The policy of the United States as regards intervention

Front matter

H"

SOUTHERN BRANCH

LOS ANGELES. CAUF,

Preface

Chief-Justice Marshall, in a famous decisian, significantly declared : " No principle is more universally acknowledged than the perfect equality of nations. Russia and Geneva have equal rights." International law has no more fundamental principle, and this view is sustained by such authorities as Grotius and Vattel.

The moitive which inspired the Declaration of Independence was the desire for freedom from foreign political and commercial control, and for individual freedom. It was declared that life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness were the " inalienable rights " oif individual men. As these rights were to be guaranteed to men as individuals, so could they be claimed for states as independent units in the society of nations.

The principles which gave to our early statesmen the inspiration of domestic policy soon found expression in our foreign relations. The most fundamental one was that of " non-intervention." As our foremost principle of foreign policy, it bears a close relation to the rights of the individual as a basis for relations within the state, and to the principle of the equality of nations as the foundation of sound international intercourse. In effect, the principle of non-intervention prevented interference in the internal affairs of other nations, and reserved to each state the right to choose its own fonii of government and to control its political destiny. Moreover, it required abstention from the political arrangements of other governments, and more especially of Europe.

293] 7

8 PREFACE [294

It has been my purpose to set forth the history and developmait of this, the cardinal principle of our foreign policy, which is so typical of our political ideals and institutions. This eanibraces not only a discussion of its origin and adoption by our statesmen as a definite principle of foreign policy, but also the extension of that principle so as to apply to the independent states of America in a special sense. This phase of the policy of non-intervention, commonly called the " Monroe Doctrine," was designed to preserve the Western hemisphere from the territorial and political control of foreign powers.

Moreover, it has been my purpose to discuss and explain departures froto the principle of non-intervention by the United States. The capital instances of departure were in Cuba and in Panama. Our inten^entions in these cases sustained a direct relation to the establishment of Cuba and Panama as independent states. They also led to arrangements under which the United States guarantees their independence. These interventions rest upon the ground that the principle of non-intervention is subject to exceptions, and that each case must rest upon its own merits.

I have, therefore, linnited my discussions of departures from the principle of non-mtervention to the cases of Cuba and Panama, and shall reserve for the future publication a discussion of special situations which have come to prevail in Santo Domingo, Nicaragua and Haiti, and which invoh'e a degree of supervision w^hich non-American powers would be forbidden to exercise in these countries. Unlike the interventions in Cuba and Panama, our interventions in these states have not contributed to the establishment of their independence. These steps have been taken, first, to arrange for the settlement of claims of citizens of foreign states, thus preventing intervention for this purpose by other powers; and, secondly, to restore and preserv^e order and political stability.

205] PREFACE 9

Such measures of control have been exercised in Santo Domingo since 1905, when a rnodiis vivendi was concluded by President Roosevelt which provided for the collection of Dominican customs by an American citizen designated by the President of the United States, and for the payment of the government's obligations. This supervision was continued under the treaty concluded with Santo Domingo in 1907. In 1 91 3, commissioners were sent to supervise the Dominican elections in the capacity of " friendly observers." In June, 191 6, American forces were landed to restore order under the supervision of the United States.

Events leading to intervention in Nicaragua occurred in 1909, when the American government refused to recognize further the Zelaya government. In 191 2, marines were landed to restore order, and in 1914, a treaty was signed with Nicaragua, giving the United States exclusive right to build a canal along the Nicaragua route, together with leases of sites for naval stations and a naval base. For these concessions, the United States agreed to pay $3,000,000.

This tendency of departure has been manifested in Haiti. Certain European governments demanded a settlement of claims. Revolutionary disturbances followed, and in 19151 American forces were landed. In 1916, a treaty was approved by the Senate, under which the United States agreed to supervise the collection and administration of customs and the training of a native constabulary. Haiti agreed to enter into no engagements which would impair her independence.

These sj>ecial situations, whether conventional or de facta in character, are manifestations of a tendency the permanency of which remains to be tested. It is my purpose hereafter to treat the more recent interventions, some of which are now pending. While it is a matter of prediction as to the direction which these departures will take, it is un-

10 PREFACE [296

likely that the development will ig-nore altogether the purposes and limits of the principle which has so distinguished the foreign policy of the United States.

