The real Chinese question

Preface

That is a charitable rule of life which bids us take every man at his best. It is, however, wiser and safer to study each individual as thoroughly as circumstances will permit, and then to strike a balance between good and evil traits of character, accepting the result as a basis for judgment and action, so far as he is concerned. The same rule may be broadened with safety, and applied to nations or races. If, in such use, it serves no other purpose, it will, at least, act as a corrective to ignorant prejudice, and to that most common fault, prejudgment.

There is much force, and a wide range of applicability, to that French saying : ** Les absens out tou jours tort/* the absent are always in the wrong. Their story is seldom fairly told, the motives and causes which led to any particular conduct are seldom brought into a plain light, and judgment goes against them by misrepresentation or default. This rule of common practice is, also, not less applicable to nations and races than to individual members of the human family.

iv PREFACE

The Chinese, whether the term be used as referring to persons of the race, or to the nation, or to the government of the nation, have suffered enormously from it. They have been " the absent" in the past. And one has only to glance at the columns of the daily press, or to read some more serious articles in magazine literature, to realize how closely the French quotation applies to them. Any statement, any tale, however incoherent, absurd, grotesque, or self-contradictory, is accepted, if it only be applied to the Chinese. The Travels of Gulliver, fairy tales, and the Wonderful Adventures of Mother Hubbard's Dog all sink into the most insipid and unexciting, matter-of-fact prose when brought into contrast with current stories about the Chinese.

It is not merely in the tales and fictitious descriptions, such as may serve to while away an idle hour, that they have suffered, and that wrong has been done to them. In matters of the gravest importance, in those upon which turn the issues of peace or war, upon which national existence may hang, the Chinese have been " the absent," and have been judged and found guilty, either upon no statement, or the enemies' statement, of their case. For until recently, at least, the Chinese have also been silent. They have been

PREFACE V

unable, or have not cared, to defend themselves or maintain their cause before the great Western world of thinking men and women. They have failed to recognize the power which this body holds to control and direct the actions of governments, and which it has been known, upon occasion, to exercise. Hence, everything has gone against them.

By way of example, it is not possible to believe that if the fair-minded and generous-spirited men and women of Great Britain had been accurately and plainly informed of the facts; if they had known what ruin was being wrought upon the Chinese ; if they had been made at all familiar with the arguments, protests, and appeals of the Imperial Government, and with its bitter opposition; if they had understood the infamous purpose for which British soldiers and British ships of war were sent to China, and used there, and blood was shed, and lives wasted — if they could have been made to see all these things, it is not possible to believe that their government would have been allowed to persist in the opium traffic, and to work such a cruel wrong upon China. But China was " absent." And China was silent when she should have appealed to a larger audience than the ministers, who cared little for vi PREFACE appeals and protests; she should have appealed to a power higher than the Throne, to the power behind it.

Chinese statesmen have been fond of saying that " China is a slumbering dragon." Of late China has been, not that, perhaps, but a dragon not fully awake to his danger and the necessities of his condition. Long outside the whirl of modern life, but being gradually drawn within it, he has neither adjusted himself to the situation nor realized its demands. And he can only complain in a language which the world does not understand.

Too much has been written about China from a purely foreign standpoint. The shelves are full of books — notably English — telling with great detail and much ingenuity what China wants, what China desires, and what is best for China, with the sole object of promoting the interests of British commerce, and thwarting the possible designs of Russia, and every other Power. But regarding what China needs, for China* s sake, the world of literature is markedly silent. It hardly need be said that volumes, written either in defence or elaboration of some foreign policy, are seldom or never just and fair to the Chinese. They are not written in order to describe how the natives of the empire feel, what they desire,

PREFACE vii

nor what they say. Nor are they written to give broad and general views of any question from the native standpoint, as well as from that of the foreigner. Upon the contrary, everything is focused down to a single point of view, and that of foreign interest and profit.

