The review of General Sherman's Memoirs examined, chiefly in the light of its own evidence

Front matter

I UNITED STATES OF AMEKICA. |

THE REVIEW

General Sherman's Memoirs

Chapter I. Introductory

The examination of this work^ was undertaken with no little interest, because the promises of its author had led me to believe that he intended to correct the Memoirs l»y the light of the records which appear to have been so generously opened to him. But the perusal of even a few of its pages must satisfy any impartial reader that its author writes in a spirit bitterly hostile to General Sherman ; and the examination of the entire work will convince him that not only do the records he cites often fail to sustain the propositions they are intended to prove, but that frequently they contradict them. To show that either this frame of mind has warped this reviewer's judgment, or that he has deliberately made false statements, and sought to ingeniously sustain thenii by an unfair presentation of records, is one of the objects of this pamphlet. It might, perhaps, be profitably borne in mind that even these records are the reports, orders, letters, etc., of persons who, no matter what their rank, were nevertheless fallible men, w\th more or less imperfect means for obtaining correct information, and that they would have been more than human had their productions been always untinged by prejudice or by the desire to set forth their own acts in a favorable light before their superiors and the public. General Sherman was one of these men; but the iact.that he was a prominent one, and has written his recollections of men and events of the war, is no reason why he should be attacked in an unfair or hostile spirit. That General Sherman has been unjust or unfair to his brother officers, subordinates, or superiors, is what his assailant fails to show.

1 Sherman's Historical Eaid. The Memoirs in the light of the Kecord. A review based upon compilations from the files of the War Office. By H. V. Boynton.

INTRODUCTORY.

It should also be borne in mind that the Memoirs do not purport to be a complete history even of the transactions to which they refer, but are narrative statements, made by the author, of facts which came more or less completely within his personal knowledge. There are thousands of officers beside Sherman who could give the public an interesting narrative of their personal recollections and experiences, which would doubtless bring to light a great mass of facts hitherto unknown; and, although such narratives are not of themselves history, they are the material out of which correct history can best be written. It is to be regretted that these officers do not collect and publish their contributions to this material. It is well known that many things, important in their bearing on events, never reach the light through official sources, sometimes to the glorification of the undeserving and to the injustice of the meritorious. Our people and posterity have a far greater interest in the truth of history than in the reputation of any man or set of men, if such reputations have not been fairly earned. But, on the other hand, all citizens have a claim and an interest in the deserved honors of their nation's illustrious men, and he who seeks to unjustly tarnish their fair fame strikes at that nation's greatness and at that people's common inheritance. If all are judged in accordance with the above, there can be no complaint.

Eut, for some different reason not generally understood, this reviewer, as the Washington correspondent of the Cincinnati Gazette, embarked, in his letters to that paper, in an attack upon General Sherman and his Memoirs, and from these letters compiled this book. It is gratifying to know that he, at least, was able to obtain copies of the official records !

Much of the running commentary which is interspersed, as their author says, to connect and explain the record, is interesting, not only for the reason claimed to be its purpose, but also because it discloses the spirit in which the book is written. These comments need no inter[>reter. They are easily comprehended.

INTRODUCTORY.

Among his first statements, he asserts that the Memoirs are "egotistical," "unreliable, and unjust;" and that their author "detracts from what rightfully belongs to Grant;" " mispresents and belittles Thomas ; withholds justice from Buell; repeatedly loads failures for which he was responsible, now upon Thomas, now upon Schofield, now upon McPherson, and again upon the three jointly; is unjust in the extreme to Rosecrans; sneers at Logan and Blair; insults Hooker, and slanders Stanton ;" and further, in efiect, that, as a military commander, he was careless and incapable; that he betrayed the trust confided in him by a pohtical surrender to the Confederate General Johnston. In summing up his case against him, at the conclusion of his book, the reviewer reiterates most of these charges, and adds to them several others, which, he says, are proven by the ofiicial files.

