Representative government. The true method of reaching concerted action and of finding the will of a concurring majority in the election of representatives of the people ..

Front matter

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Preface

The following pages are intended to show the force and application of a method of direct voting, by which the people of a free government may at once reach concerted action in the election of their representatives.

It requires but a superficial examination by any one familiar with the present methods of selecting our government officials, to discover that a large proportion of the corrupt political practices debasing our government at its every phase, are to be found in the method of making party nominations, by submitting to a series of delegatings, to caucuses, conventions, conferences and so on ; and, that they still further result from our submission to a government conducted by and wholly emanating from the one or the other of two great permanent parties, into which the people are divided.

Recognizing that delegates may disregard their instructions, or, may barter away their votes for personal ends, I asked myself the question : Why may not the instructions given to delegates, providing them with successive choices among the candidates so that they may finally reach concerted action, be placed upon paper, and a count from these papers when collected, in imitation of the repeated ballotings of a convention of delegates, be made to take the place of these delegates meeting in a convention. And then, the further question : If the instructions of a district intended for a delegate, may thus be placed upon a paper from which they may be counted, why not have each individual voter cast his own complete instructions as his vote, and thus have every election decided by the whole body of voters concerned, at one direct election.

The answers to these queries were satisfactory and complete ; and, when formulated, show that if each voter will name upon his ticket not only his first choice among the candidates in the field, but, provisionally name such succeeding choices to whom he would be willing to yield in order to reach concerted action with his fellows, the voters throughout would thus provide the means or the returns, from which by a simple count, may be determined the candidate upon whom a majority of the whole number of voters have first concurred.

This method of reaching concerted action and of finding the candidate upon whom a majority of the whole body of voters will first concur, by one direct election, at once made it evident that submission to the delegate system was no longer necessary. And still further, because by this method of direct voting a final election can be made from among three or more candidates, with as full an opportunity for the whole body of voters to reach a concurring majority as when the candidates have been reduced to two, having each of these the candidate of an organized party, the party method of government, or, having the people divided into two permanently opposing party organizations, was also proven to be unnecessary.

In other words, it will be shown that the people of a free government may select their representatives to fill any official position whatsoever, at one direct election by the whole number of voters concerned, reaching concerted action and determining the candidate upon whom a majority of their whole number will first concur, without resorting to delegates, or, submitting to permanent party organization in any form or manner.

Since the general enlightenment of the people, and the many and complete means of conveying intelligence to one another and to all parts of the country, have made them so generally familiar with the issues before the country, and equally familiar with the leading men in governmental affairs, it can no longer be argued that delegating would secure superior wisdom in making a selection of those best fitted to fill our public offices. Nor can it well be shown that permanent party organizations are needed to point out or establish great truths or principles for the people to defend. But, when once the people have reclaimed and established their right to select their own representatives, by the proposed method of direct elections, it may well be assumed that an honest and patriotic use of the public press, and other means of extending general information among the people, will still further enlighten them upon their duties as sovereigns of a great country, and with the responsibilities accompanying the use of the elective franchise.

After it has been shown that this method of direct voting affords the only true means of reaching concerted action, and that it solves with mathematical exactness the problem of finding upon whom a majority of the whole number of voters will first concur, it will still remain as a part of the purpose of these pages, to point out at least some of the more prominent evils connected with the system of delegating in making party nominations, and as a method of electing men to office ; and also, some of the evils resulting from our submission to permanent party organizations among us.

My aim will be to show, that, by delegating the right to elect men to office, to a few men, we afford professional office seekers the opportunity to autocratically secure for themselves the offices of the government; and to show further, that this system of delegating is not only unnecessary but dangerous, that submitting to permanently organized political parties in conducting our government is unnatural and unnecessary, and that it is dangerously opposed to the existence and continuation of political freedom among us.

Believing these propositions to be established beyond question, I confidently urge that committees of individuals, and that schools both public and private should take up the purely philosophical problem herein proposed ; examine into its nature and significance, familiarize themselves with its workings, and teach its truths to the masses of freemen and to their children throughout the land.

In the greatest sincerity, I further recommend that local or

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corporate organizations of men, and, that communities in conducting their local governments should at once adopt the proposed method of direct voting in the election of all their officers. And that it should be early adopted by the people in conducting their municipal governments ; in the election of all elective officers, and in deciding every issue or question where a choice is to be made from among three or more propositions.