I am indebted to Professor Edward Elliott of the University of California, who first directed my interests into the field O'f international law; and to Professor John Bassett Moore of Columbia University, for guidance and counsel in all phases of my work.

Charles E. Martin

Berkeley, California, August, 1920.

CHAPTER I The Origin and Adoption of the American Policy of Non- Intervention

Page

Introduction 19

Ancient and European backgrounds as a means for understanding American policies. ... . 19

"State interest," allianceij_and the balance of power in the

Greek city-states and in Rome 19

Medieval influences 20

The rise of the nations 21

Intervention in Modern Europe . - 22

The doctrine of non-intervention 2ym —

Intervention during the Revolutionary period 23

Status of European diplomacy at the outset of the war for

American Independence 23

International questions resulting from the Revolution .... 24

Revolutionary diplomacy 24

The desire for diplomatic relations with neutral states . • 24

Wharton's division of " schools " of diplomacy, .... 25

The resolution of Congress 26

Diplomatic agencies during the Revolution 26

Objectives of American diplomacy 26

The question of recognition 27

The attitude of neutral European countries 27

Relations with France 28

French sympathy, aifa interest in the Revolution 28

The mission of Franklin, Deane and Lee 29

Instructions of the secret committee to the mission. . 29 297] II

12 CONTENTS [298

PAGE

Agreement of the commissioners not to conclude a

separate peace 36

The change in Revolutionary fortunes 31

The audience with Vergennes 31

Note of Louis XVI to Charles III 32

The French treaties of 1778 32

Treaty of amity and commerce 32

Treaty of alliance 33

Ratification . . . 35

Intervention during the post-Revolutionary period 35

The adoption of the Constitution and the outbreak of the

French Revolution; the election of Washington 36

Washington's attitude toward the French Revolution 37

The outbreak of war in 1793 37

The appointment of Genet as Minister to the United States. . 38 Questions submitted by Washington to his Cabinet as to the reception of Genet, and the renunciation or suspension of the

French treaties 39

The Cabinet meeting of April 19, 1793 40

The Jefferson-Hamilton controversy 41

The views of Jefferson 41——

The views of Hamilton 42_>-

The arrival of Genet as French minister 46

His commissioning of privateers, 46

Jefferson's views of neutral rights and duties 47

Genet's recall; his defense 48

Neutrality as related to non-intervention 49

Neutrality proclamation of April 22, 1793 SQ-^rr

The Napoleonic wars .... 51

The protection of neutral rights 51

French decrees and complaints • 52

The mission of C. C. Pinckney 55

The course of President John Adams; the mission of Marshall,

Pinckney and Dana 56

The X, Y, Z affair 56

Measures approaching war 57

Mission of Ellsworth, Davie and Murray 57

Non-intervention as a principle of American political philosophy. . SQ-mr

Difference in geographical conditions 59 ^»^

Difference in government 60^

The views of Locke; the right of revolution and the natural

rights of man 61 ~

The views of Congress 62

299] * CONTENTS 13

PAGB

The attitude of John Adams. 63,

The Farewell Address of President Washington 65

Summary: non-intervention during the Revolutionary and post- Revolutionary periods 66

CHAPTER II The Extension of the Policy of Non-intervention

Limitations of the early declarations of policy 69

The question of the attitude of the United States toward the relations of European powers with other American states 69

Steps taken by the United States leading to security in territory

and navigation 69

The revolutions in Spanish America 71

Recognition by the United States; Mr. Adams' recognition theory, 73 The policy of the United States with respect to European intervention in independent American states . 73

European backgrounds of the American policy yy

The Holy Alliance jy

The alliance of November 20, 1815 78

The Conference of Troppau 80

The Conference of Laibach 81

The Congress of Verona 81

The application of the principle of intervention as recognized by the Holy Alliance to the Americas; concern of

the United States 82

Mr. Canning's proposals to Mr. Rush 85

The views of President Monroe 85

The views of Jefiferson and Madison 86

Discussion with Russia over colonization and the question

of recognition 86

The definite extension of the policy of non-intervention to the

independent states of America 87

Cabinet deliberations 87

The question of a joint declaration 87

The question of an answer to Russia. . . . gi

The compromise of the Cabinet as to the form and

character of the message . . 93

The Monroe message of December 2, 1823 94 •■

The principle of non-intervention 94

The non-colonization principle . 96

The Panama Congress 97

14 CONTENTS [300

Factors leading to the extension of the principle of non-intervention to the independent states of America g8 "^

