The Private Letters Sir James Brooke ,K.C.B.

Front matter

HFA REITE

D

Be mA

Preface

I am aware of the responsibility, that attaches in making public a private Correspondence, and how rarely it should be attempted, until the chief actors have passed from the scene. I trust, however, to stand acquitted in the present instance, for the following reasons :

Sir James Brooke was my early and intimate friend, from whose society I have derived the greatest possible advantage, and to whose friendship and example, I attribute much of my success in life. When the outcry was raised against him in 1849, I knew how false it was, and it was my duty, in his absence, to point the defence in the right direction, and to trace the calumny to its source. It was during this period,

Sir James Brooke suggested the propriety of pubvill PREFACE.

lishing his Letters, and forwarded to me those to his mother, leaving it in my discretion to lay them before the public, either then, or at any future time. Partly from want of leisure, but more from a natural reluctance to break the seal of so intimate a correspondence, for the sake, merely, of refuting Mr. Hume | and the Directors of the Eastern Archipelago Company, 3 I at that time refrained; and the large majorities of the House of Commons, on three successive occasions, in Sir James Brooke’s favour; the strong voice of public opinion out of doors; and the approval and confidence of Lord John Russell’s Government, and afterwards, of that of Lord Derby, appeared sufficient to justify the course that had been taken, and to render nothing further necessary. When, however, the pertinacity of Mr. Hume obtained from the present Ministry, their consent to a Commission of Inquiry, under circumstances, that on the part of some members of the Cabinet, implied at least a distrust in Sir James Brooke; and when this was followed by Lord Clarendon’s Letter of Instructions to Lord Dalhousie, to appoint Commissioners, conceived in such a spirit, and containing such statements, as evinced a feeling

PREFACE. 1X even deeper than distrust; I felt I ought no longer to withhold a Correspondence which, from its intrinsic truthfulness, must carry conviction; and by showing the actions, feelings, and opinions of Sir James Brooke, during his career in Borneo, as given in all the confidence of friendship, enable his countrymen to judge between him and his defamers.

It may be proper here to correct a misapprehension which has got abroad—occasioned, perhaps, by the tenor of Sir John Pakington’s letter to Sir James Brooke, relieving him of the Governorship of Labuan—that a want of confidence was shown him by the late Administration. The case, however, was quite the reverse. The reduction of the establishment at Labuan, which | involved Sir James Brooke’s retirement from the Governorship, met with his approval under the then circumstances of the settlement; but, so far from evincing any distrust, the late Ministry expressed their continued confidence, by appointing him, as a part of the same arrangement, to a high ministerial office in the Indian Archipelago, which, by the real power it conferred, was completely in accordance with

b x PREFACE.

his wishes ; and the formalities were all but complete, when Lord Derby’s Ministry retired from office, and their successors refused to confirm the appointment.

Although deeply sensible of their kindness, I need not express my thanks to the relatives and friends, who have so materially assisted me with the letters addressed to them—our object has been a common one.

In conclusion, I may be permitted to say, that never were letters written with more apparent facility (whole pages of the originals without a correction), or laid before the public with a more entire unreserve.

ate

Hatcham Lodge, New Cross ; December 1, 1853.

PRIVATE LETTERS

OF

SIR JAMES BROOKE, K.C.B.

Chapter I. December 7, 1838, To January 2, 1839

ING: 1.

Joun C. Tempter, Esa.

Royal Hotel, Devonport, My DEAR JACK, December Us 1838.

Tue wind is fair, and I write to bid you farewell. Dear friend, farewell, may all happiness and good fortune attend you during my absence. Write to me. Watch me! I need not say how much of affectionate feeling I have for you,—how deeply sensible I am of your friendship and watchful kindness, and how amid all changes and chances, it will survive till I survive no more, or till we meet again.

Yours, dear friend, with kindest regards to Prior* and your sister, Very affectionately,

J. BROOKE.

P.S. Kell+ left me yesterday, he saw two shipwrecks,

* A brother-in-law of the editor. + A brother of the editor. VOL. I. B

Margaret* wants you to send her my paper on Borneo: if not copied, the one in your possession. Again and again, adieu.

