Russian wars with Turkey;

Front matter

I RUSSIAN CONQUESTS SINCE 1689.

I At tliia moment, whon Ruaaia has embarked on ; i a new uipeditjon. of conquest, it may not be inop- [ I portune to mention a few leading facts in Russian I hiitory, with a view of showing how the repoatod blows Btrnok by this gigantic barbarism at her j neighbours bavo always aimed at the same result j — n;imely, the extension o( Ruaaian [jower in the j Eaat. Whether the will of Petur the tireat woe i

Napoleon or i

Chapter I. The Eaelt Wars Up To 1828

Treaty of Caiiowitz in 1699— War of 1709— Treaty of Pruth— Peace of Passarowitcli — War of 1735 — Siege of Azopli — Details of war — Continuance of war in 1738 and 1739 — Defeat of Count Wallisat Belgrade — Success of armies of Czarina — Ttiirty years' peace — War of 1769 — Successor of Komanzoff — Continuation of war — Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardghi — War of 1787 — Siege of Ismail — Continuation of war — Peace of Jassy — War of 1806 — Exploit of Admiral Duck%Yortli— Peace of Tilsit— War of 1810- 11 — Siege of Eustcliuk — Defeat of Turks — Conclusion of peace between Alexander I. and the Porte — Events from Peace of 1815 to 1828 U

CHAPTER H.

THE POSITION AXD RESOUPvCES OF THE TWO COMBATANTS AT THE OPEXIXG OE THE WAPv IX 1828.

Position of Russia in Europe in 1828 — Position of Turkey— Condition of her army and her fleet — Convention of Akkerman — Forces available to be brought into the field by Turkey — Forces available for invasion by Eussia — Disposition of forces at opening of campaign — Lines of defence possessed by Turkey — The Pruth— The Danube— The Balkans— Biijuk Chekmedge . . 55

Tui COSTENTS.

Chapter III. The Campaign Ln' Eueope IX 1828

PAGE

Eeasons why operations were delayed — Method of Paissian advance —Passage of Danube — Siege of Brailow — Peculiarities of Turkisli defence of fortresses — Advance of Russians towards Varna — Strategy of Turks — Schumla — Siege of Varna — Attempts at relief —Fall of Varna — Contests before Schumla — Retreat of Russians to the Danube — Operations of 6th Corps in Wallachia — Siege of Silistria . . . . . .71

CHAPTER lY.

Campaign commenced too late — Russian force too weak — Arm)' should have marched on Varna — Diversion to Schumla a mistake— Strategy of the Turks — Tardiness of Grand Vizier — Results of Campaign in Bulgaria — General Geismar and his operations 97

Chapter V

Situation at commencement of year — Resources of Russians — Diebitsch — Resources of Turks — Commencement of hostilities Capture of Sizeboli — Naval exploit of Turks — Siege of Silistria — Diebitsch "s march on Schumla and subsequent operations — Battle of Kiilewtscha — March across the Balkans — Capture of Adrianople — Position of Russian army at Peace of Adrianople — Signature of Peace 108

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER VI. REMAKKS OlSr THE CAMPAIGN EST EUROPE OF 1829

PAGE

The character of the Russian operations — Remarks thereon — Extracts from Appendix to Count Moltke's book on sickness in the Russian army — Field-marshal Diebitsch 138

CHAPTER Vn.

THE CAMPAIGN IN ASIA IN 1828.

State of affairs in Asia in winter of 1827-28 — Attitude of Persia — Russian preparations for invasion of Asia Minor— -Resources at her disposal — Alternative methods of attack — Preparations of Turks — Commencement of campaign — Fall of Kars — Outbreak of the plague — Capture of Akhaltsikh — Defeat of the Seraskier — Capture of other fortresses— Conclusion of campaign — Remarks 156

CHAPTER Vm.

ASIATIC CAMPAIGN OF 1829.

Preparations of Turks for campaign — Threatening attitude of Persia — Consequent precautions of Paskewitch — Turkish attempt on Akhaltsikh — Successful defence and results — Letter of Paskewitch — Defeat of Hadgi Pacha — Defeat of the Seraskier near Kainly — Retreat of Hadgi Pacha— Fall of Erzeroum — Check of the Russians at Khart— Final defeat of the Seraskier — Retreat of Russians — Conclusion of war — Remarks on campaign Conditions of peace 164

COXTEyTS.