The result is most unfortunate, as the present situation must plainly show. A cyclone, a volcano, an earthquake, or by any other fearful name that it may be called, has suddenly burst into terrible activity in the Chinese Empire, accompanied with horrors and agonies which no man dare describe. Tens of thousands of unoffending men and women and helpless children have been slain. Millions upon millions of money have been wasted in brutal riot, and as much more in the effort to suppress it, and none can yet see the end. The continued existence of China as a nation hangs quivering in the balance.

And yet, in these days of quick communication and, what may be termed, universal information ; when everybody is supposed to know everything; when every nook and cranny of the world have been invaded and explored ; when floods of books and avalanches of newspapers cover the earth, telling everything that is true and much that is not; when the contents of this globe have ceased to be matters of speculation, and men have turned viii PREFACE

their eyes to Mars and other planets — in such times as these, in the presence of such a hideous catastrophe as the uprising of an immense race of men in frenzied defiance of all Western nations, the great masses of the most intelligent and best-informed in those nations are gazing at each other in astonishment, wondering what has been the cause of it all.

Whereas, any fair knowledge of events and influences at work in China during the past sixty years, knowledge which involved even a moderate acquaintance with the Chinese side of the history, no less than the foreign, would cause wonder, not at the outbreak, but that it had delayed so long. Better than that, such just information would have prevented the outbreak, by destroying the cause.

It is the purpose of this volume to bring before the thoughtful and fair-minded public some portions of the history referred to, and to explain certain forces and influences which operate in China to give those who may read it an opportunity to realize how certain events and certain lines of Western policy must have appeared to and have affected the Chinese. In doing this, it may help to furnish a wiser and safer basis for judgment and decision of the real Chinese ques-

tl02l

PREFACE ix

The volume apologizes for and defends no one, least of all the Chinese. It states facts, some of which are painful and humiliating, but which ought to be stated, and which are neither exaggerated nor overdrawn. It appeals not for China, but for fair play.

Chester Holcombe.

September 15, 1900.

ANALYSIS OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER I. Some Serious Mistakes 1-29

Insufficient grounds of prejudice, i. Friction and conflict result from misconception of Chinese character, 2. Importance of better understanding, 3. Empire not in condition of anarchy, 3. Chinese satisfied with form of government, 4. Much freedom of action permitted, 4. Chinese obedient and fond of order, 4. Orderly disposition of Chinese in United States, 5. Prefer their own systems, 6. Will not allow others to decide for them, 6. Chinese and foreigners at cross purposes, 7. Chinese resent being imposed upon or treated as children, 8. Shanghai- Woosung Railway, 8. Restrictions upon foreign commerce, 12. Source of trouble and dispute, 12. Chinese side of question, 13. Forces discrimination against Chinese, 13. Interferes with Government revenue, 15. Foreign revenue used to pay foreign loans, 16. Lekin tax, 16. Opposition to foreign improvements not due to bigotry and superstition, 16. Object to employment of foreigners, 17. Chinese labor question, 17. Silk filatures at Shanghai, 20. Railway from Tientsin to Peking, 24. Chinaman docile but stubborn, 26. Exceedingly sensitive, 27. Similar in essential characteristics to Anglo-Saxons, 28.

xii ANALYSIS OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER II. Chinese Character 30-60

Chinese a conundrum, 30. A man and yet a child, 30. Many modern theories and ideas tested in China centuries ago, 31. Radical yet conservative, 32. Slow yet rapid, 32. Resents unsought advice, 33. Practical and capable of close discrimination, 35, Logical reasoner, 36. Anger at hypothecation of lekin tax, 36. Difficult to analyze Chinese down to original characteristics, 40. Are his peculiar ways and practices signs of a first or second childhood? 42. Chinese have fixed system for everything, 43. Fond of argument, 45. Always ready with natural, or forced, explanation, 47. Highly cultivated aesthetic taste, 48. Care of cemeteries, 49. High standard of literary taste, 50. Moderation — the root idea of Confucianism, 51. Grave points of weakness, 51. Acts mainly as a repressive force, 53. Unexpected and frenzied outbreaks the result, 53. Examples, 54. Causes of anti-foreign outbreaks, 55. Chinese cherish secret grudges, 56. Explanation of Boxer movement, 56, Chinese punctilious in courtesy, 57. Exacting in personal rights, 58. Generous and public spirited, 58. Bridges and temples, 58. His good-nature is the weaker side of the Chinaman, 58. Chinese not a decadent race, 59.

