The problem of omnipotence in current theology

Front matter

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THE PROBLEM OF OMNIPOTENCE IN CURRENT THEOLOGY

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY

Contents

Introduction 1

The scope of the investigation 1

The main problems involved 2

Introduction

The Scope of Our Investigation

Christian theologians have defined God as absolute sovereign (ens absolutum) of the world. ''The sovereignty of God," says Charles Hodge, a modern exponent of the Medieval tradition, ''is universal and extends over all his creatures from the highest to the lowest. It is absolute and there is no limit to be placed to his authority. Such a conception of divine absoluteness in government leads us to the affirmation of omnipotence indicating that God is the masterful, decisive cause of everything. But the sovereignty of God is not to be conceived as a despotic domination, making God a taskmaster and men his slaves. "Although the sovereignty, " says Hodge, " is thus universal and absolute, it is the sovereignty of wisdom, holiness, and love. So with omnipotence. Practical interests require modifications of the divine almightiness. We do not want to conceive God as mere uncontrolled and uncontrollable power. We cannot think him to be a brute force blindly acting without aim and end. The very idea of God seems to imply unmistakably his moral and rational character, as Hodge says, with wisdom, holiness, and love. The almightiness of God then must be subject to rational and moral direction. The divine power, however absolute and infinitely resourceful, should be expressed in limited ways in accordance with the intrinsic nature and character of God. Now the problem is: how are these practical limitations to be harmonized with the idea of omnipotence which literally signifies an absolute power? "How can God," asks James Ward, "be omnipotent, and yet be limited?" The ideas of creation and of God as creator imply a self-] imitation of divine activity in a definite way, and this self -limitation means nothing but a limitation. As soon as God has created anything in a definite way, can we still call him absolutely free? If God is to act in limited ways, can we still call him almighty? The problem has long given much trouble to theological writers, but they are unwilling to give up the conception of omnipotence. Consequently they aflarm the idea of divine power with diverse modifications. The task of this thesis is to see whether such modifications do not so undermine the con-

^ Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology, Vol. I, 440. ^Ihid., Vol. I, 441.

ception of omnipotence as to leave no actual content in the term. If we frankly assume a limited omnipotence as acceptable to our thought, a further task is to see whether this modified omnipotence is compatible with facts of practical life. We shall finally ask how the conception of divine power should be defined in order to meet adequately the practical religious needs of man.

The Main Problems Involved

(1) The Problem of Evolution. God's world, as shown by modern sciences, seems to be developing from the lower to the higher, from the simple to the complex, from the worse to the better, through a tedious method of evolution which implies incidental waste and much blundering, destruction and decay, suffering and sacrifice, as the cost of progress. If God is omnipotent, why does he not accomplish his task of creation at once instead of by the slow process of evolution which as a means is in itself useless? Or shall we say that evolution is only in appearance and that things are all complete and perfect as a whole?

(2) The Problem of Imperfection. If the world is perfect as a whole, or God the creator is a perfect Being, we may next ask, why is there the sense of imperfection in life and nature? Are they illusory, only real as phenomenal in our finite view? If God is omnipotent, can he not do ay/ay even with such illusion at once and make us feel more at home in this universe? If imperfections are real, the problem would be still more vexed. How can God, omnipotent and perfect as he is, put up with imperfections in his created universe? Why, for instance, does death exist which is at least an undoing of what has once been constructed and seems to be a failure of creation, if God is all powerful?

(3) The Problem of Evil. Not only death but life itself involves a vast variety of ills and pains, physical sufi"ering and mental anguish. Why does God, if omnipotent, tolerate or, indeed, why has he created such evils as earthquakes, storms, floods, droughts, and other disasters which cannot be ascribed to human causation? If man is not responsible for them, who else but the author of the universe can be responsible for those ills? Shall we say then that evil exists in spite of a good God who is incessantly struggling against it and that he will finally overcome it all? If so, can he still be regarded as omnipotent, or shall we understand him better without such an awe-inspiring word as omnipotence? These are in the main the implications of the problem of evil.