CHAPTER IX.

WAR ON THE DANUBE OP 1853 AND 1854 AND rEEVIOTJS EVENTS FEOM PEACE OF ADRIANOPLE.

PAGlf

Relations that existed between Russia and Turkey after 1829 — Revolt of Mehemet Ali — Victories of P^rahim Pacha in Syria — Assistance given to Turkey by Russia in 1833 — Russian forces quit Constantinople — Second revolt of Mehemet Ali in 1839 — Intervention of Allies — Danger of an European war — Strategical position of Jaffa and Acre — Bombardment of Beyrout and Acre — Convention of 1840 — Occupation of Principalities by Russia in 1849 — Events that occasioned Crimean War — Assurances of Nicholas — War on the Danube in 1853 ; success of Omar Pacha — Siege of Silistria — Retreat of Russian Army — Landing in the Crimea — War in Asia and fall of Kars — Peace signed — The Treaty of Paris 179

CHAPTER X.

THE EESOrRCES AND AE:\IED STRENGTH OF RUSSIA AN"D TURKEY AT THE PRESENT TliTE.

Events connected with Eastern Question from Treaty of Paris up to present time — The Russian army — Russian railroads — Roumania, Servia, Montenegro, and Greece — Resources of Turkey— Turkish Army 204

CHAPTER XI.

THE CHANCES OF SUCCESS POSSESSED BY EACH COXBATANT IN THE EVENT OF AVAR.

Divergence of views on the subject — To ensure success a large f(»rce required by Russia — Probable Russian system of invasion — Time required by the various Corps to reach the Danube and

CONTENTS. xi

PAGE

Schumla — Lines of defence to be occupied l:)y the Turks — Line of the Danube — Schumla — The Balkans — Selimno Pass — Flanking column by Servia — Time required to reach Adrianople — Probable date when Constantinople would be threatened — Keasons why Schumla cannot be disregarded — Alternative plans of operation — Difficulties of railway transport — Importance of Schumla— Description of the position of the Chekmedg^s — of that of the Dardanelles — of the position in Asia Minor — Opportunity lost by Russia in 1876 — Concluding remarks . 254

CHAPTER XII.

THE POLITICAL ASPECT OF THE EASTERN QUESTION.

Importance of Austria in a Eusso- Turkish war — The Slaves — Policy of Austria — How the action of Aiistria might be neutralised, externally and internally — Slavonic question — Danger to Austria — Limits of Bulgaria — Interests of England- -Traditional policy of Russia — Essentially aggressive in its character — Various lines of policy open to England — Which it is her interest to adopt — Unfortimate natural antagonism between Russia and England — Advantages of the policy suggested . 288

EUSSIAN WARS WITH TUEKEY.

Introduction

It is a common saying that history repeats itself ; perhaps it might be said with greater truth that, as in the common occurrences of life, so also in history, similar causes produce similar results. It now seems as if there is to be another of the many successive conflicts that have taken place between Eussia and Turkey within the last hundred years. The same causes are at work, the same symptoms are visible. On the one side the misgovernment and tyranny of the oppressor, coupled with lamentation and cries for aid on the part of the oppressed : on the other side sympathy for suffering brethren of the same race and religion, and indignation against their taskmasters. On the one hand a rapidly decaying and bankrupt power, existing, as it were, on the sufferance of its neighbours, but possessed of, perhaps, the most fertile and highly favoured territories of the earth, whose fertility they turn to no account, and whose advantages they neglect ; and these highly favoured lands inhabited by people antagonistic in religion, in habits, in feelings, the dominant race far inferior in numbers, receding in civilisation, intolerant, unyielding ; the subject race rapidly increasing in numbers, advancing in prosperity, and daily more and more ambitious for the sovereign power, for which they are still unfitted. On the other hand a gigantic and powerful empire, with great resources still undeveloped, with territories whose sterility is their bane, and whose vast extent is their weakness, peopled by races but half civilised and more than half fanatic — races obedient to the dictates of a single man, but with prejudices so strong and feelings so deep, that this man, great as is his power, sacred as is his person, if he values his life cannot afford to disregard them. And as it were within the grasp of this mighty nation, there is a land flowing with milk and honey, which would supply all that in their own land is wanting, whose conquest would alike coincide with the tenets of their religion, with the dictates of their feelings, and with the consideration of their material advantage.