These statements are broad enough to attract attention, especially when made under such circumstances and in such connection as to almost create the impression that the book is the indirect production of the War Department. This impression is strengthened by the fact that there is a certain ex cathedra style running through his statements which indicates that the ideas were inspired at that office .

It presents a somewhat singular spectacle to see the ofiicers of the War Department furnishing material for an attack upon the integrity and capacity of the General of the army. The student of history will, however, be thankful for the documents published by the reviewer, and will not be likely to cavil at the cause which has led to their publication.

Chapter II. Forts Henry And Donelson

The credit which the Review first gives, then denies, Grant.

In the opening paragraph of the chapter relating to the above named forts, General Sherman is presented to the reader as an officer deserving severe condemnation for ingratitude and injustice to General Grant. The specific charge on which this is based is " a deliberate attempt to take from General Grant the credit which belongB to him " for his movements on these two forts, and to assign it to General Halleck.

A careful examination of the Memoirs will show that Sherman gives Halleck the credit of 'planning the move which resulted in the capture of these forts, and to General Grant and Commodore Foote and their respective forces he attributes the praise for taking them. A like examination of the Review (pp. 10-13) shows that in effect, its author claims for General Grant all the credit for both 'planning and executing the move. The records produced only prove, at most, that Halleck had contemplated this move long before Grant ever suggested it to him, but that- he (Grant), by Halleck's permission, attempted it and succeeded sooner and with less troops than the latter thought it could be done. The extract from the Memoirs (Review, p. 11), states that Halleck, at least a month before Grant's move, was seated in a room with a map before him, with two of his subordinates, CuUom and Sherman, near him, and that he asked for the views of these two as to the proper place to attack the rebel lines. One of them suggested "the center," which a pencil line, then made by Halleck, showed would coincide nearly with the course of the Tennessee river. Halleck then said: "That's the true line of operations."

It can not be seen from the above how long this very (8)

FORTS HENRY AND DONELSON.

plan may have been in Halleck's mind. It only shows that it was also in the mind of Cullom or Sherman, or both, before it was executed by any body, and that possibly this advice strengthened Halleck's own favorable opinion of it. Indeed, it appears from the following quotations that he had long been thinking about this move. The reviewer quotes extracts from a letter dated January 20th (p. 12), from Halleck to McClellan, which, the reviewer says, " are sufficient to settle the question at issue." So they are. The following are sentences referring to the plan of operations :

" The idea of moving down the Mississippi by steam, is, in my opinion, impracticable, or at least premature. It is not the proper line of operations, at least now. A much more feasible plan is to move up the CMmSer- Zanrf awrf Te/znessee,! making Nashville the present objective point. . . This line of the Cumberland and Tennessee is the great central line of the western theater of war, with the Ohio, below the mouth of Green river, as the base, and the two great navigable rivers extending far into the theater of operations."

" These suggestions are hastily written out, but lltey are the result of much anxious inquiry and m.ature deliberation. I am confident that the plan, if properly carried out, will produce important results."

No attempt is made to show that, up to this time, Grant had in any way suggested or proposed this plan to Halleck, or offered to take either fort. But on the 28/A of January, one v)eek after the above letter was written, Grant proposed to General Halleck to take Fort Henry, obtained his consent, and took it on the 6th of February, and Fort Donelsonon the 16th.

This is the substance of the evidence by which it is sought to prove that Grant planned as well as executed the move against these forts, and on which are based the grave charges against General Sherman, found in the opening paragraph !

But on p. 13, the reviewer, with a sudden change of base, says that " if General Sherman had searched, the records with the least care he would ;, have found " that General Buell had suggested to Halleck. long before this,

1 The italics in this and other extract* are mine,T-M.

10 FOKTS HENRY AND DONELSON.

just about the same move that Grant afterward carried out. Evidence to prove this is furnished (pp. 13-18). Then it was neither Grant nor Halleck who originated the idea after all ! But as the reviewer himself takes pains to show us (Eeview, p. 3) that Sherman only proposes to give " his recollection of events, corrected by a reference to his own memoranda," it is plainly wrong to censure Sherman for not giving the credit to Buell or to Grant instead of to Halleck, as neither his recollection nor his memoranda could furnish him any knowledge of Buell's correspondence with Halleck.

