The precinct of religion in the culture of humanity

Front matter

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Preface

THE following work contains the substance of the lectures delivered in the Graduate School of New York University in the course entitled, Philosophy of Religion. As the title will suggest, the purpose of this essay is to indicate the limits of religion in human culture, although, as a reading of the succeeding pages will show, the principle of limitation is to be imderstood in a manner acceptable to a genuine conception of faith. The spirit in which the precinct of religion has been examined is not that of the older noiunenalism, still less that of the newer phenomenalism ; both metaphysics and psychology are here set aside for the sake of a hiunanism which seems best adapted to defining the essence of human worship. Thus it is not with antipathy towards certain popular tendencies that we make this departure, but rather with sympathy for living religion whose rich intellectual content seems to be most faithfully conserved when expressed through the culture of humanity.

C. G. S.

Table Of Contents

PAGES

Philosophy of religion a modem idea. i. The Age of Enlightenment. Metaphysical dualism with Descartes. Moral diremption with Hobbes. The regressus to fundamentals in thought, in life. Emancipation of religion. Its inness and universality. The error of deism corrected. 2. The Age of Culture. Moralism and pessimism in Kant. Hegel's intellectualism and positivism. Schleiermacher as epoch-maker. Schleiermacher and Spinoza . 1-16

Part I The Essenck Of Religion

Religion, Philosophy, and Science

Threefold view of the world and the soul. i. The world of nature. The cosmos of philosophy. Religion and the world of spirit. Threefold attitude toward the world. 2. The problem of life. Science and utility. Philosophy and value. Religion and blessedness. 3. Methods. Science and mathematics. Philosophy and logic. The method of religion. 4. Limits. The temporal and spatial in science. The eternal in philosophy. Religion and history ,. . . . . i7-33

2. The Limitation of Religion

Effect of secularism and sacerdotalism, i. The ramification of modem philosophic disciplines. The independence of religion. 2. Limitation of religion. Its internal and qualitative aspects. Religion limited by itself. The precinct of religion. 3. Interaction between religion and other forms of culture. Speculative and practical forms of interaction . • 33'53

X TahU of Contents

3. Religious Consciousness

PAGBS

I. The precinct of religion and religious consciousness. Historic consciousness of the race. Hindu and Hebrew. Religious consciousness of the soul. Idea of a world-whole peculiar to religion. God a religious notion. 2. Religion no simple element of the mind. The faculty of judgment. Religion both passive and active. The totality of the soul . . . 53-^9

4. Religion, the Self-Afflrmation of the Soul

What is desirable in definition ? i. The inness of religion. Its foundation in the ego. Self-doctrine in Descartes, Fichte, and Schleiermacher. 2. Attitude of soul toward world. The spontaneity of religion. Affirmation of the World-Soul. 3. Motive for self-affirmation. The humanistic principle. The place of pessimism in religion ..... 69-82

PART II \, The Religious View of the Worlu

I. Religion as Knowledge

I. Modem logic and religion. Value of Herbert's " De Veritate." Scepticism of Hume. The case of Kant. Conflict between intellectualism and moralism. 2. Religion not irrational. Place of knowledge in religion. Living ideas of religion. 3. Cognitive, conception, and communication of religion. Israel and India. Religion as faith . . . . . 83-102

2. Religion as Esthetic Intuition

The essential nature of art. i. Origin of aesthetics in Plotinus. Value of Gothicism. Theology of Romanticism. 2. Religious significance of art. Esthetic unity of spiritual life. Religious nature of the artistic deed. Their commoil idealism. 3. Positive form of art and religion. Artistic furtherance of faith. The religious element in the fine arts. The intelligible nature of intuition . ...... 103-116

B. The Religious Interpretation of Life

I. Religion and Ethics

The half- work of Kant. i. The formal distinction between religion and ethics. Range of ethics. Theoretical nature of the ethical.

