Psychology; or, a view of the human soul : including anthropology, being the substance of a course of lectures, delivered to the junior class, Marshall College, Penn.

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Preface

^^ Know thyself ^^ was the inscription on the temple of Apollo. The meanina: of this terse admonition was either a practical one: Know thy frailties, thy human weakness, thy sinful nature ; acknowledge thyself what thou art, — and amend thy ways ; or it was a theoretical one : Man, the highest being in nature, who studies every thing below himself, who knows the soil which he cultivates, and the stars that regulate the seasons, and the laws of crystallization, vegetation and animalization — should not he desire to know himself? a being, who stands midway between the kingdom of nature and that of immortal spirits ? who is the measure of the earth and all it contains, who unites what is dispersed in nature, every power and every beauty in himself? But how shall man become acquainted with himself both practically and theoretically 7 This is the question, which the great Apollo did not answer. Shall he merely observe himself? But man is inclined either to place too high or too low a value upon himself; he has not a proper measure for his judgment in himself. Shall he watch others ? He that will understand himself must observe those around him, but to understand them, he must look into his own heart. Thus he may indeed obtain a knowledge of man, but one, that is without systematical connection, incomplete, partial and imperfect. While we cannot do without such a knowledge of man, the admonition of Apollo will only be listened to fully, when we connect with this experimental g PREFACE.

knowledge a systematical development of all contained in man, especially of his reason and ivilL These are the basis of all the ihonghts and actions, of all the sciences and practical pursuits in man, and without a knowledge of them, it will always remain difficult to understand man, as we meet him in life. Theory must here, %s every where else, assist practice.

The principal object of the author in writing this book, was to render this noble and delightful science accessible to all classes of readers, for as the inscription on the temple of Apollo was not only intended for some, but for every one approaching it, so the knowledge of man iis desirable for every one and not for a few only. The author flatters himself, that he has effected this purpose by using plain language, by following a simple course pf thought, by taking all his illustrations from nature, and by comparing constantly the activities of mind with $hose analogous to it, in nature. With the exception of a few divisions, it is hoped therefore; that the present "work may be read by all.

A second object of the author was to give the science of man a direct bearing upon other sciences, and especially upon religion and theology. Psychology and theology are connected by their common subject, which is man. Religion, of which theology is the science, is intended for man, and for him only ; psychology treats of man and not of any other being. Man as the subject of psychology, is created for religion and cannot do without it. Religion is not a mere quality^ but the substance of man. He remains what he is, though he has no learning, no beauty, no wit, neither a strong memory nor an acute judgment; but he ceases to be man in the full sense of the term when he has na ifeligion ; — he is then only an animal, more cunning, crafty and prudent, than all the others, one that can invent machines, but he is no longer the lord of the earth, the image of his Creator. Novv religion has for its soul,/ai/A ; this contains thoughts and ideas, as for instance, those of providence, of sin, of sanctifi^ cation, of regeneration, of repentance, &c. Psychology develops the nature oX reason and consequently tha^

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PREFACE. 6

of its productions, which are thoughts : and without understanding the nature of reason and its capacities^ that of faith will not be clearly known ; for if faith and reason differ, as they do, how can this difference be exhibited, unless the being of each is manifest to us i Again : Faith must be active by love, or else it is dead. It must therefore affect our will and fill it with love and animate it to good works. If so, the being of our will in its state of nature, and previous to its regenerationj ought likewise to be known. But as such it exists in the form of desires, inclinations, emotions and passions^ and these are the subjects of psychology ; hence the study of the latter again is indispensable to a thorough study of theology. AVhile, therefore, the first section of the second part will assik the science of dogmatics, the second has for its remote object to be auxiliary to that of christian ethics.

It will scarcely be necessary toshowtheinfluence which a good, systematical knowledge of man, of his reasoii and will, and their union with his body must have on the practice of medicine ; and if the physician studies humari and comparative anatomy, physiology and somatology in general, he will find it ruuch to his advantage, td know the whole life contained in the body which he dissects. And how will he manage cases of mental disease without psychology ? The basis of all pathology is certainly a knowledge of health, and this must bd the same in the sphere of mind.

