The psychological principles of education : a study in the science of education

Front matter

PRINCETON - NEW JERSEY f we Re tye.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES OF DEDUCATION

OF EDUCATION

Preface

PROGRESS in every art dates from the application of science. Chemistry widens industry, physics perfects means of communication, bacteriology advances medicine, sociology humanizes jurisprudence, economics elevates business, scholarship revivifies Biblical truth. The old professions of law, theology, and medicine grounded themselves in science during the medizval period. Business and teaching, though arts as old as man, have not yet struck into the sure path of science. There are many indications, however, that these arts also are now in the act of transition from the empirical to the scientific. The period of transition has already lasted a generation; it is likely to last several more.

This volume attempts to lay scientific foundations for the art of teaching, so far as those foundations are concerned with psychology. Though the art of education is founded in all the sciences of man, probably no science has quite so much to contribute as psychology. The wonderful progress in all departments of psychology during recent years makes an outline map of consciousness now possible. The same progress makes educational applications in order; for, as Professor

Titchener says, ‘‘No sane man can doubt that there is vii

Vill Preface a relation between the science of mind and the art of teaching.”

The author has attempted to be the middle man between the psychologist and the teacher, taking the theoretical descriptions of pure psychology and trans- _ forming them into educational principles for the teacher. The psychologist as such cannot be asked for practical applications, nor must the teacher be burdened with technical and unapplied psychology. The book will satisfy neither readers of pure psychology nor lovers of teaching devices; it seeks to satisfy teachers who love the principles of their art.

There is a certain peril in attempting the practical in the matter of educational principles. The vision must not fail, lest the old-time rule of thumb, rote, and insipidity be again enthroned. Nor must the application fail, lest the vagueness of abstract theory both confuse and weary. Is it possible to say practical things to the busy and devoted host of American teachers that shall be at once inspiriting and nonmechanical, avoiding each horn of the dilemma of unusable theory and useless platitudes? Let this book be my trial answer, to the publication of which I am encouraged by the many teachers, in various places, who have heard its contents in lecture form.

The outline of the discussion is evident from a glance at the table of contents. In Part I we get our bearings in the field of the science of education. The remainder of the book sketches such a science from the standpoint of psychology. Its parts are suggested by the nature of man, the subject of education. Psychologically

Le peta

Preface 1X viewed, man is body and soul. The phases of the soul’s

e, ‘according to distinctions v wrought now into common usage and adopted here for this reason, are knowledge, feeling, aa and will. At the same time psychology finds in ‘in the soul no ‘religious section, just because the whole soul is conscious of its relationship to deity. In view of the nature of man, complete education, psychologically viewed, is therefore physical, intellectual, emotional, moral, and_spiritual. These give the divi- “sions of the ood Only the discussion of physical education is omitted, as the reader who is interested in doing so can find my views on this subject elsewhere.” At this point I may remark, by the way, concerning the relationship of my two books to each other that, whereas the first was mostly theory with some practice, this is mostly practice with some theory.

A few characteristic things about the mode of treatment may here be noted. Perhaps for the first time in the many similar works in this general field, the education of the emotions is permitted to stand on a noticeable parity with intellectual and moral education, in accord with the theory of the former volume. Also, the education of the emotions and the will is treated with greater analysis than customary, but no greater than their complexity deserves. Also, I have attempted to emphasize practically the idea of the unity of education by concluding the work with a discussion of religious education. This is not a new type of education but just education conscious of its true end, as the teacher whose life is right spiritualizes education into religion.

1 The Philosophy of Education, ch. III.

x Preface

At the same time the reader will observe my effort not to mix the educational and religious issues in the American public school situation.

For convenience of reference the chapters are numbered continuously, despite the division of the book into parts. The special problems and bibliography at the end of each chapter are intended to serve the teacher of the subject, and also to provoke the reader to further study and reflection upon what is perhaps one of the gravest and greatest human problems.

If this volume helps to point the way to a science of educating, or to make the task of any fellow-teacher somewhat lighter and sweeter, the author has his reward.

HANover, NEw HAMPSHIRE, May 26, 1906.