Yours, ever, J. B.

The paper referred to in the postcript, was written by Sir James (then Mr.) Brooke, before he left England, in 1838, and is so explicit as to the objects of the expedition, and so explanatory of many passages in the letters, that no apology is considered necessary for introducing it here. It is taken from the original MSS. in the editor’s possession, and has never yet appeared as a whole. A brief abstract of it was published in the Journal of the Geographical Society, in 1888, vol. viii., p. 443.

Mr. Brookes Expedition to Borneo.

Borneo (in the language of the natives Bruni), Celebes, Sulu, the Moluccas, and the islands of the Straits of Sunda and Banca, compose what is commonly called the Malayan group, and the Malays located on the sea shores, of these and other islands, may, with certainty be classed as belonging to one nation.

It is well known however, that the interior of these countries is inhabited by various tribes, differing from

* A sister of Sir James Brooke.

the Malays and each other, and presenting numerous gradations of imperfect civilization.

The Dyaks of Borneo, the Arafuras of New Guinea, and others, besides the black race scattered over the islands (objects here as elsewhere, of traffic,) present an interesting field of inquiry; and it is surprising, whilst our acquaintance with every other portion of the globe, from the passage of the Pole to the navigation of the Euphrates, has greatly extended, we know scarcely anything of these varieties of the human race beyond the bare fact of their existence,* and remain extremely ignorant of the geographical features of the countries they inhabit.

Countries which present an extended field for Christianity and commerce—which none surpass in fertility — —rich beyond the Americas in mineral productions, and unrivalled in natural beauty, yet continue unexplored, and spite of the advantages which would probably result, have failed to attract the attention they so well deserve. The difficulty of the undertaking will scarcely account for its non-performance ; if we consider the voluntary sacrifices made on the shrine of African research, or the energy displayed, and the sufferings encountered by the explorers of the Polar regions, yet the necessity of prosecuting the voyage in an armed vessel, the wildness of the interior tribes, the lawless ferocity of the Malays, and the dangers to be ap-

* See Raffles and Prichard.

Bez prehended from the jealousy of the Dutch, would prevent most individuals from fixing on this field for their exertions, and points it out as one which can only be fully accomplished by Government, or some influential body.

It is not my object to enter into any detail of the past history of the Malayan nations, but I may refer to the undoubted fact that they have been in a state of deterioration since we first became acquainted with them ; and the records of our early voyagers together with the remains of antiquity still visible in Java and Sumatra, prove that once flourishing nations have now ceased to exist, and countries once teeming with human life, are now tenantless and deserted. The causes of such lamentable changes need only be alluded to, but it is fit to remark that whilst the clamour about education is loud, and extravagant dreams are entertained of the progressive advancement of the human race—a large tract of the globe has been gradually relapsing, and allowed to relapse, into barbarism.

Whether the early decay of the Malay states and their consequent demoralization, arose from the introduction of Mahomedanism, or resulted from the intrigues of European ambition, it were useless to discuss ; but we are very certain that the policy of the Dutch has, at the present day, reduced this “ Eden of the Eastern wave,” to a state of anarchy and confusion, as repugnant to humanity, as it is to commercial prosperity.

Enough is known of the harshness of this policy, and there is no need of here contrasting it with the energetic, successful, though ill supported sway of Sir Stamford Raffes—but it is the indirect influence which it exerts, that has proved so baneful to the Archipelago, under the assumed jurisdiction of this European power. Her unceasing interference in the concerns of the Malay Governments and the watchful fomenting of their internal dissensions, have gradually and effectually destroyed all rightful authority, and given rise to a number of petty states, which thrive on piracy and fatten on the slave trade. The consequent disorganization of society arising from these causes, has placed a bar to commercial enterprize and personal adventure, and has probably acted on the interior tribes, much in the same way as this fatal policy has affected the Malays. As far as can be ascertained, the financial and commercial concerns of the Dutch have not been prosperous ; it is easy to conceive such to be the case, as it will be conceded that oppression and prosperity cannot co-exist. In short, with the smallest possible amount of advantage, the Dutch Government has all along endeavoured to perpetuate an exclusive system, aiming more at injury to others than any advantage to themselves, or to the nations under their sway; for where an enlightened administration might have produced the most beneficial results, we are forced to deplore not only the mischief done, and the mass of good neglected, but the misery and suffering inflicted on unhappy races, capable, as has been proved, of favourable development, under other circumstances.

