The presidential campaign of 1832

Front matter

SERIES XL

No. i

JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY STUDIES

Preface

An account of the presidential campaign of 1832, it may be well to state, cannot be confined solely to that presiden tial year, as might perhaps be done with a present day na tional campaign. Today our sharply differentiated, perma nently organized parties have a definite political machinery which functions rapidly and efficiently in designating their candidates and in stating the platforms upon which they will go before the country. Consequently our national cam paigns now are limited wholly to the presidential year, one might almost say to the time embraced between April and November of that year. This speed and precision of oper ation is due largely to our superior means of travel and communication.

Presidential campaigns during the period 1824-1832 were facilitated by no such present-day means as railroads, tele graphs, telephones, good roads and automobiles. Then, the circulation of both individual and information was limited by such speed as could be extracted from equine motive power traveling over roads which often hardly merited the name. This state of affairs the river steamboat did little to improve owing to its limited application. For this, if for no other reason, presidential campaigns were of much longer dura tion then than now. In addition, it was a period of political change; new parties were developing, party principles were becoming fixed, and new methods of choosing candidates were being tried. All these causes operated to make the presidential campaign of the period an affair of never less than two years' duration. That such was the case is shown by the fact that the campaign of 1824 was well under way before the close of 1822, that of 1828 began as soon as its predecessor closed, and the opening of that of 1832, by no stretch of imagination, can be put later than July 4, 1830, the date Gay's campaign for the presidency was launched.

Vll vjij PREFACE

For these reasons then, any adequate treatment of the cam paign of 1832 necessitates considerable attention to much that occurred in the four years following Jackson's first election in November, 1828.

In this monograph the writer's aim has been to show the party development and the maneuvers which affected the course and outcome of the presidential campaign of 1832, and in this movement appears the first application of the nominating convention to political practice. So much has been written on the Jacksonian period that a new study re quires justification, but the topics here emphasized have never been adequately treated.

So closely are the presidential campaigns of 1824, 1828 and 1832 connected by the two topics, the development of political parties and the early application of the nominating convention idea, that adequate treatment of the campaign of 1832 involves a study of the two immediately preceding it- It was this which makes necessary the brief summary of the campaigns of 1824 and 1828 contained in the first chapter. In this chapter and elsewhere I have pointed out, I believe for the first time, the significance of the first state nominat ing convention in Pennsylvania, the germ and precedent for its successor, the national nominating convention, and that the idea of the latter had been suggested as early as Febru ary, 1822. I have shown how Antimasonry came to in augurate in American politics the use of the nominating con vention. It has never before been clearly shown how en tirely a one-man party the National Republican was in the campaign of 1832, and how hard pressed it was for a leading issue on which to oppose Jackson. I have endeavored to set forth in some detail the internal struggle for the succession in the Democratic party and the bearing of the resulting breach between Jackson and Calhoun on the campaign. In the same connection I have tried to correct the view that the Democratic convention of 1832 owed its origin solely to Jackson's determination to force Van Buren on the party as vice president. What actually took place in the three na-

PREFACE

IX tional conventions — aside from the bare references to the nominees and the two-thirds rule — regarding their establish ment of precedents, such as the unit rule, which are in use today, is a neglected subject on which I have tried to throw light. Some new light has also been thrown on the political tactics of the United States Bank. Further research has brought out clearly the political paradox of 1832, a situation where Antimasons and National Republicans were both doing their utmost against Jackson yet were unable to unite behind one candidate, though both parties were well aware that cer tain defeat awaited their failure to combine. I have also established as nearly as possible the way in which the party names " National Republican," " Democratic " and " Demo cratic Republican " were used during the campaigns of 1824, 1828 and 1832, and their status at the close of the latter con test. This topic has been placed in the appendix, as it suited the structure of the monograph better there than if attached to either the chapter on the Democrats or that on the Na tional Republicans.

This study was undertaken at the suggestion of Professor John H. Latane, of the Johns Hopkins University, to whom, with Professor John M. Vincent, also of the Johns Hopkins University, I wish to express my sincere appreciation and hearty thanks for their helpful interest and advice. To Professor J. S. Bassett. of Smith College, I am also in debted for valuable suggestions. I desire to make special acknowledgment of the unfailing kindness and courtesy of those in the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress, and particularly of the valuable assistance rendered me by the Assistant-Chief, Mr. John C. Fitzpatrick, whose kind ness in lending me the proof sheets of Van Buren's Auto biography prior to its publication so appreciably facilitated my work. Acknowledgment is also due to Mr. Charles Fickus, of the Maryland Historical Society Library, for his help in locating some useful Antimasonic pamphlets and periodicals.