In truth, one may say, however sincere be expressions of peace-loving rulers, however earnest the endeavours of highly skilled diplomatists, it may be possible to postpone but it is wholly impossible to prevent these wars between Russia and Turkey, that are as natural in their origin as they are historic in their recurrence. "Whether the year 1877 will or will not see another campaign on the banks

RECURRENCE OF WARS WITH THE TURKS. 3

of the Danube, and on the slopes of the Balkans, we may rest assured that so long as the crescent flies on the dome of St. Sophia, so long as the Muscovite empire remains imited, there must be sooner or later a contest for very existence between the * Colossus of the North and the Sick Man of the South.' The Eastern question will still be unanswered, and there will still be a dormant volcano which one day will convulse Europe.

Ever since the year 1453, when the Turks conquered Constantinople, it may be said that they have been in almost a chronic state of dissension or war with their Ohristian neighbours. Up to 1683, when Mahomet tlie Fourth besieged Vienna, the tide of their conquest was advancing ; since then it has been slowly but certainly receding. On three successive occasions their naval power has been destroyed by the combined fleets of other nations, and twice has England participated in this destruction. In 1571, at Lepanto, the fleets of Spain, Grenoa, Malta, Venice, and Pius V., combined to destroy their navy; again in 1770 they were defeated by the fleet of Eussia aided by Englishmen, in the passage of Scio ; once more, fifty-seven years later, in 1827, at Navarino the Tm'kish navy was annihilated by the united fleets of England, Eussia, and France. The Turks have not unfrequently been called ^ our ancient allies ; ' it will be found on referring to history that they might with greater truth be called 'our ancient enemies,' as up to 1840 we were nearly always allied against them.

B 2

4 BUSSIAN WARS WITH TURKEY.

England has always had a considerable interest in Eastern afifairs, both on account of her commerce and for her vast possessions in the East ; but that interest has in-- creased within the last fifty years, in a degree scarcely realised at the present time. As our Indian empire has been added to, as it has become yearly more and more bound up with the associations, the feelings, and the fortunes of Englishmen, so have our interests in the East become magnified, and our solicitude as to how they may be best protected has become hourly more and more intense.

It is remarkable to note the comparative indifi'erence with which our fathers, grandfathers, and great-grandfathers heard of a war between the Russians and the Turks, and the complacency with which they witnessed the near approach of Russian armies to Constantinople. It will be asked, why is there not this indifference now ? Why are we more anxious, more solicitous, more nervous than those who have gone before us ? The answer is plain. In those days neither the overland route to India nor the Suez Canal had been established ; our communication to India was round the Cape, and hence the conversion of the Black Sea into a Russian lake, and the preponderance of Russian power and influence in the ^Mediterranean were important only so far as they affected our commerce, and indirectly prejudiced our position and general prestige. It is needless to remark that the case is very different now to what it was in 1791, or even in 1829, and those who attempt to argue that because oiu*

INCREASED INTEREST OF ENGLAND IN THE EAST. 5

ancestors were indifferent, we should be so likewise, start from false premisses, which must lead to mistaken conclusions.

While, however, the position of England has materially altered within the last fifty years, it cannot be said that the positions of either Eussia or Turkey have changed within the last hundred and fifty. The former State is, undoubtedly, more powerful for attack, the latter is weaker for defence, but as regards interest and causes for disagreement they are precisely the same as they have been for the last two centuries. Eussia is still somewhat cut off and isolated by the very existence and geographical position of the Ottoman empire, and would derive enormous benefit from an extension of her southern territory. Turkey still hideously misgoverns her subjects and ill-treats her Christian population, though from all accounts not so much as in former days, not more than Eussia herself ill-treats some of the inhabitants of her subject and recently subdued provinces. Turkey still occupies the position described as follows, by Sultan Mahmoud : ' The Franks envy us oiu- possessions in Europe, and must sooner or later drive us into Asia. This would have been done twenty years before I mounted the throne had it been possible to divide Constantinople between them ; but like a beautiful female captive, she has remained inviolate in the bosom of banditti. They cannot yet agree whose prize she is to be.'