The United States as the champion of the principle of non-intervention; cases involving the application of the principle 99-- Attitude of the United States toward the continued non-recognition by Spain of the revolted Spanish colonies gg

Cases arising in relation to Mexico 100

Representations made by Minister Poinsett ..... 100

Proposed European interventions, 1858-1860 102

President Buchanan's proposal of American intervention. 105

French intervention in Mexico, 1861-1867 107

Cases arising in relation to Venezuela 109

Question of American interposition 109

Proposed joint intervention, 1871 no

The Venezuela boundary dispute. in

English, German and Italian reprisals against Venezuela,

1902-1903 115

Cases arising in relation to Brazil 118

Question of American alliance and intervention 118

The Brazilian naval revolt, 1893-1894 119

Cases arising in relation to the Argentine republic ... 123

Question of American intervention 123

The Falkland Islands afifair 124

Question of American interposition 126

Cases arising in relation to Chile 127

The Egan asylum case 127

The Chile-Peruvian war 129

Significance of the cases involving the application of the principle of non-intervention in its establishment as a definite

policy 135/

CHAPTER III Early Cuban relations 139

Views of early statesmen 139

Opposition to European aims and proposals 140

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D

PACK

Steps proposed to safeguard American interests 142

Policy of President Grant and Secretary of State Fish .... 144 Colombian proposal of general interposition by the states of

America ... 145

Instruction No. 266; justification of the right to intervene, and

the duty of the United States to act 146

Its communication to the European powers; their replies . . • 147

The insurrection of 1895, and steps leading to intervention .... 149

Intervention . . . . 154

The McKinley message of April 11, 1898; grounds of intervention 154

The resolution of intervention 156

The outbreak of hostilities 158

CHAPTER IV Intervention in the Revolution at Panama, 1903

The treaty of 1846 between the United States and New Granada. . 162

Guarantee of neutrality and sovereignty 163

Guarantee of free and open transit 165

The recognition of Panama 167

The Hay-Bunau-Varilla treaty 167

The Reyes- Hay controversy 168

President Roosevelt's special message to Congress, January 4, 1904. 170

PART I

THE FORMATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE POLICY OF NON-INTERVENTION

CHAPTER I The Origin and Adoption of the American Policy of Non-intervention

The aittempt to find in Ancient and European systems the sources and inspiration of American foreign policy is doomed to failure. Not only is identity lacking, but fancied analogies tend only to mislead. European and American policies differ, both historically and theoretically. At the outset, it is Avell to indicate the scope of the subject and to insist upon the fact that European practice cannot be made to approach American practice, and vice versa. Nevertheless, knowledge of a system entirely different from our own aids materially in gaining an adequate understanding of the American system, by comparison and contrast, if not by identity and analogy. Moreover, American international practice during and after the American Revolution has had at leasit an indirect relation to European practice. A brief review of the factors entering into the formulation of American policy will contribute to a more comprehensive treatment of the subject.

The theories of state-interest and the right of self-preservation, from which is deduced the principle of intervention, are by no means peculiar to Modern Europe. The Greek and Roman legal and political theorists eloquently championed these ideas. The feeling of the time is best expressed by Aristotle who contended t^at the state is a self-sufficient body, and that the desires of the individual should be subordinated to the interests of the state. The 305] 19 true interests of the individual, indeed, were identical with ithe interests of the slate, because the state could desire only the best for its citizens. With the conception of the primacy of the state well established, it was not difficult to extend the poHcy of seeking the interests of the state to its international relations, and to cause the will of the state to prevail over exterior, as well as interior, forces. Certain conceptions of the Roman law have been incorporated into international law ; and certain others, while not so incorporated, have influenced the conduct of nations profoundly. The conception of state-interest, which treats the maintenance of the position and prosperity of the state as superior to all other considerations, was expressed in alliances, designed to preserve the peace of the Mediterranean, or to check the inordinate power of ambitious states. The adoption of the principle of the balance of power, also, led to the formation of alliances for its preservation. When the balance of power was destroyed, crippled, or perhaps threatened, it was the duty of the alliance to act. This action, based on the doctrine of necessity, inevitably resulted in intervention in the affairs of another state or group of states. We have, then, the Greek and Roman system ante-dating the Modem European system, and differing little from it. The idea of state-interest extended to a group of states, by means of alliances designed to preserve the balance of power, furnishes the key, generally, to the history of the principle of interv^ention. Intervention to preserve rights of succession, and inten^ention by one state alone, constitute exceptions to the rule. The practice of intervention continued in the Ancient world until the principle of the balance of power yielded to the expansion of the Roman Empire.

