Rifts in the universe; a study of the historic dichotomies and modalites of being

Front matter

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Introduction

I. The Dichotomies of Being

I

. Being vs. Becoming a. Space vs. Time b. Temporal vs. Eternal

. Substance vs. Attribute a. Terms vs. Relations b. Essential vs. Accidental

. Form vs. Matter a. Essence vs. Existence

b. Potentiality vs. Actuality

c. Universal vs. Individual

d. Formal Sciences vs. Content Sciences

. One vs. Many a. Substance vs. Modes b. Absolute vs. Relative c. World vs. Individual

. Spirit vs. Matter a. Spirits vs. Bodies b. Ideas vs. Things c. Psychology vs. Material Sciences

. God vs. World

7. Nature vs. Man a. Sciences vs. Humanities

. Subject vs. Object a. Self vs. Not-Self b. Ego vs. Non-Ego c.I vs. Me d. Me vs. Not-Me Table I. Correlations Within §8

. Phenomena vs. Noumena a. Fact vs. Value

Xil Contents b. Empirical vs. Transcendental

c.Immanent vs. Transcendent

d. World of Description vs. World of Appreciation e. Cause vs. Purpose

f. Mechanism vs. Finalism

g. Science vs. Philosophy

h. Naturalism vs. Idealism

10. Actual vs. Ideal Table II. Correlation of §89 and ro a. Descriptive Sciences vs. Normative Sciences b. Realism (Actualism) vs. Idealism

II. Correlations

1. Being-Becoming ; Substance-Attribute Table III. Entities and Events 2. Spirit-Matter; God-World; Man-Nature; Persons-Things; Soul-Body; Mind-Brain; Subject-Object Table IV. God and the World, etc.

Table V. Analysis of Man’s Nature 3. Substance- Attribute; Noumenon- Phenomenon; Consciousness-Behavior; and the former Table VI. Analysis of the Self 4. Space-Time; and the former Table VII. Aspects of Space and Time Table VIII. Noumena-Phenomena and Space-Time 5. Individuals - Universals - Particulars; Essence - Existence - Entelechy; Entities - Events; Substance-Attribute-Value; Things-Persons Table IX. Entities and Events Table X. Analysis of Individual Table XI. Analysis of Individual Table XII. Analysis of Person 6. Actual-Ideal; Fact-Value; Potential-Actual Table XIII. Facts-Values; Actual-Ideal Table XIV. Classes of Ideals

Contents God-World; and the former

8. Summary

Table XV. General Correlations: Entities Table XVI. Correlations: Entities and Events

IIT. Methods of Treating Dichotomies

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. How Antitheses Arise . Methods of Solving Antitheses a. The Method of Compromise b. The Eclectic Method c. The Synthetic Method Table XVII. Methods of Solving Antitheses

. Application to the Dichotomies of Part I a. Being vs. Becoming b. The One and the Many Table XVIII. Solutions of the Quantitative Problem c. Form vs. Matter d. Spirit vs. Matter Table XIX. Solutions of the Psychophysical Problem e. God and the World Table XX. Solutions of the Theocosmic Problem Illustrations of Theocosmic Theories f. Nature vs. Man g. Subject vs. Object h. Substance and Attribute k. Phenomenon vs. Noumenon 1, Mechanism vs. Finalism Table XXI. Solutions of the Cause-Purpose Dichotomy m. The Actual and the Ideal

. Some Psychological Dichotomies a. The Intellect vs. the Will Table XXII. Theories as to the Primary Menial Faculty b. The Senses vs. the Intellect Table XXIII. Solutions of the Senses-Intellect Dichotomy

X1V Contents

5. The Epistemological Dichotomy The Mind and its Object Table XXIV. Solutions of the Epistemological Dichotomy

6. Conclusion of Part III

IV. The Modalities of Being and Their Opposites 1. Being a. Being vs. Non-Being

b. Persistent Being vs. Becoming

c. Present Being vs. Past and Future Table XXV. Being and Its Opposites

2. Reality a. Underlying Reality vs. Appearance b. Objective Reality vs. Imagination c. Reality vs. Unreality d. Correlations Table XXVI. Correlations of Reality and Being