(4) The Problem of Sin. Another companion problem is that of sin or moral evil. The fact of moral evil needs no proof. Human history is often said to be a history of sin, and everybody is conscious of his own sinful thoughts and deeds. As to its origin, however, sin is usually attributed to human agents. We are supposed to have been endowed by the Creator with the power of free choice either to do good or evil. But if God made man who has originated sin, is not God the ultimate ground of sin? Why, being supremely good and omnipotent, does he not eliminate sin at once from the universe? On the other hand, if sin is inevitable to a moral system, it can not be in God's power to cut it out at once. Can such a God be called omnipotent?

(5) The Problem of Freedom. Finally we may ask, if God is omnipotent, how much of freedom can we have? If God is lord of all existence, are we to be held responsible for all that we do? Can he punish us for our errors and wrongs, while he is the author of all? If he is not the author of all but we also are authors of something, at least, creative in evil doing, can God still be called omnipotent? Does not our freedom defeat the absolute divine control?

(6) Problems Created by Denying Omnipotence. If these problems entail a difficulty on every hand with our conception of God as omnipotent creator, can the denial of his omnipotence solve the problems? If so, does not the denial imply the denial of his absolute creatorship, because, if God is the sole creator of the universe de novo, all the imperfections and evils in the world must be directly due to God, even though he is not omnipotent? Then, the nature of God as supremely good would be questioned since he is the ex nihilo creator of the world that embraces evil, although he may not be almighty. In the presence of such a difl&culty, can we hold to his supreme goodness if we give up the idea of his creatorship as well as the idea of his omnipotence?

Our purpose is then to give a systematic and comprehensive view of different solutions of these problems offered by current theology from diverse points of view, and to indicate in conclusion the relative value of typical positions. With this purpose in view, we must first, before entering the main discussion, define the general conception of God in order to see clearly what place the idea of omnipotence, relative to its problems, has in the conception of divine attributes.

Theological Conception of God In defining the nature of God, such divine attributes as wisdom, power, and goodness are useally expanded to the superlative degree to make them consistent with the thought of divine perfection. Charles Hodge, representing the Calvinistic type of traditional theology, asserts that God is ens perfecHsshnum; absolute perfection distinguishes Him from all other beings. " The best definition of God, he says, is in the "Westminster Catechism," namely, "God is a spirit, infinite, eternal, and unchangeable, in his being, wisdom, power, holiness, justice, goodness, and truth." Exegetically following this definition, Hodge enumerates the divine attributes as certain perfections of God's essence revealed to human experience. God as a spirit, self -existent and "necessary," is immaterial and simple. This self-existent, immaterial being cannot be thought as limited in space. The infinitude of God, says Hodge, is not merely a spatial boundlessness of his substance but rather an illimitability of his being and perfections. God's omnipresence as to spatial relations points to his eternity regarding time. His timelessness leads us to conceive of his immutability as well as his omniscience. The changelessness of God however, says Hodge, does not mean his inaction: He thinks, feels, wills in time, and the result is manifested in the history of the universe, but God in himself is timeless and immutable in his essence and attributes. "He can neither increase nor decrease; He is subject to no process of development or self-evolution. His knowledge and power can never be greater or less."^ "Being the cause of all things," Hodge goes on, "God knows everything by knowing Himself; all things possible, by the knowledge of his power, and all things actual, by the knowledge of his purposes." If God be ignorant of man's free act, his knowledge must be limited and "his government of the world must be precarious, dependent, as it would then be on the unforeseen conduct of men." Thus Hodge holds that the eternal God has a prefect knowledge of all events possible as personality implies the knowledge of himself and others. With the foreknowledge of all things, God is asserted, as a person, to have a perfect power of will or self-determination. "He may decree to permit what He forbids; He permits men to sin, although sin is forbidden." Omniscient and omnipotent, God can do whatever He wills. "He wills and it is done." But this absoluteness of divine power does not mean that he can act contrary to his nature — to infinite wisdom and love. God with his omniscience and omnipotence, says Hodge, would be to us an inscrutable power but not a personal God, if He had not the moral quahty of holiness, justice, goodness, and truth in the supreme degree as the sovereign of the universe.