And still further, I hope to see it soon adopted by the people of the States and Nation, and finally, that our National Constitution shall be so amended, that the methods it directs for the election of the highest officers of our government, shall be made to conform to the true spirit of popular rule.

Let no one hastily assume to pronounce, that, although the proposed method of direct voting may be right, its introduction is an impracticable scheme. The primary question is, whether it is right. That which is right is always practicable, and may be very readily introduced where the right is respected.

Respectfully,

Thos. D. Ingram, M. D.

West Chester, Pa., May, 1884.

CHAPTER I.— Introductory. THE PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING THE STRUCTURE OF A FREE GOVERNMENT

The basis of monarchical or autocratic rule contrasted with the principles of a free government, 1 — The importance of establishing the true significance of political freedom, 2 — Political freedom defined, 2 — The sentiments or convictions which arouse the desire for political liberty, 4 — The conditions necessary to establish a free government, 4 — When these sentiments and conditions exist among men they are impelled to demand political liberty, 4 — The evils defended under the plea of conservatism, o — A Free Government is instituted for mutual protection and not for production, 5 — Government is a structure in action, and the methods adopted for conducting it are as important as the principles it aims to defend, 6 — The people of a Free Government have less use for a " Bill of Rights," than they have for a sure and equitable method of expressing the popular will, 6— Ours, a representative form of free government, 6 — The will of a concurring majority must be acceded to in the selection of representatives, 7 — A true method of finding the will of a concurring majority, the only safe defence of equal political rights, 7.

Chapter II

THE TRUE METHOD OF REACHING CONCERTED ACTION, AND OF FINDING THE WILL OF A CONCURRING MAJORITY.

In conducting an election, if only two candidates are to be selected from, the problem is simple, 8 — But, when more than two candidates are to be selected from, the problem becomes more complex, 8 — The conditions which this more complex problem presents ; and the necessity which demands that some voters must yield and support a second choice in order to concur with their fellows, 8 — A method of voting directly for the candidates, which provides the voters a means of reaching concerted action, and which affords the basis for a true solution of the problem of finding upon whom a majority of the whole number of voters will first concur, 9 — This method of voting illustrated, 9— The tally sheet or the returns from an election illustrated, 10— The method of summing up the returns from an election illustrated, and the significance of this truthful

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method of finding the candidate upon whom a majority will first concur, set forth, 11 — The method applicable to any number of voters whether in a convened body or widely scattered, 11 — And applicable to any number of candidates, or, to the selection of one from three or more propositions, 12 — This method of voting would make it possible to conduct a purely democratic form of government, 12 — Its great significance in the selection of representatives of the people by a direct vote of the whole body of voters to be represented, 12 — The proposed method of a single direct election compared with the present complex method of selecting our official representatives, 12 — The requirements of the present method made use of in determining who shall fill an official place, 12 — Reasons for the origin and development of the existing complex method, 13 — The proposed method of finding the will of a majority compared with its attempted solution by the trial ballotings of a convention, 13 — The first ballot of a convention of delegates compared to the primary result by the direct method of voting, 14 — The difficulties attending a delegates' making a second choice in order to reach a concurrence with his fellows, 14 — The purposes for which an individual voter will name a second choice upon his ticket, 14 — The repeated ballotings of a convention often a mere test of the delegates' endurance, 15 — When a delegate adopts a second choice and thus adds his support to those who had before made this candidate their first choice, it has the same significance as when the number of individual voters making a candidate their second choice, are added to those who had before made him their first choice, by the proposed method of direct voting, 15— The trial ballotings of a convention resemble a game of chance, 15 — Arbitrary rules adopted by conventions to modify the evils of repeated ballotings, manifestly unfair, 16 — The trial ballotings of a convention illogical and uncertain, — delegating and redelegating the party voice, the source of evil and of political corruption, 16 — The division of the people into permanently opposing political parties unnatural, and the source of danger to our free institutions, 17 — Apparent objections to the working of the proposed method of direct voting, anticipated and answered, 17 — The supposition that a formidable number of candidates will be voted for,' unfounded, 17 — The fear that but few of the voters will name a second choice, unfounded, 18 — Reasons why many voters will name provisional choices, 18 — Principles which will guide a voter in naming succeeding choices, 18 — Further directions for the summing up of the returns and final solution of the problem in all contingencies, 19— Examples where the actual working of the proposed method of voting has been exhibited, 2Q — These modest examples exhibit the same problem as that presented in the election of any officer from a town constable to the President of the United

States, 24 — The universal application of this method of solving the problem where a choice is to be made from among three or more persons, or, where a choice is to be made from three or more propositions of things, whatsoever, 24 — The adoption of the proposed method of voting would avoid the uncertainties of trial ballotings, the evils of delegating, and the corrupt practices of permanent party organizations, 24— It is the universal weapon for the defence of political freedom, 25.

