Annual, No. III, tables x-xiii; J. J. Rein’s Industries of Japan, English translation, New York, 1889, chapters on agriculture; and H. Dumolard’s Le Japon politique, économique et social, Paris, 1903, pp. 109-121.

wages ranging between nine and fifteen cents, though the latter have risen more than 100 per cent. during the last fifteen years.’ With this meagre income some of the laborers have to support their aged parents, wives, and children. - The tenants, whose number bears the ratio of about two to one’ to that of the proprietors, live literally from hand to mouth, and cannot always afford even the necessary manure, and the proprietor’s profit hardly rises above 5 per cent., while the capital he em- -ploys pays an interest of 15 to 30 per cent.’ and his local and central taxes further reduce his income. The farmer would in many cases be unable to subsist, were it not possible for him, as it fortunately is, to try his hand at silk-culture or some other subsidiary occupation.

Japan’s agriculture, then, can neither be much extended nor be greatly improved, can neither satisfy the old population nor support the new, and, above all, can only produce smaller and smaller portion of the necessary raw material for her growing in-

-1 The 20th Century, p. 117; Dumolard, pp. 112-113.

2 'This ratio includes, however, in the tenant class those farmers who are partly lessees and partly proprietors of small lots. In 1888, the ratio between (1) independent farmers, (2) partly lessees, and (3) entirely lessees, was 147: 200:95. Since that time the ratio must have grown in favor of the tenants. See the 20th Century, p. 90.

® See the U. S. Consular Reports, advance sheets, No. 1529 (December 26, 1902). In 1902 the total debts of the farming classes of Japan were estimated at 400 million yen. Mr. S. Nakayama, in the Toyo Keizat Shimpo (“Oriental Economist”’) for July 15, 1902, p. 14.

dustries. Under these circumstances, it is becoming more evident every year that the time is forever past when the nation could rely solely upon agriculture for subsistence. It is hardly necessary to repeat the well-known law of population — which is at the root of our subject — that every advance in the economic life of a nation creates a situation which is capable of supporting a larger population than in the preceding stage. What agriculture cannot support, industry and trade may. Japan’s growing population may only be supported, as it has already begun to be, by an increased importation of raw material and food-stuffs and an increased exportation of manufactures. Trade statistics unmistakably show that such markets for her manufactures and such supply regions of her raw and food articles are found primarily in Kast Asia, with which the commercial relations of Japan have grown 543 per cent. since 1890, as compared with the 161 per cent.’ increase of the American and the 190 per cent. increase of the European trade,” until the East Asiatic trade amounted in 1903 to 295,940,000 yen in value, or 48.7 per cent. of the entire foreign trade of Japan.’ The

* In 1903, Japan’s American trade was much below that of 1902. The latter showed an increase of 362 per cent. over 1890. * The actual figures were: —

In East Asia are included Korea, China, Hong-kong, British India, French Indo-China, Dutch East Indies, the Straits following table gives a comparison of the importation in the years 1882, 1902, and 1903, of what may be considered as primarily East Asiatic products :*’ —

From these eloquent facts, the conclusion would seem tenable that, should the markets of Kast Asia be closed, Japan’s national life would be paralyzed, as her growing population would be largely deprived

Settlements, Siam, the Philippines, and Russian Eastern Asia. If Hong-kong, an essentially transit-trade port, is excluded, the East Asiatic trade of Japan amounts to 264,476,239 yen, or 43.6 per cent. of the entire foreign trade of Japan. See the Kwampé (Official Gazette of Japan), No. 6199 (March 4, 1904), p. 74, table 4.

Of the three great divisions of Japan’s markets, Europe sells her machineries and articles of general consumption, and buys in return such peculiar products of her soil as silks and teas. East Asia, including India and the southern islands, takes coal and manufactured goods in general and furnishes cotton, food-stuffs, and other articles of more direct need than the European goods. America occupies a unique position in regard to Japan, as it combines to a large extent the peculiarities of both Europe and East, Asia: it exports to Japan cotton and flour, besides machinery and goods of general consumption, and imports from her, not only raw silk and tea, but also smaller manufactured articles.