The psychology of industry

Preface

THIS little book is intended not so much for the student of psychology as for the ordinary man. It is true it has been written partly with the purpose of meeting the needs of W.E.A. classes and courses for social study, such as the classes the writer has himself had experience of teaching in Edinburgh. But, while the needs of such readers have been kept in view throughout, an attempt has also been made to present the matter in a way that would interest and assist the intelligent man in the street who desires to know something of what has been done by the psychologist in this new field. Much psychological acti\dty has been recently manifested in this field of industry and commerce, and it has indeed become imperative that the results should be known to a wider public. That may be taken as the main object of the present work.

There are several books in existence, especially by American writers, which profess the same object. Nevertheless there seems to be room for a book adhering more to the psychological point of view, and emphasizing principles rather than details of results to a greater extent than most of the existing books. In the works of the scientific-management engineers, while there is much lip service to psychology, the psychology itself is with difficulty recognizable by the professed psychologist. Even in the works of psychologists there is a marked tendency to stress results, and to overlay the discussion with so many illustrations drawn from practical life, that the general lines of the underlying psychology are apt to be obscured. It is all the more necessary to present the psychology as a definite and more or less coherent system because of the fact that the ordinary man has a somewhat vi THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INDUSTRY

distorted view regarding the nature of the science. The writer on a recent occasion lectured in a Scottish manufacturing town on some of the developments of applied psychology, and learned afterwards that one of the criticisms passed on the lecture by an intelligent working man was that " it was not psychology, but common sense." Such a criticism encourages the writer in believing that a clear exposition of the applied psychology of industry and commerce will appeal to the practical man as at bottom " common sense."

Another recent conversation with a working man, that deeply impressed the writer, was with an intelligent miner. a travelling companion in a railway carriage. He began from the position that it was our scientists who had enabled us to win the war, and he developed a line or argument practically identical with that in Chapters H and HI of the present work. It seemed to the writer that the refutation of the statement that the working man was hostile to the application of psychology in industry was as complete as it well could be. The working man is naturally hostile to what he considers exploitation at the hands of the capitalist, but an honest investigation of the facts, and a courageous following in practice of the conclusions to which such an investigation leads, will always have the strongest kind of appeal for him.

It is incumbent on the psychologist discussing industrial problems to observe scrupulously the frontiers of his science. As a psychologist he is concerned with facts, and is strictly impartial towards the claims of capital and labour, so far as these involve questions of policy and rights. Of course even the psychologist may express an opinion on policy — will almost certainly be led to do so by his study of the facts — but he must make it quite clear that in doing so he is no longer speaking as a psychologist, but as a social philosopher or a citizen. It is a profound error for the psychologist to put forward as a psychological principle what is ethics, or politics, or social philosophy, or even religion. First, last, and always, the duty of the psychologist is to study his facts, and to formulate the laws expressing the causal sequence and inter-

PREFACE vii

dependence of these facts. At that point his duty as a psychologist ends ; if he goes further he must speak as a pohtical or social philosopher, or reformer^ not as a psychologist.

The author desires specially to acknowledge his indebtedness for underlying principles to Professor McDougall, and for illustrations to Miinsterberg, Hollingworth, Muscio, and Myers,

J. D.

University of Edinburgh January, 192 1 t

Contents

CHAPTER PAGE

I. INTRODUCTION ----- I

The " Old " Psychology and the " New " — Applied Psychology — Psychology and Economics — Psychological Problems of the Economic Life

Chapter I Introduction

THE most striking characteristic of the history of the last century is the great progress made by science, and the marvellous changes effected on social and industrial life, as a consequence direct or indirect of this progress. If we may specify at all, we may say that there are two spheres of human activity in particular in which these changes are specially noticeable — the practice of medicine and the manufacture of commodities. But it is also a notable fact that the most important element in all human activity, the human element itself — human nature, to use the popular phrase — is precisely the element which has until recently been most neglected in the advance of science and appHed science, and especially in both these spheres. Let us limit our view to industrial and commercial life. At every point in the manufacture, handling, and transportation of goods, we can see the results of applied science ; similarly in the market, the shop, the office, inventions which facilitate economically important processes meet the eye on every side. Science does not stop at the concrete and the material. There is a science which investigates the laws of the production, distribution, and exchange of commodities — the science of economics — and the principles of that science are also in a measure recognized and consciously applied in modern commercial and industrial life. Yet, it must be repeated, the most important factor of all is the factor which has hitherto been most neglected in the application of science to modern life — ^the factor studied by the science of psychology.