3. Actuality a. Complete Actuality vs. Potentiality, etc. Table XXVII. Correlations of Actuality and Possibility b. Mere Actuality vs. Ideality c. Correlations

4. Existence a. Existence, Subsistence, and Prosistence b. Existence vs. Non-Existence Table XXVIII. Existence and Its Opposites

5. Correlations Table XXIX. Thalheimer’s Analysis of Being Table XXX. The Modalities of Being

V. Conclusion

1. Final Correlations Table XXXI. Final Correlations

Contents XV

2. Metaphysical Implications Table XXXII. The Moments of Becoming

Appendix A. On the Meanings of “Idealism” 111 1. Idealism vs. Realism: Ideism

2. Idealism vs. Materialism: Mentalism and Spiritualism Table XXXIII. Classification of Qualitative Theories

3. Idealism vs. Naturalism: Transcendentalism 4. Idealism vs. Actualism: Normative Idealism

Appendix B. On the Nature of Matter and of Substance 117

Table XXXIV. Substance and Its Differentiations Table XXXV. Subjects and the World of Substance

Index 123

Introduction

ROM the beginning of time, man has tended to

split his universe into two distinct parts, and thus to dichotomize it into a duoverse. Of the rifts resulting from this persistent inclination to divide in order the better to understand, by far the most abysmal is the chasm between mind or spirit and matter, which has played such a prominent part in philosophy since classic times. Other divisions in the field of reality are such as those between phenomena and noumena, existences and subsistences, facts and values, etc. Some of these dichotomies are open to criticism on the ground that they present as distinct species of reality what are essential aspects of all reality; others are defective in their omission of some third equally distinct but neglected species; and all are in one way or another misleading.

With regard to the mind-body distinction, for example, the question is decidedly apposite whether after all man may not be a ¢richotomy. That he is so has doubtless been maintained by many theologians, but with an interpretation open to serious criticism from the standpoint of general metaphysics; whereas the innumerable philosophers who have considered the so-called “mind-body problem” have proposed solutions which are in every instance based on the hypothesis of a twofold distinction—whether of substances, attributes, aspects, or what not. In our sections II, 2, and II, 3d, a suggestion is offered which it is thought is new, and which it is hoped may have some advantages over any of those now in the field.

Each of the divisions or “rifts” which we are to consider in the ensuing pages has received the attention of many commentators in the past, but the task of viewing them in their relation to one another, and comparing their relative merits, seems to have been largely if not wholly neglected. In the present work, therefore, it is proposed (1) to examine as briefly as possible some of the more important of these dichotomies;* (2) to correlate them with one another; and (3) to inquire into the various methods by which all false or inadequate diremptions of reality may be resolved, in order that a more comprehensive view of the world of being may be attained.

Pertinent to our general problem will be also (4) a consideration of the various allied concepts to that of Being which are in common use among philosophers— such as Reality, Existence, Actuality, and their opposites. These, taking “Being” as summum genus or principal concept, I denominate “Modalities” of Being, and a discussion of them constitutes our fourth task. Lastly, (5) it may be of value to draw some final correlations between these various modalities and the dichotomies of our earlier discussion.

1To consider any one of these dichotomies with the care which they all deserve would be an endless task, and we can give them only summary consideration here.

I The Dichotomies of Being

1. Being vs. Becoming. Virtually the first dichotomy to meet us in the history of philosophy, and one of the most persistent ever since, is that between Being and Becoming, Permanence and Change, Things and Processes, the Static and the Dynamic conceptions of reality. From the first philosophers of Greece to the neo-realists and the mathematical philosophers of the present day, the real has been defined as the permanent: from Heraclitus to Bergson, the advocates of Becoming have cried that all things flow. And yet all along there have been those wiser ones who have taught that any true view of reality must allow for both aspects—not that some things persist and some things change, not that the world is made up of things and processes; but that all entities undergo change, and yet remain identical with themselves through all this change.