Chapter III

Our army not surprised. Generous treatment of Buell's army.

In Chapter III., the reviewer discusses the buttle of Shiloh^ and the alleged unfair treatment of Buell and his arm\'.

In treating of the observations in the Memoirs about this battle, the reviewer undertakes to show, Firsts that the Union forces were surprised, and that Sherman was responsible for this ; Second, that the positions of the various divisions with reference to each other was bad, for which also Slierman was responsible; Third, that Sherman wronged Buell and his troops by not mentioning them more fully and favorably in his Memoirs.

It is not my purpose, nor is it necessary, to go extensively into the history of this battle, for the purpose of contradicting the foolish stories about our forces being surprised by the enemy, at its beginning. No matter what were the reasons for starting them originally in the newspapers and elsewhere, there is not the slightest excuse for reiterating them at this time. Almost every one of the many extracts from the records found in the Review (pp. 26-35), contradicts these stories. The substance of these extracts may be fairly gathered from the following quotations :

"All my* troops were in line of battle, ready. . . I gave necessary orders to the battery (Waterhouse'.--) attached to Hildebrand'a brigade, and cautioned the men to reserve their fire till the rebels had crossed the ravine at Owl Creek and had begun the ascent. Also sent staff oflScers to notify Generals McClernand and Prentiss of the coming blow. Indeed, McClernand had already sent three regiments to the support of my left flank. They were in position when the onset came."

^ The reader is referred to Van Home's History of the Arm3' of the Cumberland lor a fair and full history of this battle. K. Clarke & Co., Cincinnati.

^From Sherman's official report of Battle of Sliiloh. Review, p. 28.

12 SHILOH.

1" Between 6 and 7 o'clock on Sunday morning, I was informed that our pickets were fired upon. I immediately gave orders for forming the brigade on the color line, which was promptly done."

2" On the morning of the 6th, our regiment met the enemy about two hundred yards in front of our color line."

3 " On Sunday morning, April 6, about half-past 7, 1 received a message from Brigadier-General Sherman that he was attacked in force heavily upon his left. I immediately ordered Colonel J. C. Veach, commanding the Second Brigade, to proceed to the left of General Sherman. This brigade, consisting of Twenty-fifth Indiana, Fourteenth, Fifteenth and Forty-sixth Illinois, was in march in ten minutes, arrived on General Sherman's line rapidly, and went into action."

*" About 7 o'clock on the morning of the 6th, heavy and rapid firing of artillery was heard, and in a few minutes we received orders to form in line of battle in front of our camp. This order was obeyed with a coolness and promptness highly creditable to the officers and men."

It is shown, on p. 34 and p. 35, that the heavy fighting did not begin until about 8 o'clock; but previous to this, Buckland's brigade had advanced about forty rods from their color line and opened fire on the rebels, instead of being surprised by them. (P. 33.)

The documents cited by the reviewer, together with other reports^ of ofiicers at the front, show that these officers were in a constant state of watchfulness ; that the pickets were not less than two and a half miles out, and were strengthened as occasion required ; that reconnoissance in force were made from time to time, and that both these and the pickets reported the presence of cavalry and infantry to the division commanders, who were on the qui Vive in consequence, and that their troops were in line of battle on the morning of the attack.

1 From Colonel Buckland's official report to General Sherman. Review, p. 33.

2 From Lieutenant-Colonel Purlin's report. Forty-eighth Ohio. Review, p. 134.

2 General Hurlburt's official report of Battle of Shiloh. * Colonel B. H. Bristow's report of Battle of Shiloh. 5 Senate Doc. No. 66, 2d Session, 37th Congress.