CHAPTER III. The Chinese Literati 61-89

Prominent in all Chinese affairs, 61. Membership open to all, 61. Constitutes immense literary

ANALYSIS OF CONTENTS xiii

The Chinese Literati — continued 61-89

aristocracy, 62. Are the brains of the nation and leaders in public opinion, 63. Impractical course of study, 64. Grotesque when compared with modern knowledge, 64. Cannot estimate number of living members, 66. Sketch of examinations, 66. Chinese eager for membership, 68. No certain ground for sweeping charges of corruption in examinations, 69. System of value in the past, 70. Four grades in Chinese social scale, 70. Graduates debarred from menial employment, 71. Many literati unable to secure official positions, 72. Unemployed, they form a large and dangerous body, 75. Two civil service rules, 75. " Expectant " officials, 76. " Searchers," 77. Literati as teachers and physicians, 78. As story-tellers, 79. As fortune-tellers, 80. Difficult to be held in check, 81. Origin of Confucianism as a cult, 82. System of morals rather than religion, 83. Literati the champions of the system, 84. Opposed to change, 85. Source of much of the anti- foreign sentiment, 87. Responsible for many anti-foreign outbreaks, 88.

CHAPTER IV. Chinese Societies 90-114

Chinese power of organization, 90. Peculiar form of clannishness, 90. Develops pride and provincialism, 91. Sources of clanship of locality, 92. Peking phases, 93. Combinations against Cantonese, 94. Clan divisions not of serious importance, 95. Chinese a chemical compound, 96. Commercial and labor combinations, 96. Provincial clubs xiv ANALYSIS OF CONTENTS

Chinese Societies — continued 90-114

or guilds, 98. Local mutual aid societies, 99. Temperance societies, 100. Secret social fraternities, 100. Absurd fictions regarding secret political combinations, loi. First appearance in China, 102. Little scope for politics in China, 103. No desire for change of government, 104. Satisfied with Manchu rule, 105. Little precaution taken against revolt, 106. Preventive measures, 107. " White Lily " sect, 108. Interdicted by Emperor Shun Chih, 109. Change of name, no. Action of Hong Kong authorities, no. Secret societies little cause of anxiety to government, no. " Ke Lao Huei," or " Society of Elder Brothers," in. Not a military conspiracy, 112. " Tai Ping Rebellion," 112. Author a disappointed malcontent, 113. The Boxer movement, 114.

CHAPTER V. The Chinese Army and Navy ii5-i47

Chinese Board of War, 115. Scope of duties,

115. Post-office system and " Bureau of Victories,"

116. Officers of Board of War, 116. Incapacity of members, 117. Board of War a barnacle office, 118. No intelligent officers available, 119. China has no army, 119. Description of Peking, 120. Under military control, 122. Form of organization, 122. Manchu soldiers, 123. Frauds in pay and rations, 124. Raids upon the Treasury, 125. Vices of soldiers, 126. Management of military affairs has drifted away from Peking, 127. Flexibility in government system, 127. Aside from

ANALYSIS OF CONTENTS xv

The Chinese Army and Navy — continued 1 15-147

Manchu soldiers, entire military system is provincial, 128. Utter lack of uniformity, 129. Resultant troubles, 129. Northern and southern superintendents of coast defense, 130. Li Hung Chang notable leader in military affairs, 132. Interference and opposition, 132. Agents for sale of military and naval supplies, 133. Influence and bribery, 134. Unfamiliarity with modern arms, 135, Lack of trained officers and disciplined soldiers, 136. Chinese educational mission to the United States, 137. Plan sought for Chinese Military School, 137. Unsatisfactory efforts to secure foreign military and naval instructors, 138. Competition among foreign Powers, 139. Two foreign military officers at Tientsin, 140. German officers at Nanking, 141. Any success due to Viceroy Li,