TabU of Contents xi

PAGES

The positive form of reUgion. Its historical essence. Spiritual religion pessimistic. World-despair. Religion infra and supra moral. 2. Actual connection between religion and morality. Position of Jesus and Socrates. Nature of religions conduct. Specific and sacred character of righteousness. 3. Value of morality for religion. The ethical the highest means of selfafi&rmation. Moral destiny of man . . . 1 16-139

2. Religion and Rights

The practical side of religion juristic, i. Common origin of jus naturale and religio naturalis. Effect of natural rights upon deism. 2. Parallel history of rights and religion. The forensic in Christianity. 3. Substantial bond between religion and rights. The metapolitical in religion. The humanistic in jurisprudence. 4. Metaphysical realism of rights. Religicm and law the sanction of ethics. Le;r ^a/Kmts and non-resentment . . 1 39-154

PART llX.

I. The Origin of Religion

I. The argutnentum a tergo. The beginning of religion genuine. Fallacy of supematuralism. Insufficiency of rationalism. 2. Naturism and spiritism. Humanistic quality in primitive worship. The poetical element in naturism. Value of the disorderly in nature. Sundering of man from nature . 155-168

2. The Development of Religion

Modem genetic thinking, i. Opposition to development in logic and ethics. The progressive in religion, art, and law. Hegd's treatment of history. History the mere vehicle of religion ? Spiritual meaning of history. Value of historical events to Israel and India. 2. How history realizes the essence of religion. Self-affirmation of the soul cumulative. Stages in the development of idea of God ...... 168-181

3. World-Religions

Three types of universal religion, i. Chinese religion of nature. The hexagrams of the Yi-King. Eternal recurrence. Taoism as world-religicm. Naturistic nihilism. Quiescence and non-resentment. 2. Intellectualism of the Veda. " Tat tvam asi ** — " aham brama asmi." The Self without and within. Aim of vi xii TaJ)U of Contents

Vedanta. Empirical ego and the Sdf. Spirit of non-resistance. 3. Christianity a religion of spirit. The living World-Sonl. Transcendental needs. The Christian deed positive. "That art Thou " in the eternal Gospel .... 181-200

4. The Revelation of Religion

Revelation and the Christian religion, i. Revelation a communion of human and divine. Relation to universal religion. God, redempticm, and revelation. Revelation communion not communication. 2. Goal rather than source of religion in revelation. History an eternal present. Participation of man in history of humanity. Christianity as revelation. Revelaticm not abrupt. Pedagogical analogy. The order of revelation . . 200-214

Part IV The Rbugious World-order

I. The Religious Value of Theism

Idea of God humanistic, i. Interpretation of being. Theism and religion. Theology and metaphysics. Striving toward the Godhead. 2. World Ground and law of identity. Empirical scruples against " immanence." Possibility of atheism. Theism and monotheism. World of things versus world of spirits. 3. Theistic " demonstrations." Career of the ontological argument. Religious world-order the unity of religion and theism 2 1 5-23 1

2. The Affirmation of Absolute Life

Religion more than theism, i. Real significance of thought. Logic and life. 2. ^sthetical yearning for reality. Genuine culture metaphysicaL Significance of human ecstasy. Communion of beauty and truth. 3. Metaphysical moment in ethics. Meaning of conscience. Psychology of remorse. 4. Rights and eternal justice. Logic of ncm-resentment. Problem of evil. Vicarious suffering and Absolute Life . • . . . 231-247

3. The World of Humanity

Idea of humanity not primitive, i . The " Gunas " of Sankhya philosophy. Humanism in the Occident. Contrast between ancient and modem ideals. 2. The ontological in man. Phenomena, noumena, and pneumata. Place of persons in the world of humanity. Illusion of individuality. Consciousness of humanity. Problem of death. 3. The historical in humanity. History and the individual. Temporal and eternal considerations. Destiny of man . . . . . . 248-263

Table of Contents xiii

4. Unity of Finite and Infinite

PAGBS

Various phases of the problem, i. Sense and reason in philosophy. Spinoza's solution. The religious method. Dualism of conscious and unconscious in religion. The individual and the Absolute. Immortality of man. Unity of temporal and eternal. Relation of man to God. 2. Ethical unity of life. Synthesis of fate and freedom. Moral units of man and God. Man's participation in the infinite. Final unity of life . . . 26y^2yg