A more recent author such as Samuel Harris tersely defines God as the absolute personal spirit, "unlimited and unconditioned by any power

3 Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology, Vol. I, 390.

independent of himself. He is the all-conditioning, the Creator. The universe, with all in it that is finite, must be created by God and dependent on him."^ The most typical definition, however, which we find among the theologians of today, is perhaps that which is given by Clarke and generally accepted by Brown. In substance it runs as follows: "God is the personal spirit, perfectly good, who in holy love creates, sustains, and orders all." In nature, a personal spirit; in character, perfectly good; in relation to others, he creates, sustains, and orders all; his motive in relation to others is holy love. By "personal spirit" it is meant that God is " a self-conscious and self-directing mind. "^ "He is the one perfect and typical person, and man, as yet, possesses personality only in a rudimentary and imperfect way, as a growing gift which is gradually coming toward perfection."*^ "Perfectly good" means all possible moral excellence of God in the human sense of morality, as Clarke says, "when the best conception of moral good that is possible to man has been reached, it will be found that God corresponds to that conception, while yet he transcends it."^ By "hol> love" is meant "God's desire to impart himself and all good to other beings, and to possess them for his own in spiritual fellowship."^ Omnipotence, omniscience, and omnipresence, says he, are implied in the assertion that God creates, sustains, and orders all, for a being cannot create a universe, sustain it, and direct it to an end, without being everywhere present with his works, knowing all things, and possessing all power. "^ From the creation we learn, he continues, that God must be adequate to all its needs, in power, wisdom, and character. "God must be the most perfect being that can be conceived. "^^ Wisdom in God is that quality by which he perfectly understands all things, and knows how to accompHsh the ends that his character suggests. Understanding holy love working in wisdom, we see there the character of God.^-

Since God is conceived as the absolute Being, it is taken for granted that omnipotence, along with other divine attributes such as omnipresence, omniscience, and perfect goodness, must be affirmed. Virtually

* Samuel Harris, God the Creator and Lord of All, Vol. I, 117.

* William N. Clarke, An Outline of Christian Theology, 68. ^Ihid., 68.

all theologians affirm the omnipotence of God in one way or another. But on the other hand, some philosophical writers, such as James, McTaggart, and others, have recently denied omnipotence in any form. Our task is to see in the following chapter (Chapt. II) how diversely the divine omnipotence can be conceived and in what sense it is affirmed by current theology. After having accounted for various definitions of omnipotence, we shall discuss, chapter by chapter, the problems which arise in the affirmation of omnipotence in each particular sense, and see how they are to be solved. We shall see whether the affirmation of omnipotence in any form would entangle us in insoluble mysteries (Chapts. Ill- VII). Finally, if we are to deny the term omnipotence as empty or misleading, we must see what kind of God we can have without the idea of omnipotence. This would be a definition of non-omnipotent God (Chapt. VIII). In conclusion we shall have a general resume of our investigation and see what functional value is involved in the affirmation or the negation of omnipotence. And we shall indicate in closing the current tendency in the conception of God (Chapt. IX).

CHAPTER II Definition or Divine Omnipotence

It is necessary, as was indicated in the last chapter, to define the concept of omnipotence before we begin the discussion of the problems. There are three general conceptions of omnipotence, namely, absolute or transcendent omnipotence, pantheistic or immanent omnipotence, and modified omnipotence. The first two are generally discarded by modern theologians, the first as absurd and the second as insufiacient. A short account of the first two is necessary to distinguish them from the third type which is actually current in the present day theology.

