The rational basis of orthodoxy

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I. The Rationality of Faith .... 1

n. Evolution and Theism 28

Chapter I

Two characteristic features of modern scientific thought are worthy of special notice. One is its idea of what constitutes proof ; the other is the peculiar attitude of mind it requires on the part of all who would use its methods for the advancement of knowledge. The definition of proof which it would seem to have adopted is, " Such a degree of evidence as will necessitate conviction in any intelligent mind." Thus, one of the golden rules of Descartes is,^ " Give unqualified assent to no propositions but those the truth of which is so clear and distinct that they cannot be doubted." Of the same tenor is Professor Huxley's message to the youthful student of science : " Tell him that it is his duty to doubt until he is compelled by the absolute authority of nature to believe that which is written in books." These quotations will also serve to indicate in what attitude of mind the scientists would have the search for truth con-

1 T. H. Huxley, Essays Selected, etc. (Macmillan & Co., 1871.)

ducted ; as will also Mr. Lecky's observation : " To raise the requisite standard of proof, to inculcate hardness and slowness of belief, is the first task of the inductive reasoner. He looks with favor on the condition of suspended judgment ; he encourages men rather to prolong than to abridge it." And the views set forth in the above excerjjts find a logical resultant in an opinion expressed some years ago by a writer in the " Contemporary Review," to the effect that they who have not the time or the ability to investigate have no right to believe.

It is not easy to find fault with either of the positions which science thus occupies. Mathematical reasoning has long been regarded as the ideal method of establishing conclusions because perversity itself cannot call in question its results. The inductive reasoner also points to a body of truth built up by his methods which is almost, if not quite, as far beyond the reach of doubt as a theorem in geometry. He has thus shown that the conception of proof furnished by mathematics is practical as well as ideal, and that it may be realized in other sciences than that of quantity. He knows, too, that every belief which is not strictly necessary must be due, in some degree, to a volition and is consequently, to that extent, an assimiption. He is not, therefore, to be censured if he gives the name of proof only to that degree of evidence which makes doubt impossible, if he is inclined to regard as unscientific all convictions which are in any measure voluntary.

But if so much is conceded, if it is admitted that a proposition cannot be regarded as proved, in the highest sense of the word, until assent cannot be withheld from it even by prejudice itself, then the inference is not to be denied that the human mind, while engaged in the pursuit of knowledge, should be characterized by hardness and slowness of belief, that its attitude should be as long as possible one of suspended judgment ; for evidence cannot be known to be irresistible until unbelief has given way in a determined effort to resist it. Only when a man is convinced, as it were, in spite of himself, can he feel any well-grounded assurance that his conviction rests on a foundation of genuine proof.

There would be no disposition on the part of the Christian Church to criticise unfavorably these two scientific principles if they were applied only in the pursuit of natural knowledge. But it is impossible, even if it were desirable, to restrict the use of them to particular fields of inquiry. Christianity has a message for students of nature as well as for other men, and its imperative command, " Believe," is sure to evoke from them the retort, " Prove so that we cannot but believe." Nor can science act here only on the defensive and be true to itself. If it is working in the only way in which valid beliefs are to be had, it must and ought to be aggressive. It cannot be faithful to its mission if it does not scrutinize the supports of religious as well as of secular opinion, and insist that Christianity itself shall abandon all claim to scientific recognition, or produce in its defense reasons which will establish its truth beyond all question.

And, in meeting such a challenge, it will not be enough for theologians to show that there is, on the whole, a presumption in favor of the truth of their religion, or even that Christianity is probably true. Presumptions and probabilities cannot be received by the man of science as equivalent to proof. They may be well enough in their place, but not until they have developed into certainties which even prejudice cannot rationally deny to be such, will he or can he consistently deem them worthy of unqualified assent and unhesitating confidence.

Now here arise some important inquiries which need to be soberly and candidly considered. Is Christianity susceptible of that degree of proof which is thus demanded ? Are its objective evidences, that is, its evidences which are universally available, of so convincing a nature that religious doubt must disappear from every mind by which they are examined without prejudice ? Are the stock arguments of our theological schools of such a character that we must deem every man either irrational or insincere who shall fail to be convinced by them ? In a word, are we justified in adopting the view of faith set forth by President Hopkins ^ years ago and regarding it merely as an

^ Evidences of Christianity, p. 21.

inevitable result of a candid attention to evidence which to an impartial mind will have all the force of a demonstration ?