The policy of the British in the Indian Archipelago, has been marked by vacillation and weakness. The East India Company, with a strong desire to rival the Dutch, aimed at doing so by indirect and underhand means, and shrunk from the liberality of views and bold line of conduct, which was perhaps inconsistent with their position and tenure of authority. It was in vain that Sir Stamford Rafes urged on them a line of conduct, which, had it been pursued, must eventually have ensured the ascendancy of the British over the space from Borneo to New Holland, and have linked her colonies in the East by a chain of posts from the northern part of India to the southern extremity of Van Diemen’s Land. The timidity of the Company and the ignorance or indifference of the then existing Governments, not only neglected to carry this bold project inta execution, but sacrificed the advantages already acquired, and without stipulation or reserve, yielded the improving Javanese to the tender mercies of their former masters. The consequences are well known ; all the evils of Dutch rule have been re-established, and the British watehfully excluded, directly or indirectly, from the commerce of the islands. i

It is true that the settlement of Singapore has attracted a large portion of the native trade to its free port, and has become from its happy situation, in some measure an emporium for Straits’ produce; but, with this single commercial exception, our loss of footing and political influence in the Archipelago, is complete, and our intercourse with the natives has gradually become more restricted. _We may sum up these remarks by taking a brief survey of the present position of the Archipelago. The Dutch are masters of a large tract of New Guinea at one extreme, and, at the other, have possessed themselves of the coast of Borneo, extending from the western boundary of Borneo Proper, to the southern limit of Matan. A glance at the chart will show that they have stations of more or less importance connecting these points, and that Java, and their settlement on Sumatra, give them exclusive command of the Straits of Sunda. It may likewise be here observed, that their territorial extension is only limited by their desires, for as there is no check from European nations, a title to possession is;too readily acquired from distracted and contending native governments.

But the position of the Dutch nation in the “ far East,” though apparently so imposing, is, in reality, far from strong, and their power would easily sink before _ the vigorous opposition of any European country.

Java, exhausted and rebellious, submits, but remembers the period of British possession. The wild

Battas, of Sumatra, successfully repel the efforts of the Dutch to reduce them. The Chinese of the southern part of Borneo, are eager to cast off the yoke of masters who debar them every advantage, and would fain, were it in their power, exact a heavy tribute. Their possessions in New Guinea are nominal rather than real, and their older settlement of the Moluccas, fallen in value, can scarcely be supposed to compensate for the sacrifice of men and money, caused by their narrow-minded views and ill-directed efforts. ‘The Dutch are strong enough to defy any native power directed against them, but their doubtful title and oppressive tenure would, as I have before said, render the downfall of their rule in the Archipelago, certain and easy, before the establishment of a liberal Government and conciliating policy.

Of the Malays, it is sufficient here to remark, that they have ceased to be powerful, and that their distracted and disorganized state, renders it dangerous for friends or strangers to trust themselves in their hands ; but their hatred of the Dutch is unbounded, and there is no reason to think, that any insuperable obstacle would be met with in the formation of a strong legitimate Government amongst them.

Our recent knowledge of the position of the native states, is so circumscribed however, that it is difficult to say much on this subject.

The Bugis, the traders of the islands, and their hardiest and most enterprizing race, are checked and hampered by Dutch restrictions, and this remark, applying most forcibly to them, is true of the whole trading interests, and renders all alike inveterately hostile to the Dutch.