IN THE CULTURE OF HUMANITY

RELIGION is as old as man ; philosophy of religion is confined to modem thought. The religious consciousness may be traced as far back as human culture and civilization, but the problem of religion was not raised until the opening of the seventeenth century. The vast orient which gave the religious fact, and which, once for all, performed the religious deed, did not possess the intensity necessary for deducing the religious idea. From the East comes the content of religion, from the West its form. Among ancient Mediterranean speculations, we find that Plato, with his worthy views of the human mind, and Aristotle, with his extensive comprehension of human nature, did not isolate and discuss the religious problem as such, but remained content in the plastic and contemplative spirit pecuUar to the antique. Stoicism, the earnestness of whose thinking gave us ideas of nature, humanity, conscience, rights, and progress, as well as suitable terms for the expression of their meaning, likewise contributed the idea of religion. This service, however, was largely confined to terminology, and the result of the invention of the word was expended wholly upon the side of etymology. Philology is not philosophy, and the idea and consciousness of religion remained implicit until the natural religious discussion of modem times.

In modem philosophy, two periods have contrived to produce a philosophy of religion : first, there came the age of enlightenment which covered the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries ; then, there followed the period of culture from the French Revolution to the present. Here there was analysis which culminated in the Kantian philosophy ; there was found synthetic movement which had its beginning with German idealism. For religion the propelling force was, first, a juristic tendency which had its source in the philosophy of natural rights ; secondly, an aesthetical influence incident upon the current problem of culture. That modernity shoidd evince the religious idea should not be deemed paradoxical, nor must it be assumed that the problem of religion arose serenely as one question among several. The very bent of modernity was destined to call forth the thought of religion, and tiie progranune which the modem laid down for himself made this a necessary part.

In seeking to account for those modem conditions which have made religious thought possible, history must investigate something more than clearly marked periods and leading personaUties. The very tendency and direction of modem philosophy incline toward religion in a manner no less forceful and direct. Here may be noted the strong duaUstic movement which acted as the cause of our modem philosophic science, and that equally invincible impulse on the part of thought to return to first principles. In each case the religious principle was involved in both a general and specific manner, and the undercurrent of modem speculation seems to have been directed toward the religious precinct. The reason for this consists in the fact that religion lies in the depths of man's spiritual nature, and when thought creates vast divisions in the human understanding and returns to fundamental principles in the life of mankind, the connection between living religion and speculative philosophy is more easily made out. Breach with the world of appearance and tradition and the return to a fundamental ground are the very elements which religious speculation needs, and hereby does religion itself become a problem.

I. So invariable is the dualism which pervades our modem thought that it may be regarded as essential to our problem. Upon the psychological side, a beginning could not be made until Descartes created a fundamental distinction between mind and body. It is true that the way in which this distinction is expressed, as the contrast between two substances known as res cogitans and res extensa, can hardly satisfy our psychical and physical theories to-day, but the Cartesian dualism was necessary for presenting the psychological problem. In the same way, modem duahsm appears in Kant where it assumes the form of sense and understanding, or phenomenon and noumenon. Here again, we may dissent from the peremptory fashion in which Kant seeks to solve the problems of empiricism and rationalism, yet we cannot fail to observe how germane to the modem was the distinction between appearance and reaUty. So far as historical facts in philosophy may indicate necessary thought, it may be said that problems of mind and of thought could arise and be discussed only as the thinker separated mind from matter and thought from sensation. The vigour with which this was done caused a shock, the reverberation of which we feel even to-day.

Nor were the practical problems of life exempt from this diremptive tendency, for here as well was made distinction which set the speculator against himself and divided the modems into party-thinkers. The ethical problem, introduced by Hobbes and thoroughly presented by the thinkers who opposed or corrected his doctrines, was subject to the same influence. Here was a hedonism which based aU moral sanction upon some heteronomous principle, while there was an intuitionism appealing to the autonomy of reason. Thus the modem took sides in the conflict between natural desire and rational duty. In the field of aesthetics, there was aroused somewhat the same conflict and there appeared the same dualistic agency. Accordingly, taste was defined in terms of pleasure which appealed to the senses, or after the manner of perfection whidi partook of reason and spirit. Likewise the philosophy of rights which set up abiding contrasts between /«s and lex. When Puflendorf , from his chair of international law, endeavoured to adjust the claims of ego and society, as these had been set forth by Hobbes and Grotius, he evinced the keen nature of the problem at hand. Thus the issues of man's life which would be expected to leave him happy in the sense of his humanity, move against him and make his life a problem.