143. Chinese navy, 143. The " Osborne Flotilla,"

144. Chinese make good soldiers, 145. Possible size of Chinese army, 146. Last days of brave old Admiral Ting, 146.

CHAPTER VI. The Missionary 148-177

Hostile comment upon his work, 148. Claim that civilization and commerce should precede him, 149. Chinese possess high standard of morals, 150. Foreign objector to presence of young women in China as missionaries, 151. Mistaken notions of Chinese about social relations of foreigners, 152. Value of missionary homes as object lessons, 152. Views of Chinese official, 153. Work among Chinese women, 154. Missionaries not the cause of xvi ANALYSIS OF CONTENTS

The Missionary — continued 148-177

anti-foreign feeling, 155. Literati indifferent to missionaries, but hate them as foreigners, 156. Why mob violence is more frequently directed against missionaries, 157. Complaint not against natives because they become Christians, but that they become foreigners, 158. Missionaries not smuggled into the interior, 159. French treaty of 1858, 159. Foreign Powers protect them only as citizens, 161. Questionable wisdom of " Article of Toleration," 162. No occasion to argue question of interior residence, 163. Conceded as a favor by China, 164. Reparation for injuries, in China and elsewhere, 165. No complaint against Protestant missionaries as a class, 166. Valuable courtesies shown to missionaries by Chinese officials, 167. Chinese policy in religious matters uniformly tolerant, 169. The Nestorian faith, 170. Roman Catholic missions, 171. Chinese policy compared with that of certain Western Powers, 173. Missionaries not pugnacious, 174. Valuable services to commerce and civilization, 175. No wisdom in abandonment of nationality, 176. Missionaries rapidly gaining ground in China, 177.

CHAPTER VII. Diplomacy in China 178-215

Beginnings of commerce with China, 178. Early diplomatic missions, 178. Exchange of commodities, 179. Chinese engineers, physicians, and astrologers in Persia, 179. Diplomatic intercourse, 180. Trade at Canton, 180. East India Company

ANALYSIS OF CONTENTS xvii

Diplomacy in China — continued 178-215

and " Hong Merchants," 180. Right Honorable Lord Napier, 181. Insulting and bombastic corre spondence, 182. Ignorance of Chinese, 184. American and French missions,, 186. Struggle over right of residence at Peking, 187. War of 1858-60, 187. Chinese objections to diplomatic relations, 188. Commerce not connected with diplomacy, 189. Chinese conceit, 190. Audience question, 191. The Tsung li Yamen, 192. Appointments to membership in it, 193. Chinese difficulties, 194. Invariable courtesy of Chinese, 197. Diplomatic trickeries, 199. Macao and the Portuguese treaty, 200. Chinese lack of good faith, 201. Interference with rights of sovereignty, 202. Chung Hou and treaty of St. Petersburg, 203. Refusal to sign Japanese treaty, 204. Action of French Government in Tonquin, 205. Great Britain and Chefoo Convention, 205. Diplomat an educator, 206. Disregard of native prejudices, 206. Difficulties of language and interpretation, 208. French minister and Tsung li Yamen, 209. French vessels-of-war at Foochow, 210. Unskilled in international law, 212. Inevitable difficulties, 213. Personal equation large factor in Chinese diplomacy, 214.

CHAPTER VIII. Chinese Opinion of Foreigners 216-249

Universal love of home, 216. Beneficent results, 217. Transfer of allegiance difficult and slow, 217. Determine Chinese opinion of foreigners by foreign opinion of Chinese, 218. Comparison of xviii ANALYSIS OF CONTENTS