Part I Introduction: A Science Of Education

CHAPTER PAGE I. THE CONCEPT OF A SCIENCE OF EDUCATION’ .- 3 Il. THE RELATION OF THE HISTORY TO THE SCIENCE

OF EDUCATION : ; : ; : ST lea

III. THE PROBLEM OF EDUCATION . : : si

IV. THE ESSENTIAL QUALIFICATIONS OF THE TEACHER = 42 V. THE CONTRIBUTION OF PSYCHOLOGY TO A SCI-

ENCE OF EDUCATION : ° : . ASC aLSLS VI. THE THEORY OF FORMAL DISCIPLINE A SOG PART II

INTELLECTUAL EDUCATION, OR EDUCAT- ING THE MIND TO KNOW

VII. OPENING THE WINDOWS OF CONSCIOUSNESS Sy OG VIII. EDUCATING THE MIND TO PERCEIVE . : TRO ICS y LX. Tue EpuCATIONAL USES OF THE APPERCEPTIVE PROCESS . : : ; A 2 ° SLOT X. AIDING MEMORY . ? , : : u AHI tg XI. EDUCATING THE IMAGINATION ‘ : - 140 XII. STIMULATING THE MIND TO CONCEIVE . Lin GS XIII. TRAINING THE MIND TO JUDGE . ° : LOS

XIV. TEACHING TO REASON . : ; : . UD YO xi

X11 Contents

PART «III

EMOTIONAL EDUCATION, OR EDUCATING THESMINDS TOP EEE

CHAPTER PAGE XV. DESCRIPTION OF THE FEELINGS . . uate XVI. PRINCIPLES OF EDUCATING THE FEELINGS . 208

XVII. THE PLACE OF PLEASURE AND PAIN IN Epvu-

CATION. : ; : ; 4 : Ae eg i

XVIII. CONTROLLING THE COARSER EMOTIONS . Ye 2G

XIX. DEVELOPING THE ALTRUISTIC FEELINGS ee |

XX. AESTHETIC EDUCATION . : : “ LEG PARIS LY)

MORAL EDUCATION, OR EDUCATING THE MIND TO WILL

XXI. THE FIELD OF WILL. : , 3 ive 3 XXII. THE Use oF INSTINCTS IN EDUCATING . ay elie XXIII. TRAINING THE IMPULSES : ‘ : - e270 XXIV. THE PLACE oF IMITATION IN EDUCATION . 278 XXV. EDUCATING BY SUGGESTION . : : szod. XXVI. FormMInG HABITS . : : : : ap) ise.

XXVII. DELIBERATING AND CHOOSING : “ <1 8300 XXVIII. SECURING ATTENTION . - : : a che PARE OV

RELIGIOUS EDUCATION, OR EDUCATING THE SPIRIT IN MAN

XXIX. THE PRINCIPLES OF RELIGIOUS EDUCATION . 335 XXX. THE DEVELOPMENT AND TRAINING OF THE RELIGIOUS NATURE . : a“ : - 349

CHAPTER

XXXI.

XXXII.

XXXII.

XXXIV.

Contents

RELIGIOUS EDUCATION IN THE HOME RELIGIOUS EDUCATION IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOL RELIGIOUS EDUCATION IN THE CHURCH

THE TEXT-BOOK OF RELIGIOUS EDUCATION .

XU PAGE 365 382

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INTRODUCTION: A SCIENCE OF EDUCATION

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CHAPTER aL

THE CONCEPT OF A SCIENCE OF EDUCATION !

Is there a science of educating?

In considering this subject, upon which such a variety of modern opinion has been expressed, let us begin with a definition of the terms involved. }

By “science”? we may agree to mean classified and verifiable knowledge. The root meaning of the word science suggests knowledge. But not all knowledge is science. Only the knowledge whose details appear in some relatively organized whole, into which some order has been introduced by classification, deserves to be called scientific. ‘The knowledge of the usual, untrained mind fails of being scientific at this point of system. And further, also, the knowledge that is truly scientific is verifiable; it is capable of demonstration by other observers, by all other efficient observers. The announcement of a new discovery, like the appearance of “canals”? on the planet Mars, becomes truly scientific only when any capable astronomer can verify it. Physics, chemistry, botany, biology, logic, esthetics, ethics, etc., are called sciences, for example, because they are classified and verifiable bodies of knowledge. The

1 This discussion is a revision of a paper on the same subject read at the World’s Congress of Arts and Sciences in St. Louis, September, 1904.