For my own part I do not hesitate to answer all of these questions in the negative. If the scientists have the right idea of proof, Christianity presents itself to no man at the outset as a religion that is proved. If they have truly described the attitude of mind in which it is to be investigated, it is not likely to be proved.

In support of the first assertion it may be stated that the familiar arguments for the existence of God are incumbered with serious objections. The a priori argiunents assume without proof that certain mental concepts imply the existence of corresponding objective realities. The argument from causation is open to the criticism that it makes the First Cause itself an effect. The argument from design — the only one which Mr. Mill ^ regarded as of any value whatever — can furnish at the best, according to that writer, only a strong probability, and is weakened, in his opinion, by the possibility that the theory of evolution may be established. Only a few years after he had so expressed himself that theory had come to be regarded as sound by a large part of the thinking world, and there can be little doubt that Mr. Mill, if he had lived, would have reduced accordingly still more his estimate of the evidential value of the argument mentioned. The proof from expe-

^ Three Essays on Religion.

rience requires time, and can be had, as a rule, only by those who are willing to take for granted at the start that which it is sought to prove.

The evidence for the immortality of the soul, in the opinion of Rev. F. W. Robertson,^ although valuable in the way of suggestiveness, is yet, apart from revelation, worth nothing in the way of proof ; and the doctrine, according to Bishop Butler, ^ even when the existence of God is conceded, is proved only " to a very considerable degTee of probability." Nor do the representatives of the Society for Psychical Research who have published the results of its latest investigations profess to have established the existence of disembodied spirits beyond all controversy. If it becomes in any measure a matter of doubt whether the existence of God can be proved, then it becomes more than ever doubtful whether Hume's celebrated argument against the credibility of the Christian miracles has been answered, inasmuch as the only replies to it now held to be satisfactory take the existence of God for granted. In the belief in God and his miraculous interpositions in the affairs of men is involved the belief in a supernatural revelation and in the resurrection of Christ. If confidence in these truths is shaken, the incarnation and the atonement become, in a proportionate measure, objects of doubt, while the belief in redemption and heaven becomes, to a similar degree,

1 Sermons, "The Doubt of Thomas." ^ Analogy, chap, i., last paragraph.

clouded with uncertainty. I repeat, therefore, that if science has the only correct idea of proof, Christianity, as commonly defined, is not proved by the objective evidences now adduced in its behalf.

It is not enough to allege that the objections just suggested have been answered, for it is certainly not true that they have been so completely overthrown as to appear indubitably unsound. Neither is it pertinent to maintain that Christianity in its conflicts ^vith its antagonists has gained an advantage over them ; for, even if this statement could be trusted, it is not necessarily true that victory in debate means the establishment of the positions defended. If the scientific notion of the proper grounds of belief is correct, then belief in Christianity is unscientific until unbelief is impossible, a condition which cannot be perfectly fulfilled so long as its defenses can be regarded with any degree of well-founded suspicion. And even if it be contended that this condition is never really fulfilled in the conclusions of science itself, yet if the reasoning of the scientists approximates so closely to their ideal of proof as to reduce the voluntary element in their beliefs to a minimum, the assertion just made will stand ; for there will still be in the accepted results of science a degree of certainty which no balance of probability alleged to exist on the side of revealed religion is competent to produce.

In defense of the statement that Christianity is not likely to be proved if it is admitted that truth must always be sought in the attitude of mind already described, let me merely mention a few corollaries which might be deduced from such an admission: The listener in the pew ought to cultivate a spirit of intellectual resistance to the preacher in the desk. Conversion ought seldom, if ever, to follow immediately the hearing of the Word. Now is the accepted time not to believe but to investigate. The dying skeptic needs, not exhortations to put his trust in Christ, but copious extracts from works on Christian evidences. Then, too, doubt is often wholesome. It is a safeguard against false opinions, and ought to be encouraged as long as obstinacy itself can keep it alive. Ministers ought not to argue in behalf of the gospel •without indicating all that has been or can be said on the other side. The works of able infidels ought to be placed in our Sunday-school libraries and in the rooms of our Young Men's Christian Associations. Every one who has been converted without having learned what objections the skeptics urge against his religion ought to familiarize himself with them at once. He ought to assume a state of suspended judgment, and to believe again only after he has labored faithfully but fruitlessly to doubt. Paine, Renan, and Strauss should share impartially with the Bible his attention. Some disciple of the late Colonel Ingersoll should be invited to labor in conjunction with every revivalist or praying-band. If the truth of Christianity must be established by argument, there should be fairness in the discussion, and both sides ought to have an impartial hearing. If, as Professor Huxley asserts,^ there is but one kind of knowledge and but one method of acquiring it, then religion ought to form no exception to his remark that skepticism is the highest of duties, blind faith the one unpardonable sin.

