The Russians in Bulgaria and Rumelia in 1828 and 1829; during the campaigns of the Danube, the sieges of Brailow, Varna, Silistria, Shumla, and the passage of the Balkan by Marshall Diebitch. From the German of Baron von Moltke

Front matter

THE RUSSIANS

IN

BULGARIA AND EUMELIA

Part I. — Campaign Of 1828

CHAP. PAGE

INTRODUCTION. — POLITICAL RELATIONS THE TURKISH AND

RUSSIAN ARMIES 1

I. THE THEATRE OF WAR, WALLACHIA THE DOBRUDSCHA

BULGARIA THE LINES OF THE DANUBE — THE

BALKAN 30

II. PLANS OF OPERATION 54

III. OPENING OF THE CAMPAIGN ■ — OCCUPATION OF MOLDAVIA

AND WALLACHIA PASSAGE OF THE DANUBE AT SA-

TUNOVO .57

IV. THE STRONGHOLDS OF THE DOBRUDSCHA . . . .68

V. SIEGE OF BRAILOW . . . . . . .79

VI. ADVANCE OF THE RUSSIANS INTO BULGARIA — BATTLES AT

BAZARDJIK, KOSLUDJA, AND BEFORE VARNA . .106

VII. THE BATTLE OF JENIBAZAR — DESCRIPTION OF SHUMLA

THE SIEGE OF SHUMLA BY THE RUSSIANS . . .115

VIII. SIEGE OF VARNA . . . . . . . .138

IX. ATTEMPT TO RELIEVE VARNA — COMBAT AT KURT-TEPE —

FALL OF VARNA 191

X. THE INVESTMENT OF SILISTRIA ,. . . , . 220

XI. MILITARY OPERATIONS IN WALLACHIA . . . 233 XII. END OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1828 . . . . . 244

XIII. CONCLUSIONS 246 vi

CONTENTS.

Part II. — Campaign Of 1829

chap. page introduction 261

i. taking of sizeboli in the spring naval enterprises

of the turks . . ..... 277

u. opening of the campaign in may passage of the

danube and siege of s1listria .... 284

111. offensive operations of the grand vizier skirmish

of eski- arnautlar and battle of kulewtscha . 325

iv. cessation of hostilities from the middle of june to

the middle of july the passage of the

balkan the battle near aidos, jamboli, and

slivno the march upon adrianople . . . 364

v. surrender of adrianople military position of

constantinople negotiations demonstrations

— conclusion of peace 410

vi. concluding remarks . . 446

Medical Report, russian losses by disease 461

LIST OF PLANS.

PLAN

1. Map of Isakchi and Passage op the River at Satunovo

2. Brailow or Ibrail ........

3. Plan of Operations against Shumla .....

4. Plan and Environs of Varna

5. Plan of Siege of Silistria ......

6. Engagement at Bojeleschi (included in Plan 1) .

8. Straits of the Dardanelles . . . . . (g

9. Plans of Towns on the Danube and Balkan

10. Plans of Turkish Towns on the Black Sea

11. Plans of Turkish Towns on the Black Sea and Danube

PART I.

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1828.

THE RUSS

IN

BULGARIA AND

I A N S

RUMELIA.

Introduction

POLITICAL RELATIONS — THE TURKISH AND RUSSIAN ARMIES.

The hostility which broke forth between Russia and Turkey in 1828 had been imminent for a number of years. Both powers accused each other of having broken the treaty of Bucharest, and it was only owing to the great zeal and ability of the European diplomatists that the rupture was so long delayed.

Canning expressed in the clearest language the true cause of the moderation of one party, and the headstrong obstinacy of the other.

" Let me be understood," said Mr. Canning, in his speech of the 12th of December, 1826, on the affairs of Portugal — " Let me be understood, however, distinctly as not meaning to say that I dread war in a good cause (and in no other may it be the lot of this country ever to engage !), from a distrust of the strength of the country to commence' it, or of her resources to maintain it. I dread it from an appre-

B

EUROPEAN REVOLUTIONS.

Introd.

hension of the tremendous consequences which might arise from any hostilities in which we might be engaged I said that I feared that the next war

which would be kindled in Europe would be a war

not so much of armies as of opinions I much

fear that this country (however earnestly she may endeavour to avoid it) could not in such case avoid seeing ranked under her banners all the restless and dissatisfied of any nation with which she might come in contact. It is the contemplation of this new power in any future war which excites my most anxious apprehension."