SHILOH. 13

Since the reviewer himself has completely refuted these absurdities abont a surprise,Mt would be idle to pay any attention to his efforts to show that Sherman, a subordinate commander, was responsible for it.

As to whether the Union officers knew the plans and purposes of the enemy, or even the numbers and disposition of their forces as early as the reviewer intimates they should have known, is a very different matter. If these officers, under the circumstances, were in doubt as to the intentions of the rebel leaders, but were ready for any emergency, they are not liable to censure. We now know from rebel sources^ that they did not fully determine until the second of April (their forces were then scattered from Corinth to luka) to make the attack ; that the main body of their troops did not reach the vicinity of Sliiloh, and that they did not definitely fix the date of the attack until late in the evening of the fifth. The battle began early on the sixth. It is readily seen from the above that to accuse our officers of blindness, criminal carelessness or incapacity for not knowing the plans of the enemy previous to the eve of battle, implies that it was their duty to know the date of

^ As to the rebels' view of this surprise, this sentence from Polhird's "Lost Cause," on p. 239, where he describes their advance to the attack, is significant: "But the enemy scarcely gave time to discuss the question of attack, for soon after dawn he commenced a rapid musketry fire on the Confederate pickets." On the same page, he shows that they had no inconsiderable amount of fighting to do with our advance parties and pickets, before they came to Sherman's main line.

There is not as much evidence to support the assertions that our army was surprised in this battle, as there was for the assertion that Wellington was surprised at Brussels into the battle of Waterloo. It could be shown that he was at an entertainment at the Duchess of Richmond's on the evening of the 15th of June, and that an attack was made upon his forces at Quatre Bras on that day; that the troops so attacked, retreated during the two succeeding days, and that the battle of the 18th was fought twelve miles from the first point of attack, the duke having retreated that distance before he fought the decisive action; and that, up to the very day of the fight at Quatre Bras, he did not know precisely the point at which the attack would be made. Popular writers of that day made a liberal use of these ideas at the time.

14 SHILOH.

attack before the rebels had decided upon the time of making it, or their troops were on the ground !

With reference to the charge concerning the positions of the various divisions, it is only necessary to state that Sherman was a subordinate officer, in command of one division only, and the reviewer does not even attempt to prove " by the record " that he was responsible for these positions, if wrong, or that he could be so considered.

In reviewing what the Memoirs say about Buell and his army, the reviewer labors to make Sherman appear guilty of ingratitude for a personal favor rendered by Buell, as well as grossly unjust to him and his troops. Among other things, he says :

"All would suppose that when the author of the Memoirs sat down to write his version of Shiloh, he would at least have done bare justice to Buell and his army ; but the reader will look for it in vain."

Both in the narrative part, lately written, of the Memoirs, and in his official report of the battle of Shiloh, which is inserted in full in vol. 1, p. 235, Sherman speaks repeatedly of this army, and of its officers by name, in even higher terms than the reviewer himself. A few of these passages are here quoted:

" Here I saw for the first time the well-ordered and compact columns of General Buell's Kentucky forces, whose soldiery movements at once gave confidence to our newer and less disciplined forces. Here I saw Willich's regiment advance upon a point of water-oaks and thicket, behind which I knew the enemy was in great strength, and enter it in beautiful style. Then arose the severest musketry fire I ever heard, and lasted some twenty minutes, when this splendid regiment had to fall back."

" The enemy had one battery close by Shiloh, and another near Hamburg road, both pouring grape and cannister upon any column of troops that advanced toward the green point of water-oaks. Willich's regiment had been repulsed, but a whole brigade of McCook's division advanced beautifully, deployed and entered this dreaded woods."

" Eousseau's brigade moved, in splendid, order, steadily to the front, sweeping everything before it."

SHILOH. 15

" McCook's splendid division from Kentucky drove back the enemy along the Corinth road, . . . where Beauregard commanded in person."

Sherman nowhere speaks in as high terms as these of his oion troops engaged in this battle!