IX CHAPTER III.

THE ILLOGICAL NATURE, AND THE EVILS ATTENDING THE PRESENT METHOD

OP REACHING CONCERTED ACTION AND OP FINDING THE

WILL OP A MAJORITY.

Permanently opposing party organizations, limited to two, dividing the people of a free government, shown to have no natural or just existence, 26 — Party organizations continuing to exist after the original purpose of their harmonizing has been accomplished, are opposed tb our original compact of National unity, 27 — A Party organization becomes permanent in order to conduct the delegate system, in making the party nominations, 28 — Other reasons for permanency of organization, 28 — The Evils of the Delegate System, 29 — The purpose of the delegate method in determining upon a party candidate, 29— Why this method of finding the will of a majority of the whole number of voters is illogical and uncertain in its results, 30 — Primary delegates represent but added majorities, or often, but added pluralities of the whole number of party voters, 30 — State or National delegates need represent but one-fourth of the party voters, and a nomination may be determined by delegates representing the concerted action of but one-eighth of the party voters, 31 — Taking advantage of these possibilities affords a corrupt means of securing office, 31 — The system of delegating and re-delegating has no relationship to the principle forming the basis of a representative government, 32 — Because the delegate system is illogical, and because it is so complex, it affords the opportunities for the practice of innumerable political evils, 32 — It affords party officers, and party managers, and office-seekers an opportunity to control the party nominations, 33 — Methods by which a few party managers determine the delegates and thus pervert the will of the people, 33 — The corrupt bargainings of office-seekers and party managers in delegate conventions, in caucuses and conferences, and in secret committees, 34 — The repeated ballotings of a con* vention of delegates much like the rehearsal of a farce, while their final decision has much the nature of the result of a game of chance, 35 — The uncertainty, and the farcical nature of the repeated ballotings of a convened body exhibited in the election of United States Senators, 35 — Recapitulation of the reasons why the delegate system is illogical and uncertain in its results, 36 — A review of the opportunities afforded for corrupt political practices, and of some of the evils attending the use of this illogical system in making party nominations, 37 — The seeming paradox, why so many intelligent voters should submit to this delegate system, and yet, for themselves take no part in it, 38 — Their " apathy" frequently rebuked by superficial political philosophers, 39 — The long habit of not thinking the delegate system to be wrong has given it the superficial appearance of being right, 39 — The organizing of Vigilant Committees and their attempts at " political reform" fruitless, for want of concerted action between sufficient numbers, and, because they have known of no means whereby large numbers of voters may reach concerted

action except by delegating, 40 — Reasons why any and every attempt at "Political Reform" must fail so long as the people submit to delegating, 41 — The only remedy for these evils to be found in the true method of reaching concerted action, and of finding the will of a concurring majority by one direct vote of the whole people, 42.

Chapter IV. The Evils Of Permanent Party Organization

Party organization may be the best, and may often be the only successful means of reaching concerted action in advancing a great public cause, but, by being permanenily organized it may become as dangerous a power for evil as it was primarily a power for good, 44 — Permanent party organization is opposed to the spirit of compact forming the basis of our government, and is prejudicial 'to the best interests of the whole people, 45 — Opposing political parties in a limited monarchy are natural, there, they represent a continual contest between the desire for freedom, on the one hand, and the defence of monarchy on the other, between the rights of the masses, and the oppression of an aristocracy, 45 — There can be no permanent contest among the people of a free country, 46 — Permanent parties among a free people destroy the loyalty and love due to their country, and develop a contest for power, 46— Permanent party -organization has substituted a love of party for love of country, 47 — Permanent party organizations contesting for power have made " spoils" and plunder out of the public offices, and out of every form of government patronage or favor, 47 — The great contests for party favor at the party primaries or delegate elections, 48 — Party platforms very often but mere platitudes, or schemes to enlist the unwary, 48 — Party success and the party name become the watchwords of office-seekers, 48 — Permanent party organizations arouse prejudices and jealousies which affect the social and business associations of the whole people, 48 — Party organizations from their inherent evils, finally fall by revolution, 49 — But, the same pitfalls as before await the organizing of a new party, 49 — The contests for power between two opposing political parties have made much of the history of our government, 49 — The party in power the one enjoying the fruit of a mere contest for spoils, 50— Submission to party government, a government emanating from a majority of the office-holders of the dominant party, 50— The decision of a party caucus final, 50 — The election of all officers determined by party caucus, and all legislation must submit to the decision of a caucus by the dominant party, 50 — Legislation is impeded, and, when one branch of a legislature is dominated by one party and the other branch by the other party, important legislation may be lost, 51 — In State Legislatures thus composed, entrusted with the election of United States Senators and with the apportionments of the state, political " dead-locks" ensue, 51 — Every issue in every department or division of the government is made to have a partisan signification, and every question is made to yield a share of " spoils" for partisan purposes, 51 — The contests for place within the party, and the opportunities to manipulate the delegate system, the scene of the greatest- personal strivings for office, 52— Office-seekers become party managers and manipulators of the delegate system, 52— How a United