In Spain, in Italy, and in Greece, the people had risen simultaneously against their rulers : the general discontent had manifested itself in every country by insurrectionary movements : even in Eussia this feeling had shown itself by conspiracies which resulted in the death of the Emperor Alexander. The governments which had to repress this popular tendency were banded together at this period to maintain the public peace and order. Their main object was to keep down the revolution, and a war which was sure to spread over all Europe was the subject of dread to every power. Moreover, the finances of every country were in an unhealthy state, in consequence of the heavy expenses attending the wars against the French empire ; so that peace was absolutely necessary for all governments.

The most difficult problem of the day was the

Introd.

THE GREEK REVOLT.

revolt of the Greeks against the Turkish government. The insurrection in the Morea arose from a cause very different from Carbonarism ; excessive oppression had forced the Greeks to rebel. They fought for their religion and their liberty. The Christian powers were hardly justified in taking measures which would have delivered those who professed the same faith over to the vengeance of the savage Moslem ; they wished to remain neutral, and hoped that the Turks would put down the insurrectionary movement, and tide over the danger by making timely concessions.

The worst was that it soon became manifest that the Greeks would secure their freedom without the intervention of European diplomacy; and the moment this contingency appeared possible, there arose a vague feeling of distrust among the powers of Europe, lest some neighbour, forgetting the principle of non-intervention, might stretch forth the right hand of fellowship, and thus obtain lasting influence and great political importance.

Former schemes of conquest, religious sympathies, and the geographical position of Russia, pointed to that country as the most dangerous neighbour. A war against the old arch-enemy was looked upon in Russia as the only means of putting an end to the disquiet that had prevailed since the Emperor Alexander's death. Russia was the natural protector of all those who professed the Greek religion and who

b 2

POLICY OF WESTERN POWERS.

Introd.

lived under the dominion of the Turk. The Turks, contrary to their promises, still kept possession of Moldavia and Wallachia. They had interfered in Servia without the consent of Russia, and had stopped the navigation between the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. Why should not Russia occupy Turkey in the same manner that Austria held Italy, France Spain, or England Portugal? The Russians were clearly in the right, as the treaties had not been fulfilled. It was another question whether these treaties were not decidedly contrary to the laws of nations. They contained within themselves the seeds of future wars ; the mere fact of giving to a foreign monarch rights of protection over the subjects of the Porte might lend an appearance of justice to the most arbitrary attack on the part of that monarch.

From the meeting of the Congress of Verona, Europe was divided into two hostile camps : on one side was England, on the other the Holy Alliance. Austria remained true to her policy. She required the Greeks to submit to their liege lords, at the same time that she impressed upon the Porte the necessity of making concessions to its subjects.

England had as little desire as Austria that the Porte should be weakened, but looked upon the liberation of Greece as a fait accompli ; she was the first European state to recognize Greece as a power de facto in 1824.

The same motives had their effect in France. An

Introd.

TREATY OF LONDON, 1827.

attempt to secure to the Porte, by means of the mediation of all the European powers, the possession of the territories of which she was then seized, failed, as was to be expected, with the Russian court. From her geographical and commercial position, Russia is destined to exercise a decided influence at Constantinople ; indeed, without this she cannot develop the resources, nor secure the frontiers, of her southern provinces. This influence was again secured to her by the treaty of Akkerman, and there was therefore no overpowering reason why Russia should precipitate the downfall of the Ottoman empire. But it was a very different matter to guarantee the stability of a state which threatened to fall to pieces from internal dissensions. An union of the European powers to protect Greece against the Turks, and Turkey against any other power, was, under the circumstances, impossible. But it was important so to entangle the northern giant in a treaty with England and France, that he should be prevented from entering into any independent or one-sided line of action. The treaty of London of the 6th of July, 1827, in the negotiation of which the several parties had opposing objects, was purposely vague in its meaning, and doubtful in its terms. Its results were precisely contrary to the intentions of the English and French governments.

For seven years European diplomatists had endeavoured in vain to bend the stubborn obstinacy of

BATTLE OF NAVAMNO.