Roman Imperialism, while superseding the principle of the balance of power, ser\'-ed to make possible at a later

207] ORIGIN AND ADOPTION OF THE POLICY 2L

time the comity of nations by acquainting the colonies comprised in the imperial domain, subsequently to become states, with the aims and civilization of the Roman world. A family of nations, governed in their exterior relations by a body of rules called international law, could not be established, based merely on the practice of the Mediterranean area. Christianity was a leavening force, placing emphasis on interests other than those merely national in character, and especially on the belief in a universal brotherhood. The Crusades did much to bring the Western nations together. Thus, a " community of interests " among the nations was getting a firm hold. The Reformation, causing alliances to be formed ostensibly on grounds of faith as opposed to grounds of race, but actually on grounds of conquest and expansion, played an important part. But it remained for the discovery of the New World to quicken the European nations with an appreciation of their international responsibilities and opportunities. The desire for colonies and for the conquest of inferior peoples, while bringing the .nations into conflict, had a distinctly sobering influence on them; for extended colonial expansion has for its counterpart increased complexity in foreign relations.

Following the bringing of the states into closer relations, ■certain influences operated to reestablish and preserve the balance of power and alliances. The most potent of these influences was the rise of the nations. The break-up of the Roman empire and of the empire of Charlemagne, and the subsequent rise of France and England as nations, settled the fact that European political development should be national in character. The interests of the Papacy were best served, not by European political unity, but by national political unity. The Holy Roman Empire by its failure only ha.stened the development of the nations. Nicolo Machiavelli. writing in the fifteenth century, advocated the doctrines or *' reasons of state " and political expediency. This was the first concrete expression of the later theory of the balance of power. The Italian states made use of the principle when Naples, the Pope, Tuscany, Venice and Milan attempted to maintain a balance of power between them. The growth of commerce and the dominance of Spain in the sixteenth century further demonstrated the necessity of some sort of equilibrum among the states of Europe. Strong absolutism in France, and the Bourbon and Hapsburg dynastic rivalry were disturbing elements. It remained for the Thirty Years ' War and the Peace of Westphalia definitely to establish the balance of power and the status quo in Europe.

The Peace of Westphalia did not remove from European politics the danger of an ambitious state. The power of Spain had declined and was no longer to be feared. Louis XIV, desiring to humiliate the Hapsburgs and to give to France the leadership of the Roman states, greatly disturbed the peace of Europe. His doctrine of natural boundaries and frontiers could only lead to intervention. The treaty of Aix-Ia-Chapelle in 1668 served further to establish the balance of power. Intervention for rights of succession is well illustrated in the eighteenth century^. The War of the Spanish Succession, in which France was opposed by the intervention of the Grand Alliance, was settled by the Peace of Utrecht in 1713. By this peace France was reduced to her original position as an ordinary European power. The war of the Austrian Succession, while giving the Hohenzolierns a victory over the Hapsburgs, did not settle the points at issue, and the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle proved to be only a truce. The Seven Years' War, however, had definite results. English dominance in 'North America was established, and France and Sj>ain were humilated. The treaty of Paris in 1763 settled the controversy between. England,

France, Spain and Portugal. The treaty of Hubertsburg brought the war to an end between Austria, Prussia and Saxony. The treaties did little to encourage a " lasting peace." The principle of partition was applied to Poland by the partitions of 1772, 1793, and 1795. Intervention, then, was a definite principle in the European political system.