S. R. G.

Chapter I

James Monroe's second administration terminated the line of Revolutionary founders of the United States which had filled the presidency since the inception of that office. It likewise terminated the so-called " Virginia dynasty " which had uninterruptedly supplied the presidential material during the last twenty-four years. These two circumstances made possible the complete disintegration of the old Republican party which had come into power with the "Virginia dy nasty " and was now to make a simultaneous exit.

The prime factor in the Republican party's long domina tion of national politics under direction of the Virginia line of presidents was the Virginia-New York alliance. This combination had been founded by Jefferson and indoctri nated with his political philosophy. Its power rested upon the political alliance of Virginia and New York, supported by certain States greatly under the influence of their ex ample; namely, New Jersey in the North, and Kentucky, North Carolina, Tennessee and Georgia in the South. Under this combination, to Virginia went the presidential and to New York went the vice-presidential selection. The Presi dent's influence and preference exercised such weight in the designation of his successor that, immediately the latter was known, he was styled by his enemies " the heir apparent." x

1 Charming, History of the United States, 1789-1815, vol. iv, chap, vi; Bassett, Life of Andrew Jackson, vol. i, pp. 323-324; cf. Henry Adams, History of the United States, 1801-1807, vol. ii, pp. 201-206.

II

Just prior to the opening of the campaign of 1824, tne mainsprings of the Virginia-New York alliance were two organizations known as the Richmond Junto of Virginia and the Albany Regency of New York. Each of these political organizations dominated the politics of its particular State, and hence of the adjoining States in so far as the latter in clined to follow the political lead of Virginia or New York in a presidential contest. The Junto was the looser organ ization of the two, being composed of some dozen men of high character, political intelligence and prominent families, with no one individual predominating. The Junto's mouth piece was the Richmond Enquirer, whose editor, Thomas Ritchie, was one of the members. The Regency had been born in the factional struggles of New York State politics between the followers of DeWitt Clinton and Martin Van Buren. By 1822 the latter faction under Van Buren's able leadership was completely victorious, and their leader the political master of the State. The Albany Regency was a consequence of this victory and comprised the faction's leaders in the State, all upright, able men, most of whom held office of some sort at Albany. Its mouthpiece was the Albany Argus, edited by one of its members, Edwin Croswell. So effective was this machine's centralized control that, excepting about two years, it dominated the State, and was a prominent factor in national politics for over twenty years.2

The Republican party's character had changed markedly during the quarter century in which it had dominated the country's politics. Its rival, the Federalist party, had died, attainted with disloyalty to the country in the War of 1812, so that since 1816 it had been unopposed by any political enemy, and had come to embrace a vast majority of the en tire electorate. The disappearance of political opposition

2 Lynchburg Virginian, quoted in Richmond Enquirer, May 6, 1823; cf. Niles' Weekly Register, vol. xxvii, pp. 1-5, 17-21; for Regency, Thurlow Weed, Autobiography, p. 103; Jabez D. Ham mond, History of Political Parties in New York, vol. ii, p. 157.

and the country's war-born tendency toward nationalism had been chiefly responsible for the change in the party's original character. The alteration had been furthered by Monroe's policy of appointing men to office with slight at tention to their former political creed, and likewise by his inclination to favor internal improvements at national ex pense. Consequently, by 1822 the line of demarcation be tween a Republican and a member of the former Federalist party was so dim as to be practically invisible, and the old party landmarks had so far vanished that the Republican party was sponsor for the Bank of the United States, the protective tariff, and was markedly inclining toward a cen tralized nationalistic policy relative to internal improvements.8

The presidential campaign of 1824 was, therefore, an intra-party contest in which all the candidates, broadly speaking, professed the same principles. Consequently the contest was fought primarily on the basis of the relative personal fitness of the candidates for the presidency — a campaign of oppos ing persons rather than principles, the latter being subordi nated to the man and used principally as incidental to his elec tion. Hence the contest necessarily hinged on the method by which the candidate was to be nominated or selected — and therefore elected. The struggle for the coveted office was the immediate factor which shattered the Republican party into five fairly distinct factions.