The lawyer, on the other hand, who protects our rights, will be the more successful in doing so, the better he understands human nature ; for all rights ard those of man, and when disputed, passions and desires have darkened our knowledge of them ; and the lawyer in addressing the court, in developing the case before! him, must well understand the nature of the passions, to make his case clear. The greatest lawyers and public orators, Pitt, Sheridan, Fox, &c., were also the finest psychologists. Many actions are committed under the influence of vehement emotions or passions : to valud the guilt of such actions, their moving springSj the passions must be known^

4 PREFACE.

But above all is the study of psychology useful to parents and teachers ; they have to d raw out, what is in their children, and how can they do this well without knowincr the nature of what they are expected to cultivate ? Hence the studyof psychology and especially of desires, inclinations and emotions, is indispensable to them.

Yet why should we speak of the mere usefulness of a science, which if well represented, is one of the most entertaining and interesting, which the human mind has produced? Who would not feel anxious to see his portrait, drawn before the eye of his mind ? Psychology is not only intended for the wants of man, whether sensual or intellectual, those of life or of social intercourse ; its highest design is to make man conscious of the subjects of which it treats, reason and will, and give him full possession of both. Man possesses only that of which he is conscious; an inheritance of which I know nothing, may be mine in law, but not by possession. Unless I know my reason and will, I possess neitlier fully, but only partially.

The present work is, as far as the author knows, the first attempt to unite German and American mental philosophy. This design has not been executed by bringing together two separate systems or by forming an eclectic compound, which is neither the one nor the other, and the parts of which do not grow forth from one spirit, but are brought together from different sources and united by the writer — a real sphinx in the sphere of science. The author was rather anxious to have whatever the work contains, bear witness of one and the same objective spirit, which formed all the parts into 07ie life, as the specific life of a tree changes all particles into one juice.

The author feels himself under obligation to acknowledge fully the use he has made of the following writers : Locke, D. Stewart, Reed, Broion, Rosenkranz, Cams, Jr., Cams, Sen., Daub, Stiedenroth, Suabedissen, Eschenmayer, Heinroth, Hegel, Kant, Wirth, Steffens, Herbart, Hartman, and others. He has used these authors with more or less freedom, and especially Carus, Jr., Daub and Rosenkranz, whose general arrangement

PREFACE. O

he has adopted not without some improvements, however, as he hopes. The work was to be of one spirit ; whatever has been suggested by others, had to become a part of the whole by receiving this spirit and by representing it. Hence to save space, a general acknowledgment has been thought sufficient.

As to the language, the author has particularly to beg the indulgence of his readers. He hopes this will be granted, as in philosophy beauty of speech is less desirable than clearness^ and as in this science we desire less to be entertained than to be enriched with ideas. The terminology of mental philosophy in the English language, as in almost all others, is difficult and not perfectly agreed on. Thus, to mention one instance instead of many, the difference between sensation and perception is by no means clearly established ; as yet it is still disputed. The author has therefore used sensation indiscriminately both for the perception of the object and the feeling connected with it in the sense by which it is perceived. Simplification has been his great object ; yet the signification once given to a word, has been strictly adhered to.

Mercersburg, April 21st, 1840.

INDEX OF CONTENTS.

I. INTRODUCTION. ^%'

CHAPTER I. — Difference between man and animal : 9

1. Piiysical difference, - - - 9

2. Psychical difference, - - - 11 CHAPTER n.— Life : - - - - 18

1. Of the plastic power or the principle

of individual life, - - 21

3. Of the ingenuity of animals, - 35

4. Relation of instinct to man, - - 41 PART I. ANTHROPOLOGY: - - - - 47

CHAPTER I. — The influence of nature upon man : - 48 1. The influence of the sun, of seasons

and times, of zones, &c., - 49

2. The influence of the moon, - - 52

3. The local influence of the earth, - 52

4. The diflferent races of mankind, < - 59

5. National differences, - - 61

6. dualities of the mind, produced by

sexual difference : - - 65

(3.) Their union, - - 69

7. Temperaments in general : - - 70

(1.) The sangume temperament, 73 (2.) The choleric, - - 74 (3.) The melancholic, - - 75 , (4.) Phlegmatic, - - 76 - 8. Mental capacities : - - - 77 (1.) Docihty, ... 78 (2.) Talent, ... 79 (3.) Genius, ... 80 9. Idiosyncrasy : - - - 85 (1.) Sympathy, - - 86 (2.) Antipathy, - - . 87 (3.) Apathy, - - - 87 CHAPTER II.— The natural modifications of mind, produced by age, waking, sleeping and dreaming ; - - 88