Opposed to the theory of intervention was the doctrine of non-intervention. It did not, however, gain much approval, except among the smaller states. It is obvious how difficult it was for such a principle to fiouriih in Europe. Na sovereign state would agree not to intervene in the internal affairs of another state, when such abstinence might seem directly to involve its own existence; and non-intervention might have meant the ruin even of a large European state, so long as the system of alliances continued. The adoption of non-intervention as a deliberate and consistent policy was reserved to the United States; the wisdom of which became ver)' real after an instructive exi:)erience with a European alliance and a narrow escape from being drawn into the European conflict during the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars.

The status of Euroi)ean diplomacy at the outbreak of the war for American Independence was practically the same as at the close of the Seven Years' War. England had svio ceeded in establishing a position of maritime and colonial supremacy against the opposition of France and Spain. The American colonists had fought valiantly on the side of England. But England did not make proper use of her victory. The colonists wanted individual, governmental and commercial freedom, together with the destruction of the then universal system of commercial monopoly. They finally became convinced that revolt was the only way to secure their natural rights, and they were willing to take this step, together with an assumption of its responsibilities.

24 THE UNITED ST/fTES /IND INTERVENTION [310

The European powers were little in sympathy with England, but were not prepared to give the colonists any active and open support. The important thing to notice is that Europe was still governed by the principles of the balance of power, alliances and intervention; while the Americans, conscious of the evils of the European system, were to follow a new course, in which the principles controlling Europe were to have only a negative influence.

It is not strange that the question of intervention or non-intervention as a national policy should have arisen during the Revolutionary period. The Revolution, if successful, meant the creation of a new state with all the usual consequences, including the establishment of foreign relations. Questions of treaties, exchange of diplomatic representatives, alliances and intervention would naturally arise; and ihere would be a serious responsibility to assume in committing the government to a definite policy, the subsequent abandonment of which, whether forced or voluntary, might result in humiliation. The history of American foreign policy at this time is limited to the definition of our relations with the states of Europe. The extension of that policy, comprehending the other independent states of America and the relation of the United States and of the states of Europe to them, was reserved for a subsequent and different occasion.

"^""The new government, soon after entering upon the war with England, sought admission to the family of nations by attempting to enter into diplomatic relations with the neutral states. In this it encountered serious obstacles. Independent states at war find diplomacy difficult; but a revolutionary government is more seriously embarrassed. At the outset American statesmen for the most part not only lacked experience in international relations, but, what is even more important, they lacked the means and opportunity to conduct such relations effectively.

According to Wharton, there were two schools of thought in Congress — -those who favored and those who opposed the exercise of a highly centralized executive authority. The conflict between these schools continued until the adoption of the Constitution, and persisted subsequently in dealing with questions of construction and interpretation. Both schools attempted to extend their ideas of internal administration to diplomacy. The first, represented by Saniuel Adams, John Adams and Richard Henry Lee. did m,uch to spread propaganda against Great Britain, but did not equal the other school in constructive statesmanship during the progress of the Revolution and afterward.^ Such influence in Congress prevented efficiency, not only in diplomacy but in war and finance as well. Dr. Franklin was the ablest and shrewdest diplomatist of the Revolutionary era, as will be shown in considering the negotiation of the French treaties. Morris, Livingston and Jay were constructive diplomatists, whife the work of Jefferson and Hamilton at home was doubtless equal to the work of Franklin in France. It is an easy matter to magnify the importance of Wharton's distinction, and to attempt to explain tendencie.N by it for which it can in no degree be held responsible.

The success which our Revolutionary diplomatists eventually achieved must be credited to their own ability rather than to any guidance or aid from Congress. The organization of the department of foreign affairs was a:iything but satisfactory. In both the determination and the administration of foreign policies, experience seemed to be the only teacher of Congress. The first diplomatic organ during the Revolution was established by resolution of Congress:

^ Wharton, Diplomatic Correspondcvce of the American Re-volution, rol. j, p. 2S3-

November 29, 1775.

Resolved, That a committee of five be appointed for the sole purpose of corresponding with our friends in Great Britain, Ireland and other parts of the world, and that they lay their correspondence before Congress when directed.