Monroe was hardly well under way with his second admin istration before mention was being made of various indi viduals to succeed him. Indeed, as early as April, 1822, there were sixteen or seventeen such would-be candidates before the public.4 This number before the end of the year had narrowed to Henry Clay, John C. Calhoun, William H.

3 Van Buren, Autobiography (John C. Fitzpatrick, Ed.), Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the year 1918, vol. ii, p. 124 ; Niles' Register, vol. xxiii, p. 401 ; Richardson, Mes sages and Papers of the Presidents, vol. ii, pp. 144-183; James Parton, Life of Andrew Jackson, vol. iii, pp. 86-87.

*Niles' Register, vol. xxii, p. 130.

Crawford, John Quincy Adams and Andrew Jackson. Each of these had entered the field from a different angle and looked with more or less confidence to various sources of support for success.

Clay's course for several years had been shaped toward the presidency. Popular in the West, one of the " war hawks," negotiator at Ghent, several times Speaker of the House, he relied on this record, but more particularly on his advocacy of a high protective tariff and the construction of roads and canals at national expense — the "American System" — and of increase in the military establishment to secure him gen eral support, especially in commercial and manufacturing New York, Pennsylvania and New England.5 Calhoun, like Clay, relied on vigorous support of a nationalistic program, the Bank and tariff particularly, and upon his able admin istration of the War Department in Monroe's cabinet, to gether with his popularity in South Carolina and Pennsyl vania.8 Adams, favorite son of New England, negotiator at Ghent, generally admired for his skillful handling of the Department of State, a vigorous nationalist, had also in his favor the feeling that the North was now entitled to fill the presidential chair.7

Crawford had been near supplanting Monroe for the nom ination in 1816, had been several years Secretary of the Treasury, an office controlling a great deal of patronage, and in addition was favored by Jefferson and the Virginia in fluence. He further had the support of a large part of the administration press. He professed Republican principles more strictly Jeffersonian as to States' Rights and internal im provements than did Clay, Calhoun or Adams. More effec tive still, his cause was the cause of the Regency and the

5 Van Buren, Autobiography, p. 116; Thomas H. Benton, Thirty Years' View, vol. i, pp. 22, 32.

6 Van Buren, ibid.; Hammond, vol. ii, p. 126; Gaillard Hunt, John C. Calhoun, p. 48.

7 Hammond, vol. ii, pp. 127-128 ; Parton, vol. ii, pp. 655-656 ; Miles' Register, vol. xxv, pp. 340, 360, 370.

Junto, and Van Buren, his chief manager, was untiring in his behalf, making several trips to Virginia to coordinate the efforts of the alliance and to confer with Jefferson and other leaders of the party.8 Jackson's chances rested on the general admiration of his military record, the almost idol atrous worship in which he was held by the democracy of the country, especially in the West. His views on both tariff and internal improvements were not definitely known, but as far as could be ascertained from his expressions and votes in Congress, he favored both so far as they contributed to the country's military strength, and no farther.9

Judging by the views of these candidates on the subject of internal improvements at national expense, and by the expressions of contemporary political leaders, by the middle of 1823 there was a barely visible tendency in the Republican party to divide into two general groups on opposite sides of the question of a national, as opposed to a States' Rights, pol icy concerning internal improvements. Inclined, but not pos itively committed, to the strict construction attitude were Crawford and Jackson with their followings, so far at least as the latter heeded the constitutional side of the question. Strongly advocating the loose construction view of the na tional government's powers on this score were Adams, Clay and Calhoun, with their supporters. The tendency was noticed by Jefferson, Van Buren and Benton, the latter stating it thus :

The candidates for the Presidency spread their sails upon the ocean of internal improvements. Congress was full of projects for different objects of improvement, and the friends of each candidate exerted themselves in rivalry of each other, under the supposition that their opinions would stand for those of their principals. Mr.

8 Jefferson, Writings (P. L. Ford, Ed.), vol. x, pp. 235-236; Van Buren to G. A. Worth, March 16, 1822, M. Ulshoeffer to Van Buren, April 2, 1822, Van Buren to Smith Thompson, June 4, 1823, Van Buren, MSS.; Van Buren, Autobiography, pp. 131, 177, 514.