But while the positions of Eussia and Turkey have remained almost unchanged, the position of Austria, as will be shown in a future chapter, has altered in a degree, if possible, more striking than that of England. The events of 1866 and 1870 have bequeathed a legacy of danger to the Court of Vienna such as she cannot ignore or disregard.

As before remarked, until there is a complete and radical change in the entire state of affairs in the East, wars between Eussia and Turkey are inevitable and must recur as often, if not indeed oftener, than they have done in the last hundred years. It is therefore especially desirable that we should thoroughly realise the character of these contests — that we should study alike their political and their strategic aspect, and should be fully prepared for any eventuality which the course of events may bring about.

^Mlen we look back we find that since the year 1709 Eussia has made war against Turkey no less tlian eight times, namely :

From 1 709-1 711. — Single-handed.

„ 1735-1739. — In alliance with Austria.

,, 1787-1791. — In alliance with Austria.

,, 1806-1807. — A short time in alliance with England.

In these eight contests Eussia has invariably been the aggressor, and nearly always has added to her territory. In fact, to quote the words of a distinguished writer on Eastern affairs in the year 1854: ' A reference to the

THE PROGRESS AND AGGRESSIONS OF RUSSIA. 7

map will show that Eussia has advanced her frontier in every direction ; and even the Caspian Sea, which appeared to present an impediment to her progress, she has turned to advantage by appropriating it to herself. It will be seen that the plains of Tartary have excited her cupidity, while the civilised States of Europe and Asia have been dismembered to augment her dominions. It will be seen that the acquisitions she has made from Sweden are greater than what remains of that ancient kingdom ; that her acquisitions from Poland are as large as the whole Austrian empire ; that the territory she has wrested from Turkey in Europe is equal to the dominions of Prussia, exclusive of her Rhenish provinces ; and that her acquisitions from Turkey in Asia are equal in extent to all the smaller states of Grermany, the Rhenish provinces of Prussia, Belgium, and Holland taken together ; that the country she has conquered from Persia is about the size of England ; that her acquisitions in Tartary have an area equal to Turkey in Europe, G-reece, Italy, and Spain ; and that the territory she has acquired within the last sixty-four years (since 1772) is greater in extent and importance than the whole empire she had in Europe before that time. .........'

' The power and resources of Russia lie in the countries to the west of the Volga, not in the wilds of Siberia ; and her empire in Europe has been nearly doubled in little more than half a century. In sixty-four years she has advanced her frontier eight hundred and fifty miles towards

8 liUSSIA^^ WARS WITH TURKEY.

Vienna, Berlin, Dresden, Munich, and Paris ; she has approached four hundred and fifty miles nearer to Constantinople; she has possessed herself of the capital of Poland, and has advanced to within a few miles of the capital of Sweden, from which, when Peter the First mounted the throne, her frontier was distant three hundred miles. Since that time she has stretched herself forward about one thousand miles towards India, and the same distance towards the capital of Persia. The regiment that is now stationed at her furthest frontier post on the western shore of the Caspian has as great a distance to march back to Moscow as onward to Attock on the Indus, and is actually further from St. Petersburg than from Lahore, the capital of the Punjab. The battalions of the Russian Imperial Gruard that invaded Persia found, at the termination of the war, that they were as near to Herat as to the banks of the Don ; that they had already accomplished half the distance from their capital to Delhi ; and that therefore, from their camp in Persia, they had as great a distance to march back to St. Petersburg as onward to the capital of Hindostan.'

Whatever opinion we may entertain of the intentions, the wishes, and the character of the present ruler of the Muscovite empire and of his government, no one, we may add, who has watched their career can have other than a high one ; no one can question their sincerity : nevertheless facts and history remain, and the traditional policy of a mighty empire, which possesses patriotic and faithful

REPEATED ESCAPES OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE. 9

children, cannot change in a day or suddenly become unaggressive and peaceful after having been for centuries the reverse.