Chinese Opinion of Foreigners — continued 2 16-249

ideas, 219. Narrow grounds of Chinese opinion, 221. Ignorance concerning Western races, 221. Roman description of ancient Chinese, 222. Character of Europeans who visited China, 222. Dutch at Canton in 1506, 223. Chinese judge the many by the few, 223. Cowardly and obsequious demeanor of some, 225. Dutch at Peking in 1795, 225. Supernatural gifts attributed to foreigners, 226. Boxer movement, 228. Possible origin of idea, 228. Buddhist and Christian rivalry, 229. Chinese policy of seclusion, 230. Chinese originally invited foreign intercourse, 231. Unwelcome knowledge of past sixty years, 232. Chinese judge from their own standpoint, 233. Western atmosphere repugnant to Chinese, 234. Unaccustomed to world of to-day, 235. Partition of China, 236. Selfish advice and purposes, 237. Japanese position, 237. Characteristic incident, 238. Resent foreign air and conduct, 239. Unreasonable demands and criticisms, 242. Spheres of influence, 242. Failures of justice, 243. Injudicious conduct of Roman Catholic missionaries, 248. Anti-foreign feeling chronic and universal, 249.

CHAPTER IX. Opium 250-288

Modern China begins with 1842, 250. Opium war and treaty of Nanking, 250. Inception of foreign relations unfortunate, 251. Prejudice caused by opium traffic, 251. Chinese names of drug, 252. First knowledge of poppy, 252. Penalties for use

ANALYSIS OF CONTENTS xix

Opium — continued 250288

of opium, 252. Not used prior to 1775, 253. Early efforts to smuggle opium, 253. British East India Company monopoly, 253. Importation prohibited, 254. Growth of contraband traffic, 254. Spread of trade in opium, 255. British Government silent, 256. Increased efforts to suppress smuggling, 257. British Government favors the illicit trade, 257. Condition of opium trade in 1838, 258. Appointment and orders of Commissioner Lin, 259. His energetic action, 259. His correspondence with Captain Elliott, 260. Surrender and destruction of opium at Canton, 261. Failure of efforts of Commissioner, 262. Attitude of British authorities, 262. Blockade of and war at Canton, 263. Sir Henry Pottinger and Chinese Commissioners, 264. English merchants protest to Sir Robert Peel, 266. Growth of illegal traffic, 267. Hypocritical action of Great Britain, 268. War of i860, 269. Sir John Bowring and case of the " Arrow," 269. Profits of British Crown from opium, 270. Amount of opium traffic, 271. False assertions that China was indifferent, 272. Absurd pretence of harmless character of the vice, 273. Deadly effects of opium smoking, 274. China cowed and humiliated, 276. Pleads for suppression of traffic, 277. Result of formal appeal to British Queen, 278. Protest of January, 1875, 280. Action of Great Britain on Chef 00 Convention, 281. United States treaty of 1880, 281. Correspondence between China and Great Britain, which Christian and which heathen, 282. Spread of poppy cultivation in China, 283. Opium traffic enemy to honest commerce, 284. All foreigners suffer, 287. Modern Great Chinese Wall, 288.

XX ANALYSIS OF CONTENTS CHAPTER X.

Foreign Aggression 289-315

Chinese fear absorption of empire, 289. Proud of their country, 290. Memorial from Governor of Canton to Emperor, 290. Suspicion of foreigners,

291. Conduct of early Europeans in China, 291. Dutch at Macao, Pescadore Islands, Amoy, and Formosa, 292. Portuguese at Ningpo and Macao,

292. Source of annoyance and trouble, 293. Coolie trade and " fan tan " at Macao, 293. Great Britain at Hong Kong, 293. Depot and headquarters of opium smugglers, 294. Real character of Hong Kong trade, 295. Lord Charles Beresford on opium smuggling from Hong Kong, 296. Chinese sentiment toward Russia, 297. Russian diplomatists, 298. China and Japan, 299. Results of war with Japan, 300. France in China, 300. Connection between Catholic missionary troubles and designs of France, 301. French course unjustifiable, 301. No trade, no marine, no interests in China, 302. French not natural colonists, 302. No points of natural contact with Chinese, 303. Germany's opportunity, 303. How sacrificed, 304. Maintenance of balance of power is graduated spoliation, 305. Foreign concessions, 306. British concession at Shanghai, 307. French Legation at Peking, 308. French concession at Shanghai, 308. Another form of spoliation, 311. Lord Charles Beresford upon the practice, 312. Influence of such acts upon Chinese, 313. Destructive of trade, 314.