Is it, then, too much to maintain that, if the search for truth can be rationally conducted on no other principles than those which are approved by science, Christianity has not been and is not likely to be proved ? Is it too much to assert that its objective evidences are not strong enough to banish all doubt of its truth from every intelligent mind that is resolved to doubt as long as possible ? But every one who contends that theology at the outset rests on rational foundations as strong as those of science, and that Christianity ought to be accepted because it can be proved in advance of experience to be true, must submit his reasoning to the scientific tests already named ; for, in that case, they are sound. If the intellectual evidences of Christianity are sufficient to demonstrate the truth of it, then they are strong enough to necessitate belief in the most resolutely skeptical mind. If, as President Hopkins ^ asserted, God " asks no one to beheve except on the ground of evidence," then either Christianity is incredible, or else he is

1 Lay Sermons, p. 18. (D. Appleton & Co., 1870.)

2 Evidences of Christianity, p. 21.

correct and self-consistent in asserting that the evidence of its truth is as convincing as that for the forty-seventh proposition of Euclid, and, if candidly examined, must be believed. But if it is less conclusive than this, then the inference cannot be resisted that faith in Christianity must be to some extent voluntary, and therefore, to the same extent, an assumption.

But now arises the inquiry, if we concede that Christianity cannot be proved — at least at the outset — in the highest sense of the term, do we not make a complete surrender to our enemies ? If we admit that intelligent men may honestly fail to be convinced by the ordinary Christian evidences, must we not retreat in confusion from the field of discussion ? By no means. If some Christian apologists have made a serious mistake in overrating the rational supports of their religion, those scientists who have attacked their faith have made a graver one in practically forgetting that evidence which is too weak to be called proof may yet be strong enough to justify action. Because the hostile critics are preeminently men of study and reflection, they seem in many cases to have lost sight of the fact that the affairs of practical life must be conducted on principles widely different from those on which scientific knowledge is now pursued.

A mechanic may say, " I believe I can invent a machine that will do a certain work." On what does he ground that conviction? Probably on nothing, at first, more convincing than his knowledge of his own ingenuity and his recollection of some earlier mechanical successes. It is quite likely that he has as yet no notion whatever of the particular way in which he will carry out his idea. Shall we therefore say to him, " You have no right to your belief ; it is an unjustifiable assumption, resting on the scantiest evidence; you ought to distrust such baseless opinions and guard yourself resolutely against the tendency to put confidence in what has not been proved " ? Such advice would be equivalent to an admonition to invent no more. He must believe that he can do what he is seeking to do, otherwise he wiU lack the courage to attempt to do it ; for twenty years or more may elapse before he can bring his machine to that degree of perfection which will justify him in saying, " My faith in my ability to do what I proposed is justified by evidence which is perfectly conclusive."

A capitalist determines to employ his wealth in building a factory in order to increase his income. He does so because he believes that the undertaking will succeed. But is his belief founded on irresistible evidence ? By no means. He has his misgivings and anxieties. He has acquaintances, perhaps, who predict that his scheme will miscarry. Are we then to counsel him to distrust his convictions until he knows that they are sound? That would be virtually to advise him to give up his project altogether, for it is only his faith in the feasibility of it that gives him courage to carry it out.

Professor Hiixley compares the field of scientific investigation to the great ocean which stretches away indefinitely beyond the visible horizon. One cannot but think that the illustration must have suggested to him the method by which the world learned the most important fact that has come to its knowledge in modern times. How did Europe discover that land existed west of the Atlantic Ocean? Not because Columbus maintained an attitude of doubt in reference to the inconclusive arguments which could be cited in support of the fact, but because he believed, on what seemed to the world the most meagre evidence, that India could be reached By sailing westward. Had he cherished the skeptical habits of thought inculcated by modern scientists, he would have viewed his theories with such doubt as must have precluded him from ever risking life and reputation for the sake of testing them.