Absolute or Transcendent Omnipotence

By absolute power, as understood by certain schoolmen and some of the later philosophers, is meant power free from all restraints even those of reason and morality. McTaggart insists that the term omnipotence must be used in this sense of absolute power, or else the concept must be given up altogether. "An omnipotent person," says he, "is one who can do anything."^ McTaggart has no difficulty in showing that this conception is untenable. He brings forth the old subtle question: Could God create a being of such a nature that he could not subsequently destroy it? Whatever answer we make to this question, says he, is fatal to God's omnipotence. If we say that he could not create such a being, then there is something that he cannot do. If we say that he can create such a being, then there is still something that he cannot do — to follow such an act of creation by an act of destruction.^ Again, says McTaggart, if God cannot do things logically contradictory, he cannot be omnipotent. Supposing that man's freedom involves freedom to sin, there would be no freedom of will for man, if God did not permit sin. So it is urged that God cannot give freedom to man by restraining him at the same time from doing evil, for it is logically incompatible. McTaggart however asserts that "even if the two were logically contradictory, a really omnipotent being cannot be bound by the law of contradiction. If it seems to us absurd to suggest that the law of contradiction is dependent on the will of any person, we must be prepared to say that no person is really omnipotent."^

^J. M. McTaggart, Seme Dogmas of Religion, 202. 2 Ihid., 204.

Uhid., 166.

Omnipotence with McTaggart must mean ability even to do logical impossibilities; an omnipotent God must be able to act even against his own nature. If God is a god, he urges, whose nature he owes to none but himself, since he is generally supposed to be the uncreated creator of the universe, his nature must also be subject to his will.

Most theologians, however, maintain that God has a determined nature, and the inability to act against it does not impair his omnipotence. Indeed as Augustine says, " God is omnipotent and yet he cannot die, he cannot lie, he cannot deny himself. How is he omnipotent? He is omnipotent for the very reason that he cannot do these things. For if he could die he would not be omnipotent.'"' McTaggart's insistance on the true meaning of omnipotence to be a power to do anything whatever indiscriminately leads us to absurdity and no theologians of today hold such an unqualified conception of the divine power.

Pantheistic or Immanent Omnipotence

This idea is another extreme example of defining omnipotence. While the absolute omnipotence described above asserts divine transcendence, and makes God irresponsible for consequent contradictions and absurdities, pantheistic omnipotence simply affirms that God is the direct cause of everything that exists. God being completely immanent in the world of changing phenomena, everything owes its existence to God. But the vitalizing force that is adequate to the ongoing of this infinite universe must be regarded as an omnipotent power. Thus it was understood by Schleiermacher^ who says that it is not proper to understand God's power to be ability to do what he pleases, but rather that God is the cause of all that is; that there is no causality in God other than what is manifested. There is no reserved causaUty.

This conception is unsatisfactory to most theologians. "This hypothesis," says H. B. Smith, "rests on an essentially pantheistic notion of what God is; that all that exists is simply an emanation from Him, simply evolution of his nature. This is contrary to the very idea of rational, intelligent, and independent being. Genuine theism, says Sheldon, asserting as it does the transcendence as well as the immanence of God, "must hold that the actual is not the full measure of the possible. Supposing God to be true person, it is perfectly conceivable, so far as

* Augustine, De Symbolo, I, 1.

• H. B. Smith, System of Christian Theology , 33.

mere power is concerned, that He could increase the sum of created being.

Modified Omnipotence

Since the conception of transcendent omnipotence leads us to absurdity and since immanent omnipotence is rejected as insufficient for divine perfection, current theology proposes to navigate safely between Scylla and Charybdis by modifying the conception to meet the situation. It tries to make God bigger than a mere cause of what exists, and to explain why this 'bigger' omnipotent God acts in limited ways. "God is a free Spirit, " says Clarke, ''immanent, as always in the universe, and transcendent, as always independent of its limitations and able to act upon it. Such a transcendent yet immanent God has unlimited power but expresses himself in limited ways. The idea of omnipotence here is decidedly modified by the idea of God's moral and rational nature. We may distinguish in this type three sets of definitions not essentially different from one another yet not quite identical since they put the more or the less limitation to divine omnipotence. The first of them approaches absolute omnipotence as its upper Hmit, while the last of them is near to immanent omnipotence as its lowest limit.