ANALYSIS OF CONTENTS xxi

CHAPTER XL

The Partition of China 316-351

Chinese dynasties, 316. Genghis and Kublai Khan, 316. Grand Canal, 317. Secret of success of Manchu dynasty, 318. Narcotism of Chinese rulers, 318. Origin of Chinese race, 319. Not a mixed race, 320. No intermingling of blood, 320. Eurasians, 321. Chinese uniform and identical in racial traits, 322. Clans and quarrels, 323. Differences of dialect, 324. No geographical lines of demarcation, 326, China shut away from other nations, 326. Chinese Empire one great hive of commerce, 327. Official travel and intercourse,

328. Chinese such a type as might be expected,

329. Modern Rip Van Winkle, 331. Dismemberment of China, 331. No sound arguments favoring the scheme, 331. Real motive is plunder, 332. Reason for British attitude, 332. Good ground for complaints against Chinese administration, 333. Easy and efficient measures of remedy at hand, 334. Concerted action of great Powers, 334. Rivalries in China, 335. Lord Charles Beresford upon foreign policy in China, 336. Archibald R. Colquhoun, 338. Harold E. Gorst, 338. Great Britain, Russia, foreign loan, and Wei Hai Wei, 338. European Powers at fault for troubles in China, 340. Policy of the United States, 342. Results of quiet and friendly methods, 343. Arguments against partition, 344. No solvent found for the Chinaman, 345. Lack of success of Western Powers in governing Oriental races, 346. Great Britain in India, 346. Chinese able to govern themselves, 348. Peace of Europe depends upon the integrity of Chinese Empire, 349.

xxii ANALYSIS OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER XII.

;Reform in China 352-386

Not the concern of outsiders, 352. Natural but dangerous to meddle, 352. Sweeping reforms necessary, 354. Examples of corruption, 355-360. Parental system of government in part responsible,

361. Chinese system of balances and adjustments,

362. Proceedings of a tax collector, 364. No system of individual responsibility, 365. No partition of official duties, 365, China over-officered, 366. Exaggerated notions of the wealth of Chinese officials, 367. China not the land of the enormously rich, 368. Wide division of results of official peculation, 368. Inadequate official salaries, 369. " Anti-extortion fund," 370. Understanding between officials and people, 370. Unwisdom of system, 371. Is nation capable of reforming itself? 2)1^' No doubt that it is, 372. Great majority of Chinese honest, acute men of business, yjZ- Large and growing body of intelligent men in the empire, 374. " Chinese Educational Mission," 375. Power of public opinion, 375. Danger of trouble, yj^- Chinese will reform China for their own benefit, Zl^- Interference should be cautious and kindly, 378. Consistent slowness necessary, 379. Cause of failure of the Emperor in 1898, 379. Three necessary preliminary measures, 381. Systems of weights, measures, and coinage, 381. Readjustment of salaries and pay of all official servants, 382. Exclusion of all victims of the opium habit from any form of public duty, 383. The real Chinese question, 385. Policy which should be adopted, 386.

The Real Chinese Question

Chapter I. Some Serious Mistakes

It is a trite remark that ignorance is a prolific source of trouble. Views and opinions of men or races, which are based upon little knowledge and much imagination, may be harmless in works of fiction, but become dangerous when made the basis of intercourse and practical relations. Mutual mis judgment, injustice, and enmity are the inevitable results.

It is easier to call the Chinaman a heathen than to understand him. That he has eyes queerly shaped and located, eats with chopsticks, dresses his hair into a queue, and wears his shirt outside of his trousers, are held, by the large majority of people, to furnish ample grounds for the application of this offensive term. Yet he neither shaped nor placed his eyes, our own ancestors braided their hair and wore it, as he does. And the relative arrangement of the garments named is not a matter of either morals, intellect, or religion. Thus this petty abuse of him is largely the result of ignorance.