Intbod.

the Porte ; the Sultan arrogantly refused to listen to any agreement with the European powers. The Reis-EfFendi declared the treaty of London to be one which his master could not accede to ; the note remained unsealed on his divan, and never was answered. Political prudence would have suggested to the Porte to agree to the treaty of the 6th of July, 1827 : the Greeks might have been changed from bitter foes to zealous supporters — the example of Servia is to the point — and the Porte might then have relied upon the support of England. It was thought that the appearance of an English, French, and Eussian fleet might open the Sultan's eyes ; it was intended as a demonstration by means of which a character like that of Mahmud II. might be intimidated. The "untoward event," the battle of Navarino, destroyed the Turkish naval power. Thus one of the great hindrances to any attack by Russia on the Turkish empire was removed, entirely contrary to the intentions of the contracting powers, and the upshot of the war could no longer remain doubtful.

The treaty of London and the obstinacy of the Porte placed England in a false position : she was playing into the hands of Russia, as it was impossible for her to wage war in favour of the Turks against the Russians, whose ostensible object was the liberation of Greece. Thus it was that Russia and Turkey were left to fight out their quarrel alone.

If we ask how it was that the Porte ventured to

Introd.

THE JANISSARIES.

trust to its own resources, and to oppose the wishes of all Europe, we shall find that, even if Sultan Mahmud had not possessed a determined unbending spirit, he was compelled to assume that character : he resisted every appeal from foreign governments, because he was powerless at home. Every concession to Christian powers would have been made at the risk of his life and his throne.

The bond that unites such various nations, Kurds, Arnauts, and Arabs, under one head, is a common faith, and devotion to a dynasty which has ruled over them for five hundred years. The thirtieth ruler of this race had been borne to power by a revolt of the Janissaries on the 28th of July, 1808. Mahmud had sacrificed his brother Mustafa, and was the last surviving male in direct descent from Osman. Frequent revolts among the J anissaries rendered fresh sacrifices necessary : one vizier after another fell victims to this wild soldiery ; it was impossible to take any steps in favour of the Christian population ; and yet these very undisciplined troops, which involved the Porte in constant dissensions with other nations, were everywhere beaten in the field, so that the Janissaries might be looked upon as the real cause of the diplomatic embarrassment and the military decrepitude of the Porte.

Long and bitter experience had taught Mahmud that it was impossible to make his own power felt so long as the Janissaries existed : he was determined

EASTERN FEUDALITY.

Introd.

to destroy these Moslemite Praetorian guards : this was an undertaking in which five of his predecessors had already lost their thrones, and two of them their lives.

When the victorious followers of Osman overran the most fruitful provinces of three parts of the globe, they gave the conquered their choice between death, conversion, or paying tribute. According to the Koran, the soil belonged to the Sultan as God's vicegerent ; the Moslems were not to cultivate the land themselves, but were specially appointed to wage war for the spread of their religion. It was therefore agreeable to them if the greater portion of the conquered subjected themselves as " Rayahs," for the Moslems had no intolerant lust for conversion. The "Rayahs," or Christian subjects, not only retained the right of exercising their religion, but were left in possession of their properties, paying a capitation and land-tax. The Moslem warriors were, on their side, allowed to raise the taxes paid by the " Rayahs" to a certain extent, with the understanding that for this privilege they were to fight for Islam, or to provide substitutes to fight in their stead.

Thus it was that a regular feudal system arose in the East. In Turkey the Osmanlis were exactly what the nobles had been in Europe — a privileged class; only they were not, like them, of the same faith or blood with the mass of the population.

The same circumstances which in Europe replaced,

Inteod.

THE JANISSARIES.

by standing armies, the nobility called into existence by the feudal system, made the Janissaries a necessary complement in the Bast to the Spahis and Timarlys. The corps of Janissaries was recruited originally from Christian children, mostly Bulgarians, who were taken when quite young from their homes, and became the most zealous adherents of their new faith. It was they who conquered Constantinople, Ehodes, and Belgrade, and carried the Crescent triumphantly to the walls of Vienna. But this very corps of foot-soldiers, which for three centuries had been the support of the Osmanli empire, became, from causes unconnected with military matters, the source of the ruin of the Turkish empire.