It may be fairly concluded from the foregoing remarks, that the injury done to British interests by the cession of Java and the consequent loss of power, has been greatly counterbalanced by the misrule of the Dutch, since their undisputed re-establishment. The field is again open therefore, to any nation desirous of rivalling Holland, and little doubt can be entertained of the success of such an effort, if carried on by a course of policy and conduct the reverse in every respect of that pursued by the present monopolists. The fact must be always borne in mind, that the Dutch are . masters of the Archipelago, only, because no other nation is willing to compete with them, and although any attempt by another power might, and would doubtless, be watched with the greatest anxiety and distrust, and every opposition direct and indirect be levelled against it, yet it could not be considered any infringement of acknowledged right or actual possession.

A liberal system indeed, recommended by mutual advantage, would assuredly triumph over any local opposition,’ if not obstructed by European interests ; nor is there any great reason to apprehend such a probability, unless, going from one extreme to another, we

B 3 should attempt hostility, to regain what was foolishly thrown away.

Nevertheless, sooner or later, the time must arrive, when we shall again be in possession of these islands, and we may accordingly look forward and prepare for the event in various ways.

The subject may be divided under two heads, viz., Territorial Possession, and Commercial Prosperity ; and these appear so intimately blended, that the second is greatly dependent on the first, for it must be remembered that Sir Stamford Raffles, the highest authority on this point, has pronounced, that no purely commercial settlement can succeed in the Archipelago, and has attributed the numerous failures which have occurred, to a lack of knowledge of the country, and the non-possession of territory.

Many arguments might be urged, and many reasons given, to show the entire justice of this opinion, but it will be sufficient to state, that where a native population exists, and is rightly governed, an influence is insensibly acquired and strengthened, not only over those immediately protected, but also over the neighbouring tribes, and that on the occasion of any disturbance or collision with other powers, the means of resistance or the punishment of aggression, are at hand. A commercial post on the contrary, though advantageously situated, is liable to the fluctuations and distractions of its neighbours, its means of attack or defence are necessarily limited; and whilst it fails to command respect, the natives are rather injured than benefited by its existence.

The chief consideration, however, seems to be, that territorial power is constantly opening new sources of traffic, and extending those already established, by disembarrassing trade of the intermediate clogs which tend to limit exports, from the small amount of benefit to the original dealer—and to lessen the demand— from the increased price attendant on passing through various bands.

The insular situation of Singapore may be adduced as a proof of this, for all articles of Straits produce before coming into the possession of the British merchant, afford profits to several classes of natives, in a very unequal degree; and little hope can be entertained of the favourable progress of a trade wherein the original producer or proprietor participates to so trifling an extent in its advantages. It may, indeed, be considered a monopoly by the natives inhabiting the coasts, as severe on the interior tribes, as the Dutch restrictions on themselves.

For these and many other causes which readily occur it would seem, that territorial possession, is the best, if not the only means, by which to acquire a direct and powerful influence in the Archipelago, but any government instituted for the purpose must be directed to the advancement of the native interests and the development of native resources, rather than by a flood of European colonization, to aim at possession only, without reference to the indefeasible rights of the Aborigines.

On the second head, viz., the Commercial Prosperity, nothing need be added save that, being dependent on the right working of the first principle, it must unavoidably in its progress, present a striking contrast to the commercial monopolies of the Dutch, and be the means of bringing the English merchant in contact with the original native dealer.

The advantages, political and commercial, accruing from a well-managed territory, need only be alluded to, as every one in the slightest degree acquainted with the country, is well aware of its vast capability.

In a political view, the contiguity of the islands to our possessions in New Holland, and India, and the command over China, are sufficiently apparent ; and commercially, it would only be necessary to quote their productions, to prove their value. The difficulty of once more placing our interests, on a footing worthy a great nation, is no doubt considerable, but apt to be greatly overrated; as the unpopularity of the Dutch, and the weakness of the native states, would ensure success to an establishment aiming at sufficient results by slow but steady means. The question, indeed, is not one embracing the acquisition of territory, but its occupation: viz., whether England shall claim and improve lands she holds by as good a title as any the Dutch can show, and whether doing so, she shall use the full ascendancy of her national position, to extend her commerce, and distribute her manufactures, among a people who have always when permitted shown their craving for mercantile adventure ?