Allied to the division just considered is the problem of Space, Time, and Eternity. Either (a) Space is taken as the principle of Permanence, and set over against Time as the principle of Change; or (b) we have the Temporal or changing opposed to that which is Eternal and abiding. The best philosophy of the present day, however, learning both from the errors of the past and from the relativist physics of today, sees in Space- Time one great principle of the form of material things,

4 Rifts in the Universe Ch. 1:§1 and in the Eternal-Immense that which comprehends and underlies all Time and Space.

2. Substance vs. Attribute. Equally primitive with the Being-Becoming distinction, though not always known by the name here given it, is the contrast between Substance and Attribute (or Accident), Things and their Qualities. Often the two divisions have been combined —Substance being viewed as the permanent substratum underlying and uniting the constantly changing Attributes. From the beginning, philosophers have sought for the fundamental Substance of things, and have viewed the world of changing phenomena as merely a world of half-unreal Attributes of this only real Substance. Substance is also described as that in which the Attributes inhere: in its most recent form (as defined in the system of McTaggart”), a substance is anything which das attributes, and is not itself an attribute. The best usage regards Substance, not as something added to the attributes (Locke’s “unknowable somewhat”), nor as merely the sum-total of the attributes, but as the attributes in their unity: the real tree, for example, is not merely the roots, trunk, leaves, sap, etc., in the ageregate, nor something added to these; rather, these elements in their living organic unity constitute the substance of the tree.

Allied distinctions are that of Spinoza between the one Substance with its Attributes, and the various Modes (v. 4a, inf.); and (a) the logical distinction between Terms and their Relations. The former of these

2 The Nature of Existence, vol. I.

Ch. I: §2 _ Dichotomies 5 is so bound up with the One-Many dichotomy which we shall soon consider, that we shall postpone its discussion for the present. The logical distinction, however, draws attention to a defect in the main dichotomy: viz., that quality and attribute are not identical concepts, but that, rather, Attributes are of two kinds—Qualities and Relations. Terms may represent either Substances or Qualities, but the Relation which binds the terms of a proposition together is a further kind of Attribute. Perhaps, too, Quantity should be added as a third kind of Attribute. Finally, another logical distinction within the field of attributes (b) is that between those attributes which are essential to the existence of a thing (differentia and properties), and those which are accidental or occasional only.

3. Form vs. Matter. This distinction appears in embryo from the beginning in the contrasts between the Milesians and the Pythagoreans, the Love and Hate and the four elements of Empedocles, etc., and since its coming into fruition under Aristotle has played a prominent part throughout the history of philosophy. In recent years, when the traditional division was beginning to show signs of having outworn its usefulness, we find it revived in (a) the Essence-Existence distinction of the critical realists. The precise meanings of the contrasted terms have varied almost more than in any of the other dichotomies; but, in general, Matter has cor-

3 This distinction itself, of course, is a venerable one, but has acquired a new significance in the writings of the contemporary critical realists.

responded to Substance, as that which, without Form or Attributes, would be nothing; and Form has been regarded as that which gives meaning, distinctness, character to Matter, since it is by virtue of the Attributes that we know Substance. Similarly, to the critical realists, the Essence is the datum of immediate intuition, and Existence is known only through Essence.

Allied to Aristotle’s distinction of Form and Matter is (b) the same philosopher’s dichotomy of Potentiality and Actuality. Matter is Potentiality, Form is the energizing principle which when infused into Matter makes the potential Actual. The true Substance to Aristotle is the actual union (Entelechy) of Matter and Form; though he admits the lesser substantiality of Matter (as substratum) or Form (the Platonic Idea) taken alone. The Potentiality-Actuality distinction, however, is essentially a distinction within the field of Becoming (Events, Processes). Substances are actual Entities: change is a passage in a Substance of Potentiality into Actuality.