To protect themselves against an arbitrary government, the Turks established various corporations — such as the Ulemas, or servants of the law ; the guilds or fraternities in the towns ; but more especially the widely-spread corporation of Janissaries. In Sultan Mahmud's time there were 196 ortas, which reckoned 400,000 members — the famous thirty-first orta alone counted 30,000— and yet, out of this 400,000, there were only 40,000 men capable of bearing arms ; for mechanics and civilians, rich and poor, old men and young children, were admitted into the body of Janissaries.

Sultan Selim had raised the Nizam Dschedid, or regular army, as a check to the Janissaries, but this had led to violent outbreaks, and cost the Sultan his

THE JANISSARIES.

Introd.

life. His nephew, Mahmud, pursued the same course, but with greater cunning and with success. He formed fresh troops, who were paid and exercised in the European form, and whom he lodged in large barracks. The new Aga of the Janissaries, Hussein, was named Pacha, and these new troops, the Askjiri- Muhammidje, were placed under his command. The new Pacha was devoted to the Sultan, and equally determined to break the pride of the wild mass who had selected him to be their chief and protector. After various outbreaks the Janissaries went into open revolt on the night of the 14th of June, 1826, and directed their chief rage against Hussein, whom they suspected of treason. But he took refuge in the Seraglio, surrounded by strong walls, and situated on the tongue of land between the harbour and the Sea of Marmora, where the Sultan was also. The Asiatic troops encamped near Scutari, under Mohammed Pacha, were rapidly brought over to Constantinople, and united with those under the Sultan on the European side of the Bosphorus. The Sultan unfurled his holy standard and advanced against the rebels, declaring his determination to destroy the Janissaries to the last man. He succeeded in dispersing the rebels, and their power was broken by death and exile.

Many thousands were still dispersed about the capital and its provinces, but the body was broken up, and the great work of destruction accomplished; at

Introd. DESTRUCTION OF THE JANISSARIES.

one blow the incubus that had oppressed Turkey disappeared, and the Osmanli ruler thought himself lucky in having destroyed the Osmanli army, at the very moment when one-half of his subjects was in open or secret rebellion against him, and when the hordes of his dreaded neighbour were ready to pounce upon his possessions in Europe and Asia.

Under these circumstances the Sultan's great object was to gain time, so as to build up something new in the room of that which was destroyed. Thus it was that after some delay the convention of Akkerman was entered into on the 25th of September, 1827. The terms of this convention were so onerous, that the Sultan would never have signed them, except with the full determination to break them on the first opportunity. In his Hatti-scheriff of the 20th of December of that year he declared to his people that they must perceive that " he had only gone to work in this friendly manner with the unbelievers, so as to gain time ;" every Moslem was the born foe of the unbeliever.

The war was inevitable, and Sultan Mahmud felt that success was essential to give the necessary sanction to his reforms in the eyes of the Moslems ; and the reconstruction of a force that should be equal in the field to the European armies, and a trusty instrument in his own hands, was the object of his most strenuous exertions.

The institution of the Timarlys and the Spahis

THP] NEAV TURKISH ARMY.

Introd.

was allowed to continue, as the Government, by withdrawing the fiefs, held the means in its own hand of securing to itself the devotion and faith of these horsemen. On the other hand, instead of the Janissaries, an army of 48,000 men was shortly raised, clothed, armed, and disciplined after the European fashion. The Sultan directed the drill in person, after learning the cavalry exercise from European officers.

The novelty of these measures, the opposition they encountered, the necessity for immediate action, and the want of time, caused everything to be hurried. Among his own followers Sultan Mahmud found no one enlightened man to aid him with his counsel : all had to be done by means of foreigners, and by the Sultan's own iron will. The recruits were seized in their villages, often carried in chains to Constantinople, and there kept as prisoners. There was an utter lack of intelligent native officers, and religious prejudice stood in the way of the employment of foreigners. The Rayahs were excluded from "the military service. The youngest men were selected from among the Moslems, in the hope that they would sooner get accustomed to the tiresome constraint of discipline, and remain longest in the service. But the dislike of the Turks to the service, their close quarters in the overcrowded barracks, their vices, and the wretched hospital arrangements, made sad havoc in their ranks, so that new levies were constantly required. The army therefore was com-

Tntrod.