How do men learn what kind of business they can best succeed in ? How does a student ascertain whether he is adapted to a certain profession ? How do apprentices determine whether they can become successful mechanics ? Not, certainly, by distrusting their own private opinions ; not, certainly, by any process of reasoning maintained against cultivated doubts until these disappear of themselves. Otherwise they would starve before they would have confidence enough to learn any vocation whatever. They simply assume that their personal preferences are indicating to them their proper calling, and then verify their assumption or falsify it, as the case may be, by the experience of subsequent years.

Thus it would appear that convictions which are sought merely to increase knowledge, to gratify curiosity, may be wisely resisted until they are established by indubitable proof, but that those which are requisite as a ground of immediate action may be laudably indulged on the slightest evidence, or perhaps even on none at all. There is such a thing as enterprise, the kernel of which is a willingness to take things for granted. To assume that what is desirable is true, and then to test the assumption by acting as if it were so, is often the only way in which a man can become acquainted with his own powers and give to his life the highest possible success.

If, then, Christianity is to be regarded merely as the best philosophy extant, or as a benevolent endeavor to convey to manldnd additional religious information, there is no reason why it should not be thrown into the crucibles of modern thought and tested by the rigid canons of the inductive sciences. And even if it claims to teach chiefly or only for the purpose of influencing human conduct, yet if it demands action simply on the ground that it is already demonstrated by its evidences to be true, it ought to encounter an intellectual resistance and a demand for proof as determined and exacting as are met by any new scientific theory which seeks to be admitted into the category of established facts. In neither of these cases, I am convinced, can it expect to make head against its opponents.

But if it is presented to men as that which I believe it to be, as a revelation which it is not impossible at the outset to doubt, but which cannot be practically disbelieved without injury to the prospects of immortal souls, then it has at least as good a claim to human confidence as have the convictions which stimulate men to work for a lifetime in particular directions for position or wealth. And, moreover, since it promises to those that shall believe in it additional evidence of its truth in this life and a complete verification of itself in the life to come, it has vindicated its right to be received among the practical working theories of the human race, theories in pursuance of which men of energy and push always deem themselves justified in denying themselves and laboring for an indefinite length of time in the uncertain hope of reaping a harvest in the end.

I conclude, therefore, that the true source of religious confidence is not primarily the objective Christian evidences, but Christian experience obtained through a voluntary trust in the gospel when doubt is possible, or, what is substantially the same thing, by acting in a state of some uncertainty as if the religion were kno^vn to be true. In other words, Christianity is offered to the human race, not as a mere contribution to religious knowledge, but chiefly as a body of directions for a moral crisis, and is therefore to be used like everything else of the same class, that is, it is to be proved by making trial of it. " To be indecisive and reluctant to act," says Mr. Mill,^ " because we have not evidence of a perfectly conclusive character to act on, is a defect sometimes incident to scientific minds, but which, wherever it exists, renders them unfit for practical emergencies." Nothing, to my mind, could show more plainly than does this admission of a candid thinker the true ground of that conflict between religion and science of which we hear so much to-day. It is a conflict between methods which are adapted to a crisis and those which are not. Human life, in view of its moral conditions, is a practical emergency ; the objective evidences of Christianity are not of a perfectly conclusive character ; but to lay aside indecision and reluctance and act as if they were so is the one way to become equal to a crisis and to get that firm religious assurance which otherwise will remain inaccessible.

And now, in concluding this chapter, let me observe : —

1. It is not implied in what has just been presented that arguments for Christianity and works on its evidences are useless or of little value. The word assumption^ which I have used so often, means not belief without evidence, but only belief on evidence which is not demonstrative. It denotes merely the mental act by which we decide that a

1 Logic, 8th ed., p. 417. (Harper & Brothers, 1879.)

proposition is true wlien there is any ground whatever to suppose that it may not be so. The boy who must leap across a wide stream will naturally search for the narrowest part of it, although he knows that even there he must risk a spring. What are conmionly called the proofs of Christianity may serve to make faith easier even though they can never make unbelief impossible. The transfer of a soul from intellioent doubt to relisious confidence will always be effected by a leap into the unknown, by an act of volimtary trust in doctrines which can easily be made to appear in some degi-ee uncertain ; but the length of the leap, the difficulty of the trust, may be indefinitely diminished in most minds by the aid of the Christian evidences.