To compare with this, we will state what General Grant has said about the same troops on this occasion, together wnth the reviewer's comments on it (Review, p. 42) :

" Concerning the actors in this battle, General Grant says: " ' Of the part taken by each separate command, I can not take special notice in this report, but will do so more fully' when the reports of the division commanders are handed in. General Buell coming on the field with a distinct army long under his command, and which did such etBcient service, commanded by himself in person on the field, will be much better able to notice those of his command who particularly distinguished themselves, than I possibly can.' "

" In this report General Grant says nothing of himself, and nil of good that he could about others."

If this is all the good he could say about Buell and his troops, he certainly has said far less than General Sherman did. But let us see what comment the reviewer makes about Sherman's words of praise (Review, p. 39) ; which words, however, knowing, as he must, that they would condemn him, he does not give, nor does he in any way lead his readers to suspect their import: "But," he says, "it has never heretofore answered General Sherman's purpose to state the facts about Buell's army at Shiloh."

Such downright unfairness as this can only be the ofispring of malice joined to a vindictive spirit, which men of small understanding can easily develop by careful training and long practice.

' No other report was afterward made by Grant.

Chapter IV

lUKA AND CORINTH.

General Rosecrans defended.

In this chapter, the reviewer invites attention to the battle at luka, and attempts to fix upon the Memoirs a misrepresentation of General Rosecrans. It has alwa3^s been understood that Grant was disappointed with the conduct of Rosecrans upon that occasion, and the Memoirs give substantially the same account of this affair as the best informed writers^ have given, varying as personal recollections usually vary from accounts made up from reports, documents, etc., but there is no expression in the Memoirs of disrespect toward General Rosecrans. They do say that Grant was offended with him, and the facts sustain the statement. There had been delay, caused, according to General Grant's official report, " by the blundering of a guide." It seems that the delay in attacking Price, in concert with General Ord, deranged Grant's plans. This offended or disappointed him. The blundering of the guide misled Rosecrans, and caused the delay. The Memoir says " Grant was off"ended;" but, "that in his (Sherman's) experience, these concerted movements generally fail, unless with the best of troops, and then in a country on whose roads some reliance can be placed, which is not the case in northern Mississippi." It is plain that General Grant in his report is excusing Rosecrans for the delay, while commending him for what he accomplished. The most reliable accounts which we have of the matter, are that Rosecrans dispatched to Grant, early in the evening of the 18th September, that he was about to

1 An intelligent writer, speaking of Grant's plans about these two battles, says: "He knew from his scouts that Van Dorn's army could not reacb Corinth for four days. This would give him time to punish Price's temerity at luka, and then return to receive Yan Dorn with a warm welcome at Corinth. But every hour was of incalculable importance." — Grant and his Campaigns, p. 122. (16)

lUKA AND CORINTH. 17

move for luka, and would close in npon the enemy that nio^ht, pursuant to previous orders. General Ord was to advance from Burnsville, while Rosecrans was to move northward, in two columns, from Rieiizi, and attack from that direction. Instead of moving at once, he was delayed until midnight, at which time he dispatched to Grant that he could not reach luka before one or two o'clock the next day. This was the disappointment, because Grant feared that Van Dorn would join Price, and his desire was to have Ord and Kosecrans join in the attack upon Price before this junction.^ The reader can readily understand the statements of the Memoirs, and that Grant's report excusing Kosecrans in no way tends to contradict the statement that he was otfended and disappointed. In his zeal to contradict the Memoir, the reviewer apparently fails to comprehend the application of the language in the records.

So far as the statements relate the retreat from Corinth, the facts are these. After the retreat of the rebels began, on the 5th (October), Rosecrans started in pursuit, but by some error, he took a road north of the one which the rebels took, and they thus obtained a few hours the start of him. This advantage made it appear to General Grant useless to keeji up the pursuit, and so he ordered it discontinued against Rosecran's protest. I do not wish to express any opinion as to whether Grunt or Rosecrans was right in this matter, but the simple fact that Grant ordered the pursuit abandoned, and Rosecrans protested against abandoning it, is enough to authorize the statement in the Memoirs that Grant was displeased. Tliis inference is evident from the correspondence published by the reviewer. Instead, therefore, of his records tending to contradict Sherman, they confirm his statements.