Meaning of * Science.’

Descriptive and Normative Science,

Meaning of ‘ Educating.”

nether and the upper boundaries of science are both vague, it is true, — there being no clear line of cleavage where unscientific knowledge ends and scientific knowledge begins, or where scientific knowledge ends and speculative hypotheses begin.

So far it is evident that if educating is capable of reduction to a scientific basis, there must be had concerning it a body of systematized and demonstrable knowledge. Cie

To assist us further in thinking of what a science is, the logicians and philosophers who have sought to classify the various sciences distinguish two kinds, viz. the descriptive and explanatory, and the normative. ‘The so-called descriptive sciences tell us what the fact is and what are its causes. The normative sciences tell us what the fact ought to be; 7.e. they establish norms or standards of experience. Physics, history, and psychology would illustrate the descriptive sciences, while logic, esthetics, and ethics would illustrate the normative sciences. Psychology describes and explains states of consciousness, including how we think; logic tells us how we ought to think in order to reach valid conclusions.

So our first question must now be restated in the form, Is there a descriptive, or a normative, science of educating; or, indeed, are the facts of educating capable of both modes of treatment? This is the question we must seek to answer as soon as we can agree what our second term, “educating,” signifies.

By “educating” in this connection we may agree to mean the realizing of the natural powers of pupils through all the agencies of the school... This definition, and indeed the very form of the word we have chosen, — “educating,” —suggest the activities of education. Educating is no passive process; it is doing something; it is the fertilizing and cultivating of minds. Presupposing the inherent mental capacities as the gifts of nature, educating is a seeking to find and to realize them. ‘The term covers whatsoever the school, as one of the institutions of society, does to assist its members in becoming their true selves.

This definition leads us at the threshold of our inquiry to consider whether educating is primarily a science or an art. What a science is we have seen; an art in distinction from a science is action rather than knowledge. The arts are the practical endeavors of society to express its purposes. We speak of the arts of navigation, of war, of commerce, etc. Obviously, educating is primarily an art. It is one of the practical activities of society to attain a specific purpose. Just as society engages in the art of producing and distributing wealth, of applying nature’s forces to man’s purposes, of healing diseases, of reforming criminals, of ministering to souls, so also it engages in the art of educating the young. In considering whether educating is reducible to a science, we must not, therefore, lose sight of the fact that it is primarily an art.

But the analogy of the other arts throws us back with emphasis upon the opening question whether and in what sense there is a science of educating; for all the efficient arts of society rest upon sciences. There are

Educating primarily an Art.

The Analogy of the Arts.

A Descriptive Science of Education.

economic laws for the capitalist, natural and mathematical laws for the engineer, physiological and anatomical laws for the physician, pathological and social laws for the criminologist, psychological and ethical laws for the minister. In proportion as educating is similar to the other arts of society, analogy would lead us to suppose that there are some laws for the teacher. Educating is similar to the other arts in the essential respect of being a social activity to attain a specific purpose. This essential similarity warrants the presumption by analogy that there are also laws for the educator. He alone in the group of social experts is not to be left without scientific guidance. Presumptively at least, then, in addition to being primarily an art, educating is also secondarily a science.

But, now, in what sense may we think of educating as a science, descriptive or normative? ‘There can be no question that a descriptive science of educating is possible. Students of education can observe, gather, classify, organize, and verify facts. There is nothing about educational phenomena to prevent their being studied scientifically. Only those matters that are beyond human observation and verification, like the realities of pure philosophy, such as God, Freedom, and Immortality, forbid by their nature scientific treatment. The observable data for such a descriptive science of education are largely at hand in the educational documents of the race, including all accounts and reports of what the facts of education have been and are. If history is a descriptive science, whe Concept) ofa Science of) Education’) 7 who can deny that the history of education is a descriptive science? And if there can be “A History of our own Times,” there can be a history of contemporary educational systems. A descriptive science of education would include then a careful and systematic record of the past and present educational facts. Such a descriptive science associates itself with that group of the sciences commonly called social, other members of which are economics, sociology, and history. Remembering the extent to which the facts of education have been recorded, compiled, digested, and classified in our day, the extent to which histories of education, however imperfect, already exist as a result of such eager study, we must affirm that a descriptive science of education is not simply a possibility, but also a partial actuality.