(1.) Childhood, - - 90

2. Sleeping and waking : - - 95

(1.) What is sleeping and what is waking,

Where is sleep met with ? - 97

What is its design? - 99

[4.) What are its conditions? - 101

(5.) What is a regular sleep? - 102

(6.) What is faUing asleep? - 103

(7.) What is waking ? - - 104

CONTENTS. 7

Page.

(I.) The form of dreams, - 111

(2.) Causes of dreams, - - 113

(3.) Prophetic dreams, - - 115

(4.) Presentiments, . - 119

(6.) Second sight, - - 124

4. Magnetic sleep : - - - 128

5. Teh health and the diseases of mind : 136

(1.) Melancholy, - - 138

CHAPTER III.— The power of the mind over the body: 148

1. The mind has an influence o\er the

form of the body : - - 148

2. It exercises a power over the health of

the body: - - - 149

3. The power over the body may be

seen from the formation of habits ; 153

4. From the art of representing its emo-

tions and thoughts by the motions

of the body ; - - - 155

5. From physiognomy : - - 157 6 From phrenolocry ; - - - 159

Part II. Psychology. . - - - 161

INTRODUCTION. 1. Self-consciousness: - • 163

2. Mutual relation of body and soul ; - 168

3. Personality : - - - 174

4. Division : - - - - 180 SECTION I.— On Reason, . _ _ - 185

CHAPTER I.— 1. Sensation and the senses : - 185

2. General remarks on the senses : - 187

3. Of Attention : - - - 193 CHAPTER IL— 1. Conception : - - - 199

3. Imagination : - - - 208

(1.) Characteristics of Imagination : - - - 215 (2.) Semeiotic Imagination, - 225 (3.) Language, - - 237 o,. Its etymological elements, 237

b. Grammatical and syntactical

elements, - - 240

c. Written language, 241 (4.) Memory : 244

Page.

3. Rational desires ; -

.

_

CHAPTER II.— On inclinations and passions : _

I. Inclinations arising from the relation.

in which man stands to himself

. _

1. Self-love : -

_

2. The love of life: -

_

3. Self-hatred :

s.

4. Self-love as a passion : -

.

5. Self-love as passion in its negative

form : -

.

6. Love of property ;

-

7. Love of property as a passion :

-

(L) Covetousness, -

-

(2.) Avarice, - (3.) Prodigality,

.

_

8. Love of honor : -

.

9. Love of honor as passion ;

.

(1.) Ambition,

.

.

(3.) Vanity, -

o

II. Social inclinations, or inclinations

arising from the relation of man

to

his fellow-men :

_

(L) Sexuallove,

-

(2.) Sexual love as a passion.

(3.) Parental and filial love.

(4.) Fraternal love, -

_

' (5.) Nationallove, -

-

(6.j Love of mankind, 2. Remarks:

.

.

CHAPTER III.— Emotions : - _

I. Simple emotions, I. Pleasure:

-

2: Pain,

II. Mixed emotions :

I.Hope:

2. Fear:

III. Compound emotions :

1. Depressing emotions :

(1.) Melancholy, -

(2.) Anxious expectation, (3.) Despondency, -

(4.) Patience,

2. Strengthening emotions :

Conclusion : -

On Religion:

1. Religion of desire :

2. Religion of imagination:

3. Religion of cool reflection :

APPENDIX.— On Animal Magnetism :

Note to Imagination :

Note to Remarks on Religion :

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Introduction

Ennius^

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MAN AND THE ANIMAL.