THE NEW TUEKISH ARMY.

posed of men disciplined after the European fashion, wearing Russian jackets and Turkish trowsers ; with Tartar saddles, and French stirrups, and English sabres : it consisted of Timariots, or troops giving feudal service ; of troops of the line, whose service was for life ; and of militia, who served only a term of years, of whom the leaders were recruits and the recruits mere children. The system of organization was French, and the instructors were men from all parts of Europe. The splendid appearance, the beautiful arms, the reckless bravery of the former Moslem horde, had disappeared ; but yet this new army had one quality which placed it above the numerous host which in former times the Porte could summon to the field — it obeyed.

The Turkish empire, just before the outbreak of the Eussian war, stood on the brink of perdition. The Turkish army had been destroyed by the Sultan at Constantinople, the Turkish navy by the Franks at Navarino. The Russians were waiting on the frontiers both of Europe and Asia, ready to advance. The French held the Morea, and Ibrahim Pacha was reduced to great straits. The Greek flag was free, and the Mediterranean was closed by the maritime powers. In addition to this, the finances were much embarrassed, the population partly in open revolt, and all discontented. Well might the Sultan exclaim to his vizier — " Keep your wits together, for Allah knows the danger is great ! "

EFFORTS OF THE SULTAN. Introd.

His first object was to put down the rebellious Greeks, and then to attack his foreign foes. But he was beaten in the Morea. After all this it can surprise no one to find the Sultan so utterly unprepared for the emergency, although war with Russia had so long appeared inevitable.

From the year 1822 the frontier fortresses on the Danube had been restored, and on the land front of Constantinople immense barracks had been constructed, which might be considered as detached forts. The coinage had been debased, recourse had to oppression to procure money, and every measure taken to raise a military force. But the institutions were too new to take root, and the army in no condition to hold its ground against the Eussian host in the open field ; it was also too weak for the Sultan, much against his wish, not to have recourse again to the irregular Asiatic hordes. Wallachia and Moldavia were considered untenable, and most of the troops in those Principalities were withdrawn for the defence of the fortresses on the Danube. From Bosnia, a remarkably warlike and Mahommedan province, it was intended to send 40,000 men on to the Drina. But there opinion was strongly opposed to the Sultan's reforms. The Janissaries maintained their influence, and no one would subject himself to the Nizam's control. Abderrahman Pacha preferred to have the Sultan's firman read by one of his officers, but the firman, and the European clothes that accom-

In trod. WAR BETWEEN RUSSIA AND PERSIA.

panied it, were torn to pieces by the infuriated mob, and Bosnia did not contribute one soldier to the Turkish army during the whole campaign : it was with some difficulty that the Bosniaks, who were acting on the Danube, could be retained in the Turkish service. Bulgaria was half-peopled with Greek Christians, whom it was not thought safe to arm. Most of the irregular troops had to be drawn from Asia, and these could not be reckoned upon during the winter. The only hope of the Turks was in the Persians ; but after a short and glorious campaign, General Paskiewitch forced Persia to come to terms on the 2nd of November, 1827 ; the Persians agreeing to pay a contribution of 18,000,000 rubles, and to give up the Khanat-Erivan. This acquisition of territory enabled the Russians almost to surround their still unconquered possessions in the Caucasus, and to become the immediate neighbours of the Turks in Asia. Persia attempted to throw off the yoke, but was forced again, by the vigour of the Russian general, to make peace on the 22nd of February, 1828 ; so that, before the Turks entered the field against Russia, Persia was humbled, and a peace, upon still harder terms than before, was forced upon her. The corps of General Paskiewitch could be used against the Asiatic possessions of the Sultan, who was therefore obliged to raise a force especially for this service, and to divide his army.