A recent writer has remarked, somewhat paradoxically, , that psychology is a very old science, but it has a very short 'history. Like most paradoxes the statement contains only that bit of truth it is intended to call attention to. As a science in the strict sense, psychology is not old. The earliest systems of thought, the germ from which have developed modern science and modern philosophy, may be said to have been reared under the influence of two main motives : (i) the desire to gain control over natural processes, in order to satisfy needs and attain ends, and (2) a restless craving to penetrate into the secrets of the universe for the mere satisfaction of knowing and understanding. The second motive would naturally be characteristic only of a few individuals in any community. These became the philosophers of the early civilization. While the science of the practical man, motived by the first of these motives, was in embryo, imposing systems of speculative philosophy were built up.

We may take this to be the radical distinction between speculative philosophy and science : that the final court of appeal for science is the world of fact and practical applicability to the world of fact, that it studies actual happenings with a perfectly neutral or open mind, allowing the facts themselves to suggest and to test the theories by which an attempt is made to present them in orderly sequence and mutual interdependence ; while, on the other hand, the final court of appeal for speculative philosophy is the rational, and it applies its theories to the world of fact with the presupposition that this world is a rational world. Under the conditions of primitive life the practical motive and the practical criteria would obviously not carry men very far in the direction of scientific knowledge. Hence, as we have

INTRODUCTION 3

seen, at the beginning speculative philosophy got a long start of positive science.

Now from very early times speculative philosophy has been greatly interested in that very group of phenomena which constitutes the special province of the science of psychology as we understand it. Thoughts, feelings, desires, emotions, were looked upon as manifestations of the mind or soul, a substance quite distinct from the matter of which external bodies consisted. Many of the deepest and most momentous problems were raised by the relation of this mind and this matter to one another. Hence one of the chief interests of philosophers came to be to interpret both in such a way as to satisfy the demands of the human reason, on the one hand, and the needs of the human spirit, on the other. Thus was created the atmosphere in which the " old " psychology came into being. It was characteristic of this " old " psychology that it was either deduced from the supposed nature of the mind or soul, or it was formed by the observation and selection of those facts of experience and consciousness which seemed to support a certain view of the nature of the mind or soul, or it was reached partly in the one way, partly in the other. In any case the " old " psychology could not in strictness be described as a science. It was the battleground of contending philosophical systems. The truths generally accepted as established principles were submerged in the vast mass of controversial matter, in regard to M^hich some held one opinion, some another, according to the philosophical views which required to be supported. As a result the interminable disputes obscured the very real advances in psychological knowledge that were made. Such was, without any exaggeration, the position of psychology from the time of Plato and Aristotle, or even earlier, till the eighteenth or nineteenth century. As a science it had practically no history during that period.

In the meantime very important events were taking place in the domain of positive science. As civilization developed life became more and more complex. As life became more complex its practical needs multiplied. Under the stimulus of these needs knowledge of, and control over, natural phenomena rapidly extended. This is not the place to trace in detail the development of positive science. Suffice it to say that the application of the method of science led to triumphs in one field after another. It was inevitable that sooner or later the method of science would be applied in the field of psychology also, and indeed to every problem where the conclusions of philosophy come into contact with the world of fact. It is the application of the method of science in the field of mental phenomena that has given us the modern science of psychology — the so-called " new " psychology.

It is perhaps worth while indicating briefly what the change from the " old " psychology to the " new " really amounts to. This is best done by taking the definition of the science from the respective points of view. The " old " definition of psychology was " the science of the mind or soul", or " the science of mental or conscious processes". The "new" definition of psychology is " the science of the facts of human nature and human behaviour ", or " the science of human behaviour in its relation to, and dependence upon, mental process". There is indeed a strong body of opinion among present-day psychologists in favour of defining psychology simply in terms of behaviour. In any case the tendency is always to lay stress upon the actual facts studied, and by preference the objective facts. The " new " psychologist rightly holds that to define his science in terms of mind or soul is to define it in terms not of facts, but of an inference from facts which might be challenged, and is therefore entirely illegitimate.

This " new " psychology really made a serious start with the application of experimental methods some fifty years ago. A quarter of a century later, when experimental psychology had already made substantial progress, systematic efforts were begun to develop applied psychology in various fields. This was an inevitable outcome of the change in attitude and point of view. In all respects, therefore, the history

I

INTRODUCTION 5

of the science has been that of the other sciences from the time when it first took shape as a definite science.