1. Quasi Absolute Omnipotence. Under this name it may be convenient to group the definitions given by Hodge, Shedd, and Strong. "We can do very little," says Hodge, "God can do whatever He wills. We, beyond very narrow limits, must use means to accomplish our ends. With God means are unnecessary. He wills and it is done. He said, Let there be light; and there was light. He by a vohtion created the heavens and earth. . . . This simple idea of the omnipotence of God, that He can do without effort, and by a volition, whatever He wills, is the highest conceivable idea of power. God creates, says Shedd, all things from eternity by one act of power, as he knows all things from eternity by one act of knowledge, and as he decrees all things from eternity by one act of will.^*^ The divine power is optional in its exercise. God need not have created anything. And after creation, he may annihilate. The divine power is not to be measured merely by what God has actually effected. Omnipotence is manifested in the works of the actual creation, but it is not exhausted by them.^^ Strong defines

^ H. C. Sheldon, System of Christian Doctrine, 180. ^W. N. Clarke, An Outline of Christian Theology, 180. 'C. Hodge, Systematic Theology, Vol. I, 407.

"W. G. T. Shedd, Dogmatic Theology, Vol. I, 345. ^'Ihid., 359.

omnipotence as the power of God to do all things which are objects of power, whether with or without the use of means.^^

Accordingly, the divine power is qualified mainly in three respects: (1) Omnipotence does not imply power to do that which is not an object of power; for example, (a) Doing that which is self-contradictory such as making a square triangle, or the making of a past event not to have happened. These are not objects of power, and therefore it is really no limitation of the divine omnipotence to say that it cannot create them. They involve the absurdity that a thing can be and not be at the same time. ''Logical impossibihty is, in truth, a non-entity; and to say that God cannot create a non-entity, is not a limitation or denial of power, for power is the ability to create entity. "^^ (b) Again, that which is contradictory to the nature of God is not an object of power, such as for instance, to lie, to sin, to die. God cannot do anything inconsistent, says Shedd, with the perfection of the divine nature. God cannot sin because sin is imperfection, and it is contradictory to say that a necessarily perfect being may be imperfect.^'* Another significant point which Strong brings out is this: (2) Omnipotence does not imply the exercise of all his power on the part of God. He has power over his power; in other words, his power is under the control of ''wise and holy will." God can do all he wills, but will not do all he can. Else his power is mere force acting necessarily, and God is the slave of his own omnipotence. Another point of no less importance is the assertion that (3) Omnipotence in God does not exclude but implies the power of self-limitation. Since all such self -limitation is free, says Strong, proceeding from neither external nor internal compulsion, it is the act and manifestation of God's power.^^

According to this definition, God has a nature which is rational and moral in the human sense of the terms. But it is asserted that the divine power can work miracles which are irrational in the sense that they "suspend" the laws of nature which we understand to be logical in the human sense. Yet in defense of miracle Hodge says that nature and its laws are subject to God, and therefore liable at any time to be suspended or counteracted, at his good pleasure; the laws of nature are uniform only because he so wills, and their uniformity continues only

"A. H. Strong, Systematic Theology, 286.

"W. G. T. Shedd, Dogmatic Theology, Vol. I, 359.

"A. H. Strong, Systematic Theology, 288.

SO long as he wills. Such a power to suspend the law of nature as Hodge asserts seems to be tantamount to an absolute omnipotence. But since absolute omnipotence involves a flagrant absurdity in connection with the problems to be discussed later on, more recent theologians are chary of asserting even this quasi absolute omnipotence. We see in the following two groups typical definitions of modified omnipotence as actually held by the current theology.