Religion itself, which naturally profited by a view which separated man from the world about him and emancipated him from his inmiediate consciousness, was to participate in exactly the same spirit of dualism. Here it became something more than an academic dispute, and assumed the form of a great religious conflict. On the one side was the newly discovered principle of reason, which was set at variance with the medieval idea of tradition, and this contrast between rcAio and traditio was destined to emancipate human nature. In perfect keeping with this strident separation of reason and culture was the conflict between freedom and authority. In this distinction between libertas and auctoritas, there was involved the principle of free-thought, as also the whole progranmie of toleration. Hereby the religious consciousness of man was liberated and philosophy of religion became a possibiUty. Tradition which had been the guide of the fathers, and authority which played the same part with the Schoolmen, were now set at naught ; no longer was it argued de religionis non est disputandam, but the essence of religion became a leading problem. Thus with mind and body, noiunenon and phenomenon, jus and lex, reUgion and revelation, the modem inaugurated the religious problem.

In inmniediate connection with this duaUstic tendency was that philosophical impulse which led the early modem thinker to retrace his principle to its source. It cannot be said that the characteristic thinker of the seventeenth century was possessed of any genetic motive or historical spirit, for no greater conflict with history than that which developed in the EnUghtenment can be noted. What the pioneer speculator was doing consisted in reducing accepted philosophical dicta to their appropriate groimds, so far as his rationaUstic methods could discover these. It was at this point that religion was destined to gain, for religion manifests itself as a principle of thought only when the superficial view of things gives way before the fundamental. Problems of physics and politics, questions concerning thought and action were taken up as soon as the Enlightenment came to consciousness. Then the way for religion was prepared, and the religious problem itself was adjusted to this vast retroactive tendency. The path of this regressus was not far removed from that of the dualistic movement, and in each case the modem assumed his characteristic attitude.

As Descartes had proposed the dualism of mind and matter, so he was practically the first modem to point out the way toward fundamentals. The scepticism and subsequent rationalism of Descartes are well known and sufficiently estimated, yet their bearing upon religion is not properly appreciated. With a sceptical spirit and a logical method, Descartes found the fundamental principle to consist in self-consciousness, cogito, ergo sum. To him this was convincing, and he was satisfied with the discovery of the soul as res cogitans ; yet his thought could not rest until it had evinced the validity of the idea of God, and Descartes, who imitates Augustine's scepticism, rehabiUtates the reaUsm of Anselm with his famous ontological argument. Upon the same speculative side, Locke deduced the fimdamental of the understanding after the manner of an empiricist. The soul viewed in its primitive form is not a res cogitans, but a tabula rasa, upon which experience traces its objective elements. Locke, who invests the mind with more content and gives it more life, still agrees with Descartes in seeking the fundamental. The extremes to which these advocates of rationalism and empiricism went only evince the vigour of their thought and fimdamental character of their common problem.

The first and fundamental thing in human life was none the less an object of investigation, and the speculative impulse which urged the thinker to discover the primary principle of thought, also acted to lead him to investigate the original impulse in hirnian life. Grotius thus set about to evince the indigenous in human life. This he foimd to consist in an original form of rights, ]us naturale, which in its independence of tradition as a source of authority as its sanction was conceived by him to hold valid of itself and non esse deum. The extreme to which Grotius went in his endeavour to lay bare the primary character of rights was imitated by Hobbes in his theory of the status naturalis. In this condition of mere nature, man has a natural right to everything and a legal right to nothing, while he acts in response to motives which are egoistic in their courses and pessimistic in their consequences. Indeed, Hobbes was so unflinching in his determination to reveal the essential impulses of man that he put them upon a materialistic basis and brought about a imion of physics and politics. In this spirit, problems of mind and problems of man were reduced to prime numbers of the natural.