It is a very general remark, that man is the highest order of animals, or that he is an animal gifted with reason. Were this correct, we might say with equal truth, that the animal is man without reason ; or that some of the plants, which seem to form a transition from the vegetable to the animal kingdom, are animals without sensation. Though man has, physically speaking, many things in common with the animal, he nevertheless differs wholly from it. Man is no more a mere continuation of the animal, than the animal is merely a continuation of the vegetable. The difference is perceptible, both physically and psychologically.

1. Man has the same physical functions that the animal has, but they are more perfect and more delicate. The body of the animal is either covered with scales or feathers, with fur, wool, or bristles. All of these approach more or less nearly to the nature of vegetables ; and some of them, as for instance, the shell ofsnails and the tortoise, to inorganic nature. These insensible substances, interposed between the skin and the elements that surround and affect living beings, deprive animals of the more tender and delicate sensations, at the same time that they like conductors protect them from the inclemency of the seasons. The body of man is covered with a thin, highly sensitive, and beautiful skin, which is not concealed under a vegetable and lifem less veil, but unveiled exhibits the presence of the blood, the pulsations of the heart, and the utterance of animation over the whole body. Everywhere sensitive, the swellinor life shines forth from within, and the fresh, bloomins: color of the skin is but the expression of the internal life, the mirror of its healthy or sickly state. Over the face of man are shed beauty and spirit, and even animals are said to gaze at him with mute wonder. The cottiplaint, that man alone is born without raiment, is silly, for this apparent helplessness is the source not only of the most various and delicate sensations, and knowledge derived from them, but also of much ingenuity. Man has not claws, but hands, that are susceptible of many different positions, by which he handles the chisel, which pours life and beauty over the hard, cold marble, the pencil that animates the canvas, the instrument from which he draws forth sweet melodies, and the iron, from which he forms' the weapons denied him by nature. His body is so fashioned that he must walk upright ; for while no animal is intended to walk otherwise than on all-fours, the proportions of the human frame are such, as to render any other than an upright position almost impossible. His legs are much longer than his arms, his knees bend forward,' his eyes are in front and not at the sides, the ligaments of the neck are weak and incapable of supporting the head when hanging down, the arms are at a great distance from each other, and the breast is broad and full. A horizontal position would drive the blood into the head with such violence as to cause stupor. Man is made to turn his head from the earth to the sky, from the right to the left, to view now the crawling insect beneath his feet, and now the millions of stars above his head. To the fish it is natural to swim, to the bird to fly, to man to walk upright. The Greek word for man (dvepojnos) indicates the difference between man and animals in this respect. It influences our whole being and nature. Even the bees, when they have lost their queen-bee, cause the larva of a future laboring bee to be transformed into a queen by changing its horizontal to an upright position, and giving it different food. •

The same superiority is visible in the human face, its proportions and features. With the animal, the most prominent part is the mouth ; with man, the upper part of the face. With the animal, the mouth, jaws, and teeth are to serve only physical purposes ; they are formed to pluck the grasses and twigs, or to seize and carry their prey, and thus tp perform at the same time the service of the hands of man. The human mouth, with its beautiful and sensitive lips, its regular rows of teeth, serves not only the body, but the soul ; nourishes not only the stomach, but also the understanding. Its muscles are so movable, that according to Haller's calculation, it may pronounce in one minute fifteen hundred letters. The contraction of a muscle forming the letter must consequently take place in the three thousandth, and the vibrations of the stylo-pharyngean muscle in pronouncing a letter, in the thirty thousandth part of a minute. ' No bird flies as fast as the winged words fall from the lips of man.'

Comparing the animal physiologically with man, we cannot but perceive a great difference in this respect also. The lower the animal in the scale of being, the more it is confined to one and the same food. To this food it is directed by instinct, by constitution and appetite, as the magnet to the pole. Man, on the contrary, selects his food and drink from all the kingdoms of nature, from the salt of the ocean to the mushrooms of the forests, from the oyster and the amphibious turtle to the lofty sailers of the air and ibex of the High Alps. He prepares his food by fire, and the story of Prometheus is not a mere fable. The laws of his digestion differ widely from those of animals, the functions of assimilation penetrating more thoroughly the elements of nutrition. The flesh of the fish, when compared with that of the bird, is found less formed and solid ; that of the bird less so than that of the quadruped, but the flesh of man is more perfect than that of any animal. Thi shows itself externally on the whole surface of the hu man body, and especially in the " morbidezza " of the skin, the trial-point of all artists.