2. Deterministic Omnipotence. Under this name we may designate the definition given by Brown; that given by Harris perhaps belongs also to this category. By omnipotence we mean, says Brown, that " the holy and loving God is really Lord of the universe, able to do in it all things which his character and purpose may suggest. "^^ There is nothing in the universe as such which can prevent the working out of the divine plan. God is not hindered, as dualism affirms, by any foreign substance. Man cannot prevent the execution of the divine plan, nor can sin prevent it. Like every wise and consistent person, God is "determined" by his character. It is morally impossible for him to do anything which is inconsistent with this. God's power, says Harris, is inseparable from his reason; it is God, the absolute reason, who himself is energizing. This regulation is constitutive in the sense that the principle of reason, the contradictories of which are absurd, determines what it is possible for power to effect. It is also ethical in the sense that God's will by his eternal free choice is in harmony with his reason in perfect love.^^ Having created a stone, he cannot instruct it in knowledge, nor convince it by argument, nor move it by an appeal to compassion. After creating man a free agent, he must act on him, if at all, as a free agent, by influences adapted to a rational free will. He cannot change his will by almightiness any more than he can move a stone by eloquence.

But this regulation of almighty power by reason, says Harris, implies no limitation of God. Instead of being a limitation or defect, it reveals the perfection of God as the absolute Reason. ''If we regard God," he continues, "merely as the Almighty, he has power to do wrong, if he should so will. Free will implies power to do wrong or to do right. But God is not mere almighty power. . . . That which makes it impos-

" C. Hodge, Systematic Theology, Vol. I, 620.

W, A. Brown, Christian Theology in Outline, 116.

" S. Harris, God the Creator and Lord of All, Vol. I, 179. ^^Ihid., Vol. I, 181.

sible for God to do wrong is not lack of power, but his eternal self-determination in love in accordance with the principles and laws of reason.^^

As we have seen in the definition by Brown, God has a determined character which is intellectually wise, emotionally loving, and vohtionally holy.^^ God, it is asserted, not only does not, as is asserted in the theory of quasi absolute omnipotence, but he even can not, act against his character. This is determined by his nature, and he cannot change it by his will. God by almighty power, says Harris, cannot change the eternal principles, laws, and ideals of reason.^^ The sovereignty of God does not imply that God's will is his law. ''His will is subject in all his action to reason and regulated by it; therefore all the exercise of his power is in free will under the eternal law of reason. "^^ Will-power reigning supreme above all law, imposing its own arbitrary and capricious commands and compelling conformity with them by resistless force, is the essence of despotism and tyranny.^^ It is clear, according to Harris, that divine law is not different in kind from the natural law and moral law which man knows, nor is the divine character different in kind from the human in its rational and moral aspects.^^

God's omnipotence is thus more closely Hmited by his own logical and ethical nature than in the theory of quasi absolute omnipotence, since the divine law which is an expression or part of his nature is not considered to be subject to change according to his free will. God is a determined being, not free in the indeterminist sense of the word, although Harris and Brown do not hesitate to assert devine freedom in their own way, that is, in the deterministic sense. It might seem that God cannot be the absolute, ''the unconditioned and all-conditioning," if he is under law and obeys law. But this objection, says Harris, would only be valid if the law were independent of God and imposed on him from without, but "obeying law he is not conditioned by any being independent of himself, "but God finds the law in himself and obeys it."^^ God has, that is to say, a given nature to which his own will must conform but as it is his own self-existent nature God is not supposed to be really limited by anything whatever.

20 Harris, op. cit., Vol. I, 221.

A. Brown, Christian Theology in Outline, 105.

"Harris, op. cit.. Vol. I, 531. ^Uhid., 533.

3. Creative Omnipotence. This definition does not really differ from the former in content but has a different approach. The former starts from the determined nature and definite character of God, while the latter starts from the creative ability of God. Clarke gives a typical definition with which Curtis and Sheldon virtually agree. The Almighty, says Clarke, is not merely the all-Strong, but rather the all-Master, the strong Lord of all. In his mastership is of course implied power sufficient for such a relation, yet apparently the sufficiency of power was inferred from the universal control, rather than the universal control from the sufficiency of power.^^ An abstract conception of boundless might is far less effective in its greatness than recognition of the living God as acting upon all as Master, and using all power that his work upon so vast a universe requires. "So omnipotence, in Christian doctrine, is adequate ability. It is the sufficiency of God. . . .God as a transcendent being is greater than his universe, and the whole of his power is not exhausted or required by its demands. He is adequate to more than he is doing. "^^