9 Van Buren, Autobiography, p. 449; Annals of Congress, i8th Cong., ist sess., vol. i, pp. 583-738, passim; Bassett, Life of Andrew Jackson, vol. i, pp. 344-345; Jackson to Coleman, April 26, 1824, in Niles' Register, vol. xxvi, p. 245.

Adams, Mr. Clay, and Mr. Calhoun were the avowed advocates of the measure, going thoroughly for a national system of internal im provements; Mr. Crawford and General Jackson under limitations and qualifications.10

The number of candidates made it certain that if all re mained contenders for the office none would have a majority of the electoral votes, and the election would end in the House of Representatives. This was universally regarded as a very undesirable termination, but there agreement ended. The congressional caucus, the mode of selecting the party's candidate in use for twenty years past, pleased nobody ex cept the Crawford faction. It was this need for some better method than the caucus for fixing upon a candidate that pro duced the first suggestions that a national nominating con vention of the party should be resorted to. The first of these was in an anonymous letter to Hezekiah Niles in February, 1822 ; lx Thomas Ritchie made another like suggestion in his paper of August 13, 1822 ; 12 and a third was made by a mem ber of the Pennsylvania delegation in Congress in a letter to the editor of the Franklin Gazette dated January 6, i824.13 The idea was not adopted, however, primarily it would seem, because the divisions in the electorate caused by the several factions prevented the general party cooperation necessary to the establishment of this large piece of political machinery.

Under the leadership of Van Buren, who was in close con tact with the Junto and the older Republican leaders in Vir ginia, the Virginia-New York alliance backed Crawford's candidacy, and by the summer of 1823 his chances were of the best. At this juncture he was prostrated by a paralytic stroke and for a time his life was despaired of. This nec essarily damaged his chances with the country, but the Junto- Regency combination would not withdraw him. Seeking to place upon him the stamp of " regular " candidate, they began

10 Benton, Thirty Years' View, vol. i, p. 22 ; cf . Van Buren, Auto biography, p. 116; Jefferson, Writings, vol. x, p. 282.

11 Niles' Register, vol. xxi, pp. 403-404.

12 Richmond Enquirer, August 13, 1822.

13 Niles' Register, vol. xxv, p. 306.

PARTY REORGANIZATION, 1824-1828 l*J

moves looking to the holding- of a congressional caucus for that purpose.

No congressional caucus had been held since that of 1816, and this one had aroused considerable adverse criticism. The functioning of such a caucus consistently with party harmony was possible only when a majority of Republican sentiment favored one candidate, a condition emphatically not the case in the pending campaign. Hence the Crawford faction's move for such a caucus savored so strongly of an attempt to force him upon the party as to bring on a revolt against the old method, in which all the other factions participated. Nevertheless the Crawford managers persisted and called a congressional caucus in February, 1824. This was so far from having present a majority of the members of Congress as to merit the name " rump." 14 Its nomination of Craw ford and Gallatin injured the former's chances much more than it benefited them.15

The anti-caucus revolt had really been born in the demo cratic West with the nominations of Jackson and Clay by caucuses of their respective state legislatures in the latter part of 1822. These nominations had been endorsed by other state legislatures, using the same mode, in various Western and Southwestern States. All of these state nom inations were designed to anticipate any move by the con gressional caucus, and this means of forestalling its action was also adopted by the supporters of Adams and Calhoun in the East.

Jackson, more than any other candidate, was a man of the masses, hence his chief strength lay with the democratic West and Southwest. When first announced, his candidacy was not regarded seriously,16 but this view underwent a

13 Jackson to Donelson, February 12, 1824, A. J. Donelson MSS. ; Daniel Webster, Private Correspondence (Fletcher Webster, Ed.), vol. i, p. 346.

16 Van Buren to G. C. Verplanck, December 22, 1822, Van Buren MSS.; Richmond Enquirer, July 30, 1822.

l8 THE PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN OF 1832

rapid revision during 1823. During the closing months of this year Jackson sentiment spread like wildfire through the State of Pennsylvania.17 This enthusiastic adoption of Jackson by Pennsylvania had several highly important results. It made Jackson the leading candidate by fortifying his western and southwestern strength with the twenty-eight electoral votes of Pennsylvania, a position he retained until the election entered the House of Representatives. It an nihilated Calhoun's presidential candidacy, thereby causing him to withdraw in Jackson's favor in return for the latter's support of him for vice-president,18 thus breaking ground for the future alliance of South and West. Lastly, the Pennsylvania stampede to Jackson introduced the genuine nominating convention, on a state scale, into American na tional politics.