A strong government established in Malludu Bay, a British territory, capable of extension, and possessing internal resources, having sufficient authority to cultivate a good understanding with the native governments, and spread inferior posts over the Archipelago, as opportunities offered, would effect this object, and without infringing upon the claims of any foreign state, ensure a commercial footing on a scale never yet developed in this portion of the world. Malludu Bay, situated at the northern extremity of Borneo, has been mentioned as best adapted for the purpose in view, on several accounts.

Ist. It is a British possession.

2nd. There is no great Malay or Bugis settlement in its vicinity.

3rd. It is the place where in all probability a direct intercourse may be held with the Dyaks of the interior.

4th. The position relative to China is advantageous.

5th. It forms the western limit of the Archipelago, and our new settlement at Port Essington bounds it to the eastward. The climate and soil are well spoken of: a river flows into the bay, and is reported to communicate with the lake of Keeny Balloo, and the mountains in the interior—one of very considerable elevation. Above all, however, the natives are reported to be docile and easily taught ; the servants of the company attached to their settlement of Balambangan were decided in opinion, that this bay was far preferable in every respect, to the station chosen and subsequently abandoned.

Supposing these advantages to be as above stated, yet it would scarcely authorize any active steps being taken without a more accurate knowledge than we at present possess of the particular locality, and of the states in its vicinity; it is to this point that I would direct attention, remarking, however, that although Malludu Bay, should on enquiry be found to be unfit for the purposes of colonization, yet the general view of our policy remains unaffected, as it would be only necessary to obtain a suitable place.

With a settlement at each extremity of the Archipelago, we could readily protect the trade of the natives, and obtain minor posts, and free-trade ports, whence the best principles of commerce and good government might be disseminated, and our interests best promoted, by the general prosperity of the countries under our sway, or in our own vicinity. It is scarcely necessary to say more on this subject, but before closing these remarks, I cannot help adverting to the colony at Port Essington.

The former settlement, which existed in the immediate neighbourhood of Port Essington, was after a trial (of a few years) abandoned as useless, and the same difficulties which checked the progress of the first, will probably impede the present colony.

It was a striking feature of this settlement, that the natives, though frequenting the coasts to the northward of New Holland, seldom if ever visited or offered to trade with the settlement. This has, I know, been attributed to the natives being ignorant of the exist ence of the place, but this reason appears to me improbable in the highest degree, and we may with more justice surmise the cause to be, our utter disinclination and local inability to protect traders from the consequences attendant on a breach of Dutch regulations. This conjecture gathers confirmation from the facts, that the inhabitants of the Eastern portion of the Archipelago, are not addicted to maritime adventure, being supplied by the traders of the Western Islands with such articles of European or Chinese manufacture, as are suited to their tastes. The Bugis vessels that frequent the north coast of New Holland chiefly carry on the trade with the Arafura group, and it is evident that going and returning from this voyage, they are at the mercy of the Dutch cruisers. Is it probable then, that the Dutch would allow an intercourse with a British settlement, which it was in their power to prevent ? And whilst the Bugis, are the carriers, is it not in the power of the Dutch to restrict and harass, if not totally to prevent their communication with us? The natives of the Archipelago cannot look to the British for protection, but they can and do look for Dutch vengeance, and dread it.

These considerations are not urged against advantages to be derived from the possession of Port Essington, but rather as a warning against the over sanguine expectations of its having a trade of any considerable extent, whilst our relations with the Archipelago continue on their present eclipsed footing. The good to result from this colony, must be looked for on the continent of New Holland, where it will probably extend and make the same progressive strides to importance, as the sister colonies in the same country: but with reference to the Archipelago, its government will want authority to control the evil influence, cusp! to ameliorate the present system.

Not far distant to the westward of Port Essington, is the large and fertile island of Timor, a portion of which, there is no doubt the government of Portugal would cede willingly for the smallest equivalent, as it has been long virtually abandoned, and is utterly useless to the mother country. ‘The size and situation would render the possession of the Portuguese frontier of this island a desirable acquisition, and the favourable opportunity may not, if allowed to pass over, again recur.