One of the main purposes of the present work is to indicate the results of some of these efforts to build up an applied psychology. We may take these results as evidence of the extent to which psychology is already prepared to meet its obligations to practical life. A word with respect to the point of view of applied psychology will not be out of place. As a science of facts it is not concerned with the advocating of any policy, educational, economic, or political. The ends which are to be attained, the results which it is desirable to produce, are settled independently of psychology. The concern of that science, as applied, is merely the best way in which these ends can be attained, or these results produced. Hence psychology is neither unionist nor radical, neither protectionist nor free-trade, neither capitalist nor labourist, neither individualist nor communist. The claims of each or any of these political, economic, or social philosophies are entirely outside the province of psychology ; all that psychology has to discuss is the way in which, having regard to the facts, any particular line of policy may be best pursued, and the psychological results which will follow — not in the slightest degree the merits or demerits of the line of policy itself, except so far as it seeks to attain ends which are psychologically impossible with the means to hand.

Apart from this general standpoint, which is characteristic of all sciences, pure and apphed alike, applied psj^chology may be said to differ somewhat from pure psychology in the point where it lays its emphasis. Pure psychology seeks to understand the behaviour of living organisms, and especially of human beings, by understanding the mental processes, the thoughts, feelings, desires, and purposes, which underlie the behaviour. But applied psychology seeks to go beyond the mere understanding. It seeks not only, and not mainly, to understand behaviour and mental process, but to use such insight as we possess or can gain, in guiding behaviour in a dafinite direction, and towards the production of definite results. Consequently applied psychology lays far more stress on external results. It is, as we say, predominantly objective. Further it is less concerned with general laws and principles, more with the individual human being in the concrete, and the correlation of his nature and behaviour with the concrete claims and needs of practical life.

As our aim is to consider applied psychology in the economic sphere, it is also necessary to be clear as regards its relation to economics. Marshall defines economics as " a study of man's actions in the ordinary business of life".^ This is curious and interesting, because it is precisely how a behaviourist might define human psychology, and the fact would seem to indicate how closely the two sciences may come to each other when we consider the relation of both to ordinary life. If, again, we define economics as the science which studies the activities of human society involved in the production, distribution, and exchange of commodities, we still experience difficulty in marking off its proper field from that of psychology. The activities of society are the activities of individual members of society, which find their motive and explanation in the underlying mental processes of individual human beings. The truth is we can only separate the field of economics from the field of psychology by recognizing that economics is really an abstract science, which deals with one aspect only of the activities of the human being or of human society — the economic aspect — and that we obtain the economic aspect by ruling out that part of the concrete fact in which the psychologist is interested, by assuming a society consisting of standard economic individuals, not the concrete human society which is the primary fact. Psychology takes up the investigation of the activities of human society at the point at which economics, as it were, leaves off by studying the concrete activities of the concrete individuals.

Ruskin, it will be remembered, made some violent attacks on the science of economics and those who pursued it.^ The

^ " Economics of Industry", p. i.

^ See, for example, " Unto this Last".

INTRODUCTION 7

attacks were of course quite wrongly directed. We might as well attack the hosiery manufacturer because we cannot get a supply of boots and shoes in his warehouse, as attack the economist because he gives us no account of the altruistic side of human nature. The economist does not profess to supply the goods. That is the business, or part of the business, of the psychologist. All the same, Ruskin's contention and criticisms appear to be valid against an economics that claims to apply its findings directly to social activities in the concrete, irrespective of the nature and behaviour of the concrete individual, as economics has on occasion tried to do. Taking for a moment the wider point of view which Ruskin takes, we may hold that the factors which economics does not investigate, which it, as it were, takes for granted, are precisely the factors which in the world of concrete reality give meaning and significance to every economic process, which underlie and maintain all economic activity. Human needs, impulses, and desires constitute the very driving force of economic life. The processes in the economic world are each and all inspired by human purposes, carried through by human labour, ingenuity, and skill. When we speak of economic forces we are speaking abstractly. In strictness there are no separate economic forces. We so designate from our abstract point of view forces which are really either physical or psychological. In all the applied social sciences the problems are psychological as well as economic, and the fundamental problems being human problems are primarily psychological rather than economic.

While economist and industrialist — labourist as well as capitalist — would probably be prepared to admit all this when advanced as a theoretical position, in nine cases out of ten they would argue that it was after all merely a pious opinion, and that practically the science of psychology was not in a position to jdeld any significant assistance in the solving of the various industrial problems of modern life, whereas the science of economics was in such a position. The argument would have been perfectly sound twenty years ago.