States Senator becomes the great party " boss," and how a few United States Senators become a great oligarchy of power in the management of the party, 52 — The power of a United States Senator to secure his own reelection, 53— The power of a few United States Senators in determining the party presidential candidate, 53 — The right claimed by these United States Senators, through " sena-

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torial courtesy," to dispose of the great appointments to office and other executive favors, 54 — The offices of the government filled by appointment, used as " spoils " and made to purchase a control of those intended to be elective, 64 — The community of purpose among office-seekers, and their combining to contribute to each other's success, 54 — Party managers and party leaden avoid new issues because they disintegrate the party, "Fealty to party" their watchword, and party glamour and excitement their best hope for personal success, 65 — All office-holding is afforded an autocratic significance, and office-seeking becomes a life-long profession, because a few men are entrusted with the power to nominate, or, in other cases to finally elect to office, and because these few men may too often be purchased with money or with political favors, 55— Our government shown to be an oppressive autocracy, 56— The evils of permanent party organisation and the evils of the delegate system recounted in order to make plain their remedy, 57 — Gen. Washington's farewell address, warning the people of the evils sure to result from party organizations in a free government, 57 — The dangers from permanent parties characterized by geographical discriminations realized, and the evils resulting from them experienced, 59 — Gen. Washington's warnings "against the baneful effects of the spirit of party generally," 60 — Political parties permanently defending the rights of the people in a monarchical government, natural and defensible, 61 — Had the people of this government known how to reach concerted action without submitting to delegates, the evils of delegating and of permanent party organizations, would have been averted, 61 — Oar government grown cumbersome, and extravagant from submission to the autocratic rule of office-seekers, 62 — The high hopes of a free government entertained by our fathers, not realized, 62— The efforts of the people aiming at political reform have proven fruitless, because they have not removed the cause of the evils ; because they have not known how to avoid delegating, and how to avoid permanent party organizations, as means of reaching concerted action, 62 — To teach the true means of reaching concerted action, and the true method of finding the will of a majority of the whole people in selecting their representatives throughout, the aim and purpose of this work, 63.

Chapter V. The President And Vice-president Of The United States Should Be

ELECTED AT ONE DIRECT ELECTION BY THE

WHOLE PEOPLE.

AND,

UNITED 8TATES SENATORS SHOULD BE ELECTED AT ONE DIRECT ELECTION BY THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE.

Considerations to be regarded in proposing amendments to our National Constitution, 64 — The methods directed by the Constitution for the election of the superior officers of the government shown to have been the result of compromise, 64 — Evidence that this nation of people recognize in themselves the only true source of all governmental authority, 65 — Notes from Bancroft's History of the Constitution, 65— The Virginia plan of electing an evecutive,