Finally, we have a third allied dichotomy—(c) that between the Universal and the Individual (or Particular). In the Aristotelian metaphysics, the Form is the Universal principle, and the Entelechy is the individual which manifests Form in Matter. This is the true or “first substance,” the Universal being substance only after a second order. So, with the critical realists today, Essence is the Universal, and the Individual is a union of Essence and Existence.

Before leaving this general division of things, it may be worth while to note that our modern distinction (d)

Ch. 1: $3 Dichotomies "4 between the Formal or Abstract Sciences (logic and mathematics) and the Content or Concrete (“material” or “descriptive”) Sciences is based upon the dichotomy of Form vs. Matter.

4. The One and the Many. One of the most persistent of all philosophical problems since the days of the controversy between Zeno the Eleatic and his pluralizing antagonists has been the problem of the One and the Many, or the Whole and the Parts. This also is the first dichotomy we have studied (with the possible exception of the first one of all) on which a division of metaphysical schools has been based—the age-long division between the quantitative (or numerical) Monists (Singularists) and the Pluralists. On the monistic side we find several allied dichotomies: with Spinoza, the distinction becomes that between (a) the one Substance and the many Modes; for modern absolute idealism, (b) the Absolute rather than Substance is the One, and is contrasted with the Relative Many; and in all systems which tend toward monism, and yet regard reality as both One and Many, the problem becomes that of (c) the World and the Individual—of saving the reality of the individual* in a monistic universe. Pluralists, on the other hand, incline to deny the seriousness of the problem, and to view the World as merely an aggregate of individual atoms or other units,

4For the pure monist, indeed, the Whole is the only true Individual; whereas for the pluralist, the Whole has no individuality at all. But in the text, I am describing the position of the more moderate monists.

or at best as a system of such units (é.g., recent “personal idealism’’).

Taking the synthetic view that reality is in some sense both One and Many, we find that most of the other dichotomies may be viewed either (A)° from the standpoint of the Whole, or (B) from that of the Many. Thus, the Being-Becoming dichotomy (1A) becomes, from the standpoint of the Parts (1B), the distinction between Entities (things) and Events (processes ); and so with others to be considered later.

5. Spirit (Mind, Intelligence) vs. Matter (Nature). Though considerably later in its clear formulation than any of the dichotomies already discussed, this has been by far the most influential of all metaphysical distinctions throughout the greater part of the history of thought, at least since the time of Plotinus. The most fundamental classification of metaphysical systems is based on it—psychophysical Dualism, which teaches the equal and distinct reality of both; psychophysical (qualitative) Monism, which reduces them to one; and the various forms of the latter, which are distinguished according to whether this one kind of reality is defined in terms of Matter, of Mind or Spirit, of both (e.g., Spinoza), or of neither (é.g., contemporary neutral monism).

From the standpoint of the Many (B), we have the

5 For convenience in reference, I shall use numbers to identify the leading dichotomies, small letters to indicate the allied subordinate dichotomies, and large letters to refer to the Whole (A) and the Parts (B) respectively.

Ch. I: §5 Dichotomies 9 allied distinctions between (a) Spirits (Souls, Minds) and Bodies (or Spirit vs. Flesh, Mind vs. Brain, etc.) ; and between (b) /deas and Things, or mental phenomena and physical phenomena; and the division of the field of science between (c) Psychology (the Mental Sciences) and the Material (Physical) Sciences.

Recent idealistic criticism has quite rightly protested against the tendency to confuse or identify idealism with mentalism. Mentalism is to be opposed to Materialism on the basis of the general Mind-Matter antithesis; Idealism is rather to be opposed either to Realism on the basis of the Idea-Thing distinction (not, of course, the ideal-real distinction which we consider later—§10), or more importantly to Naturalism on the basis of the vitally significant Fact-Value distinction (§9h) to which we shall return subsequently (see also Appendix A).