In a measure it is perhaps still sound. Nevertheless it is possible to show that psychology promises that it will soon be, if it is not already, in a position to perform practically many of the services which ought theoretically to be performed by that science. It is certain that there have been notable developments of recent years, more particularly in social psychology, and in certain branches of applied psychology, which ought to change the whole attitude towards the science of psychology of economist, industrialist, and social reformer. Social psychology will only be touched upon in a cursory way in what follows. Our main concern is applied psychology in the sphere of industry and commerce. It must be clearly understood, however, that this is only one direction in which the results of modern psychology are relevant to problems of social and economic life.

What we may describe as psychological problems of the economic life arrange themselves in three well-marked groups : (i) Problems of the worker — ^his character, intelligence, vocational fitness and the like ; (2) Problems of the work, and the factors upon which its efficiency depends, such as fatigue, length of work and rest periods, economy of movement, conditions of working, and the like ; (3) Problems of the market, that is, of demand and supply from the psychological point of view.

Within recent times a definite branch of applied psychology, calling itself " industrial psychology ", has sprung up. The first two groups of problems are its recognized subject-matter, and it might be defined in terms of this subject-matter. It may, however, be defined in such a way as to bring out still more clearly its relation to economics. As a recent writer expresses it, " all that the application of psychology to industry means essentially is that the aim of industry, whatever this is, may be effected more easily " as a consequence of the utilizing of psychological knowledge.^ This implies that industrial psychology aims at the elimination of waste — economic and consequent social waste — in so far as it can * Muscio : " Lectures in Industrial Psychology".

INTRODUCTION 9

help in this elimination. We can therefore say that " industrial psychology " is the utilizing of psychological knowledge ^i) in selecting workers for any work on the basis of natural fitness, and (2) in developing good methods of work, in order that a given expenditure of human energy may yield a maximum result, or, which amounts to the same thing, that the result which must be produced may be produced in the most economical way as far as expenditure of human energy is concerned. We would, however, interpret the psychology of industry somewhat more widely than this, so as to include at least the third group of problems, and to include also some reference to the more general psychological conditions affecting industry, as not merely an economic, but also a social, activity.

One other preliminary point requires to be noted. That is the relation of " industrial psychology " or the wider psychology of industry to that " scientific management " which has within the past few years become so prominent in American industrial life. The aim of " scientific management " is confessedly to increase output and profits, and it approaches the psychological phenomena of industrial activities from the point of view of the management. It has naturally been regarded with grave suspicion by the worker from the outset. It may be true that, theoretically and in the long run, the interests of employer and employee coincide. It is also true that practically the employee may be exploited for the immediate benefit of the employer. " Scientific management " makes only a half-hearted profession of impartiality in this matter. Industrial psychology, on the other hand, is strictly impartial, as we have already pointed out. It is concerned solely with the facts, and its investigations and results are equally at the service of both employer and employee. On the whole its tendency has perhaps been to support the worker and his claims, since the worker is the effective agent in nearly every process it investigates, and an understanding of the facts is impossible without understanding the point of view of the worker, as well as the psychological processes involved in the work itself. The ^..dustrial psychologist is tempted to reply to the contention of the advocates of scientific management, that efficiency in •roduction is in the interests of the worker as well as the employer, with the equally valid contention that the welfare of the worker is essential to efficient production and to the prosperity and happiness of the community.

Chapter II The Intelligence Of The Worker

IN any organization of human effort for any purpose whatsoever, economic or otherwise, if the best results are to be secured, account must obviously be taken of the differences between individuals in tastes, capacities, and dexterities, both general and special, both congenital and acquired. This is a principle upon which the employer of labour constantly tries to act. Before taldng a man into his employment he requires some kind of evidence that the man is in every way suitable as regards character and intelhgence. In selecting a man for a particular position requiring special skill or capacity or disposition, he takes some means to satisfy himself that the man selected has such skill, capacity, or disposition. But the problem of selecting human beings with respect to disposition, capacity, character, or intelligence is a psychological problem. Moreover it is a problem in the study of which the experimental psychologist has made great advances within recent years. No one would maintain that the old methods of selection, based as they were on general impression, or testimonials, or school certificates — methods which are still current in the vast majority of industrial and commercial undertakings in this and other countries — can be regarded as rehable, adequate, or even moderately satisfactory, if we consider them as anything more than extremely rough and ready approximations. \Vliat substitutes can the psychologist offer ?