Alison has remarked that ' such are the natural strength and incomparable local advantages of Constantinople, that it has, both in ancient and modern times, enabled the empire of which it formed the head to survive the usual causes of decay, which after the lapse of a few generations generally prostrate the most powerful Asiatic monarchies.' No one who studies the history of the last century can fail to be struck by the truth of this reflection, — it is impossible to avoid feeling the greatest astonishment that the Turkish empire has so often and miraculously survived the destruction which on so many occasions has apparently impended over her. Eight times she has been in danger from Russia : twice, in 1711 and 1739, she has saved herself by force of her own arms ; twice, in 1774 and 1829, has she been saved by the plague; once, in 1807, has she been saved by accidental circumstances ; and three times, in 1791, 1812, and 1853, has she been saved by the intervention of other powers. In truth a succession of marvellous escapes — fortunate perhaps for her, but most unfortunate for other nations, since indirectly, from her gross misgovernment, from her apparent helplessness, and the temptation she affords for attack, Turkey is the chronic and inveterate disturber of peace in Europe. She and her antagonist Russia were the only disturbers of the great fifty years' peace ; again they brought that peace to a close, falsifying the

10 HUSSIA^' WARS WITH TURKEY.

fond dreams of Utopian believers in the efficacy of international exhibitions as harbingers of a terrestrial Millennium. Xow, again, are they threatening to inflict on Europe, for the tliird time within fifty years, the horrors of an Eastern war.

The ' Eastern Question ' has been defined ' as the question whether Russia will have Constantinople or whether she will not.' This is a concise, and not altogether an inappropriate definition, but it is not sufficiently complete or exhaustive ; to it also might be added how the Turks can be made to govern properly, or, if that is an impossibility, how they may be satisfactorily replaced. Until these questions are solved, and indeed for some time after their solution, should that time ever arrive, all history bearing on the East must be replete with interest and instruction. From the earlier conflicts, which are summarised in the following pages, but little can be learnt from a military point of view. In those days the science of war had made but little progi'ess in Europe, and the East was even then far behind the West in enlightenment. As remarked by Frederick the Gfreat, the Russians and Turks,, when fighting, resembled ' a number of one-eyed men thrashing a number of blind ones.' Still physical characteristics remain the same, the sea still retains its position, and obstacles, which did not prove insurmountable formerly, most certainly would not be insurmountable now, as some believers in the Turks and in their powers of defence would imagine. When we come to the campaigns

SITUATION OF 1827 NOW REPEATED. 11

of only fifty years ago — those fought in 1828 and 1829 — within the memory of some living men, we find in every way much that can with advantage be studied ; likewise at the commencement of the Crimean War there were many remarkable events of both a political and a strategic significance. Thus in looking back and pondering over what has gone before, we must not fail to remember that the past is little else than a reflection of the future, while history is the mirror in which this reflection may be seen.

Since the above pages were written, affairs in the East have taken an unexpected turn, illustrating more than ever the truth of the saying that ' history repeats itself.' The reader can judge for himself as to the aptness of the parallel between the situation now and what it was fifty years ago.

In 1827 the misgovernment and barbarities of the Turks had utterly disgusted Europe, had converted their allies into enemies, and had deprived them of either material or moral support. Then it was also a case of oppressed nationalities, the Greeks being the sufferers instead of the Slaves. Eussia, as now, came forward as the philanthropic and disinterested champion of the sufferers fromi misrule, and was aided by England and the great Powers in her charitable efforts. A conference was assembled at London, and the delegates of the Powers there represented, ignoring the fact that ' there were

12 HUSSIAy WARS WITH TURKEY.

Turks in Turkey,' arranged the affairs of the Ottoman Empire to their own satisfaction, but without consulting the Ottomans. They suddenly found that they had reckoned without their host — to their advice, to their suggestions, remonstrances, menaces, and armed demonstrations, the Divan showed itself equally indifferent. There followed Xavarino — that ' untoward event ' as it was termed in the Speech from the Throne of the followingyear ; even this somewhat energetic demonstration failed to induce the Turk to swallow the wholesome dose which his kind physicians had prepared for him. The converse of the Malacle imaginaire, although fearfully sick, he refused to acknowledge his sickness. The French and English ambassadors left Constantinople and retired to Corfu, while Eussia was left mistress of the situation. This situation was, however, by no means an enviable one — even in those days the Eussian army was not, as a whole, the same as the splendid guards that kept watch over the Emperor's palace at St. Petersburg — even in those days there existed defaulting contractors — corrupt ofl&cials — gunpowder that would not ignite— guns that would not go off, and stores that existed only in the bills which the Grovernment had paid for them. Austria became alarmed and began to intrigue ; England, though loyal and true as ever, was by no means eager to convert Constantinople into a Eussian stronghold ; France was not a whit more anxious to encompass the same end. In fact, the Emperor Nicholas found that, though moral support

SITUATION OF 1827 NOW REPEATED. 13

was apparently freely accorded him, as regards material assistance he must rely on his own resources. Nevertheless, his word was pledged, his prestige, and perhaps his life, were at stake, and hence there followed the war of 1828. Time alone can show how far the parallel will hold good to the end.