If the original question as to the possibility of a science of education had contemplated only a descriptive science, not much warfare would have been waged concerning it. The centre of controversy has been the deeper question, “‘Is a normative science of educating possible? ’’? That is, is it at all possible to say not simply what education is, but also what it ought to be? Do the school processes admit at all of being directed toward an ideal? Is there any definable ideal of education? ‘To such deep and far-reaching questions as these the answers have naturally been diverse. He whose mind is possessed by the changes of races, and conditions, and times, and problems that history has to record, answers quickly that no

Conflicting Attitudes toward a Normative Science of Education.

e universal science of educating, no absolute pedagogy, is possible. He whose mind, on the other hand, is possessed by the sameness in human nature, by the unity of the race, by the permanence of mental laws, answers firmly that in some sense there is possible

‘a normative science of educating. What answer shall

The Negative Position of Dilthey and Royce.

we render? As leading the way to our conclusion, let us review the opposing arguments. It may turn out the two positions are not mutually contradictory, and that we may find a standing-ground between them.

In 1888 Professor Dilthey of the University of Berlin raised the question before the Berlin Academy of Sciences of the possibility of a universally valid pedagogical science.' With the general negative conclusion of this inquiry Professor Royce, in 1891, found himself in substantial agreement, as follows: —

“In short, scientific pedagogy, far from telling the | teacher finally and completely just what human nature is, and must be, and just what to do with it, will be limited to pointing out what does, on the whole, tend toward good order and toward the organization of impulses into character. ‘This is the whole province of pedagogy’ as a general science. Its applications to the conditions of a particular time, nation, family, and child, will be a matter of art, not science. . . .

“There is no universally valid science of pedagogy that is capable of any complete formulation and of direct application to individual pupils and teachers.

The Concept of a Science of Education g

Nor will there ever be one as long as human nature develops, through cross-breeding in each new generation, individual types that never were there before; so long as history furnishes, in every age, novel social environments, new forms of faith, new ideals, a new industrial organization, and thus new problems for (hesegucatoraewd:.

‘To sum it all up in one word: Teaching is an art, Therefore there is indeed no science of education. But what there is, is the world of science furnishing material for the educator to study.’’?

And with these conclusions many students of education find themselves in agreement.

In estimating these notable and influential positions of two leading thinkers, it is necessary to note carefully just what is denied, and the reasons for the denial. A universally valid science of educating is denied, because (1) conditions change, (2) individuals differ, and (3) teaching is an art.

Concerning the facts that conditions change, individuals differ, and teaching is an art, there may be no dispute. Concerning the conclusion from these facts that no universally valid science of educating is possible, there may likewise be no dispute. But with this conclusion we must not confuse, as the authors seem to do, the entirely different one, that “there is, indeed, no science of education.”’ Universal validity is not one of the inalienable characteristics of science; — those characteristics, as we saw, were system and

1 “Ts there a Science of Education?’’? Educational Review, Vol. 1, two articles.

Criticism of this Position.

The Argument from Change of Condition.

verifiability. There may be a science of education that is not universally valid, just as there is a science of therapeutics not universally valid, whose principles depend for their application upon the peculiar condition of the case diagnosed. In short, the fallacy of

‘the argument is that which technical logicians call ignoratio elenchi, or irrelevant conclusion.