The same indeed may be said of Leuconia, which offering no real benefit to Spain, would, in the hands of the English, be a lever to rule both China and the Archipelago. Rich, fertile, and blessed with a fine climate, within a few days’ sail of Canton, and commanding the China sea, it would be an unrivalled Jewel in the colonial tiara of England. When our relations with China come to be settled, and settled they must shortly be, the importance of Manilla can scarcely be overated.

Spain distracted, and torn by internal factions, and pledged to England by treaty and obligation, would readily place Leuconia in our hands, as a guarantee for the sums due, and would probably cede the possession in lieu of the claims we have on her exchequer.

For such an acquisition, the present is the time, the tide in our affairs, which taken at the flood, would lead on to fortune, and as I have before stated, that in a political point of view, it is only on an extended scale, that any real advantage, national or local, is to be gained, I must reurge my conviction that it is better to leave the Archipelago in its present state until the next general war, when it will again pass into our hands, than by contenting ourselves with paltry and insignificant stations, convey false impressions of our national importance, not easily removed from the minds of the natives.*

* I may here add a brief summary of the Dutch trading regulations :—Death was inflicted on traders in spice and opium not first bought from the Company. It is forbidden, under heavy penalties, to export or import the following articles, viz.—pepper, tin, copper, Surat silks, Indian cloths, cotton yarns of all sorts, unstamped gold, Samarang arrack, muskets, gunpowder, &c., &c. All vessels required a pass. No vessel to carry powder or shot in greater quantity than specified in the pass. No port was open to any vessel coming from the northward or the Moluccas, except Batavia. No

Whatever difference of opinion may exist, or whatever degree of credit may be due to the views here recommended, there can be doubt of our future ascendancy in the Archipelago, whether attempted at the present time, or delayed until the fortunes of war offer a fitting occasion. In either case a previous acquaintance will greatly facilitate the result, and must in all probability tend to a more just appreciation of these highly interesting countries, for when public attention is once aroused, and a stimulus given to inquiry, it cannot fail in fully developing the resources, and exhausting the knowledge of the mine, which has heretofore been left to the weak and casual efforts of individualexertion. It has been remarked by Mr. Farquhar, that the indifference of the British Government must have originated solely from the want of information, or its incorrectness, since it is not improbable that the riches of Sumatra and Borneo, are equal to those of Brazil and New Spain. The lapse of years has by no means weakened the force of this observation, for Borneo, Celebes, and indeed the greater portion of these islands are still unknown, and the government is as indifferent now, to these countries, equal in riches, and superior in commercial advantages to the new world. The apathy of two centuries still reigns supreme with the enlightened people of England, as well as their government, and whilst they willingly navigation was allowed to be carried on by the vessels of Banka and Billiton, except to Palembang: no navigation from Celebes !

make the most expensive efforts favourable to science, commerce, or Christianity in other quarters, the locality which eminently combines these three objects, is alone neglected and alone uncared for.

It has unfortunately been the fate of our Indian possessions to have laboured under the prejudice and contempt of a large portion of the well-bred community, for whilst the folly of fashion requires an acquaintance with the deserts of Africa, and a most ardent thirst for a knowledge of the usages of Timbuctoo, it at the same time justifies the most profound ignorance of all matters connected with the government and geography of ourvast possessions in Hindostan. The Indian Archipelago has fully shared this neglect, for even the tender philanthropy of the present day, which originates such multifarious schemes for the amelioration of doubtful evils, and which shudders at the prolongation of apprenticeship in the West for a single year, is blind to the existence of slavery in its worst and most exaggerated form, in the East. Not a single prospectus is spread abroad, not a single voice upraised in Exeter Hall, to relieve the darkness of paganism, and the horrors of the slave trade. Whilst the trumpet tongue of many an orator excites thousands to the rational and charitable object of converting the Jews, and reclaiming the gypsies: whilst the admirable exertions of Missionary enterprize in the Ausonian climes of the South Sea have invested them with worldly power as well as religious influence: whilst the benevolent plans of the New Zealand