Chapter I. The Earlier Wars Up To 1828

Treaty of Carlowitz in 1699— War of 1709— Treaty of Priith— Peace of Passarowitcli— War of 1735 — Siege of Azoph — Details of war — Continuance of war in 1738 and 1739 — Defeat of Count Wallis at Belgrade — Success of armies of Czarina — Thirty years' peace— War of 1769 — Successor of Romanzoff — Continuation of war — Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardgi— War of 1787 — Siege of Ismail — Continuation of war — Peace of Jassy — War of 1806 — Exploit of Admiral Duckworth—Peace of Tilsit— War of 1810-11— Siege of Rustchuk- Defeat of Turks — Conclusion of peace between Alexander I. and the Porte— Events from peace of 1815 to 1828.

It would be difficult to trace out separately, or even to summarise, all the various wars in which from time to time the Turks have been engaged since they entered Europe. In point of fact they were for centuries more or less at war, which was carried on vigorously or not according to the means they happened to have for waging it. Their neighbours were their enemies, and all Christendom combined against them as against a common foe. Russia did not appear as their separate and definite antagonist until the commencement of the eighteenth century, but since then the contest between these two nations has been continually renewed at short intervals.

EARLY WARS OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY. 15

About the year 1694 there occurred the last great miited alliance against Turkey, in which all the Eastern Powers of Christendom joined ; the war lasted more or less for about five years, and was at last brought to a close by a treaty of peace, which was concluded between the Sultan and the Czar, then Peter the Grreat, in 1699, at Carlowitz ; at that time, through the intervention of England, an armistice for thirty years was agreed on between the belligerents, and Turkey, having had the worst of the conflict, ceded Transylvania and Hungary to Austria, and portions of what is now the south of Russia, including Azoph, to Peter the Grreat.

This may be termed the first serious commencement of the decay and fall of the Turkish empire, as it will be chronicled in the pages of some future Gfibbon. Xotwithstanding this formal treaty and solemn armistice, we find a few years later, in 1709, another war breaking out between Russia and Turkey. This time the armies of the Czar were defeated, and in the hour of his need Prussia and his other allies deserted him ; he had thus to accept the best terms he could get, and to renounce all the advantages he had gained in 1699. In 1711 the treaty of Pruth was signed and matters remained in statu quo until 1720, when we find the Muscovite and Ottoman ompires, strange to say, allied together against Persia. In the meantime it may be remarked that the Turks had been engaged in a desperate conflict -with the Venetians and Austrians, and had been signally defeated.

In 1711 they besieged Corfu, but were repulsed with loss; in the same year they lost Belgrade, which was then termed the key of the Turkish Empire on the western frontier. Prince Eugene, in command of a large force of Austrians, besieged the fortress and defeated an army of 180,000 men which hastened to its relief. The result was the peace of Passarowitz between the Grerman Empire and the Porte, signed in the following year.

As before stated, in 1720 Eussia and Turkey were allied together against Persia ; this alliance, however, was not of long duration. Turkey became alarmed by the progress of Eussian arms, and was with difficulty restrained by Austria and France from declaring war. In 1722 peace was proclaimed between Eussia, Turkey, and Persia, and a convention signed, in which many advantages were conceded to the Czar. This peace likewise did not last long, for in 1735 the Empress Anne, seeing, as she thought, a favourable opportunity for recovering some of the advantages given up by the treaty of Pruth, discovered a pretext for declaring war with the Porte, and induced Austria to join her in hopes of a share in the spoil. This war was of such great duration and of so serious a character that it merits more than a passing notice. The actual and formal rupture between the Porte and Eussia did not take place till the spring of 1736, although in the previous year every preparation had been made for war. At first the Emperor of Austria attempted mediation between the Czarina and the Sultan ; but finding his efforts vain he