This convention was in all respects the germ of the pres ent-day national nominating convention. The call for it was issued by a caucus of the Jacksonians in the state legislature and representation in it was apportioned according to the electoral strength of the constituent units, the counties. In its organization it resorted to the plural number of vice-presidents for honorary purposes, and conducted business, in part at least, by the committee system. It made presi dential nominations, chose a ticket of electors and issued an address to the people, the precedent for the modern plat form.19

For all the desperate efforts of the Regency and Junto in behalf of Crawford, his prospects remained gloomy, and this gloom was accentuated by a complete overturn by the Clintonians in New York of the Regency's control of the State.20

18 Nathan Sargent, Public Men and Events, vol. i, p. 41 ; Niles' Register, vol. xxv, pp. 258, 407-408; vol. xxvi, pp. 19-20; Van Buren to B. F. Butler, February 2, 1824, Van Buren MSS.

19 Niles' Register, vol. xxvi, pp. 19-20.

This caused the Georgian the loss of nearly all that State's thirty-six electoral votes and brought him into the House of Representatives, ahead of Clay it is true, but hopelessly be hind Jackson and Adams, the respective electoral vote being for Jackson 99, Adams 84, Crawford 41 and Clay 37." Thanks to the support of both the Adams and the Jackson following,22 Calhoun was elected vice-president by a large majority of the electoral vote.

The election of John Quincy Adams by the House of Representatives was directly due to the influence and per sonal efforts of Henry Clay.23 The Kentuckian's assistance had been courted by both Adams and Jackson men. Hence the charge that his support of Adams had been secured by means of a promise of the State Department, and originating with one of the Jacksonians, is not surprising, the less so, in fact, since the campaign just ended had been mainly one of personalities and recriminations. Although the charge against Clay was not proven, its falsity was never conclu sively demonstrated; but true or false, it was destined to play a prominent part in shaping party combinations.

Among the results of the campaign, the first to be accom plished was the complete obliteration of the already faint line between the former Federalist and Republican parties. The most potent factor in this had been Jackson's candidacy, coming as it did on the heels of Monroe's amalgamation policy. The Tennessean's large popular vote and electoral plurality were due to the general admiration of his militaryrecord and to a widespread conviction of his integrity and sincerity. To these was added also the widespread aversion to the caucus system.24 Furthermore, some letters that Jackson himself had written to Monroe some eight years

21 Van Buren, Autobiography, pp. 144-145; Hammond, vol. ii, pp. 177, 178, 188; Niles' Register, vol. xxvii, p. 382.

22 Niles' Register, vol. xxvii, p. 382

23 Van Buren, Autobiography, pp. 149-153; Hammond, vol. ii, p. 189.

earlier had been used in the campaign. These contained an appeal to Monroe to exterminate the monster of party spirit by appointing to office men of ability and integrity regardless of their former party affiliation.25 These letters must have been of considerable effect in drawing to Jackson the sup port of former Federalists, for so many of them supported him that, according to Van Buren, the vote he received was " a mixed one given by former adherents of all parties." 26

Another result of the campaign, produced by the move ment toward popular nominations, had been the complete demolition of the congressional caucus as a means of nom inating presidential candidates. This old method had been replaced by the individual state nominations made by party caucuses in the legislatures. This substitute was effective, but far too prone to militate against the unity and discipline of an organized party to remain other than a temporary ex pedient. Suggestions for a national nominating convention had been made, however, and the state nominating conven tion in Pennsylvania had established a precedent admirably adapted to a democracy, based as it was upon popular repre sentation apportioned according to electoral strength. The disappearance of the caucus, furthermore, transferred the seat of president-making, that is, the selecting of the party candidates, from a relative handful of individuals in Wash ington, to the country at large; hence in future campaigns every cross-roads, hamlet, village and town would be able to participate actively.