2. The psychological difference between man and animals is yet more striking. The animal has in common with man, -Sensation and Perception. By sensation we understand an internal motion or activity, produced in a sensitive organ by something external. The organ may be seen externally, but this internal activity or motion cannot be observed ; it can only be felt. The eye, for instance, is the organ of sight ; the fluid surrounding it is constantly in motion, and this motion may be seen, because it is an external one. But when the light falls upon the eye, it causes a sensation, which as an internal motion, is invisible to the eye of the observer. He may notice the dilation or contraction of the pupil, but cannot see sight itself, nor hear hearing. Comparing the vibrations of a string of the piano with those of a nerve, subject to sensation, we shall find the former altogether mechanical and external, the string moving away from itself. The nerve, when affected, trembles within itself, and self-touched in its motions, it has sensation, or feels. The vibrating string of the piano gives a sound, but the sound is not felt by it ; the nerves of the ear, on the other hand, receive a sensation from it. These trembling motions of the nerves are called sensations^ because they are peculiar to the senses. Now, the animal has these sensations in common with man, but with this difference. In. the animal one sense prevails over all the others, and these are subservient to it. In the eagle, for example, it is the eye that is predominant ; from immense heights he observes the mouse creeping on the soil, and darts upon it, certain of his prey.

Yet this one sense has always reference to the means of subsistence, which the animal seeks under its guidance; so that while it may be extremely acute and successful in discovering the food, it may be dull and stupid in respect to other objects, of which man receives the most accurate sensations through the same sense. The ear of the wood-cock is acute in perceiving any rustling noise, as that in the fallen leaves of the forests, but shrill and clear sounds it does not notice. The eye perceives only such objects as reflect the light upon it. The eye of man may, however, direct itself to the different parts of these objects, to their color, proportions, size and form, motion or rest, and inspect each by itself, while the eye of the animal, for want of reason, is forced to admit a sensation from all these parts at once, and consequently receives but a confused impression. As one sense prevails in animals, the others are found less active. The lion has an excellent scent, but his sight is weak. Hence the animal is under the dominion of one sense, while the harmonious and equal strength of all the senses places man above them, and makes him master of them all. Which of the senses prevails in an animal, depends always upon the species to which it belongs. In the eagle it is sight, in the mole hearing, in the vulture scent ; but wherever one sense predominates, the others must subserve and be directed by it. In man, no sense being more acute than another) none reigns, but all are co-ordinate with each other, and subordinate to the understanding. The animal is vis sentiens, man natura intelligens. Hence it is, too, that we do not speak of insanity or derangement^ but of madness^ when animals can no longer distinguish one object from another, but like infuriated elephants or horses, trample under their feet every object that opposes ,

their course. And, finally, man sees not only with his eye external objects, but is also able to examine the eye, by which he sees ; the animal can neither see its eye nor itself.

Perception, however, is more than Sensation. The latter is and remains in contact with the object, by \ -^