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and of electing United States Senators, 65 — James Wilson, the earnest defender of the peopled right to rule, 66 — The mode of electing a President a perplexing problem, which long baffled the convention, 68 — Foremost in undiminished disapproval of the choice of the executive by the legislature were Washington, Madison, Wilson, Gouverneur Morris, and Gerry, 70 — Wilson's difficulty in finding a satisfactory plan for electing the President, 71 — Final submission to an election by electors meeting in their respective States, and, in case of a majority not concurring, the eventual choice to be decided by the House of Representatives, voting by States, 72 — Evidence that the most patriotic members of the convention desired to establish a government with its official representatives elected directly by the people, 72 — Because these true patriots knew of no method by which the whole body of voters could reach concerted action, they were forced to submit to a plan of delegating the power to elect men to office to a few men, 72 — Evidence that they submitted to the method of delegating from necessity and not from choice, 73 — Electors entrusted with the election of a President, and State Legislators entrusted with the election of United States Senators recognized by the people as having only the significance of delegates, 73 — Electors are not permitted to determine upon a President by their own choice, but are instructed with a precise trust, 73 — Because electors meeting in separate state colleges or conventions, at once lost all significance toward reaching concerted action, this duty has been transferred to party nominating conventions, 74 — How voting for electors, since the adoption of the general ticket system emphasizes the evils of the " unit rule," 75 — How it is possible for a minority of the voters of the country to elect a President in defiance of an opposing majority, 75 — The evils of the electoral system, and its perversion by the adoption of the general ticket system pointed out by Senator Benton and others in 1824, 75 — Senator Benton's defense of a plan of direct voting for the President and Vice-President by districts, 76 — Reasons why we should not entrust the election of a President to electors, discussed by Benton, 77 — The evils then so well pointed out as belonging to the electoral system, now shown to belong to delegates meeting in nominating conventions, 78— Reasons why the gratitude of a President when elected, is given to the few delegates who nominated him, and not to the great mass of voters who elected him to office, 79 — Summing up of the evils resulting from our delegating to a few men the power to determine upon party candidates, 80— The tendency to bargain for office or favor, when nominations or elections are entrusted to a few men acting as delegates has proven to be irresistible, 80 — The present method of electing United States Senators illustrates the field for intriguing and corrupt office-seeking afforded by

delegating the power to elect men to office in its fullest extent, 81 — The method directed by the constitution the result of a compromise, 81 — Why it was accepted by the patriotic members of the convention quite irreconcilable, 81 — The method defended by the few men holding the offices of State legislators, for selfish purposes, 82 — The same personal interests the source of the doctrine of " States' Rights," 82 — The method urged as a means of defending " aristocratic interests " because it afforded the opportunity of retaining power in the hands of the few, 82 — James Wilson's pure and patriotic arguments against these doctrines, 83 — The people now attempt to

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instruct their State legislators who to support for the United States Senatorship, 84 — The evils resulting from electing United States Senators by delegated authority graver than the evils of delegating in making party nominations, 84 — The various series of delegatings joined together in one great complex political machine under the control of party managers and party leaders, 85— The power of a United States Senator to secure his own re-election determines him as the great party " boss," 85 — Conclusive evidence that the language and intent of the Constitution is no longer respected by the people, while the submission to a perverted interpretation of its directions has simply served to complicate and increase the evils of delegating, 86 — The remedy for the evils resulting from delegating to be found in the proposed method of direct voting, 87 — Amendments of the Constitution proposed which will at once establish for us a Eepresentative, Government truthfully emanating from the people's will, 87.

Chapter VI. The Civil Service Evil And Its Remedy

Why the large number of officers employed in the executive branch of the government may not be elected directly by the people, 88— The method directed by the Constitution for their appointment, 88 — The minor grades of these officers known as the civil service of the country, 89 — The use made of the appointing power has given rise to the civil service question, 89 — The power of appointing men to office made one of the " spoils" of party government, 89 — Other " spoils" of the party in power, 89 — The corrupt use made of the appointing power, 89 — Promises of appointments to office exchanged for political services in controlling party nominations, and for aiding in securing an election to office, 89 — This corrupt traffic the real civil service evil, 90 — Other results of the evil, 90 — Removals from office, — Political assessments, etc., 90 — Why this traffic between the candidates for elective offices, and those seeking offices by appointment is corrupt, 91 — Why office-holding throughout is in no way accountable to the people, 92— Our government controlled by the few crafty enough to secure its official places, 92 — The civil service evil but an outgrowth of the evils of delegating and of permanent party organizations, 92 — The motive or consideration influencing the appointing powers but one part of the corrupt contract, 93 — Why controlling nominations and deceiving the people in the election of their higher officers is the graver evil, and, is the cause of corruption in making appointments, 93— The importance of applying the remedy to the cause of an evil, 93— The Act of Congress, entitled " An Act to regulate and improve the civil service of the United States" an attempt to relieve the servile allegiance of the minor or appointed officers to their superiors, 93 — Why legislation against the results of the evil, and allowing the cause to continue, will not stop the corrupt traffic in the offices of the government, 94 — Reasons why competitive examinations should be conducted under the direction of the superior officer in charge of the department or branch wherein the appointments are to be made, 95 — Why the recently adopted method will invite insubordination, and a want of proper accountability from the minor