J The following is Biidejiu's account. Military History of General Grant, p. 112, ei seq.: "On the 18th of Sepleinber, Ord was pushed furward to within four miles of luka, where he found the enemy in force, on the north side of the town ; and the same day, Rosecrans reported to Grant his readiness 'to move up as close as we can to-night. . . . Ord to advance from Burnsville, commence the attack, and draw their attention that way, while I move in on the Jacinto and Fulton roads, massing heavily on

18 lUKA AND COEINTH.

the Fulton road, and crushing in their left, cutting off their retreat eastward. I propose to move in ten minutes for Jacinto.' Grant ordered him to advance rapidly, and 'let us do to-morrow all we can; it may be necessary to fall back the day following.' The falling back was in the event of Van Dorn's attack on Corinth. This dispatch was dated fifteen minutes before 7 p. m.; but, after midnight, Eosecrans sent word that he had been detained, and was still twenty miles from luka, and could not ' be in ' before 1 or 2 o'clock the next afternoon, the roads being in bad condition and the country thickly wooded. This greatly disappointed Grant, who had expected to fight on the morrow, early, and had supposed Rosecrans to be by this time far on his way to luka. He consequently directed Ord, who was quite ready to bring on an engagement iu an hour's time, not to attack from the north until Rosecrans arrived, or until he should hear firing in the south. Rosecrans was notified, by his return-messenger, of this change in Ord's instructions ; but owing to the density of the forests and the difficulty of crossing the small streams and bottoms, all communication between Grant and Rosecrans was circuitous and delayed. . . .

" The wind had blown heavily to the south and east the day before, and no sound of the firing had reached Ord; during the night, however, he had had word of the battle from negroes, and so pushed on toward the town, in the morning, in advance of Grant's order. Soon afterwards, Grant himself learned that the enemy were in full retreat; had in fact left luka during the night, on the Fulton road, which it had been expressly arranged that Rosecrans was to occupy with Hamilton's division. Getting up late, however, he had failed to do this, and the rebels discovering how nearly they were surrounded by the concentration of Grant's forces, held Rosecrans in check on one road and escaped by night on the other, taking with them everything except their wounded, and the artillery they had captured the day before. "When Grant arrived at luka, at 9 o'clock A. M., the pursuit was not yet begun. He at once gave orders to follow, but the enemy had already got so far that it was found impossible now to overtake him.

" Grant had notified Rosecrans, in advance, of the movement of Hurlbut and Ord, and, anticipating the victory at Corinth, had directed that commander to push on instantly after his success, if necessary even to Bolivar; fpr, if Ord's little force encountered the whole rebel army, the danger would be great, unless Rosecrans followed up rapidly. But the troops were fatigued by two days' fight, and Rosecrans contented himself with riding over the field to announce in person his victory. At noon of the 4th he gave directions to rest that day, and move in pursuit on the morrow. When he reported his action to Grant, the latter, greatly disappointed at the delay, again issued peremptory orders to push on at once after the enemy.

" Rosecrans started out on the morning of the 5th, but was misinformed or misled, and took the road toward Chewalla, instead of that farther south, by which the eneniy had moved. After marching about eight miles out of the way, he discovered his blunder, and turned his column toward the Hatchie.

lUKA AND CORINTH. 19

" Had Rosecrans promptly moved the day before, he would have come up in the rear of Van Dorn, either as he was fighting Ord, or while attempting to pass this defile. In either event, the destruction of the rebels must have been complete; but the national forces arrived at the Hatchie, just as the rear-guard of the enemy bad crossed. Ilosecrans, from here, sent word again to Grant of the condition of afl'airs, and Grant decided that the favorable opportunity had been lost."