In graver affairs, misconceptions of the Chinese, mistaken views of their attitude, and consequent erroneous judgments and conduct toward them, are responsible for a large part of the friction and conflict between them and Western nations. They are not credited with the possession of the same spirit, motive, and feeling which animate and control the rest of the world. They are, only too frequently, neither granted the same rights, nor accorded the same privileges. The same measure of forbearance and consideration is not allowed them as is conceded to others. Governments, acting upon lines of purely selfish purposes, object to, and at times have overcome by force, the selfish or patriotic opposition of the Chinese. Some men and some governments are reckless and indifferent to ultimate results, so long as their immediate purpose is effected. But the masses of the people are disposed to be fair-minded, and have no desire to injure China for the sake of their own advantage. More than this, they are sufficiently wise to accept, as an invariable truth, the statement that no wrong done to one individual or nation can be to the permanent advantage of any other.

It is important to-day, as never before, that misapprehensions should be removed, false impressions corrected, the truth told, and the Chinese Government and people be better understood. Ignorance is too expensive and unwise to be longer indulged in. There are many common points of contact and interest which a right mutual understanding will bring to light. Fairer judgments, and increased respect, will do more to promote all proper forms of intercourse and commerce than men-of-war and dynamite. And the Western world can best aid China to understand it, by means of an honest effort to understand China.

It is a mistake to suppose that the empire is in a condition of chronic misrule and anarchy. While there are infrequent local disturbances and uprisings, caused by the action of incompetent or tyrannical local officials, superstition, or ignorance, the empire, as a whole, is quiet and peaceable. It is crowded with a great multitude of cities, towns, and villages, to which are allowed large measures of self-control, and which are orderly and well regulated. The Chinaman is not groaning under recognized burdens, nor struggling against an unwelcome tyranny. Whatever may be the defects of his governmental system, he is himself responsible for them. He is quite well aware of this fact, and never objects to the system, though he may, at times, rise in protest against what he considers as abuses, or laxity in the administration of it. In the long centuries during which it has been in existence, he has either shaped himself to it, or it is the natural outgrowth of his character. Whichever it may be, the genius of his government meets with hie entire approval.

In point of fact, the Chinese are governed less than almost any nation in the world. So long as they pay their taxes, and violate none of the requirements of the moral code, they are not disturbed by the authorities. A thousand and one official inspections, interferences, and exactions, common everywhere in America and Europe, are quite unknown in China. Some of them might, perhaps, be wisely introduced, but the Chinaman has never been guided, vexed, or harassed by them. He is, by nature and education, obedient to law and fond of good order. The teachings of Confucius, and the sacred edicts of the wise Emperor, Kang Hsi, both taught everywhere and to every subject, have had an immense and valuable influence in this direction. In evidence of the law-abiding disposition of the Chinese, let the fact be noted that, in the face of an intense and universal anti-foreign feeHng, foreigners have for many years travelled alone and unprotected into every part of the empire, and have, almost invariably, met with politeness, civility, and kind treatment. If a correspondingly bitter hatred of Chinese existed in the United States, how long, and to what extent, would it be prudent or safe for any of them to roam through our large cities and rural communities? Another fact, not sufficiently well recognized, furnishes evidence in the same direction. The Chinese immigrants to this country belong almost exclusively to the lowest class of their people, and are familiarly described, in their own land, as being, each, *' half fisherman and half pirate." Yet a careful examination of the criminal and police records of any city in the United States will show a smaller percentage of disorderly Chinese — smaller in proportion to the total number of residents of that race — than of any other foreign nationality which is to be found among us.

The Chinese are not lethargic, incapable, nor indifferent. But they insist, unreasonably perhaps, upon looking at all things through their own eyes, studying them in their own way, and deciding for themselves, whether they are of value or worthless to them. Their systems.

social, political, and economical, were settled, fully adjusted, and crystallized centuries ago. Ours are subject to almost daily alteration and development. Possibly it should not be expected that they adopt ours, without inquiry or hesitation, when they see us so ready to discard them for any others which are new or untried. Then their modes of life are more simple and quiet than ours. They abhor the ceaseless and exhausting whirl which " men of the West " call life. In other words, they criticise it very much as would the grandparents of the present generation, if suddenly thrown into the midst of it.