A third result of the campaign was the dissolution of the Virginia-New York alliance. Only Georgia, among the four States formerly dominated by Virginia, had remained loyal to Crawford, the remainder being distributed between Jackson, Adams and Clay. New Jersey had broken away from New York's leading, and the latter State had over-

25 Jackson to Monroe, October 23, November 12, 1816, January 6, 1817, Jackson MSS.

thrown the Regency's control. This failure of the Regency had been the prime, if not the sole, cause of Crawford's crushing defeat, and since failure is one of the deadliest sins a political machine can commit, it is not surprising that re lations between Junto and Regency for a time totally ceased.27

The most important single result of the campaign was the shattering into five factions of the old Republican party. A corollary of this, but equally important, was the tendency, faintly visible as early as 1823, of these five factions to co alesce into two groups — the one very mildly in favor of, the other wholly committed to, a nationalistic program. The leaders of the first were Crawford and Jackson, of the second, Clay, Adams and Calhoun.28

Clay's acceptance of the State Department from Adams entailed results more far-reaching than are perceptible at first glance. It cemented indissolubly the political fortunes of the two men, and was immediately responsible for the merging of their respective factions, readily possible from their entire accord as to a nationalistic policy founded on loose construction. Clay's acceptance lent color to the " cor rupt bargain " charge, laid against him by the Jacksonians, of obtaining his office in return for supporting Adams' election in the House of Representatives. This charge was at once circulated all over the country and kept resounding for the next four years. This with the other furious attacks on the new administration rendered it impossible for Clay to with draw from his position even had he desired.

The least known of the consequences of Clay's union with Adams was its effect on Calhoun. The latter, elected vice-president by virtue of the support of both Adams' and Jackson's followers, was in a position to incline his political strength toward either of them. His course seems to have been dictated purely by self-interest. As soon as he learned

27 Philip N. Nicholas to Van Buren, October 13, 1826, Van Buren MSS.

28 Cf. Benton, Thirty Years' View, vol. i, p. 22 ; Van Buren, Auto biography, p. 116; Jefferson, Writings, vol. x, p. 282.

of Adams* intention to appoint Clay Secretary of State, and therefore his probable successor, Calhoun made it known to the President that in this event he would join the opposition and assist in organizing it behind Jackson ; he even went so far as to suggest what men he preferred in the new cabinet.29 Adams ignored this threat and Calhoun within the year turned to the Jacksonians.

The simultaneous wreck of Crawford's health and presiden tial aspirations resulted in his withdrawal from national poli tics. His followers, who regarded themselves and were gener ally considered doctrinally as the true Republicans of the old school among the adherents of the late Virginia-New York alliance, remained aloof from initial attacks on Adams and Clay. Badly disorganized, they were now confronted with the problem of choosing a new political chief. Jackson's in definite constitutional views and uncertain attitude toward internal improvements caused them some hesitation in join ing him; but between his uncertainty and the nationalist tendencies of the Adams-Clay group they naturally preferred the former.

Adams' inaugural address and his first annual message to Congress, particularly the latter, gave all loose constructionists a wholly gratuitous shove Jacksonward. Its phrase as to the folly of being " palsied by the will of our constituents " 30 in the vigorous prosecution of a centralized nationalistic pro gram, was the signal for a furious outburst of denunciation from the Jackson, Crawford and Calhoun press. Following his inaugural address, which had been in tone a forecast of his first annual message, the confirmation of Clay's nomina tion had been attacked in the Senate by the Jacksonians, supported by a few Crawford and Calhoun senators.31 In

29 John Quincy Adams, Memoirs (C. F. Adams, Ed.), vol. vi, p. 507.

30 Richardson, Messages and Papers, vol. ii, pp. 311-317. The phrase quoted above occurred in his first annual message to Con gress.

31 N iles' Register, vol. xxviii, p. 17; Benton, Thirty Years' View, vol. i, p. 55.

the following April John Marshall wrote Clay from Rich mond that there were signs of a violent opposition to the ad ministration forming.32 In June Van Buren openly came out in favor of Jackson for next president.33 In short, the former Calhoun and Crawford men were gravitating rapidly toward Jackson, and this gain more than counterbalanced any losses resulting from the defection of his Federalist follow ing to Adams. Hence the President's first annual message was tantamount to driving home a nail already started. It now only remained to clinch it ; namely, to unite firmly be hind Jackson the Regency- Junto combination in New York and Virginia.