16 STRENGTH OF THE TURKISH ARMY IN 1828. Intkod.

It is impossible to give an accurate account of the number of men the Turks could bring into the field against the Eussians. According to an authentic statement, proceeding from the office of the grand vizier, the irregular unpaid horde in Europe and Asia (not including the men who could be summoned to bear arms in case of urgent necessity) consisted of 97,050 men, chiefly Asiatic horsemen. The paid troops were reckoned at 80,000 men. The infantry of the latter consisted of 33 regiments of

3 battalions each, 500 strong ; each had besides 120 artillerymen, who formed a separate company, and served 10 battalion guns. Besides this there were 2 regiments of Bostangis, or guards, amounting to 6000 men ; so that there were about 60,000 infantry. The cavalry consisted of 10,000 Spahis, or men bound by feudal tenure to follow their lords into the field, besides 2600 regular cavalry, who formed

4 regiments of 6 squadrons, consisting of 152 men — altogether about 12,000 or 13,000 horse. The artillery consisted of 8 troops and 84 foot companies, and 2600 sappers, miners, and bombardiers ; besides 41 companies for the conveyance of the baggage. The number of the field-guns cannot be correctly estimated, but, compared with the nature of the service and the number of the forces, it was very small.

The whole disposable force may therefore be reckoned at 180,000 men, of whom one-third at least was cavalry.

Introd.

TURKISH INFANTRY DRESS.

The clothing of the new infantry represented the transition from the Oriental to the European dress : it consisted of a woollen waistcoat, over which was a broadcloth coat, reaching to the hips, and fastened in front with hooks and eyes. Instead of the turban the shubarra was used, a sort of cloth cap without a rim, shaped like a melon and of various colours. A red shawl girt many times round the waist protected the body. The Asiatic trowsers were retained ; they were of dark cloth, wide and loose as far as the knee, and then forming a sort of half-gaiter. The gaiters were made of impervious felt, the shoes very broad, and mostly of red leather. The felt cloak had a hood, which in bad weather served as a covering to the head, and in fine weather hung down the back. The musket, of French calibre, and provided with a bayonet, was mostly of Belgian manufacture ; the sabre very crooked. The cartouch-box was a novelty. The arms and the clothing were altogether well suited to the nature of the troops, of the climate, and of the soil.

Although it was difficult to teach this infantry regular movements in compact bodies, nevertheless we shall see later, on occasions when their courage carried them away, and they threw off the severe control placed upon them, that they could charge the foe with their old impetuosity.

The cavalry were clad in a similar manner : they were armed with a broad crooked falchion, a carbine

c

HORSE AND GEAR.

Introd.

and pistols. They were drilled into a sort of discipline, but could not manoeuvre, or charge in a compact body. The impetuosity of the old Turkish mode of attack was not yet quite broken.

. The horses, especially those of the Asiatic Spahis, were small, but fiery, well broken, capable of enduring great fatigue and privations. The Kurdish and CapjDadocian horses were accustomed to be picketed, and to bear the mid-day heat and the midnight cold. They were only watered once a day, and kept in condition without barley, when fed on the coarsest fodder. The light and easy fitting palanu, or saddle, made of felt, remained on their backs day and night, so that the horseman was ready at any moment to mount. The bit was very severe for so well-broken an animal, and was intended to stop the horse suddenly in mid career, or to wheel him round in a moment. The bar of the bit was often five or six inches long, and instead of the curb chain there was a ring. The round shoe was admirably suited to its purpose. The steel was forged cold, was thin and light, lasted five or six weeks, and protected the hoof admirably on stony ground. Although they use no cruppers, the Turkish horseman rides down the most precipitous places, covered with brushwood or trees, at full gallop. They ride only stallions, as the mares are kept at home for breeding, and are very dear.

Although the Turks had made great improvement in their artillery, still they were very far behind

Intbop. TURKISH ARTILLERY— CAMP FOLLOWERS. 19 their opponents. The Turkish horses are not accustomed to draw ; for this purpose Wallachian horses are mostly used. Most of the drivers in Turkey are Wallachians to this day. The guns were 3, 6, 8, 12, and 24-pounders, roughly mounted, and the shot ill cast. The effect of their artillery in battle could never be very great; nevertheless, as the Turks laid great stress upon this arm, it had its moral worth.

The camp-followers of a Turkish army were most numerous. Not alone those high in authority and their servants accompanied the Vizier into the field, but also the whole retinue of the Pacha, the Kadi-asker or judge, the post, which was served by Tartars, the Imams or clergy, the Dervishes or monks, and a whole array of servants, merchants, mechanics, dancers, jugglers, and other vagabonds swelled the mass. As tents, provisions of corn, oxen and sheep, and even hundreds of dogs, accompanied the army, the number of beings was enormous. This mob of human beings and animals was under the command of the Bonaldbaschi, who had under him hundreds of assistants.