Meanwhile religion had not failed to participate in the great return to nature, and when the EnUghtenment set up the sharp contrast between liberty and authority, it completed this by conceiving of human worship in the form of religio naturalis. This was the original form of modem philosophy of religion. It is no difficult task to indicate the obvious imperfections of such a crass system of religious thinking. Ignoring intuition in its zeal for inference, flouting history in its enthusiasm for reason, natural religion failed to penetrate to the psychological essence and spiritual character of human worship. Thus Deism failed in its search for the actual as well as in its alignment of the ideal ; its concept of reUgion was lacking in content, while its standard was wanting in worth. Natural reUgion could no more explain positive cults than it could satisfy speculative demands. In such a manner, re^ cogitans, tabula rasa, status naturalis and rdigio fuUuralis became by-words in the seventeenth century, and they indicate a tiiorough faith in the ideals of reason and nature to which they gladly returned.

German philosophy, which was not so premature, but was more profoimd, did not follow the regressive course which modem philosophy elsewhere had been outlining. Nevertheless, the systematic speculation which developed from Leibnitz to Schopenhauer had its method of sounding the depths of human imderstanding. To pass in review over the limits of German idealism is to see how the gifted intellect of mankind pauses in the presence of the insoluble. Leibnitz' rationalism covers the domain of speculation and includes things both human and divine, yet it finds obstruction in the idea of certain veritis de faits which could not be intellectualized. Kant's abhorrence of the thing-in-itself betrays the limits of his transcendental system. The intrepid S5^tems which followed Kant in his categorical reasoning, but refused to accept the limits which he found in phenomena, found other obstacles no less insurmountable. Fichte's self-propelled ego cannot explain the bUnd " Deed-act " of the world. Schelling's " Absolute " is a dark and unfathomable world-ground, while Hegel's magnificent phenomenology of nature, man and philosophy is not broad enough to include the contingent facts of hiunan experience (" Das Zuf alUge ' ') . Schopenhauer's idealism, which reduces the phenomenal world to illusion, no less really postulates a blind, irrational will as the basis of all reality.

In the midst of these ineradicable modem tendencies, reUgion was making a history for itself. The career of natural religion during the Enlightenment exemplifies the actual course which philosophy of religion was to follow. It was at the outset nothing but a blind affirmation of religion as something free and natural. Having discovered the general principle of rights, Deism deduced the particular idea of the right to think as a special application of the same. Then toleration was demanded as the natural consequence when the emancipated and enlightened thinker desired to express his new opinions. The limitation which legal toleration prescribed for the natural freedom of thought was further reduced to definite proportions in the form of a natural religion and a rational Christianity. These were rapidly formulated by an age which felt its own internal freedom, but which further desired to live in harmony with the principles of some established religion. That which was decided upon as the most suitable reUgion was not the orthodoxy of the Church, but the abstract Deism of the natural religion school. Deism arose as a practical movement created by a philosophy which sought to unite right and law in the form of free-thought and toleration.

The immediate result of such a movement was to isolate religion and to arouse the religious consciousness ; at the same time, the subject of religion as a matter for speculation was distinguished from the non-religious. This was made possible by the modem philosophy of natural rights. By virtue of its internal nature as something belonging to man while distinct from the state, the principle of rights served to express the inward nature of religion. It was under such forensic auspices that Spinoza, as jurist, distinguished between the legal fields of reason and religion : Yoiio regnum sapietUice et vertatiSy theologia autem obedientice et pietaiis. The principle of this distinction was found in' the idea of rights, upon the basis of which it was decided what in a practical way may be included in and excluded from the precinct of religion. For religion, the importance of Spinoza consists not merely in making a distinction, but in elaborating a definition, according to which the vital nature of religion was interpreted in terms of piety and according to another conclusion of Spinoza, mercy.

What Deism, with Spinoza, accomplished was twofold ; it pointed out the inness of religion, and marked out its imiversal character. The first principle which concerned the intrinsic quality of religion was masked under the idea-of fws nalurdUy which enabled the pioneer thinker to develop his religio naturalis ; the second principle was the work of reason, which, along with the principle of rights, made religion co-ordinate with the human souL While the crass arguments for liberty of thought did not succeed in identifying the peculiar essence of religion, they did not fail to put the latter upon the basis of independent speciilation, just as the method of rationalism was able only in part to relate religion to the world-order established by human speculation. Where Deism failed was in its lack of psychological analysis, as well as in its antipathy to historical thinking.