But back of the entire difficulty lies the profound error of confusing or identifying (A) Mind (Intelligence, Reason) with Spirit; or, on the level of the Parts (B), Mind with Soul, or either with Spirit. In histories of philosophy it is almost universally the custom to use the terms Spiritualism and Mentalism (when the latter is used at all), Spirit and Mind, etc., quite indifferently. This is a grave error, but its seriousness can be appreciated more fully after we have considered the important Subject-Object (§8) and Fact-Value (§9) distinctions.

The next three dichotomies are intimately related to this one.

1O Rifts in the Universe Ch. I: $6

6. God (the Creator) vs. the World (Creation, the Universe, the Cosmos, Matter). Any of the metaphysical systems named in the preceding section (even materialism) may be either ¢hezstic or atheistic. In the former case, the present dichotomy adds itself to the immediately preceding one. God is regarded as Pure Spirit (or, in materialism, as composed of a refined kind of matter), the World as a compound of Spirit and Matter. Generally this dichotomy fuses with that which we have numbered 4: God is the One, the World represents the Many; God is Substance (Natura Naturans), the World is composed of the Modes of Substance (Natura Naturata); God is the Absolute, the World the Relative. The World in this sense is usually thought of as an orderly system (‘“‘cosmos”) of Individuals, thereby removing the problem of the relation between World and Individual which bothers the absolute monist. For the theist, furthermore, God is Creator, the World is His Creation. Finally, if Matter is taken as the antithesis of God (as in Neoplatonism and allied doctrines), the World may be regarded as a compound or mixture of both (e.g., Numenius, and in a certain sense Plato and Aristotle).

7. Nature vs. Man. On the side of the Creation a new dichotomy arises, analogous to but not identical with the fifth on our list, between Nature, or the purely material creation, and Man, who is both material and spiritual. From the standpoint of the Many (B), this corresponds to the allied dichotomy of Things vs. Persons (Selves). This division is also the basis for the

Ch. I: §7 Dichotomies eg historic distinction in the field of education between (a) the Sciences and the Humanities—the former regarded as being concerned solely with the material universe (hence, “the natural sciences’), and the latter with the world of persons. Recent educational theory, however, paralleling the advance in the fields of mental and social science, and the increasing recognition that man (“human nature”) is, in large measure at least, a part and product of nature, places a considerably lower estimate than formerly upon the significance of this distinction. In common with the whole Nature- Man dichotomy, also, the distinction of the Sciences vs. the Humanities is defective in ignoring that important field of human knowledge to which the old-fashioned term “Divinity” is most appropriately applied.

8. Subject vs. Object. The basis of this profoundly significant dichotomy is quite different from that which underlies the three previous ones, but the distinction itself is interwoven throughout all of these. That which fundamentally distinguishes Persons or Selves from Things which are Not-Selves is that Things are Pure Objects, whereas every Person or Self is a Subject- Object.® Every Entity or Process (1B) of which we can

6 The distinction is not, be it noted, between Subjects and Objects, but between Pure Objects and Subject-Objects (there neither is nor can be a “Pure Subject”), or between the Subject and the Object aspects of reality. Furthermore, in our identification of Persons and Selves, I am not attempting to predetermine the question as to whether self-consciousness appears in the course of evolution before the emergence of man. Up to the present time there is certainly no thoroughly convincing evidence that any organisms below man are think at all, ourselves included, is thereby an Object;’ but we who think them are in each case Subject as well.

The Subject-Object dichotomy is not to be identified with the allied distinction between (a) Self and Not- Self, since, as we have seen, every Self is both Subject and Object—I may be conscious of myself or of what is not myself, the Object differing in the two cases but the Subject remaining the same. Consequently, there is a second allied dichotomy which nevertheless we must also take care not to identify with the main one— namely, that between (b) Ego and Non-Ego: Ego is myself (not merely any self) as Subject-Object, Non- Ego is any Object which is not myself. But, since I myself may be my own Object (in “self-consciousness,” and in introspection), we have a third allied dichotomy within the field of the Ego, first made famous by William James, between (c) the J (myself as Subject) and the Me (myself as Object). Finally, the world of Objects may be dichotomized, from the point of view of each Ego, into (d) Me (myself as Object) and Not-Me (the not-self as Object to “TI’’).