2. This method of obtaining religious certainty is ennobhng. It does for man in relation to his spiritual concerns what the uncertainty which overliangs the future does for him in reference to his secular interests, — it stimulates enterprise. No man is likely to make much headway in life who is not willing sometimes to incur the risk of failure and disappointment. No one who will not hazard a step in any direction until he knows in advance just where it will land him has in him any of the essential qualities of the hero. Christianity would have men act in spiritual matters on the same principles which must underlie their conduct if they are to be eminently successful in their temporal concerns, — it would have them push out boldly by faith into the regions of uncertainty, and, for the sake of moral profit, act as if they knew to be true some things which they as yet only expect to find so. And as no man deserves a fortune who is not willing to risk failure in the pursuit of it, so they judge themselves unworthy of eternal life who practically doubt its reality merely because they can see a possibility that belief in it may not be sound, and who thus show themselves unwilling to cultivate moral enterprise for the sake of a prospective enlargement of their manhood and spiritual destiny.

3. The view just set forth is practical.

It is so, first, in reference to the needs of the hearers of the Word. If Christianity is to be believed only because it can be proved, what right has any man to become a Christian until he sees that it is proved, until he is constrained to believe after having spent in study and investigation the years that will be needed for him to become thoroughly acquainted with all that can be said both for and against it ? Since theology must sometimes make use of arguments of an exceedingly abstruse and profound nature, how can it be expected that persons of limited mental capacity can ever understand all of its proofs ? How can any generation be justified in adhering very tenaciously to its religious faith when theories which threaten to undermine the intellectual supports of that faith are matters of close and doubtful discussion ? Why is it not best for the man of average understanding to remain neutral in the great conflict between belief and unbelief until the roar of the great guns has ceased and victory has been decided in favor of one side or the other ? Why need Greek and Trojan spend blood and sweat, if the issues over which they fight must after all be settled by the gods who are wrangling over them in remote Olympus ? Moreover, how can the gospel demonstrate its truth in the sick chamber to a mind too weary to follow a train of reasoning ? Butler's " Analogy " and kindred works are long tracts to read to dying men ; nevertheless, they are likely to be too short to remove the doubts of many a man who is well versed in the writings of the modern skeptics. If faith in Christ must be preceded by a demonstration of the truth of Christianity, then we may safely say that it is something which many will be precluded, by sheer lack of time or ability, from ever exercising.

But if the belief enjoined in the gospel is simply a willingness, in cases of doubt, to assume for the sake of moral gain that certain ethically improving and not unreasonable doctrines are true, then it can be exercised at any time and by anybody. It may be as sudden as the choice which sent the blind man to the pool of Siloam, as the determination sometimes is which transfers a boy from his New England home to Texas or Colorado. Any one who has time enough or wit enough to ask, " What must I do to be saved ? " is likely to have enough of both to take for granted that the promises of Christ are true in the hope of finding them so through the test of a subsequent personal experience.

And, again, the view which I am advocating is practical with reference to the needs of preachers also. It is a good deal to expect, especially in these days of depleted theological seminaries, that every young man who enters the ministry will be able to unhorse with the lance of argument every steel-clad champion of unbelief who may appear in the lists against him. " For ye see your calling, brethren, how that not many wise men after the flesh, not many mighty, not many noble, are called." David would not have slain Goliath had he been satisfied to leave to the giant the choice of weapons. His flesh would surely have been given to the fowls of the air and to the beasts of the field had he put his trust in the cumbrous armor which Saul would have buckled upon him. The servant of God is likely to fare little better who engages in a purely dialectical combat with some well-read scoffer in the belief that the coat of mail which has been forged for him in the seminary will effectually resist the two-handed swords and the battle-axes of modern infidelity. Every disciple of Christ who is called to preach the gospel ought to feel that he is superior, in some particular, to every possible antagonist, and that he is mider no necessity of quitting the field merely because he has not had time to study logic or to become an expert in debate. If the ground of faith is antecedent evidence, then every doubter has good cause to make to many an earnest preacher of the gospel the remark to which I have previouslyreferred : " You have not the time or the abihty to investigate and, therefore, have no right to believe." But if the true source of religious confidence is in the experimental verification of rehgious truths not antecedently proved, then every genuine evangelist has the right to say to every unbehever, however learned and able : " A uniform condition of all enterprising action is an assumption not yet demonstrated to be true, and I exhort you to assume, for the sake of your own moral health and growth, that Christianity is true, even though you are not wholly satisfied with its intellectual supports, and to live a life of Christian seH-denial and love in the hope of verifying your assumption by so doing."