Concerning the unquestionable conclusion that no universally valid science of education is possible, it is sufficient to remark that there is no need and no demand for such. / All that society needs is a relative, not an absolute, pedagogy; is a growing, not a static, educational ideal. ,

But I desire also to examine the reasons urged to see whether they would justify the conclusion that there is no science of education at all, either absolute or relative. The fact that the conditions of human society change from age to age does not warrant the conclusion that nothing can be said in each age concerning what education ought to be, but only the . conclusion that what one age says another age must revise. The educational ideal must itself develop as the nature of human society successively discloses itself. Changing conditions do not negate normative educational procedure, — they only demand continuous improvement in educational procedure. The history of education is abundant warrant for this conclusion. Where social conditions have notably changed, quickly some educational reformer demanded that the schools adjust themselves to the new order. Indeed, it is also true that when some social reformer, like Plato, has pictured an ideal society, he has also looked to education to enact his reforms with the young and plastic generation. That the fact of changing human conditions does not annul normative educational science, a modern writer states thus: ‘‘The social environment to be dealt with changes in character with the evolution of the race, and varies with the different races; the physical environment is modified by the locality, and so on. But our general principle, as a type of educational propositions, is none the less scientific because it has not just the same application in all instances, though it may be less mathematical, less perspicacious, more complex and indeterminate on this account.” *

The second reason mentioned above, viz. individuals differ, does not invalidate a relative pedagogy. It is important to observe that the differences of individuals as subjects of education are no greater than the differences between individuals as members of society, as having physical bodies, or as having intellectual, or emotional, or volitional natures; and yet the sciences of sociology, physiology, logic, zesthetics, and ethics seem possible. In other words, the objection to the science of educating, if universalized, would render impossible all the existent sciences of man.

On the other hand, the possibility of a relative normative science of educating appears in the real and fundamental similarities of human beings. Our likenesses are greater and deeper than our differences. Our processes of physical and mental activity are

1 O’Shea, “‘ Education as Adjustment,” p. 13. ’ fee <a hie al Ay Bh 7 es ¥

* mgt

The Argument from Individual Variation,

The Argument from Teaching as an Art.

Conclusions of the Critical Argument, similar; the results of those processes in deeds and thoughts are different. The essential similarities of men appear in all their codperative effort, like speech, industry, and the arts of civilization. Essential similarities in physical and mental action permit gener-

‘alizations, and generalizations allow practical applications. They suggest a norm, a standard, to which experience in general should conform. Because pupils in school are alike, general principles of guidance are possible; indeed, in a considerable degree, they already exist.

The last argument that, because teaching is an art, it is not a science, we have already had occasion to anticipate. Admittedly, teaching is primarily an art. This admission, however, does not warrant the conclusion that teaching cannot be secondarily a science. Such a conclusion neglects the analogy of the arts. Besides, from the time of Socrates until now the teacher has had his norm in going about his work, has had what he conceived as a good and as a bad way of teaching. And when he did not know himself, others have not been hesitant in telling him how he ought to do. The argument here turns upon fact; and the fact is that educational standards of procedure, however imperfect, exist and have existed ever since education began to be reflectively considered among the Greeks.

Considering the arguments of Professors Dilthey and Royce as a whole, we must conclude that they establish that no universally valid science of educating is possible, but this conclusion is irrelevant; also that the arguments do not disprove the real point at issue, viz. whether a relative and adjustable normative pedagogy is possible. Positively, the rebuttal of these arguments has rather tended to confirm the presumption given by the analogy of the arts, viz. that there is a sense in which a normative pedagogy is possible.

In addition to the conspicuous objections just considered, there is another rather general and popular one, that pedagogy is not exact. This objection goes along with the general feeling that knowledge deserving to be called scientific ought to be exact. The feeling is natural. Exactitude is an ideal of scientific investigation. Also it must be fully admitted that pedagogy is not exact, as physics, chemistry, or astronomy are exact.

But in reply to such considerations as serious objections to the formulating of a science of educating, two things must be taken into account. One is, that there are also inexact sciences, like biology and sociology and psychology. Indeed, the sciences that deal with life, the vital sciences, are all inexact. Only the lifeless things, like matter, admit of rigidly exact treatment; the live things defy our final measurements and descriptions, —they outgrow our accounts of them. None the less there are sciences of life, inexact though they be.

The second thing to remember is that the vital phenomena, in general, and educational facts, in particular, are being more and more successfully viewed in exact statistical fashion. Not that mathematical

Another Negative Position Considered.

The Inexact Sciences.

The Increasingly Exact Study of Education.