The various dichotomies under this head may be correlated as follows:

self-conscious, but so far as they may be so they must be regarded as at least embryo persons or selves, though for our present purpose it suffices to place them in the impersonal group with other “things” (z.e., as “living things’’).

7I am not here assuming the idealist position that all entities and processes are as such Objects, but merely state that if we think them at all we think of them as Objects.

Ch. I: §8 Dichotomies 13

TABLE I Correlations EG Omen access Glsawa = Non £ vai () : ce a Number tf I------- (c) -———— Me----(d)----Nor Me Subject----- (8)------ Object Number ¢ Se/f---- (aJ---- Not Se/¥

There are here, as indicated, really two distinct fundamental antitheses—(I) that between Self and Not-Self in general, and (II) that between myself (Ego) and what is not myself (Non-Ego). (The members of each dichotomy are connected by horizontal broken lines in this and the following tables.)

9. Phenomena vs. Noumena. In recent years the Spirit- Matter dichotomy which for so many centuries has almost completely dominated metaphysics has shown signs of yielding first place to another, which is indeed in many respects a more fundamental one—I mean the dichotomy of Phenomena or Facts vs. Values or Meanings. This is the favorite representative today of the dichotomy of Phenomena vs. Noumena (or Things-in- Themselves) first made famous by Kant, in that Values like Noumena are usually regarded by those who draw the distinction as in some way more real or more profoundly real than “mere” Phenomena. I wish to consider first the Kantian distinction; then the more recent variation of it, along with other allied dichotomies; and finally to suggest a usage which seems to me of more value for the purposes of contemporary thought.

The Kantian distinction is familiar. Phenomena are things as they appear to human consciousness, but Things- as-they-are-in-Themselves are unknowable by man: a Divine Intelligence, however, may know Things-in-Themselves, in which case they would be to Him objects of intellectual intuition—i.e., Noumena— rather than of sense-perception as with man. Things, then, are for Kant Phenomena, as they appear to human consciousness, and Noumena, as they hypothetically are known to God; and the real dichotomy is this, rather than the one more customarily drawn between Phenomena and Things-in-Themselves.

(a) The allied Fact-Value distinction came forward originally under the theologizing impetus of Albert Ritschl. According to this thinker, Science has the world of existing facts for its realm, Religion the world of non-existent values, and each is sharply opposed to the other. Religion is concerned solely with values, and its judgments do not assert or imply the real existence of their objects: scientific judgments, on the other hand, are judgments of fact, and to science questions of value are simply not pertinent. Later criticism has considerably modified the sharpness of this antithesis, without denying the fundamental truths behind it. To religion, indeed, value is everything, mere fact nothing; but religion insists, nevertheless, and even bases itself, upon the postulate of the reality (and, in Hoffding’s well-known phrase, the “conservation”) of the great spiritual Values—Truth, Beauty, Goodness; God, Freedom, Immortality. To religion, in other words, Values are the Ultimate Realities, and therefore something far

Ch. I: §9 Dichotomies 15 more “real” than mere “facts”; and in no sense can such realities be denominated “phenomena.” To science, on the other hand, facts, phenomena, in their relations to one another are all-sufficient, and questions of value become of entirely subordinate significance, if they are not ignored altogether.

Allied dichotomies to those just considered have been drawn between (b) the Empirical (that which is the object of experience—i.e., phenomena) and the Transcendental (that which is presupposed in experience—+.é., the Kantian categories, the Soul, God, etc.) ; (c) the Immanent (that which is im experience) and the Transcendent (that which lies beyond all possible experience, and so on Kantian principles can not be known); (d) the World of Description (1.e., of phenomena, which as such can be described) and the World of Appreciation (i.e., of noumena, values, meanings, etc., which can not be described, but must be apprehended immediately by the individual). The first two of these are essentially Kantian distinctions, the third a post-Kantian development under the egis of the absolute idealists (e.g., Royce).