Resolved, That this Congress will make provision to defray all such expenses as may arise by carrying on such a correspondence, and for the payment of such agents as they may send on this service.^

The members chosen for this work were Mr. Harrison, Dr. Franklin, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Dickinson and Mr Jay. The selection of Dr. Franklin and Mr. Jay was not sanctioned by John Adams, Samuel Adams and Arthur Lee.* This resolution is doubly important because it was the first step taken to organize a department of foreign affairs and. the first effort to get in touch with European countries. The committee of foreign affairs was established in April, 1777, taking over the work of the committee of secret correspondence.^ The constant changing of the personnel of the committee and the lack of a permanent executive officer imperiled the work of the committee from the start. The President of Congress directed the diplomatic correspondence when no committee existed for the purpose. On August ID. 1 78 1, Robert R. Livingston was appointed Secretary of Foreign Affairs. Congress, however, entrusted him with little discretionary authority.

The conflict in Congress over the question of administration led to the practice of what Wharton calls " militia " diplomacy. The Congress paid little regard to the rules of diplomacy, w^hile some, like John Adams, chafed under them. Determined to establish diplomatic relations with,

1 Wharton, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 61. *Ibid., vol. i, p. 554- 'Ibid., vol. i, p. 456.

'European g-overnments, Congress insisted upon sending ministers to all foreign courts without inquiring as to whether they would be received. The chief object of these missions was to borrow money. Dr. Franklin regarded them as indiscreet. In a letter to Arthur Lee, March 21, 1777, he very clearly stated his judgment of the ultra-enthusiasm of Congress in hastening foreign intercourse: " I have never yet changed the opinion I gave in Congress, that a virgin state should preserve the virgin character, and not go about suitoring for alliances, but wait with decent dignity the applications of others. I was overruled; perhaps for the best." '

The quest of recognition at some of the European court-;, resulted unfortunately for the revolted colonies. Contrary to Franklin's advice, Congress commissioned Arthur I>ee to Madrid and to Berlin, William Lee to Vienna, Dana to St. Petersburg, Adams to The Hague, and Izard to Florence; all with instructions to secure both recognition and subsidy. None of these representatives was officially received. The prestige of the United States was wounded, both by the practice of sending unwelcome representa.tives, and by the manner of the appeals. Congress did not seem to take into account the likelihood that the recognition of the United States by neutral powers would be considered by Great Britain as an act of inter\^eiition.

Spain did not care to risk the consequences of recognizing the independence of the United States. Frederick the Great of Prussia was by no means opposed to the American revolt, but commercial and neutral interests prevented him from accordinsc recosfnition. Russia was at this time championing neutral rights, and hence cotild not afford to abandon her neutral position. The Netherlands had no inr clination to become involved in the American war, until

' Franklm. Works. voL vi, p 83.

complications with England made it imperative. The French alliance was the only one secured during the Revolution. While it proved of value in winning the war for independence, it was at the same time an alliance which some of our ablest statesmen later sought to avoid, and which, without proper leadership, would have led to disastrous consequences.

The American-French relations during the Revolution directly involved the question of American interference in European affairs. Encouraged by representations from the French court, Franklin favored seeking an alliance with France, but with no other power. The reasons for French sympathy with the Revolution were older than the Revolution itself. They dated back to the treaty of Paris of 1763. The Seven Years' War brought nothing but humiliation io France. That country- had lost its position in the New World. With her navy destroyed, her army defeated, and her coniTiierce badly crippled, France attempted to repair her fortunes and to restore her former prestige. If an alliance with the revolted American colonies would produce this result, she would not hesitate to enter into negotiations. Louis XV favored the encouragement of discontent in the British colonies. The accession of Louis XVI to the throne was followed by the appointment of Vergennes as foreign minister. Vergennes was not sentimentally interested in the Revolution. He watched the American situation carefully with the idea of French intervention in mind. Bonvouloir was sent to America on a secret mission to secure information and tO' indicate to the American leaders that they might secure aid from France, should war follow. Bonvouloir was received by the secret committee, but refused to commit France to any definite policy of alliance or intervention. He stated that France " wished them well " and might possibly participate in the

^I^J ORIGIN AND ADOPTION OF THE POLICY 29

war/ His impressions were conveyed to Vergennes, who at once gave himself to a serious study as to how far France should actively aid the Colonies.