Assuming, as we may safely do, that history teaches philosophy in an exemplary fashion, a glance at the counter- Enlightenment will aid in clarifying the modem concept of religion. This period, while not marking out the religious precinct, sufficed to negate the false ideal of the rationalists and served to prepare the way for Kant and the modem constructive thinkers. Here may be noted the attack upon the Enlightenment inaugurated by Vico and Voltaire, Hume and Lessing. One hundred years after the appearance of Herbert's '* De Veritate," Vico produced " Scienza Nuova " as a foundation work in the philosophy of history. Vico criticizes Grotius, Hobbes, and Puflendorf among the jurists as those who indicated a false beginning for civilization, while he himself returns to the actual beginning of human culture in the naive idea of the primitive man. From such a genuine beginning, which saw the poetical rather than the political in original man, he proceeds to outline the development of mankind according to the threefold plan of naturistic, heroic, human. To the plan of Vico's new science Voltaire adds no sublo The Precinct of Religion

stantial principle, yet his " Essai sur les mcBurs des nations " reflects a historical spirit counter to Deism and directed towards the scientific ideals of the present.

Hume and Lessing nullify the programme of natural religion, when one points out that, not reason, but " custom is the great guide of hiunan life," and the other regards revelation as " the education of the human race." Hume's scepticism which ends in his reposing his faith in habit and custom, fits him for the work of religious thinking which is ever marked by the positive. In a restricted sense, Hume may be regarded as the finisher of Deism and the f oimder of the modem science of reUgion. Lessing's service was not so vast, but more intimate. To an age given up to static views of the world, he announces that it is only after a long process that man is able to produce from within and receive from without such vast ideas as those of the unity of God and the immortality of the soul. Lessing adds to the Spinozistic ideas of unity and rationality, Leibnitzian principles of individuality and development. Thus he concludes that the knowledge of God as one and of the soul as immortal was gradual in its development and marked by successive steps toward the dinouetnent in the Eternal Gospel of the future. As Hiune's work is marred by naturalism, so Lessing's is of oblique influence, because it never advances beyond the intellectualistic ideal that religion is knowledge of God and inmiortality. Yet the ideas of custom and education serve to prepare the way for the second period, which consists of culture. Under the auspices of this age, the fate of reUgion was destined to be more happy.

2. The succeeding age profited by the errors of Deism. Just as the French Revolution changed the course of civilization, so it created the problem of culture as the writings of Rousseau and Fichte clearly show. In this age of culture, reUgion receives a more satisfactory treatment than that which the age of Enlightenment had been able to afford, and it is also the idea of culture, rather than that of rights, which is calculated to express the nature and function of religion. The thinkers who formulated the theory of religion were Kant, Schleiermacher, and Hegel. Kant bases his idea of reUgion upon the ethical, and defines it by saying, " it is recognition of duty as a divine command." Hegel resorts to a method equally logical, and regards religion as the " finite spirit's consciousness of itself as infinite." Schleiermacher mediates between the two, when he makes use of the aesthetical analogy. For him, religion consists of intuition and feeling, a feeling of absolute dependence. It was the artistic spirit of Schleiermacher which enabled him to advance beyond Kant and Hegel, and to put religion upon a satisfactory basis.

Not only in the romantic " Discourses " of Schleiermacher, but in the ethical views of Kant and the logical constructions of Hegel does the aesthetical appear. Kant's point of view in the " Critique of Pure Reason " finds its most significant feature in the part fitly styled " transcendental aesthetic," and while this foundation of the critical philosophy does not include a doctrine of the beautiful, it is not wanting in that metaphysical view of time and space, as intuitions, which in the " Critique of Judgment," reappears in the form of that which is universal without the concept. Thus, in order to comprehend the logical intuitions of Kant's greater work, one can do no better than to absolve the argmnent for aesthetical intuition which the " Critique of Judgment " puts forth. With Kant, the aesthetical plays also a teleological part in the interpretation of the actual world, and the critic who turns away from abstract ontology finds some value in the argument from design. In the case of the HegeUan dialectic, the aesthetical terms a stage in the self -development of the absolute in the form of image, representation, and concept or art, religion, and philosophy.