Analogous to the opposition of facts and values is (e) the dichotomy of Causes vs. Purpose (Efficient vs. Final Causes) as principles of explanation. The question “why” with reference to any phenomenon may be answered either by stating the cause which brought that phenomenon into existence, or by declaring the purpose for which it exists. In a familiar and extremely significant passage in the Phedo,® Socrates relates how

8 Pp. 96-99. The quotations are from Jowett’s translation.

he had hoped to find in the philosophy of Anaxagoras an explanation of the phenomena of nature, and how that hope had been disappointed, because instead of explaining all things as the products of intelligence, Anaxagoras constantly refers them to material causes. He, says Socrates, is like a man who would explain my presence here on the ground that “my body is made up of bones and muscles, and the bones are hard and have joints which divide them, and the muscles are elastic and cover the bones . . .; and as the bones are lifted at the joints by the contraction or relaxation of the muscles, I am able to bend my limbs; and this is why I am sitting here.” In all this, adds the philosopher, the physiologist “forgets to mention the true cause, which is that the Athenians have thought fit to condemn me, and accordingly I have thought it better and more right to remain here and undergo my sentence. . . . Surely,” he concludes, “there is a strange confusion of causes and conditions in all this.” And there is; but is Socrates correct in thinking the latter or teleological explanation the only true explanation? In reality, both the physiologist and the philosopher are justified in their diverse methods of explanation; and we have summed up, indeed, in this passage the entire mechanism vs. teleology controversy which has troubled the history of philosophy since the time of Socrates until today.

The Cause-Purpose antithesis, then, is a justifiable one. Furthermore, it generates three other interesting distinctions, at which our quotation from Plato and our comments thereon have already hinted. First, we

Ch. 1:89 Dichotomies 17 have the distinction (f) between Mechanism—the theory that every phenomenon is the effect of some previous cause, and that the entire universe is a system of causes and effects; and Finalism—the theory that every phenomenon is a means toward the accomplishment of some end, and that the entire world-process is the expression of an intelligent purpose. Mechanists and naturalistic philosophers deny the legitimacy of teleological explanations altogether: vitalists and many idealistic philosophers, on the other hand, deny the universal applicability of the mechanistic type of explanation; but a synthesis of the two is quite admissible, recognizing the equal validity of both kinds of explanation, and that for a thorough understanding of any phenomenon both types of explanation must be applied. Accepting such a synthesis, we may add to our list of dichotomies under our present general head (g) that between Science, which employs the causal type of explanation alone, and is interested in facts for their own sake; and Philosophy, which is interested in values and purposes. Finally, within the field of philosophical theories, we have the division (h) between Naturalism, which rejects the above principle of distinction and denies teleology, regarding the concepts of science as ultimate; and /dealism in its broadest sense, which adopts this principle and concerns itself entirely with teleology, without necessarily rejecting mechanism (though many idealists do reject it) as a scientific concept (see Appendix A).°

® Albee, Philosophical Review, vol. 18 (1909). Creighton, ibid., vol. 26 (1917).

This brings us to the close of our extended consideration of the Phenomena-Noumena dichotomy and its diverse offspring. In concluding, it may not be amiss to plead for a revival of the use of the term which appears second in our dichotomy—not in the Kantian sense of a thing-in-itself intuited by a superhuman intelligence, but in a sense which benefits from the developments since Kant in the more recent distinctions between Fact and Value and between Mechanism and Teleology. By phenomenon, then, we may continue to mean what has always been meant by it—viz., an object of actual or possible sensuous or introspective experience, a describable and causally explicable fact; by noumenon we mean any object which can not be perceived with the senses or introspectively observed or scientifically described, but which to be known and understood must be individually appreciated—e.g., God, the human Soul, and the realm of spiritual Values. Every phenomenon, then, according to our suggested synthesis, may be explained in terms of other phenomena as causes, or may be interpreted as the expression of some Noumenon—as the fulfilment of a Purpose, the symbol of a Meaning, the instrument of some intelligent End.