The Positive Position.

The Argument from Institutions.

precision will ever be attained .in the vital sciences, but such precision is the ideal of investigation, and is being ever more and more approximated. In the light of such newer work,* we may confidently expect that educating will become increasingly an exact science, though never becoming finally so, and thus this objection will have diminishing weight with the lapse of time. 3

Is there a normative science of educating possible? A summary of the preceding considerations involves the following reasons for an affirmative answer; viz. (1) each age can and does say something concerning what the education of its own children ought to be; (2) the essential similarities of children permit relative generalizations and applications; (3) the analogy of the arts suggests a science underlying the art of education; (4) the history of education reveals the presence of conscious norms; (5) the normative science of education is, and probably must remain, inexact; and to these may be added, (6) the existence of normal institutions and the normative writings of educational experts, implying the reality, if inadequacy, of an educational standard.

To refer to this last argument from institutions and men more in detail. From the time when the Jesuits began in the seventeenth century to train their teachers, down through the service of the normal schools abroad and at home, even to the establish-

' Cf. for instance, the psychological and pedagogical writings of E. L. Thorndike.

The Concept of a ScieAce of Education 15 ment to-day of schools of education and graduate departments of pedagogy in connection with practice schools in our universities, various institutions have by their existence affirmed the possibility of a scientific knowledge of education. ‘The position of various educational writers will be the same.

To omit consideration of Herbart, the most notable advocate, doubtless, of education as a science, we may mention the work and influence of Alexander Bain. In 1878 appeared his famous discussion, “Education as a Science,’’ which is the forerunner and the superior of many modern volumes. Bain opens his discussion with this paragraph: ‘‘The scientific treatment of any art consists partly in applying the principles furnished by the several sciences involved, as chemical laws to agriculture, and partly in enforcing, throughout the discussion, the utmost precision and vigor in the statement, deduction, and proof of the various maxims or rules that make up LiGearis aver

“Further it aught to be pointed out, as specially applicable to our present subject, that the best attainable knowledge on anything is due to a combination of general principles obtained from the sciences, with well-conducted observations and experiments made in actual practice. On every great question there should be a convergence of both lights. The technical expression for this is ‘the union of the Deductive and Inductive Methods.’ The deductions are to be obtained apart, in their own way, and with all

1 “Education as a Science,” p. I.

The Work of Alexander Bain.

The Work of W. H. Payne.

The Methods of Educational Science.

attainable precision. ‘The inductions are the maxims of practice — purified, in the first instance, by wide comparison and by the requisite precautions.” *

In 1886, to take another early example, Professor W. H. Payne wrote his ‘‘Contributions to the Science of Education,” from which I take the following passage: ‘In respect of method, therefore, the case may be stated in this way: the greater part of the material composing the science of education is borrowed from other sciences; and these first principles, thus taken on trust, must be applied to use by the deductive method. There are other principles, however, that the science of education must find, and the method of this finding must be inductive; but when actually found, these laws, like those that are borrowed, must be applied deductively. But a concurrent factor throughout the whole science must be the verification of laws and their applications by the analytical study of results; and this verification is an inductive process.’’?

In addition to affirming the possibility of a science of educating, Bain and Payne also agree in suggesting the means whereby it is to be attained. Since whether a body of knowledge deserves to be called scientific or not depends so largely, almost exclusively, upon the method whereby it was attained, we may well consider next the scientific methods at the disposition of students of educational phenomena. ‘These are in general the same as those that belong to any scientific investigation; viz. generalizations from ob-

1 Of. cit. p. 9. ? Page 18.

served phenomena and applications to new conditions; or, technically, induction and deduction. ~

To consider the place of induction in the formation Induction.

of a science of educating. This is the newer mode ~ of investigating educational facts, as, since Francis Bacon, it is the modern mode of investigating natural facts. It means the observing and classifying and explaining of all accessible educational data; it leads to what Professor Hanus and others have called ‘“‘the organization of educational experience.” It is the essential, though not exclusive, method whereby education as a descriptive science is being attained. The best in the descriptive is the basis for the normative. Thus in education, as in other fields, induction is one of the two feet with which scientific progress has moved.