The psychologist recognizes two distinct problems, both important both economically and socially, and both in his opinion soluble by the methods he has adopted. The first of these is the problem of determining an indi\'iduars general mental capacity or efficiency, the problem, as the psychologist puts it, of the " measurement of intelHgence ". The " measurement of intelligence " has played a great part in experimental psychology in recent times. In applied psychology the literature devoted to this topic probably exceeds in bulk the literature devoted to all other topics put together. Yet the economic importance of intelligence-testing is only beginning to be realized, and in some civilized countries, among which Great Britain must be numbered, is hardly recognized at all.

The economic significance of the measurement of intelligence is apparent from two points of view. First of all, there is the very general point of view of the social and economic welfare of the state as a whole. Secondly, there is the point of view of the desirability of securing economic efficiency in the individual undertaking, and that in the interests alike of the employer and the employee. The general point of view is scarcely the concern of industrial psychology. Nevertheless it is worth drawing attention to. The evidence, based on a very extensive series of investigations, is quite conclusive that defective intelligence — meaning by " defective " intelligence which is somewhat markedly below the normal — ranks as one of the main producing causes of crime. The economic waste which society incurs from criminality could without question be greatly reduced if measures were taken to discover low-grade intelligence sufficiently early, and where necessary to exercise such control over it as the interests of society should dictate. The records of the Kallikak family, ^ the Nam family, ^ the Jukes family,^ and the Hill folk* reveal in the most startling way the lamentable neglect on the part of society of its most elementary duties to itself. From the narrow point of view of their cost to the state, in charitable relief, care of the epileptic and insane, punishment for crime and the like, these four families have

^ Goddard, " The Kallikak Family". " Estabrook and Davenport, "The Nam Family". ^ Dugdale, "The Jukes". * Danielson and Davenport, " The Hill Folk".

accounted for an economic wastage only partially represented by a million pounds sterling during the last two generations. The problem is, however, a wider social problem, and we may leave it with this passing reference.

With the special point of view we are here more closely concerned. The loss which industrial concerns suffer from the employment of individuals whose mental ability, in spite of apparent evidence to the contrary in the shape of testimonials or school certificates, is not equal to the work they are called upon to perform, must be enormous. To leave an individual's inefficiency to be discovered after he has been tried at some work is quite obviously wasteful economically, and may be ruinous to the individual himself. The waste and the harm are all the greater if the individual is put to one kind of work after another, and found to be inefiEicient at all. We are not in this instance dealing with mental defect so great and so marked as to necessitate the protection and restraint of the individual in an institution, but with the much commoner case of an intelligence sufficiently below the normal to incapacitate the individual for performing efficiently any task demanding average intelligence. If the psychologist can furnish us with a reliable measurement of an individual's mental efficiency, sufficiently reliable to pick out such cases, he is able to perform an economic service of the utmost importance. This the psychologist claims that he can do. He claims indeed to be able to do a good deal more than this, as we shall see presently.

The various systems of mental tests, which are available at the present time, have originated from several distinct interests, and have therefore been devised with several different objects in view. To begin with, the interest in mental testing was mainly theoretical. The experimental psychologist devised tests in the psychological laboratory in order to measure sensory discrimination and the like ; the anthropologist devised tests for the purpose of studying the interrelations of mental traits with one another and with physical characters ; the eugenist devised tests in order to study the influence of environment and heredity respectively on mental characteristics. But practical interests very soon came upon the scene. The alienist and the educator especially experienced the need for some system of accurate mental testing, and most of the tests in common use at the present time have been selected and modified from these two practical points of view. It is generally agreed that the needs of both alienist and educator are now fairly satisfactorily met, and many of their tests may, with or without some slight modification, be apphed to economic purposes as well. As a matter of fact the results of the testing of both alienist and educator have themselves definite economic and industrial significance. If every young person applying for employment were required to present a certified school record, and if this school record had appended to it the mental grading of the individual as systematically determined at regular intervals throughout the school career, by means of a recognized and satisfactory scheme of tests, more than half of the difficulty of the employer of labour would be overcome, and his needs to a great extent met. The school certificate would then become to the employer a reliable guarantee of the mental efficiency or inefficiency of each individual seeking employment, and even an indication — which might, however, require supplementary testing — of special abilities and disabilities, rendering the individual suitable or unsuitable for special kinds of work in his employment.