which it is called forth, and is consequently dependent -*►*■

on it. The sensation of hearing is impossible without the vibration of the air ; that of seeing is impossible without the presence of light. Sight and light, hearing and sound, are so inseparable, that the one could not be without the other. Without light the eye could not see, without an eye, there would be an eternal night. And if there were no ear, the brooks might continue to murmur, the waving trees to rustle their branches, the winds to roar, but to earthly beings nature would be silent as the grave. Nor can man avoid admitting a sensation, when the element that excites it, acts upon the organ. As we cannot have a sensation of light unless it falls upon the ^ eye, so we must have it, when the eye is affected by it. We cannot taste salt unless it lies on the tongue, but when once it is brought in contact with the tongue, we must have such a sensation, as its specific nature is capable of exciting. In sensation, therefore, we depend wholly on the presence of external objects, and are determined by them. But after we have once had a sensation, we may have perceptions of the objects of sensation, and these perceptions are possible without the presence of the objects. This appears from the fact that one, who in the latter part of his life becomes blind, may have perceptions of all he once saw. Yet perceptions are impossible without previous sensations, for one born blind can have no perception of color or form. Another distinction between sensation and perception is this. Sensation always exists in an organ ; perception not. When I hear a fine melody for the first time, I have a sensation of it ; but when afterwards, without hearing it, it floats in my mind, I have a perception of it. Or when I experience hunger, I may have a perception of food, though it be not present, but when 1 eat, I have a sensation of it. The animal has perceptions as well as man. The hunter's dog dreams, and pursues in his dream the hare or the stag. The dog, when near to his master, has a sensation of him by scent, or sight ; but when seeking him for days in succession, he can have only a perception of him. The animal is confined within the sphere of sensation and perception, and as its sensations are limited to its natural wants, so must be its perceptions. The perceptions of man are as much more numerous and accurate, as his sensations are more various and acute. But . he has in addition to sensations and perceptions, what the animal has not, which we may express by the term ^ apperceptions.

As the animal is separated by sensation from the plant, so man is elevated by apperception above the animal. Perception and apperception differ widely. The objects of perception are always such as are single and met with in a certain place and time. The eagle, i that builds his nest on a high rock, has not the least idea

^I^RODUCTION. ^ 15 of the nature of the stone on which his nest is placed, nor of the region in which it stands, but he carries with him the image of this single rock, as it stands in a particular place, and noticing no, resemblance between it and other rocks, he would find it among thousands of others, its peculiar features being strongly and solely impressed upon his eye. The objects of apperception, on the other hand, are the kind, the species and individuals of things. It is by apperception, that man distinguishes between his perceptions and the objects perceived; and again, that he classifies nature and its productions, by discovering the union in the greatest variety, as when he says": these bushes are rose-bushes ; and by distinguishing one class from another, as pears from apples, and these from peaches. This the animal can never do. It sees, it perceives the grass, but it never arranges it according to its botanical classes. The dog universally will pursue the hare, and it may seem that he does so, because he knows this class of animals, and distinguishes between it and others ; but the truth is, that all hares being exactly alike in size, form, and scent, will produce the same sensations in the dog, and these will always set him in motion. This then is the broad difference, the chasm between man and the animal : the former can think^ the latter cannot, for it is glehae adscriptus. It lives, but acquires no experience ; it eats its food daily, but never knows what this food is.

Some indeed have gone so far as to say, that animals not only judge, but draw conclusions from causes to effects. To draw conclusions is the highest power of human reason, and if they could do this, they would be able to think ^ and to xmll like man, and to have apperceptions like him. Such men cannot know what thinking is, or what is to be understood by judging and drawing conclusions. Animals have no ideaof power, of capacities, of energy, of proportions, of beauty, of truth,- and consequently none of cause and effect. ■ None of these are visible or accessible to the senses, but only to thought, which it yet remains to be proved, that animals possess. The process by which we arrive at conclusions is simply this. We have three thoughts; each differs from the other, and each is included within a certain limit. But while all differ, one is capable of uniting the two others, and of removing this difference. Thus two thoughts are reduced to one class by a third one connecting them. To make use of an example frequently adduced, the dog once whipped, fears as soon as he sees his master take the cane with which he has been beaten on a former occasion. The cane is one thing, the master's intention another, and the pain proceeding from the whippings a third. Now it would be foolish in the extreme, to say, that the dog connects the idea of pain with the cane by the intention of the master'. He has but a confused impression, and without any conclusions or judgments, he darkly connects things as they formerly were connected, and anticipates consequences, without being conscious of such a connection, or without having any thing like an idea of cause and consequence. Hunters, it is true, have many anecdotes about the acuteness and ingenuity of animals, as do sailors voyaging to distant countries. The fact, however, is, that unless their game were bound by the invariable laws of instinct in all its actions, unless one fox would dig its hole as the other, and all stags would go to the water, and seek food at regular hours, and live in certain places at different seasons, the hunters would not be able to entrap them.